Opinion
No. 334301
03-14-2017
In re QUINTANA, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED St. Clair Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 15-000290-NA Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and METER and FORT HOOD, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the order terminating her parental rights to the minor children, NLQ and DJQ. The trial court terminated respondent's parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist), MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) (conditions other than those leading to the adjudication continue to exist), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood, based on conduct or capacity of parent, that child will be harmed if returned home). We affirm.
Respondent first argues that the trial court erred when it found clear and convincing evidence to terminate her parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). We disagree.
"This Court reviews for clear error a trial court's factual findings and ultimate determinations on the statutory grounds for termination." In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 709; 846 NW2d 61 (2014) (footnote and citations omitted). "A finding is clearly erroneous if 'the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.' " In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App 426, 430-431; 871 NW2d 868 (2015), quoting In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).
Petitioner has the "burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of a ground for termination." In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 431 (citation omitted). "To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground under MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established." In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013) (citation omitted). A trial court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712.19b(3)(c)(i) if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that "182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order," the "conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist," and that "there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified with a reasonable time considering the child's age."
The trial court entered its initial dispositional order on September 18, 2015, and entered its order terminating respondent's parental rights on July 28, 2016. Therefore, more than 182 days had elapsed since the trial court entered its initial dispositional order. Additionally, the evidence presented at the termination hearing supported the trial court's finding that the conditions leading to adjudication continued to exist, and that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be rectified within a reasonable time. The trial court entered an order on August 13, 2015, removing the minor children from respondent's home after DJQ tested positive for cocaine, morphine, and codeine at birth. On September 18, 2015, after respondent admitted to the allegations contained in the petition of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the trial court took jurisdiction over the minor children, ordered respondent to comply with a number of conditions, and returned the minor children to respondent's care because respondent had three negative drug screenings following the minor children's removal. However, the trial court entered an order on October 6, 2015, that placed the minor children back in care after respondent tested positive for cocaine.
Respondent's substance abuse issues continued to exist at the time of termination. Respondent relapsed into substance abuse three times after the trial court took jurisdiction over the minor children. Further, respondent did not seem fully cognizant of the extent of her substance abuse issues. After Samantha Mullens, an employee of DHHS, discovered a needle and a pipe in respondent's home on February 29, 2016, Mullens had to ask respondent to throw those items away after respondent began to put the items away. Respondent was eventually admitted to an inpatient treatment program after relapsing again in April 2016. However, respondent failed to complete the treatment program, and she did not contact Jessica Miller, the minor children's Foster Care Case Manager, regarding her discharge from the program. The record also confirms respondent's prior lack of participation in substance abuse treatment before this case was initiated. Additionally, respondent's substance abuse issues had resulted in her voluntarily releasing her parental rights to four other children. Considering respondent's extensive history of substance abuse, and her failure to benefit from treatment, the trial court did not clearly err when it found there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent would overcome her substance abuse issues within a reasonable time.
Respondent also failed to comply with the trial court's orders that addressed the conditions that led to adjudication. As described above, respondent had repeatedly failed to remain drug free. At the time of the termination hearing, respondent had failed to provide certification that she had obtained a legal source of income, and she failed to provide verification that she had been attending Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous meetings. During the lower court proceedings respondent failed to report to 43 scheduled drug screenings. Respondent was also inconsistent with visitation, missing multiple visits with her children after Miller began working on respondent's case. While we acknowledge that respondent made additional efforts to comply with the trial court's orders immediately prior to termination by reenrolling in substance abuse counseling and enrolling in parenting skills classes, the trial court correctly concluded that such action did not establish a reasonable likelihood that respondent would be able to rectify the conditions leading to adjudication. We make this observation particularly in light of respondent's history of not complying with and benefitting from services, as well as failing to comply with drug screens. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that statutory grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) had been established.
Respondent contends that the trial court clearly erred because relapse is typical in recovery from substance abuse, and therefore, a trial court cannot expect perfection from a recovering substance abuser. Despite respondent's contention that the trial court and petitioner expected perfection, respondent had numerous opportunities to demonstrate improvement. First, the trial court returned the minor children to respondent's care in September 2015 because respondent had three negative drug screenings following the minor children's removal in August 2015. However, by October 2015 the trial court removed the minor children from respondent's care after respondent's drug screen was positive for cocaine. Moreover, petitioner did not immediately move to terminate respondent's parental rights after February 29, 2016, when Mullens discovered a needle and pipe amidst a deplorable mess in respondent's home. Petitioner also did not immediately move to terminate respondent's parental rights after respondent's relapse in April 2016. Instead, Miller herself drove respondent to an inpatient treatment facility. Thus, respondent was not held to a standard of perfection by the trial court. Instead, the trial court properly noted respondent's repeated failures to demonstrate sustained improvement with her substance abuse issues.
Regarding respondent's other claims of error with regard to the additional statutory grounds for termination of parental rights, we note that a trial court must only find one statutory ground by clear and convincing evidence to terminate a respondent's parental rights. See In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 24; 761 NW2d 253 (2008) (noting that after one statutory ground for termination had been established by clear and convincing evidence that this Court need not address additional grounds for termination). Accordingly, we decline respondent's invitation to address the trial court's findings on the additional statutory grounds. --------
Respondent also argues that the trial court clearly erred when it determined that termination was in the best interests of the minor children. We disagree.
This Court reviews for clear error a trial court's "determination regarding the children's best interests." In re White, 303 Mich App at 713 (citation and footnote omitted). "A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In re Gonzales/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 430-431 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
"Even if the trial court finds that [petitioner] has established a ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence, it cannot terminate the parent's parental rights unless it also finds by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the children." Id. at 434 (citation omitted). "[T]he child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home, are all factors for the court to consider when deciding whether termination is in the best interests of the child." Id. (Citation and quotation marks omitted.) "With respect to the trial court's best-interest determination, we place our focus on the child rather than the parent." In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 411; ___ NW2d ___ (2016).
The trial court noted that respondent had previously released her parental rights to four other children because of her substance abuse issues, and that the minor children were removed from respondent's care because of substance abuse. Additionally, the trial court observed that respondent was still struggling with her substance abuse issues despite multiple attempts at inpatient treatment, and that the needs of the minor children for stability outweighed their bond with respondent. The trial court's findings were supported by the evidence presented at the termination hearing.
While respondent's mother, Alice Blossom, testified that respondent had made significant improvements recently, a review of the record confirms that respondent had failed to overcome her substance abuse issues. Respondent was pregnant during the termination hearing, and she testified that her unborn child would "[m]aybe, possibly" test positive for narcotics at birth. Additionally, the trial court considered the advantages of a foster home over respondent's home. Miller testified that the minor children were residing together in foster care, and that they were thriving. NLQ rarely spoke when he first came into care, but at the time of the termination hearing NLQ was speaking in clear sentences. Miller further testified, "[d]evelopmentally [the minor children] are getting to be on track." Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err when it determined that it would be in the best interests of the minor children to terminate respondent's parental rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood