Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County, Super. Ct. No. J066063, of Ventura, Tari L. Cody, Judge
Catherine C. Czar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Noel A. Klebaum, County Counsel, and Alison L. Harris, Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
GILBERT, P.J.
Crystal R. appeals an order of the juvenile court declaring that her daughter P. is adoptable and terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) We reverse and remand for the limited determination whether the Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA") applies. (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless stated otherwise.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 28, 2005, the Ventura County Human Services Agency (HSA) filed a petition on behalf of newborn P.R. (§ 300, subd. (b), (g).) HSA alleged that Crystal abused alcohol throughout her pregnancy and that P.'s father, Daniel R., was incarcerated. Daniel also had a history of criminal offenses involving violence and drugs.
Daniel R. is not a party to this appeal.
On December 29, 2005, the juvenile court ordered P. detained. HSA placed her in a foster home with the D. family. The juvenile court later sustained allegations of the dependency petition, continued P. in foster care, and ordered HSA to provide family reunification services to Crystal.
At the detention hearing, Crystal and Daniel completed Judicial Council Forms JV-130 ("Parental Notification of Indian Status.") Daniel indicated that he has or may have Chumash heritage and Crystal indicated that she has or may have Shoshone heritage. Daniel later filed a second Indian status form indicating that he also has or may have Apache heritage.
Crystal did not participate in her family reunification services plan. Subsequently, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a permanent plan hearing pursuant to section 366.26.
At the section 366.26 permanent plan hearing, the juvenile court received evidence of HSA reports, including information regarding the D. family as adoptive parents. Neither Crystal nor Daniel was present. The juvenile court concluded by clear and convincing evidence that P. is likely to be adopted and it terminated the parental rights of Crystal and Daniel. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) The juvenile court also found that the ICWA does not apply and that P. is not an Indian child.
Following the juvenile court's order, Crystal appeared in court and sought to introduce additional evidence of Indian heritage regarding grandparent tribal identification numbers. The court declined to reopen the matter, stating that it "already made findings concerning ICWA and . . . the .26 hearing."
Crystal appeals and contends that the juvenile court did not ensure compliance with the ICWA.
DISCUSSION
Crystal asserts that HSA did not provide adequate information to the Indian tribes because the notices contained conflicting information and omitted names and information regarding relatives, among other things. She adds that the juvenile court erred by refusing the untimely evidence of grandparent tribal identification numbers. (§ 224.3, subd. (f).) HSA concedes that it did not substantially comply with the notice requirements of ICWA, agreeing with Crystal that it sent four variations of JV-135 ("Notice of Involuntary Child Custody Proceedings for an Indian Child") and omitted relevant family information on the forms.
We reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand for the limited determination of the applicability of the ICWA. (In re Jonathan D. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 105, 111-112 [limited remand to require compliance with the ICWA].) If, following proper inquiry and notice, the juvenile court expressly determines that the ICWA does not apply, it shall reinstate the order terminating parental rights.
We concur: YEGAN, J., COFFEE, J.