Opinion
No. 2 CA-MH 2018-0005
12-27-2018
IN RE PINAL COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH NO. MH201800125
COUNSEL Rosemary Gordon Pánuco, Tucson Counsel for Appellant Kent P. Volkmer, Pinal County Attorney By Cedric I. Hay, Deputy County Attorney, Florence Counsel for Appellee
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County
No. S1100MH201800125
The Honorable Dwight P. Callahan, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Rosemary Gordon Pánuco, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
Kent P. Volkmer, Pinal County Attorney
By Cedric I. Hay, Deputy County Attorney, Florence
Counsel for Appellee
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Eppich authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez and Judge Espinosa concurred.
EPPICH, Judge:
¶1 Appellant appeals from the trial court's order that he undergo involuntary mental health treatment pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-540(A)(2). See also A.R.S. § 36-533. He argues there was insufficient evidence to support the court's findings. We affirm.
¶2 Following court-ordered evaluations, one of appellant's evaluating psychiatrists petitioned for court-ordered treatment, asking the court to order a combination of inpatient and outpatient treatment. The petition averred appellant suffered from bipolar disorder and was persistently and acutely disabled, a danger to himself, and a danger to others. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that all three grounds had been established by clear and convincing evidence. The court ordered combined inpatient and outpatient treatment upon further finding that appellant was unable or unwilling to accept treatment and that there were "no appropriate and available alternatives other than Court-ordered treatment." This appeal followed.
¶3 A trial court is authorized to order involuntary treatment if it finds "by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed patient, as a result of mental disorder, is a danger to self, is a danger to others, has a persistent or acute disability or a grave disability and is in need of treatment, and is either unwilling or unable to accept voluntary treatment." § 36-540(A). "We view the facts in a light most favorable to upholding the court's ruling and will not reverse an order for involuntary treatment unless it is 'clearly erroneous and unsupported by any credible evidence.'" In re MH2009-002120, 225 Ariz. 284, ¶ 17 (App. 2010) (quoting In re MH 2008-000438, 220 Ariz. 277, ¶ 6 (App. 2009)).
¶4 Appellant does not dispute that he suffers from a mental disorder, but first argues the trial court erred in finding he was persistently and acutely disabled because there was insufficient evidence he would continue to suffer severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical
harm. A person is persistently or acutely disabled if he or she has a mental disorder that:
(a) If not treated has a substantial probability of causing the person to suffer or continue to suffer severe and abnormal mental, emotional or physical harm that significantly impairs judgment, reason, behavior or capacity to recognize reality.
(b) Substantially impairs the person's capacity to make an informed decision regarding treatment, and this impairment causes the person to be incapable of understanding and expressing an understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of accepting treatment and understanding and expressing an understanding of the alternatives to the particular treatment offered after the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives are explained to that person.
(c) Has a reasonable prospect of being treatable by outpatient, inpatient or combined inpatient and outpatient treatment.
§ 36-501(32).
¶5 Appellant supports his argument by citing his ability to "testify at the hearing and articulate his position," and refers to hearing testimony allegedly supporting a conclusion he was "making progress and becoming more mellow" without medication. Appellant, however, ignores the context of the cited hearing testimony. The psychiatrist stated appellant had been "more present" and "comfortable in the unit lately," but explained that was likely due to mood changes consistent with bipolar disorder. The psychiatrist further explained that appellant still "can easily get irritated" and that his "pressured speech" persisted.
¶6 Additionally, appellant ignores other evidence supporting the trial court's ruling, including that, during manic phases, he claimed to be a messenger from God, ate inedible plants because he was "a plant-based eater," hit himself in the head and stared into the sun in an effort to "purge
the evil out of him," and had to be restrained after repeatedly hitting his head against a metal window frame. And, although Appellant also asserts there was insufficient evidence he was a danger to himself because he "confirmed" during his testimony that he had no desire to kill himself, this evidence also supports the court's finding that he was in danger of causing "serious physical harm" to himself during a manic phase of his bipolar disorder. See § 36-501(8)(a). In sum, appellant's argument is nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re Pima Cty. Mental Health No. MH-2010-0047, 228 Ariz. 94, ¶ 17 (App. 2011). And, because sufficient evidence supported the court's findings that appellant is persistently or acutely disabled and a danger to himself, we need not address his argument that the court erred in determining he was a danger to others. See § 36-540(A).
¶7 We affirm the trial court's order that appellant undergo involuntary treatment.