Opinion
2 CA-MH 2022-0006
02-03-2023
In Re Pima County Mental Health No. MH20220769
Pima County Mental Health Defender's Office, Tucson By Sarah Medley Counsel for Appellant Laura Conover, Pima County Attorney By Johnathan Pinkney, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson Counsel for Appellee
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. MH20220769 The Honorable Julia Connors, Judge Pro Tempore
Pima County Mental Health Defender's Office, Tucson By Sarah Medley Counsel for Appellant
Laura Conover, Pima County Attorney By Johnathan Pinkney, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson Counsel for Appellee
Chief Judge Vasquez authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Eckerstrom and Judge Cattani concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
VÁSQUEZ, CHIEF JUDGE
¶1 In this appeal from an involuntary treatment order, appellant J.P. asks that we vacate the trial court's order granting the petition for court-ordered treatment, and its finding that he is persistently or acutely disabled (PAD). See A.R.S. §§ 36-501(33), 36-540(A), (O). For the reasons stated below, we dismiss J.P.'s appeal as moot.
¶2 In reviewing a trial court's order for involuntary treatment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the court's findings and judgment. In re Maricopa Cnty. Mental Health No. MH 2008-001188, 221 Ariz. 177, ¶ 14 (App. 2009). We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. In re Maricopa Cnty. Mental Health No. MH 2006-000749, 214 Ariz. 318, ¶ 13 (App. 2007). In June 2022, police officers responded to a call that an individual, later identified as J.P., was setting fires in a wash, a fact J.P. does not dispute on appeal. An application for emergency admission was prepared, alleging J.P. had set multiple fires in a wash near residential structures and a walking pedestrian path, and that he was a danger to himself and others. A petition for court-ordered evaluation of J.P. was filed on June 6, 2022. A court-ordered evaluation was performed, and Dr. Francisco Garcia and Dr. Rainer Diaz completed affidavits and PAD addenda supporting a petition for court-ordered treatment. A petition for court-ordered treatment was filed, alleging that J.P. suffered from what Dr. Garcia diagnosed as an unspecified psychosis and what Dr. Diaz diagnosed as bipolar I disorder with psychotic features. The petition further requested court-ordered treatment, alleging that J.P. was a danger to himself and others and was PAD.
¶3 The trial court held a hearing on June 16, 2022, at which the two responding officers and Dr. Garcia testified. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found clear and convincing evidence that J.P. "is, as a result of a mental disorder, a danger to himself, a danger to others, persistently or acutely disabled, and in need of a period of mental health treatment." It further found that J.P. was "unable or unwilling to comply with treatment on a voluntary basis without a court order." The court then ordered that J.P. "receive court-ordered treatment for one year with the ability to be re-hospitalized, should the need arise, in an inpatient psychiatric facility for a time period not to exceed 180 days." J.P. appeals from that ruling.
The parties stipulated that Dr. Diaz's evaluation would be admitted in lieu of his live testimony.
¶4 At a judicial review hearing on October 13, 2022, the trial court apparently released J.P. early from court-ordered treatment. Based on J.P.'s release, appellee argues this appeal should be dismissed as moot. We agree. A case is moot when the involuntary commitment period has expired. See In re Coconino Cnty. Mental Health No. MH 1425, 181 Ariz. 290, 292 (1995); see also In re Maricopa Cnty. Mental Health No. MH-2008-000867 , 225 Ariz. 178, ¶ 1 (2010) (case "arguably moot" because treatment order had expired); In re Maricopa Cnty. Mental Health No. MH 2008-000028, 221 Ariz. 277, ¶ 13 (App. 2009) ("A case is moot when it seeks to determine an abstract question which does not arise upon existing facts or rights." (quoting Contempo-Tempe Mobile Home Owners Ass'n v. Steinert, 144 Ariz. 227, 229 (App. 1985))). And, "we typically decline to consider moot or abstract questions as a matter of judicial restraint," Kondaur Cap. Corp. v. Pinal County, 235 Ariz. 189, ¶ 8 (App. 2014), because "[i]t is not an appellate court's function to declare principles of law which cannot have any practical effect in settling the rights of litigants," id. (quoting Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co., 143 Ariz. 547, 548 (App. 1985)). See also Contempo-Tempe, 144 Ariz. at 229 ("The court is not empowered to decide moot questions ....").
Although the record before us does not show that J.P. was released early from treatment, he does not dispute that fact.
¶5 Appellee further contends, and we agree, that J.P. has not raised any issues exempt from the general rule of mootness, and that "the only issue raised by J.P. is the sufficiency of the evidence based on the specific facts of this case." Specifically, J.P. argues there was insufficient evidence that he suffered from a mental disorder which caused him to be a danger to himself or others, or that he was PAD. He maintains the only "concerning behavior" observed was when he had lit the fires in the wash, which he asserts was to keep the rattlesnakes away. He adds that Dr. Garcia's conclusions were based on incomplete and unsubstantiated information and assumptions regarding his statements about his education, business ventures, and pending lawsuits. Although we have considered moot appeals "when they present an issue of great public importance or one capable of repetition yet evading review" or "if the consequences of [an] order will continue to affect a party," J.P. has presented no such claim here. Cardoso v. Soldo, 230 Ariz. 614, ¶¶ 5, 9 (App. 2012).
¶6 In his reply brief, J.P. counters that his claims are not moot. In passing, he points to the "effects of the original order," including the loss of his right to own or possess a firearm and the entry of his name into the National Instant Criminal Background Check System, and asserts that he could be petitioned again for the same behavior. However, he does not indicate he has an interest in owning a weapon, that he has applied to do so, or that the trial court's ruling would preclude him from doing so in the future. See A.R.S. § 13-925 (statute providing process to restore right to possess firearm). Nor are we persuaded that any of the typical exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply here. Given the absence of a live controversy, our consideration of the merits hinges on the application of one of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine identified above. See, e.g., Contempo-Tempe, 144 Ariz. at 230. The court's ruling was based on the specific facts presented here, and does not implicate broader issues of statewide importance. Nor has J.P. established that the issues he raises present claims related to involuntary commitment proceedings that have not previously been addressed by the legislature or the courts.
¶7 Likewise, J.P.'s claims do not evade review. Although we have recognized the need to address collateral consequences related to court-ordered treatment in some instances, this case simply does not present that situation. J.P. has given us no reason to conclude the order now before us on appeal carries such collateral consequences. See Cardoso, 230 Ariz. 614, ¶ 9 (describing collateral consequences stemming from court-ordered mental health treatment, suspension of driver license, and criminal cases).
Another panel of this court has addressed an otherwise moot appeal of an involuntary treatment order due to the potential collateral consequences of such an order. In re Maricopa Cnty. Mental Health No. MH 2007-001236, 220 Ariz. 160, n.3 (App. 2008); see also A.R.S. § 13-3101(A)(7)(a) (addressing merits even though treatment "finished or nearly finished" because of commitment order in appellant's record).
¶8 Even assuming J.P.'s claims were not moot, he still would not prevail because substantial evidence supports the trial court's June 2022 findings that J.P. had a mental disorder requiring treatment. When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we will affirm an involuntary treatment order if the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous. In re MH 2008-001188, 221 Ariz. 177, ¶ 14. Law enforcement officers testified that J.P. appeared to be homeless and living in the wash. Dr. Garcia and Dr. Diaz opined that J.P. suffered from a mental disorder, basing their opinions in part on evidence that J.P. claimed to be "a scientist" and an "engineer with expertise in robotics." J.P. told Dr. Garcia he has advanced degrees, "owns companies," has "a lot of copyrights and trademarks," and "plan[ned] to remove bullet fragment[s] washed in his head robotically in the future." Dr. Garcia reported that J.P. was "guarded, demanding and suspicious," and opined that without treatment for his psychosis, J.P.'s condition would cause further harm.
¶9 Dr. Diaz observed J.P. was "manic," had "presented with rapid speech," was "talkative, easily irritated," and was "voicing grandiose delusional statements." Dr. Diaz concluded J.P. suffered from a severe mental disorder, and if left untreated, would be a risk to harm himself or others. Thus, substantial evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that, as of June 16, 2022, involuntary treatment was warranted.
¶10 J.P.'s arguments to the contrary are essentially a request for this court to reweigh the evidence presented to the trial court, which we will not do on review. In re Pima Cnty. Mental Health No. MH-2010-0047 , 228 Ariz. 94, ¶ 17 (App. 2011). Moreover, we reject J.P.'s suggestion that it was appellee's responsibility to seek information to disprove the conclusion that he was delusional. We similarly reject J.P.'s related suggestion that Dr. Garcia improperly relied on collateral information regarding J.P.'s behavior, including reports from the Crisis Response Center. Such reports are routinely part of the record in mental health cases.
¶11 We dismiss J.P.'s appeal as moot.