The appellant Todd has cited a number of cases from other jurisdictions in which courts have held that the giving of an instruction such as instruction No. 12 is prejudicial error, because it allows the jury to speculate upon a matter which it is not within its province to consider, that is, the possibility of parole. These include In re Pike, 66 Cal.2d 170, 424 P.2d 724, 57 Cal.Rptr. 172 (1967); People v. Morse, 60 Cal.2d 631, 388 P.2d 33, 36 Cal.Rptr. 201 (1964); Burnette v. State, 151 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1963); Sukle v.People, 107 Colo. 269, 111 P.2d 233 (1941); Williams v. State, 191 Tenn. 456, 234 S.W.2d 993 (1950). In some jurisdictions, it has been held proper for a jury to consider the possibility of parole so long as the trial court specifically states that this subject is not a matter for consideration and speculation by the jury.

Conviction of murder in the first degree and robbery was affirmed by this court in 1962 ( People v. Pike, 58 Cal.2d 70 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656]; cert.den. 371 U.S. 941 [9 L.Ed.2d 277, 84 S.Ct. 324]). In 1967 in habeas corpus proceedings ( In re Pike, 66 Cal.2d 170 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 172, 424 P.2d 724]) the case was remanded for retrial on the penalty phase in the light of our decision in People v. Morse, 60 Cal.2d 631 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810], as to prejudicial comments and instructions on possible future action by the judge, the adult authority or the Governor in modifying sentence. Judgment was affirmed in all other respects.

Thus the jury were diverted from their duty and responsibility of selecting the penalty in violation of the principle underlying our holding in People v. Morse, 60 Cal.2d 631, 643 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810]. ( In re Pike, 66 Cal.2d 170, 172-173 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 172, 424 P.2d 724].) The prosecuting attorney argued, "if you think that Mr. White is remorseful — why, sure he is, folks, that is why he tried to escape from the County Jail and get out of this state.

(Cf. Neumann v. Bishop (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 451, 487 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 786]; Hart v. Wielt (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 224, 234 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 220]; see also In re Pike (1967) 66 Cal.2d 170, 172 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 172, 424 P.2d 724]; People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 649-650 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810].) Plaintiff contends that defendants' claim of prejudice is wholly speculative, disregards the presumption that jurors adhere to the court's instructions, and is not supported by a single shred of evidence in the record.

(4) Even in a case where there has been impermissible interrogation, it provides no ground for a reversal of the judgment if no evidence procured thereby is introduced at trial. ( United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 [16 L.Ed.2d 510, 86 S.Ct. 1416]; In re Pike, 66 Cal.2d 170, 173-174 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 172, 424 P.2d 724]; People v. Duke, 276 Cal.App.2d 630, 637 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 69].) (1c) As the trial court found, the interview had terminated and Officer Barry was leaving the room when he made the parting statement, "Last night you thought we were kidding, but today you are booked for murder."

Accordingly, the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974], does not control. ( In re Pike, 66 Cal.2d 170, 173-174 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 172, 424 P.2d 724].) The judgment is affirmed.