Opinion
W.C. No. 4-396-750
April 12, 2000
FINAL ORDER
James E. Freemeyer, P.C. (the firm), seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Snider (ALJ) which determined the firm did not have a valid attorney's fee lien arising out of a settlement of the claim for compensation. We affirm
The claimant and the firm entered into a contingent fee agreement under which the firm was to represent the claimant in the claim for workers' compensation benefits. On August 5, 1999, the firm moved to withdraw as counsel for the claimant Simultaneously, the firm filed with the Division of Workers' Compensation a "Motion for Attorney Fees/Notice of Attorney Lien." The motion alleged the firm incurred $2839.50 in fees and $120.76 in costs while preparing the claimant's case, and requested the Director to issue an order awarding the firm the attorney's fees and costs. The motion also requested that the fees and costs be awarded "out of the proceeds" of the "worker's compensation case," and cited § 12-5-119, C.R.S. 1999 (attorney's lien statute), as authority for this request. A copy of the motion was provided to the respondents
On August 31, 1999, the claimant and the respondents entered into a settlement under which the claimant was to receive $5,091.59 in exchange for a full and final settlement of his workers' compensation claim. The settlement was approved by an ALJ on September 8, 1999. Apparently, the proceeds of the settlement were paid directly to the claimant
Thereafter, on September 10, 1999, the Director entered an order determining the firm is entitled to $2,839.50 plus costs, or twenty percent of any settlement, payable from the proceeds of the workers' compensation settlement. Following the Director's order, the firm applied for a hearing seeking to enforce the attorney's fee lien against the respondents. However, on November 19, 1999, the ALJ ruled that the firm did not have a "valid lien" because liens for attorney's fees are prohibited by § 8-42-124(1), C.R.S 1999. The ALJ further found that the specific provisions of § 8-42-124(1) prevail over the general attorney's lien created by § 12-5-119.
On review, the firm contends it established a valid lien for attorney's fees pursuant to § 12-5-119 when it filed the notice of lien with the Director and notified the respondents The firm argues that § 8-42-124(1) was not intended to deny establishment of a valid lien for attorney's fees. We disagree § 12-5-119 establishes the right of an attorney to file a lien "on any and all claims and demands in suit for any fees or balance of fees due or to become due from any client." § 8-42-124(1) provides as follows:
Except for amounts due under court-ordered support, claims for compensation or benefits due under articles 40 to 47 of this title shall not be assigned, released, or commuted except as provided in said articles and shall be exempt from all claims of creditors and from levy, execution, and attachment or any other remedy or recovery for collection of a debt, which exemption may not be waived
In interpreting these statutes, the objective is to effect the legislative intent. Because words and phrases contained in statutes are the best indicators of the General Assembly's intent, we should give them their plain and ordinary meanings. Weld County School District RE-12 v. Bymer, 955 P.2d 550 (Colo 1998). To the extent there is any conflict in these statutes, the specific statute should prevail over the general statute unless the general statute was enacted later in time, and the legislature manifested a clear intent that the general provision should govern. Climax Molybdenum v. Walter, 812 P.2d 1168 (Colo. 1991). Further, the procedural provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act are generally considered to be "complete, definitive and organic", without the need of supplementation by other legislative enactments. Gardner v. Friend, 849 P.2d 817 (Colo.App. 1992)
Here, § 8-42-124(1) unequivocally exempts workers' compensation benefits from "levy, execution, and attachment or other remedy" for collection of a debt. The only statutory exception is for court-ordered support claims. Thus, the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute is that no method of debt collection, which includes a lien for attorney fees, may be taken against workers' compensation benefits. See Fisher v. Darwin C Metzger Trucking Co., W.C. No. 3-840-457 (August 22, 1991), set aside on other grounds, Bradley v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 841 P.2d 1071 (Colo.App. 1992). Indeed, prior to the enactment of the statutory exception, our courts prohibited collection of child support payments from workers' compensation benefits despite the existence of a general statutory provision authorizing writs of garnishment against "earnings" of a debtor In re Marriage of Snyder, 739 P.2d 923 (Colo.App. 1987)
Insofar as § 8-42-124(1) may be read as conflicting with § 12-5-119, we conclude that § 8-42-124(1) is a specific provision which must prevail over the general right to claim a lien for attorney's fees under § 12-5-119. § 8-42-124(1) is part of the Workers' Compensation Act, and the Act governs the unique statutory relationships created by surrender of common law rights See Gardner v. Friend, supra, (the administrative provisions in the Act are complete, definitive and organic, without the need of supplementation of other legislative acts). If the General Assembly wished to establish a statutory right to claim a lien for attorney's fees in workers' compensation cases, § 8-42-124(1) provided a vehicle for doing so. Instead, the General Assembly exempted compensation benefits from virtually every form of debt collection except court-ordered support payments. Certainly, there is no clear and unequivocal evidence that the General Assembly intended workers' compensation benefits to be subject to liens for attorney's fees
In light of this result, we agree with the ALJ that no valid lien for attorney's fees existed. Therefore, the ALJ correctly ruled that the respondents are not liable to the firm
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED at the ALJ's order dated November 19, 1999, is affirmed
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
________________________________ David Cain
________________________________ Dona Halsey
NOTICE
This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate this Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203, by filing a petition for review with the Court, within twenty (20) days after the date this Order is mailed, pursuant to § 8-43-301(10) and § 8-43-307, C.R.S 1999. The appealing party must serve a copy of the petition upon all other parties, including the Industrial Claim Appeals Office, which may be served by mail at 1515 Arapahoe, Tower 3, Suite 350, Denver, CO 80202
Copies of this decision were mailed April 12, 2000 to the following parties:
Ronald Perez, 499 Parfet St., Lakewood, CO 80226
Inlet Structure, Inc., 5110 York St., Denver, CO 80216
Inlet Structures, Inc., P. O. Box 281, Platteville, CO 80651-0281
Kama Kohler, Workers' Compensation Manager, RTW Colorado, Inc., P.O. Box 6541, Englewood, CO 80155-6541
Karen R. Wells, Esq., 3900 E. Mexico, #1000, Denver, CO 80210 (For Respondents)
James E. Freemeyer, Esq., 1545 Ogden St., Denver, CO 80218-1405
BY: A. Pendroy