In re Paul P.

Full title: IN RE PAUL P., A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN YEARS

Court: Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Middlesex Child Protection Session at Middletown

Date published: Jul 23, 2003

2003 Ct. Sup. 8191 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003)

Opinion

No. K09-CP00-008024-A

July 23, 2003

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

RUBINOW, JUDGE.

This memorandum of decision addresses a petition brought to terminate the parental rights (TPR) of Lance P. and April P., the biological parents of Paul P., born May 29, 1992. The Department of Children and Families (DCF or the department) filed the TPR petition at issue on May 24, 2002. As amended, the petition against Lance P. alleges the sole ground of failure to achieve rehabilitation.² As amended, the petition against April P. alleges abandonment and failure to achieve rehabilitation.³ For the reasons stated below, the court finds these matters in favor of the petitioner, and accordingly terminates the respondents' parental rights.

2 As filed, the TPR petition against Lance P. also alleged the act or acts of omission or commission ground for termination. The petitioner withdrew this ground in court on February 25, 2003.

3 As filed, the TPR petition against April P. also alleged lack of an on-going parent-child relationship. The petitioner confirmed her CT Page 8191-ag withdrawal of this ground in court on April 1, 2003.

Trial of this highly-contested matter took place on February 3, 4, 5, 6 and 25 and April 1, 2003. The petitioner, the respondent parents and the child were vigorously represented throughout the proceedings.⁴

4 Paul was also ably served by a separate court-appointed guardian ad litem (GAL), appointed (Driscoll, J.) on June 29, 2001.

The Child Protection Session of the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters, has jurisdiction over the pending case. Notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Practice Book. No action is currently pending in any other court affecting custody of Paul.

I. FACTUAL FINDINGS

The Court has thoroughly reviewed the verified petitions, the TPR social study⁵ and addendum, and the multiple other documents submitted in evidence which included transcripts of other court proceedings; court records; psychological reports; curriculum vitae; records of the Department of Public Safety; hospital, school, counseling CT Page 8191-b and psychiatric records; and correspondence from Lance P. The court has also taken judicial notice of orders issued in the respondents' family court litigation. In re Amanda A., 58 Conn.App. 451, 452-53, 755 A.2d 243 (2000); In re Jessica M., 49 Conn.App. 229, 233, 714 A.2d 64 (1998); C. Tait, Connecticut Evidence (3d Ed. 2001) § 2.16.5, Judicial Proceedings and Records.

5 The Social Study for Termination of Parental Rights was submitted in evidence as Exhibit 1. Practice Book § 33-5.

The court has utilized the applicable legal standards in considering this evidence and the testimony of trial witnesses,⁶ who included: the court-appointed psychologist, the child's treating psychologist, the respondent father's family therapist, a DCF social worker, a parenting educator/visitation supervisor, and the foster mother.⁷ Upon deliberation, the court finds that the following facts were proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial:⁸

6 "It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony." In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000); see also In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 366, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). "The probative force of conflicting evidence is for the trier to determine . . . In re Ashley E., 62 Conn.App. 307, 316, 771 A.2d 160, cert. denied 256 Conn. 910, 772 A.2d 601 (2001)". In re Jonathan G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 528, 777 A.2d 695 (2001). "The trial court . . . is not bound by the uncontradicted testimony of any witness . . . and is in fact free to reject such testimony . . . The trier is the judge of the credibility of all the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony and, therefore, has the right to accept part or disregard part of a witness' testimony." (Citations and question marks omitted.) In re Deana E., 61 Conn.App. 197, 208, 763 A.2d 45 (2000). It is within the court's province to determine which expert testimony, if any, is more credible than other expert opinion evidence provided for review. Keans v. Bocciarelli, 35 Conn.App. 239, 241-42, 645 A.2d 1029, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 934, 650 A.2d 172 (1994).

7 As was their right, the respondents did not testify before the court. See Practice Book § 34-1 [now § 32a-1].

8 Additional facts will be referenced as necessary.

I.A. EVENTS PRECEDING THE OTC OF NOVEMBER 17, 2000.⁹

9 It is fundamental that, in a TPR matter, "[b]ecause the parent-child relationship is at issue, all relevant facts and family history should be considered by the trial court . . . The parent-child relationship presents an ongoing dynamic that cannot be frozen in time. The entire picture of that relationship must be considered whenever the termination of parental rights is under consideration by a judicial authority." (Emphasis added.) In re Brianna F., 50 Conn.App. 805, 814, 719 A.2d 478 (1998).

April P. was born on April 15, 1968. Of at least average intellectual ability, she has completed the tenth grade, and has worked as a pharmacy technician, as a cashier, and for a security agency. (Exhibits 1, 5.) April P. has also worked delivering pizzas, and has been unemployed. (Exhibit 2.) She married at age eighteen, and gave birth to her first son, Thomas G., on June 21, 1987. This marriage was dissolved in 1989.¹⁰

10 Pursuant to a court order, April P.'s son Thomas has resided with his maternal aunt Lisa M., her husband John M., and their family since 1998. (Exhibits 1, 2; Testimony Lisa M.)

April P. has a long history of mental illness, and has been diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder and Depression in the past. Her first mental health contact occurred during her pre-teen years; she has and has had sporadic treatment ever since. April P. reports two episodes of psychotherapy some years ago. She saw a psychiatrist in 1996 for depression and anxiety, and received a series of medications. In January 2001, she reported having spent the past eighteen months in consultation with another psychiatrist at a local mental health center (CMH); this psychiatrist prescribed specific medication management for mood stabilization. However, April P. admits that she has never taken all her medication on a regular basis. (Exhibits 5, 9, AA.)

Lance P., the respondent father, was born on October 13, 1963. He is a high school graduate who served in the U.S. Navy. He has worked as a security guard, as a Logistics Project Manager at a casino, as an electrician, and has been unemployed. From 1983 through 1989, Lance P. was married to Melissa C.; there were no children born to that union. (Exhibits 1, 2.)

April P. and Lance P. married in October 1989. They had three sons: CT Page 8191-c Dakota was born June 25, 1991; Paul was born May 29, 1992; and Colton was born December 5, 1994. In 1994, Lance P. was involved in a motor vehicle accident, and sustained a cerebral concussion.¹¹ He has Attention Deficit Disorder, which is treated with medication. DCF became involved with Paul's family in 1995 when he was being cared for by April P. after she and Lance P. had separated. The family's problems were then identified as involving inadequate supervision of Paul and his brothers and April P.'s suspected misuse of prescription medication. (Exhibit 1.) Lance P. reports that he has participated in mental health counseling off and on since 1996.¹² (Exhibits 1, 2.) In December 1996, Lance P. was arrested and charged on a domestic violence matter involving April P. His charges of Risk of Injury to a Minor, Assault in the third degree and Breach of Peace were dismissed when he completed the program of Accelerated Rehabilitation.¹³ (Exhibits 1, 4.)

11 The court was not provided with any reports or testimony directly related to the specific content of the evaluations in which Lance P. participated after this accident, although the data was examined by the court-appointed psychological evaluator. Intellectually, Lance P. functions in the "High Average to Superior" range despite any physical trauma. (Exhibit 2, 4.)

12 While the court received no direct reports or testimony from mental health providers whom Lance P. may have seen prior to 2002, Lance P. informed the court-appointed psychological evaluator that he had received biweekly treatment from Deedee P. over the course of several previous years. Lance P. reported that Deedee P.'s treatment addressed his work-related stress, without attention to his parenting status. Deedee P. did not testify at trial. Although the petitioner proffered a report from Deedee P., the court honored Lance P.'s objection thereto; thus, the evidence does not contain any documentary evidence that was personally generated by her. However, the clear and convincing evidence permits the inference that any actual treatment provided to Lance P. by Deedee P. has been sporadic, occasional, brief in extent, crisis-oriented and not otherwise focused. (Exhibit 2; Testimony of Dr. Rogers.)

13 In a child protection matter, evidence of a parent's arrests may be considered by the trial court "even though those arrests did not result in conviction; that evidence was relevant to establish that the respondent's habits and acts of misconduct [were competent to deny the] child the care, guidance or control necessary for [his or her] physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being." In re Helen B., 50 Conn.App. 818, 819, 719 A.2d 907 (1998).

On March 17, 1997, the court (Potter, J.) adjudicated Paul to be an uncared for child, and ordered him returned to the custody of April P. under protective supervision. (Exhibits 1, 19.) Soon thereafter, Lance P. filed a complaint for dissolution of the respondent parents' marriage. On November 6, 1997, the court (Solomon, J.) awarded pendente lite custody of Paul, Dakota and Colton to Lance P. At that time, Paul began residing with Lance P. and his then-companion, Michelle P.¹⁴ DCF subsequently closed its case, having determined that Paul and his brothers had no need of services while they were in the care of Lance P. (Exhibit 1; Testimony of Christine R.)

14 Lance P. married Michelle P. in May 1999. Four children had been born to Michelle P. during her prior marriage, which was dissolved in April 1997. Although Michelle P. has visitation privileges, three of those four children reside with their father. (Exhibits 1, 4.)

The marriage of April P. and Paul P. was dissolved (Gordon, J.) on April 23, 1998 after hearing at the Regional Family Trial Docket. The judgment awarded sole custody of Paul, Dakota and Colton to Lance P. With regard to April P., the court ordered that "[v]isitation is to be supervised. The court order[ed] that there be visitation once a week in a professionally supervised setting" and gave Paul's attorney specific instructions to follow in identifying an appropriate visitation facility. (Exhibit 14.) The court prohibited April P. from having telephone contact with Paul until further order. (Exhibit 14.)

A son, Joel, was born to Lance P. and Michelle P. on May 17, 2000. On November 17, 2000, the court (Driscoll, J) granted DCF's application for an ex parte Order of Temporary Custody (OTC) for Paul, who had reported physical abuse by Michelle P. On November 27, 2000, the court (Driscoll, J.) sustained the OTC upon the agreement of the parties. DCF also submitted a neglect petition for Paul, alleging that the child was being permitted to live under conditions injurious to his well being and that he had been denied proper physical and emotional care and attention. (Exhibit 1; Testimony of Christine R.) Paul was removed from Lance P.'s CT Page 8191-d home and was placed in DCF custody; he has been in foster care ever since. (Exhibits 1, 17.)

I.B. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE OTC OF NOVEMBER 17, 2000.

On November 27, 2000, the court (Driscoll, J.) ordered specific steps for both respondents. Among other things, Lance P. was ordered to cooperate with DCF, to cooperate with evaluations involving Paul, to participate in parenting counseling, to secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income, avoid involvement with the criminal justice system, and to visit Paul as often as DCF permits.¹⁵ (Exhibit 11.) Like steps were imposed for April P., although individual counseling was ordered in lieu of parenting counseling. The steps ordered DCF to "set up visitation" between mother and child. (Exhibit 10.)

15 On February 1, 2001, the court (Driscoll, J.) modified Lance P.'s steps, eliminating his obligation to participate in parenting counseling. (Exhibit 11.)

On December 7, 2000, Paul P. participated in a court-ordered evaluation performed by Kelly Rogers, Ph.D., a skilled and experienced licensed clinical psychologist.¹⁶ (Exhibit 12.) On January 18, 2001, April P. underwent a court-ordered evaluation by Dr. Rogers. In February 2001, Dr. Rogers advised in writing that "in consideration of the child's emotional health, it is not recommended that the mother have any further visitation."¹⁷ (Exhibit 5.) Dr. Rogers performed court-ordered evaluations of Lance P. and his wife Michelle P. in February 2001, and an interactional evaluation was performed with this couple and Paul. (Exhibits 1, 4.) Based upon the information available to him, in his March 5, 2001 report Dr. Rogers recommended only supervised visitation between Lance P. and Paul.¹⁸ (Exhibit 4.)

16 Paul was eight years old and in third grade when he met Dr. Rogers. (Exhibit 6.)

17 While the record does not reflect any motion from Lance P. or DCF seeking to modify the November 2000 steps requiring the department to "set up visitation" between April P. and Paul, visits were logically CT Page 8191-ai contraindicated following the publication of Dr. Rogers' February 2001 report. (Exhibit 5.)

18 Dr. Rogers advised as follows: "Visitation should initially be supervised, as [Lance P., Michelle P. and Paul] appear angry and primed for inappropriate expression of their ire. Attenuation of supervision should be at the discretion of the family therapist. Should aggressive family treatment not result in significant improvement within six months, it may be appropriate to consider long-term placement outside the home." (Exhibit 4.)

On February 1, 2001, DCF amended the neglect petition to reflect the sole allegation that Paul was uncared for in that his home could not provide the specialized care he required. Lance P. submitted a plea of nolo contendere in response to the amended petition, while April P. remained silent. Paul was adjudicated uncared for, and was committed to DCF (Driscoll, J.). Hearing and determination of the dispositional aspect of the neglect case was deferred. (Exhibits 1, 15, 20.)

I.C. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE ADJUDICATION OF FEBRUARY 1, 2001.

Starting in February 2001, at DCF's referral, Lance P. received a course of intensive family preservation (IFP) services from a local child and family agency (CAFAS-SB). In May 2001, Lance P. and Paul commenced visitation supervised by CAFAS-SB staff. As the initial response to the services was positive, DCF requested the commencement of supervised home visits involving the respondent father, Paul, and the remainder of Lance P.'s family. (Exhibit 17; Testimony of Karen C.) CT Page 8191-e

On July 17, 2001, while Lance P. was involved with parenting education services sponsored by CAFAS-SB, DCF filed a neglect petition and obtained an ex parte OTC for Dakota, alleging that he had been physically abused while living at Lance P.'s home.¹⁹ Dakota was removed from Lance P. and Michelle P. and placed in DCF custody. The OTC was sustained on July 31, 2001, and Dakota has remained in foster care. (Exhibit 15; Testimony of Christine R.)

19 It is uncontested that Dakota suffered a traumatic brain injury early in life. He is affected by developmental delays, a seizure disorder, and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). (Exhibit 15.)

Although Dakota had been removed to DCF custody, CAFAS-SB began parenting education services during supervised home visits for Paul on August 8, 2001. In addition to Lance P., CAFAS-SB involved the remaining family unit of Michelle P., Colton and young Joel in the visits. After numerous supervised visitation-parenting education sessions throughout the fall, the family was discharged from CAFAS-SB on December 27, 2001 for ostensible "Completion of program." However, CAFAS-SB reported that both Lance P. and Michelle P. had significant remaining need for parenting services. (Exhibits 1, 17; Testimony of Karen C.)

At DCF's referral, in the summer and fall of 2001, April P. underwent psychiatric medication evaluations at another local hospital (LMH-TCC). Also at DCF's referral, April P. commenced individual counseling at LMH-TCC in the spring of 2002. (Exhibit 3, 9, AA.)

The TPR petition at issue was filed on May 24, 2002.

I.D. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE FILING OF THE TPR PETITION ON MAY 24, 2002.

On May 28, 2002, Lance P. began a course of family counseling with Gary F., a licensed clinical social worker. The majority of the family counseling sessions were also attended by Michelle P., Colton and Joel.²⁰ (Exhibits 2, 3, 5, B, C-4; Testimony Gary F. See also Exhibit 4.)

20 Lance P. was referred to Gary F. for family counseling by Dr. W., a psychologist who was treating Colton for ADHD and Oppositional Defiant Disorder. Gary F. saw Lance P. individually on "a couple of" occasions. (Testimony of Gary F.) Gary F. reported that Lance P. and his wife met the goals of treatment which focused on "1) review parenting and placement histories of all children; 2) focus on co-parenting issues with Colton; 3) awareness of various diagnoses including ODD, ADHD, and RAD plus implications for parenting; 4) explore other support systems in place and needed; 5) review management issues in Lance and Michelle as a couple; and 6) review needs as a couple and explore balances between work, parenting, and couples/individual needs." (Exhibit C-4.)

In September 2002, DCF provided Lance P. with an in-home parent aide through the UCFS agency, to directly assist him and Michelle P. in dealing with Colton, and to improve his abilities to care for Paul and Dakota, as well. (Testimony of Christine R.)

On September 20, 2002, after hearing, the court (Driscoll, J.) entered dispositional orders resolving the neglect issues in Paul's case.²¹ The court extended Paul's commitment and ordered DCF to file a permanency plan "calling for long term foster care in the home of [Lisa M. and John M.] . . ."²² (Exhibits 15, 20.) CT Page 8191-f

21 The court also adjudicated Dakota and committed him to the custody of DCF, upon the finding that "Dakota was neglected as of July 17th, 2001 in that he had been abused and had physical injuries inflicted by other than accidental means." (Exhibit 15.) Dakota has been maintained in DCF foster care. (Exhibit 1.) In re Brianna F., supra, 50 Conn.App. 814.

22 On this date, the court (Driscoll, J.) also found as to Paul that "[r]easonable efforts at reunification have taken place." However, the transcript does not reveal which burden of proof was relied upon by the court when the finding was made. (Exhibit 15.) See General Statues § 17a-110(b) and § 46b-129(k)(2).

In October 2002, Dr. Rogers performed court-ordered re-evaluations of Paul, April P., Lance P. and his wife Michelle P. (Exhibit 2.)

In December 2002, Lance P. terminated the parent-aide services he had been receiving through UCFS, although the rigid and uncooperative parenting style he and Michelle P. exercised was still apparent. (Testimony of Christine R.)

I.E. PAUL, THE CHILD

Paul was born to the respondents on May 29, 1992.²³ He lived with April P. until November 1997, and with Lance P. until November 2000. For the better part of his life, Paul has been the subject of litigation between Lance P., April P., and others who have battled over the boy's custody. Upon his removal from Lance P.'s home in November 2000, Paul was initially placed at a DCF Safe Home. On January 6, 2001, Paul was placed in foster care with Lisa M. and her husband John M.; he has continued to live in this foster home with Lisa and John M.'s daughter Chelsea, and with his half-brother Thomas.²⁴ Lisa M. and John M. are committed to caring for Paul, and they would like to adopt him if he becomes legally available. (Exhibits 1, 2; Testimony Lisa M.)

23 It is uncontested that Paul's biological father Lance P. "is 1/8 Native American (Brule tribe of Rosebud, South Dakota). The tribe requires 1/4 blood lineage to be a tribal member." (Exhibit 1.) No party to this action has claimed that Paul is a formal member of any designated Native American tribe, and no tribe has participated in this action. See CT Page 8191-aj Practice Book § 26-1(5) and its predecessor Practice Book § 26-1(3); Practice Book § 32a-3(c) and its predecessor Practice Book § 34-3(c).

24 See footnote 10. On occasion, Paul's brother Dakota visits at the home of Lisa M. and John M. (Testimony Lisa M.)

Paul's special emotional needs are well documented. Following the December 2000 evaluation, the court-appointed evaluator concluded that Paul was a very seriously disturbed child whose "disassociative symptoms are emblematic of abuse, but give limited information about when and how that abuse may have taken place."²⁵ (Exhibit 6; Testimony of Dr. Rogers.) At the time, Paul manifested notable "fears of being punished [which] will continue to retard his emotional development, and he is certainly at risk for some rather serious personality disturbance as an adult."²⁶ (Exhibit 6.)

25 Dr. Rogers described Paul's presentation as being "Like a robot, like an automaton." (Testimony of Dr. Rogers.) He explained that Paul's responses were like those who had lived in an environment that was "overly harsh and/or critical" in which he had been subject to substantial duress causing him to withdraw from reality and to turn inward in response. (Exhibit 6; Testimony of Dr. Rogers.)

26 In his detailed and comprehensive report to the court, Dr. Rogers cautioned: "On casual acquaintance, Paul is such an agreeable and well-behaved child that he seems to merit little consideration of psychotherapy. This is, however, a troubled boy whose darkest feelings have gene underground, seriously thwarting his ability to emotionally mature." (Exhibit 6.)

In February 2001, Paul began individual counseling with B.T., Ph.D., a skilled and experienced licensed clinical psychologist.²⁷ Initially, therapy sessions occurred weekly; Paul now meets with Dr. B.T. and a foster parent every other week. Dr. B.T. has found Paul to be above average in intelligence, and has diagnosed him with Attachment Disorder, Inhibited Type.²⁸ Paul's condition arises from feelings of rejection and abandonment due to influences that have occurred in his environment; specifically, the child's psychological status is attributable to Paul's feeling that Lance P. has judged him as unacceptable and without value, and his feeling that April P. has abandoned him. To enhance Paul's opportunity to develop and maintain good mental health, the treating psychologist recommends that Paul remain in his current placement with CT Page 8191-g Lisa M. and John M., where the child finally feels safe and is willing to accept limits "without experiencing unhealthy levels of anxiety." (Exhibits 1, 8, 18; Testimony of Dr. B.T.)

27 Both Lance P. and DCF referred Paul for counseling. Lance P. wrote to Dr. T. in July and September 2001, tendering specific directions for the psychologist to follow in treating Paul and managing his therapy, and describing his belief that "Paul has reactive attachment disorder." (Exhibits C-2, C-3; Testimony of Dr. B.T.) Dr. B.T. has written that Lance P.'s "reasons for requesting therapy were that Paul was a pathological liar who was beating his brothers up, would tell his sibling [Dakota] to not take his seizure medication and tried to harm [Joel], his baby half brother. DCF's concern was that Paul had been through a series of traumatic living situations, was emotionally and physically abused while living with his biological mother and may have been emotionally and physically abused while living with his father and step mother." (Exhibit 8.)

28 Dr. B.T. explained that Paul's condition is due to his long-standing sense that he was not an acceptable human being. (Testimony of Dr. B.T.) "Paul's style of attachment to others is indicative of a high level of anxiety. He can attach to others but he is then threatened with being overwhelmed with anxiety. He can manage the anxiety . . . limiting the attachment or denying it totally." (Exhibit 8.) Paul has manifested his condition by barricading himself behind pillows or hiding under a table when the clinician attempts to discuss matters such as his life at Lance P.'s home. Lance P. remains single-mindedly focused upon the name of the specific diagnosis that should be assigned to Paul. However, the professionals who know this child appear to have little CT Page 8191-ak quarrel about the symptoms they identify in him, or the nature and scope of the treatment that should be rendered. (Testimony of Dr. Rogers, Dr. B.T., Karen C.)

Paul was again evaluated by Dr. Rogers in October 2002. At that time, the court-appointed evaluator found Paul to be brighter and much improved, but still troubled and frustrated; while a salutary change is apparent, the child's current emotional condition is fragile and requires appropriate nurturing attention from adults who have the capacity to interact with him in a healthy manner. (Exhibit 2; Testimony of Dr. Rogers; Dr. B.T.) Although Paul clearly benefits from his individual therapy with Dr. B.T., he remains immature and is "quite vulnerable as he begins to acknowledge his emotional need." (Exhibit 2.) Paul requires parent-figures who are not harsh and rigid but resilient, compassionate, and nurturing, as well as predictable and consistent in their approach to his needs. "Paul's apparent difficulties in trusting and bonding with others, his often limited understanding of his feelings and motives, and a propensity to translate discomfort into impulsive action will make him a challening child for whom to care." (Exhibit 2.) Resident with Lisa M. and her family for over two years, Paul has formed a secure attachment with his foster mother. He appears to be a bright child of high average or greater ability who is faring well and making friends at the magnet school he now attends.²⁹ (Exhibit 6.) The consistent clear and convincing evidence provides abundant support for Dr. B.T.'s caution that removing Paul from Lisa M.'s home would be psychologically devastating to this child. (Testimony Dr. B.T.)

29 Dr. Rogers's independent assessment of Paul's more recent status was consistent with that of the child's treating psychologist. At trial, Dr. B.T. credibly reported that currently, Paul's mood is upbeat, he is cooperative in expressing what is on his mind, and is quite verbal. (Testimony of Dr. B.T.)

II. ADJUDICATION

In the adjudicatory phase of this hearing,³⁰ the court has considered the evidence related to circumstances and events prior to May 24, 2002, the date upon which the TPR petition against April P. was filed, insofar as the allegation pertaining to abandonment is concerned.³¹ With regard to the pending allegations of failure to achieve rehabilitation, the court has also considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances occurring through the close of trial.³² Upon review, as discussed below, the court has determined that statutory grounds for termination exist as to both Lance P. and April P.

30 "Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the . . . grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in [§ 17a-112(j)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. The commissioner . . . in petitioning to terminate those rights, must allege and prove one or more of the statutory grounds." (Citation omitted.) In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 102, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000).

31 Practice Book Sec. 33-3(a) generally provides that "(i]n the adjudicatory phase, the judicial authority is limited to events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment."

32 "Despite Practice Book § 33-3(a) and case law regarding termination proceedings generally, we have determined that with regard to termination petitions brought under [§ 17a-112(j)(3)(B)], the trial court may, in the adjudicatory phase, properly consider facts and events that occur after the filing date of the petition in determining whether a respondent has achieved a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of that statute. See In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, [ 763 A.2d 83] (2000)." In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748, [ 789 A.2d 1024] (2002). Events occurring after the date of the filing of the TPR petition are particularly relevant to the issue of "whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." (Emphasis in the original; external citations omitted.) In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230.

II.A. LOCATION AND REUNIFICATION EFFORTS

As a predicate to terminating parental rights, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that "DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the CT Page 8191-h court finds in [the TPR] proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts . . ."³³ General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1); see also In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 386, 784 A.2d 457 (2001). As to both respondents, the court finds the issue of reunification efforts in favor of the petitioner.

33 As the Appellate Court has recently explained, "the department may meet its burden concerning reunification in one of three ways: (1) by showing that it made such efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3) by a previous judicial determination that such efforts were not appropriate." (Citation and quotation marks omitted.) In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, CT Page 8191-al 348, 789 A.2d 1158 (2002). Although DCF may argue that the court in this matter had previously determined that reunification efforts were not appropriate, as is represented upon the amended TPR petition, the evidence is inconsistent and insufficient to support the determination that a court made such a finding at any prior hearing by the requisite "clear and convincing" standard of proof. (Exhibit 15.) See footnote 22.

II.A.1. LANCE P., THE FATHER

Based on the clear and convincing evidence produced at trial, the court finds that the petitioner has met her reunification burden both by proving that DCF extended reasonable efforts at reunification to the respondent father, and by proving that Lance P. is unable or unwilling to benefit from statutory reunification efforts.³⁴ In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 348.

34 Insofar as § 17a-112(j)(1) is concerned, "[a]lthough `[n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.'" (Internal quotation marks, external citation omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn.App. 248, 255, 763 A.2d 71 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 105 (2001). "[R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App. 359, 372, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). Only reasonable efforts are required as "[i]t is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." (Citation omitted.) In re Antony B., 54 Conn.App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999).

A review of the clear and convincing evidence impels this conclusion. DCF has provided Lance P. with reasonable reunification efforts by implementing intensive family preservation services in the winter of 2001; by promoting weekly opportunities for him to visit with Paul and receive long-term, specific parenting training related to the visits; by providing the UCFS parent aide in 2002; and by proffering a referral to individual counseling.³⁵ These services constitute reasonable efforts to promote the father-son bond, and to help Lance P. develop the capacity to recognize and attend to Paul's needs. See also Parts I.B., C., D. and II.B.

35 In its September 20, 2002 decision, the court (Driscoll J.) found that "Father has not satisfied the Court that he has successfully addressed his need for individual therapy and parenting counseling. DCF has met its burden by the fair preponderance of the evidence of establishing the need for both." (Exhibit 15.) However, at the TPR trial, there was insufficient evidence from which the court could reasonably ascertain whether any order for Lance P. to receive "individual therapy" was entered in the uncared for case involving Paul, as opposed to the neglect case involving Dakota. (Exhibit 15).

Specifically, starting in February 2001, DCF provided IFP to Lance P. through CAFAS-SB, to build a foundation for his reunification with Paul. The IFP was followed by services directed at teaching Lance P. how to deal with his son in an appropriate manner, through the structured visitation program sponsored by CAFAS-SB and held at their facility from May through August 2001. Commencing in August 2001, supervised visitation with Paul was held at Lance P.'s home, with focused parenting education for the respondent father and Michelle P. provided by CAFAS-SB staff. These visitation and parenting education sessions continued through December 2001.³⁶ (Exhibit 17; Testimony of Karen C.)

36 Lance P. may contend that the intensive family preservation services and the CAFAS-SB at-home visitation sessions were not directed at improving his relationship with Paul, but were instead offered to help Lance P. and Michelle P. meet the needs of the other children involved. However, the clear and convincing evidence indicates that by helping Lance P. and his wife to meet the needs of Colton and Joel, who remained in their home, the CAFAS-SB services in their totality provided the corollary opportunity for enhancing Lance P.'s ability to support and care for Paul in an appropriate manner. (Exhibit 17; Testimony of Christine R.)

Notwithstanding the duration and appropriate nature of CAFAS-SB's services, Lance P. was unable or unwilling to achieve a significant benefit with regard to his ability to interact with Paul in a positive manner.³⁷ CAFAS-SB credibly observed even though Lance P. was able to exhibit improved parenting skills during early supervised meetings with Paul, the respondent father proved to be unable or unwilling to effectively communicate with his child, and unable or unwilling to provide effective discipline for him, when visits were moved to the home CT Page 8191-i milieu. In the environment shared by his wife Michelle P., Colton, and young Joel, Lance P. resumed his rigid, authoritarian, inflexible and often inconsistent parenting. Accordingly, when discharging Lance P. from its specialized parenting-education services at the end of its allotted term, CAFAS-SB noted that both the respondent father, and Michelle P. had failed to demonstrate appropriate parenting skills with Paul, and that neither had achieved the goal of engaging "in positive interactions with their children on a consistent basis." (Exhibit 17; Testimony of Karen C.)

37 In providing extended, individually oriented parenting education and supervised visitation in a progressive setting, the CAFAS-SB services CT Page 8191-am were appropriate to meet Lance P.'s mental health needs, as described the report of Dr. Rogers' February 2001 evaluation. As such, the clear and convincing evidence established that the department took the respondent's overall mental condition into consideration "when determining what `reasonable efforts' to make at reunification" as it is required to do in such cases. In re Antony B., supra, 54 Conn.App. 479.

In a further effort at reunification, DCF referred Paul for individual psychological therapy with Dr. B.T. in February 2001.³⁸ See Part I.E. Moreover, from September through December 2002, while Paul's counseling was continuing, DCF extended parent-aide services at the home of Lance P. and Michelle P. through the UCFS agency. UCFS was prepared to directly assist Lance P. and Michelle P. in acquiring appropriate skills for dealing with Colton; acquisition of these parenting skills would also be expected to improve Lance P.'s capacity to appropriately care for Paul. However, Lance P.'s lack of cooperation and insistence on rigid parenting vitiated any positive effect from the UCFS services, again demonstrating his inability or unwillingness to benefit from reasonable efforts at reunification.³⁹ (Testimony of Christine R.)

38 While the focus of Dr. B.T.'s therapy was to assist Paul in developing emotional stability, this process provided an opportunity to increase the child's capacity to interact with Lance P. in a healthy manner. Thus, Paul's own individual counseling is an integrally related feature of the reunification efforts extended by DCF to the respondent father.

39 When Lance P. terminated the UCFS parent-aide services before the program had been completed, he forfeited the opportunity for him to obtain a benefit from this reasonable reunification effort. (Testimony of Christine R.)

Furthermore, DCF extended to Lance P. the opportunity for a referral to mental health counseling, but he declined to participate in this aspect of the department reunification efforts. Recognizing the respondent father's need for mental health services, DCF raised the subject of individual counseling with Lance P. following Dakota's removal from his home in July 2001.⁴⁰ The department made no specific referrals for such services, however, as Lance P. expressly indicated that he would work with providers sponsored by his Employee Assistance Plan, and that he desired to select a provider with a high level of education and training.⁴¹ (Testimony of Christine R.)

40 The specific steps in this case did not mandate that Lance P. participate in individual counseling. (Exhibit 11.) However, the evidence permits the clear inference that the court had ordered the respondent father to attend such therapy in connection with Dakota's case. See footnote 35.

41 As found in Part I.A., Lance P. had informed DCF that he had participated in mental health treatment off and on since 1996. He stated that he was already engaged in individual counseling with a therapist of his choice, ostensibly Deedee P., at the time Paul was removed from his care. (Testimony of Christine R.) At trial, Lance P.'s counsel conceded that DCF has no obligation to duplicate services already in place. (Tr. 2/3/03.) See footnote 12.

Even with treatment from his chosen therapists and method of counseling, however, Lance P. has remained unable or unwilling to effectively benefit from reasonable efforts at reunification. As found in Part II.B., Lance P.'s family therapist Gary F. attended to issues affecting the respondent father's relationship with Colton and Joel, in conjunction with Michelle P. The social-worker therapist never addressed Lance P.'s relationship with Paul during their many family sessions or even during the two individual meetings. (Testimony Gary F.) This clear and convincing evidence is sufficient to support the inference that Lance P. did not raise Paul's situation with Gary F., leaving the matter unattended to during this counseling process. CT Page 8191-j

Moreover, as fully discussed in Part II.B., the psychological evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Lance P. is unable or unwilling to obtain reasonable, timely benefits from appropriate reunification services. The court credits Dr. Rogers's opinion that Lance P. is unlikely to ameliorate his parenting deficits under any circumstances. As Dr. Rogers has written: "The father's apparent rigidity and lack of social understanding make it difficult for him to appreciate Paul's intentions and needs, and to respond to them accordingly. His apparent lack of flexibility inhibits productive change." (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit 4; see also Exhibit 3; Testimony of Karen C.) As far as Paul is concerned, Dr. Rogers's well-founded opinion is consistent with Lance P.'s intrinsic inability or unwillingness to obtain a measurable benefit from services provided by CAFAS-SB or UCFS.

Given all the circumstances of this case and acknowledging Paul's special needs, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF proffered reasonable reunification efforts to Lance P. through IFP program; intensive visitation and parenting education services through CAFAS-SB; the UCFS parent aide; the extension of an offer to refer him for counseling; and the weekly visitation that has continued throughout the child's time in foster care. However, the respondent father was unable or unwilling to respond to these efforts in the requisite timely fashion.⁴² See In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 385 (parent must respond to reunification efforts in a timely way so as to assist the child). Reviewing the evidence in its totality, it is apparent that DCF's reunification efforts were thwarted by Lance P.'s own conduct in failing to adequately respond to these services, and by his choice or overwhelming predilection to continue with his inflexible and autocratic methods of dealing with Paul. In this case, it was "not the conduct of the department" that caused reunification efforts to fail. In re Amelia W., 62 Conn.App. 500, 506, 772 A.2d 619 (2001); see In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 350. As DCF provided reasonable reunification efforts to Lance P., and as the respondent father remains unable or unwilling to timely benefit from any services contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1), the petitioner has met her burden of proof on this issue.⁴³ See In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 385.

42 Lance P. may argue that this court is bound by the September 2002 ruling which resolved the dispositional issues related to Paul's uncared for petition. Judge Driscoll then held that continuing efforts at reunification between Lance P. and Paul were "not appropriate as the child is not capable of supporting them at present . . ." He further ordered "a plan calling for long term foster care in the home of maternal aunt and uncle to support the efforts of Paul's individual therapist, with the expectation and hope, that when and if deemed therapeutically appropriate, father will be included in the efforts to overcome Paul's attachment disorder. The Court recognizes that this may not be therapeutically indicated for many, many months, if at all." (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit 15.) However, the clear and convincing evidence CT Page 8191-an presented at the TPR trial establishes that Paul's special psychological needs preclude reunification now or at any reasonable time in the future, and that Lance P. is either unwilling or unable to achieve statutory rehabilitation. See Parts II.B. and III.B. Moreover, as found in Part I.C., the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Paul was adjudicated an uncared for child (Driscoll, J.) on February 1, 2001. It is the finding of adjudication, and not the disposition of the underlying uncared for petition, which serves as an elemental predicate to termination of Lance P.'s parental rights in this case, pursuant to the application of § 17a-112(3)(B). See In re David W., 52 Conn.App. 576, 584 (1999) (separate judgments required for uncared for and termination petitions); In re Jessica M., supra, 49 Conn.App. 247-48 (dissenting opinion by Hennessey, J.) (construing the predecessor to applicable termination statute).

43 Either Lance P. or April P. may attempt to argue that DCF failed to undertake reasonable efforts at reunification under the analysis utilized by In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637 (2002). Salient factual distinctions, however, render the Vincent B. result inapposite to the present matter. Unlike the respondent father and mother in this case, the parent in Vincent B. had successfully participated in "a long-term inpatient substance abuse treatment program to treat a lengthy alcohol addiction." In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 642. He had apparently achieved functional recovery, as in that matter "[t]he record shows no evidence of relapses." Id., 644. Furthermore, the psychological expert in Vincent B. had formed her opinion concerning the respondent father's inability or unwillingness to benefit from reunification efforts based only upon an evaluation performed "prior to his successful completion of the treatment program." (Emphasis added.) Id., 646. In this case, however, there is no reliable evidence establishing that either Lance P. or April P. has successfully benefitted from valid mental health services or that either parent has gained any significant measure of insight into his or her parenting deficits. In the absence of such evidence, the principles of Vincent B. are inapposite to the present matter.

II.A.2. APRIL P., THE MOTHER

Based on the clear and convincing evidence produced at trial, the court finds that the department has met its reunification burden by proving that April P. is unable or unwilling to benefit from any of the reasonable reunification efforts contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1).⁴⁴ In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 348. DCF provided April P. with case CT Page 8191-k management, transportation, permanency planning, and administrative case review services. As found in Part I.A., prior to Paul's removal from Lance P.'s home, April P. had participated in psychotherapy, psychiatric treatment, and medication management for her mental health issues. She reported that she had commenced a course of psychiatric care and medication therapy eighteen months prior to her court-ordered psychological evaluation in January 2001, although she had not complied with her medication regimen. (Exhibit 3.)

44 See footnote 34.

Notwithstanding this prior treatment, following her January 2001 evaluation, Dr. Rogers firmly established that from a psychological viewpoint, April P. lacked the personal resources to make any progress in developing appropriate parenting skills, even if other reunification services were extended to her. The court credits and accepts Dr. Rogers's opinion, expressed in the winter of 2001, that April P.'s personality style and psychological functioning then made it highly unlikely that she would be able to change her parenting methods or communication skills within a reasonable period. (Exhibits 3, 5.) The court further accepts and credits Dr. Rogers's subsequent caution, rendered nearly two years later in the fall of November 2002 that: "Based on past and present interview and testing of [April P.] . . . she is unlikely to significantly alter her long-term pattern of erratic, self-focused and often irresponsible action."⁴⁵ (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit 3.)

45 In his February 2001 report, Dr. Rogers incisively wrote with regard to April P.'s emotional status, unpredictable and self-focused personality style, as it then existed: "It is not anticipated that any form of counseling or therapy could so materially alter these circumstances as to make reunification feasible within a reasonable period.' (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit 5.)

As found in Part II.C.2., the facts of this case prove the accuracy of Dr. Rogers's prognosis. April P. has failed to change her pattern of conduct notwithstanding a course of counseling with LMH-TCC, and medication management she ostensibly received from that hospital-based provider, to which she was referred by DCF. While April P. has, from time to time, shown some ability to bring her personal life under some control, she has been unable to achieve any lasting or long-term benefit from her present or past mental health treatment. (Exhibits 3, 9, AA.) Because April P. continues to lack insight into her own problems, the prospect for timely benefit of services remains sadly remote. Under these circumstances, the clear and convincing evidence impels the conclusion that April P. is unable and unwilling to effectively respond to reunification efforts in a timely way. See In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 385.

April P. may argue that DCF cannot prevail on this issue because the department failed to make reasonable efforts to facilitate visitation after Paul was returned to foster care in November 2000, and that the department thereby failed to comply with the court's order for the department to "set up visitation" for mother and son. (Exhibit 10.) Notwithstanding the sincerity of the respondent mother's argument, the CT Page 8191-l clear and convincing evidence establishes that DCF acknowledged April P.'s desire for contact with Paul, but judiciously deferred visitation until the court-appointed psychological evaluator had determined whether this would serve the child's best interests. When DCF learned from Dr. Rogers's January 2001 report that mother-child visits would be detrimental to the child, the department appropriately relied upon the psychologist's recommendations and reasonably declined to offer visits for April P.⁴⁶ (Exhibit 1; Testimony of Christine R.) In December 2001, when April P. again asked DCF for visitation with Paul, DCF appropriately consulted with the child's therapist, Dr. B.T.

46 In his January 29, 2001 report, based upon his thorough assessment CT Page 8191-ao of mother and son, Dr. Rogers cautioned that "[r]eunification would likely be quite emotionally harmful to this already quite wounded child." (Exhibit 5.) DCF's determination to withhold mother-son visitation was also consistent with the restraining order ruling of April 27, 1998 (Gordon, J.) which allowed only professionally supervised visitation that is "set up by" Paul's attorney. Moreover, in honoring Dr. Rogers's recommendations, the department took the respondent's overall mental condition into consideration when determining that mother-son visits would not constitute a reasonable reunification effort in the context of this case. In re Antony B., supra, 54 Conn.App. 479.

Upon Dr. B.T.'s indication that she would need to interview April P. and her therapist before recommending visitation, DCF asked the respondent mother to arrange for an appointment. In so doing, the department reasonably opened the door to mother-son visitation in this case. The evidence is insufficient to allow the court to ascertain why this interview never occurred, whether April P. failed to make appropriate efforts to contact Dr. B.T. to arrange for the interview in question, or whether Dr. B.T. failed to respond to any inquiries the respondent mother may have raised. (Testimony of Dr. B.T., Christine R.) However, it is abundantly clear that DCF did not interfere with the child's therapist's suggestion that she be permitted to interview April P. before condoning visitation with Paul.

April P. may also argue that economic circumstances prevented her from accessing individual counseling on a consistent basis, so that the petitioner is thereby precluded from prevailing on the reasonable efforts element of the TPR claim. As the court has previously found based on clear and convincing evidence that April P. is fundamentally unable or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification services, however, this contention is inapposite.⁴⁷

47 See footnote 71; see also Exhibit 14. There is insufficient evidence from which the court could reasonably conclude that April P. had, at any time, requested financial assistance from DCF for purpose of securing mental health treatment.

April P. may further protest that the petitioner cannot succeed on this element of the TPR petition because DCF wrongfully placed Paul in the home of Lisa M., with whom the respondent mother has a discordant relationship. April P. would have the court find that it was Lisa M., and not other factors, that kept her from maintaining a relationship with Paul. Such an argument belies the fact, however, that April P.'s separation from this child was mandated by a pendente lite order and by judgment of the court in the dissolution action, as fully discussed in Part I.A. Given these constraints, and given Thomas's placement in Lisa M.'s home, the department acted appropriately by arranging family foster care for Paul. As found in Parts I.E. and III.B., Paul has grown into a more healthy and better adjusted child while in the care of Lisa M. and her husband. The court received insufficient evidence from which it could CT Page 8191-m reasonably conclude either that this placement in any way adversely affected April P.'s opportunity to participate in reunification services, or that the placement had a negative impact upon her ability or willingness to benefit from reunification efforts.

In reaching the decision that April P. is unable or unwilling to benefit from the extension of reasonable reunification services, the court acknowledges that she cooperated with the majority of the specific steps at issue. She complied with DCF's request for a substance abuse evaluation in January 2002, and attended some medication management and individual counseling sessions at LMH-TCC in response to DCF's request. (Exhibit AA; Testimony of Christine R.) However, as fully discussed in Part II.C.2., April P. has failed to obtain anything but fleeting benefit from the LMH-TCC therapy process, despite available medication management and the treatment she has received in the past. April P.'s mental health condition remains refractory to treatment, and inimical to the nurturing, consistent parenting style that Paul so desperately requires.⁴⁸

48 As found in Part I.E, Paul commenced individual psychotherapy with Dr. B.T. in February 2001. While the focus of Dr. B.T.'s therapy was to assist the child in developing emotional stability, a corollary benefit would be the enhancement of Paul's capacity to interact with April P. in a healthy manner. On its own, Paul's own individual counseling stands as a part of the reunification efforts extended by DCF to the respondent mother. However, Paul has not yet acquired the psychological fortitude which he would need to have meaningful contact with April P. Given the respondent mother's failure to effectively respond to mental health treatment despite the passage of time, April P. has not yet developed the communication skills necessary to allow contact with Paul that would be safe and beneficial to the child.

Reviewing the evidence in its totality, it is clearly and convincingly apparent that DCF's reunification efforts were thwarted by April P.'s own behavior in failing to make effective use of the counseling services provided, and by the chronic, unrelenting psychological conditions which affect her, "not the conduct of the department." In re Amelia W., supra, 62 Conn.App. 506; see In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 350. As the respondent mother remains unable or unwilling to timely benefit from any reunification services contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1), the petitioner has met her burden of proof on this issue.⁴⁹ See In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 385.

49 See footnote 43.

II.B. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION — LANCE P. — FAILURE TO REHABILITATE — § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)

The petitioner alleges that Lance P.'s parental rights should be terminated because he has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).⁵⁰ Lance P. counters that he has attended to the pivotal elements of the specific steps, and has made sufficient progress in rehabilitation to resume a responsible role in Paul's life. As Paul was found to be uncared for on February 1, 2001, the critical issue for this court is whether the respondent has achieved rehabilitation in the statutory sense. Applying the requisite legal standards⁵¹ and construing the statute in accordance with § 17a-112(p),⁵² the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.

50 General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court as to the parent of a child who: "(i) has been found by the . . . Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child."

51 "`Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful CT Page 8191-ap role as a parent . . . [The statute] requires the trial court . . . to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [the parent] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [the parent] can assume a responsible position in [his] child's life.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Eden F., [ 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999)] . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [the] ability to manage [his or her] own life, but rather whether [the parent] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000). See also In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384-85; In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied 255 Conn. 250, 759 A.2d 63 (2001).

52 Section 17a-112(p) establishes that the provisions of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) "shall be liberally construed in the best interests of any child for whom a petition under this section has been filed."

Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case CT Page 8191-n compel the conclusion that Lance P. has yet to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation with regard to his underlying mental health issues, rigid personality style and parenting deficits as would encourage the belief that at some reasonable date in the future he could assume a responsible position in Paul's life. See In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 354, 776 A.2d 487 (2001); In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448. First, the psychological evidence in this case clearly and convincingly establishes that Lance P.'s capacity to parent Paul remains significantly impaired by his unresolved mental health issues. In re John G., supra, 56 Conn.App. 24. In reaching its determination, the court has accepted and relied upon the testimony and written opinions emanating from Dr. Rogers, the court-appointed psychological evaluator who performed serial assessments and interactional evaluations of Lance P. and Paul.⁵³ Dr. Rogers's thorough evaluation process, his detailed, comprehensive analysis and his credible expert testimony provided a clear and convincing explication of Lance P.'s anger, communication difficulties, and parenting issues, consistent with the other reliable evidence produced at trial.⁵⁴

53 Dr. Rogers had reportedly evaluated Lance P. in the fall of 2001, and submitted a report to the court under date of November 20, 2001. (Exhibit 2.) This report was not submitted in evidence at the TPR trial.

54 "The psychological testimony from professionals is rightly accorded great weight in termination proceedings." (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) In re John G., 56 Conn.App. 12, 24, 740 A.2d 496 (1999). In assessing the degree to which weight should be attributed to mental health professionals in this proceeding, the court followed the applicable rules for assessing witness testimony. See footnote 6. Connecticut's courts have long honored the axiom that "[t]he court has every right to lean more heavily upon the testimony of one expert than upon the testimony of another. In the case of a conflict in the opinions of experts, the court's duty is to accept that testimony which appears to be more credible. The acceptance or rejection of the opinion of the expert witness is a matter peculiarly within the province of the trier of fact." (Internal and external citations omitted.) Sorenson Transportation Co. v. State, 3 Conn.App. 329, 331-32 (1985); see also Keans v. Bocciarelli, supra, 35 Conn.App. 241-42.

Upon this substantial foundation,⁵⁵ the court credits Dr. Roger's opinion that while the respondent father demonstrates no major psychiatric illness, he presents with disturbing personality traits that markedly interfere with his ability to safely parent Paul.⁵⁶ (Exhibit 4; Testimony of Dr. Rogers.) With Obsessive-Compulsive Personality traits seen in his preoccupation with perfection, order and rigid control over his surroundings, and with narcissistic features manifest by self-aggrandizement and lack of empathy, Lance P.'s limited ability to understand or respond to social cues serves as a major impediment to his capacity to effectively communicate with Paul. As a result of his psychological condition which has remained unchanged despite the help Lance P. has ostensibly sought from Deedee P. and that which he has obtained from Gary F., the respondent father is unable to adequately meet Paul's special psychological needs. (Exhibit 4; Testimony of Dr. Rogers.)

55 In addition to the substance of his opinions, the court credits the testimony rendered by Dr. Rogers "based on its firsthand observation of his conduct, demeanor and attitude" in its entirety, and its review of the evidence as a whole. State v. Owens, 63 Conn.App. 245, 251, 775 A.2d 325 (2001); see also In re Ashley E., supra. 62 Conn. 316; In re CT Page 8191-aq Pascacio R., 52 Conn.App. 106, 114-15, 726 A.2d 114 (1999). In assessing the respondent parents, Dr. Rogers thoroughly accounted for such factors as Lance P.'s desire to present himself in the best possible light, his history of trauma and ADHD, his military background, stresses related to the removal of children from his care, the status of other family members, and other relevant factors. As to April P., Dr. Rogers fully accounted for her long history of mental illness, her court-ordered separation from her children, her choice of partners, and other relevant factors. (Testimony of Dr. Rogers.) Under these circumstances, the court finds that throughout his involvement with this matter, Dr. Rogers's provision of expert evidence has been fair, objective, and without bias, prejudice or allegiance to any person or party.

56 At trial, Dr. Rogers credibly explained that Lance P. presents with some of the features of many different Personality Disorder categories, but not enough to warrant diagnosis with any one particular Personality Disorder. (Testimony of Dr. Rogers.)

Other aspects of the psychological evidence in this case clearly and convincingly establish that Lance P.'s capacity to parent Paul remains significantly impaired by his unresolved mental health issues. See In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 354; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448. In his February 2001 meeting with Dr. Rogers, Lance P. raised many complaints about Paul's behavior, which he claimed to involve aggression, stealing and manipulation of his brother Dakota and others.⁵⁷ Lance P. was highly defensive about the conditions that affected Paul when he lived with him and Michelle P.; he demonstrated a lamentable lack of awareness CT Page 8191-o that it was appropriate for Paul to desire safety and nurturance in the home, with freedom from unreasonable restraints.⁵⁸ While criticizing Paul, Lance P. attempted to deflect confrontation concerning his own psychological issues. Lance P. "consistently avoided reporting of problems to such a great extent that it detracted from his credibility" and his self-directed "bias likely obscured any areas of potential concern" during Dr. Rogers' evaluation process. (Exhibit 4.) Through this behavior, Lance P. manifested a fundamental unwillingness or inability to acknowledge the grave effects of his own conduct, stating that he could not accept responsibility because so doing would mean that the child "[has] got what he wants." (Exhibit 4.)

57 Lance P. had presented these same complaints to Paul's treating psychologist, Dr. B.T., at the commencement of the child's counseling in February 2001. The court credits the treating psychologists' determination, made after examination and treatment, that Paul is not a manipulative child, but one who feels rejected and abandoned. (Testimony of Dr. B.T.)

58 As discussed in Part III.B., given the firm marital bond between Lance P. and Michelle and the fact that they make their home together, the step-mother's capacity to responsibly parent Paul is fundamental to the subject of the degree, if any, to which the respondent father has achieved statutory rehabilitation.

Nearly two years later, in his October 2002 meeting with Dr. Rogers, Lance P. continued to complain about Paul.⁵⁹ Lance P. reported that during visits with Colton, Joel and Michelle P., Paul's aggressive, angry and violent behavior was "even a bit more severe than before" the child entered foster care.⁶⁰ (Exhibit 2.) Lance P. appeared both angry and stilted in behavior during this evaluation. (Testimony of Dr. Rogers.) Despite his four months of participation in Gary F.'s couples counseling, months of parenting education services from CAFAS-SB, and Lance P.'s reported treatment with Deedee P., many aspects of Lance P.'s psychological status remained unimproved from the conditions found in the February 2001 court-ordered evaluation.⁶¹ At trial, Dr. Rogers credibly opined that Lance P.'s emotional condition and parenting capacity had actually deteriorated between the 2001 and 2002 evaluations, as the respondent father had become progressively more disorganized, and his propensity for acting without thinking was more prevalent. (Exhibit 2; Testimony of Dr. Rogers.) Dr. Rogers cogently explained the ramifications of Lance P.'s narrow focus upon issues such as the specificity of Paul's psychological diagnosis, and his lack of appropriate attention to or interest in the supportive, understanding aspects of parenting which are so fundamental to ensuring this child's healthy development: "While intellectually capable of perceiving Paul's status and needs, [Lance P.] seems too preoccupied with the particulars of the boy's condition to respond to him in an effective and nurturant way . . . [Lance P.'s] seeming need for control interacts poorly with Paul's reticence and his propensity to distort events and relationships." (Exhibit 2.)

59 During Dr. Rogers' October 2002 interview, Lance P. demonstrated the same self-bias in responding that had been noted during his previous psychological evaluation; with some assessments, his "excessive attempt to present himself in a favorable light" led to the invalidation of test results. (Exhibit 2.)

60 Lance P. described Paul as screaming at his brothers, defying authority, lacking accountability for his behavior, and being secretive. He reported that Paul was "`ripping things and stormed off.'" Lance P. was also concerned about the child's ostensibly over-interest in video games and junk food. (Exhibit 2.)

61 The court credits Dr. Rogers' well-founded opinion that in October 2002, "[Lance P.] presented clinically and psychometrically as a rigid CT Page 8191-ar and extremely self-focused man who strongly resists influence or change . . . He seems satisfied only when in clear control of his social and situational milieu, but influence of both appears to have eluded him. Compulsive and Narcissistic Personality Traits continue to create substantial problems in coping." (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit 2.)

Overall, the psychological evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that notwithstanding the opportunities available to him and the passage of over two years since his son was placed in foster care, Lance P. has not gained the ability to care for Paul's particular needs. Lance P. was no better able to care for Paul in October 2002 than he had been previously, but was, from a psychological viewpoint, less able to CT Page 8191-p meet the child's special needs and unable or unwilling to meet those needs in the foreseeable future. As Dr. Rogers succinctly explained in his November 2002 Psychological Evaluation Addendum, "[Lance P.'s] orientation, stance and style continue to interact poorly with Paul's needs, and this is unlikely to change within a reasonable period." (Exhibit 3; Testimony of Dr. Rogers.) Thus, from a psychological perspective, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Lance P. has failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation.⁶² In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384-85; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665.

62 It is Lance P.'s inability or unwillingness to function as a parent, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, and not his mental health status per se, that leads the court to find that the respondent father has not achieved rehabilitation in this case. See In re Jessica S., 51 Conn.App. 667, 673, 723 A.2d 356, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 901, 738 A.2d 1090 (1999). "`Termination has been consistently recognized as being in the best interest of the child when the parent has a mental deficiency or illness which renders [him] unable to provide the child with necessary care.' In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn.App. [598, 605, 520 A.2d 639, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 804, 525 A.2d 519 (1987)]." In re Jessica S., supra, 51 Conn.App. 667, 673-74.

Second, the empirical evidence reflects that although Lance P. persistently expresses an interest in doing so, he is functionally unable or unwilling to implement the skills necessary to serve as a responsive parent for a child with Paul's specific emotional needs. See In re Anmeris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384-85. During the interactional evaluation performed by Dr. Rogers in February 2001, a high level of tension was apparent between father and son; the respondent exhibited precious little compassion, empathy, or warmth toward the child; and Paul appeared to be "braced to be chided and/or punished" by his father. (Exhibit 4.) Neither Lance P. nor his wife Michelle P. verbally or physically expressed affection for Paul during this session, although there was abundant opportunity and reason to do so.

Although some improvements were noted during the initial CAFAS-SB sessions, Lance P.'s parenting deficits remained largely evident throughout the subsequent course of supervised visitation and parenting education, as described in Part II.A.1. During home visits, the CAFAS-SB staff noted that both Lance P. and Michelle P. remained rigid, controlling, and authoritarian, yet inconsistent in their parenting style. At home, Lance P. had limited communication with and only sporadically praised any of the children; and remained unable or unwilling to utilize appropriate disciplinary techniques. Lance P. and his wife both became resistant to receiving constructive criticism or suggestions for modification of parenting behaviors. The CAFAS-SB discharge report indicated that the respondent father had made only partial progress in augmenting his communication skills with Paul during his visits, and also stated that neither Lance P. nor Michelle P. yet learned how to interact with any of the children in a positive manner.⁶³ (Exhibit 17; Testimony of Karen C.)

63 The CAFAS-SB discharge report also states that "[d]uring [Lance P.'s and Michelle P.'s] involvement with the visitation program, they were referred to the DCF Care Line . . ." (Exhibit 17.) As a result of one referral, Colton and Joel were removed from the home and placed in DCF care, but they were soon returned to the custody of Lance P. and his wife. (Exhibit 17.) Lance P.'s lack of progress in rehabilitation is further demonstrated through the need for Dakota to be removed from the home in the midst of the CAFAS-SB program, as found in Part I.C.

Lance P. argues that his compliance with the specific steps precludes termination of his parental rights. (Exhibit 1.) Indeed, his technical fulfillment of the original steps is consistent with Dr. Rogers's finding that Lance P. has "a reasonable grasp of the basics of childcare." CT Page 8191-q (Exhibit 4.) The degree of Lance P.'s compliance with the steps remains at issue, however; the court has previously addressed the insufficiency of Lance P.'s response to the parenting counseling that was initially ordered, and the lack of measurable evidence reflecting his ostensible individual therapy.⁶⁴ Moreover, compliance with specific steps does not, in and of itself, evince a parent's rehabilitation in the context of a TPR proceeding based on § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) allegations. The Appellate Court has confirmed that, "[i]n determining whether a parent has achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation, a court may consider whether the parent has corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment, regardless of whether those factors were included in specific [steps] ordered by the court or imposed by the department." (External citations omitted.) In re Vincent D., 65 Conn.App. 658, 670, 783 A.2d 534 (2001).

64 See footnote 35.

In this matter, Lance P. has not corrected the parenting deficits or self-absorbedness that were apparent when Paul was removed from his home in November 2000. The evidence may indeed support Lance P.'s contention that he has attended a long course of supervised visitation and parenting education and that he has, from a chronological standpoint, completed that program. (Exhibit 17.) However, Lance P.'s deep-seated parenting deficits persist, resting upon the unchanged fact that although he has substantive knowledge of children's needs in general, he remains unable or unwilling to apply that knowledge in a manner that will have a beneficial effect upon Paul. As discussed above, in the CAFAS-SB program, Lance P. resisted opportunities to implement what he had been taught; was unable or unwilling to apply the multi-modal disciplinary techniques in which he had been instructed; and persisted in using his own rigid, controlling and ineffective methods of child management. Failing to demonstrate due interest in learning behavior modification techniques from the CAFAS-SB staff, Lance P. persisted instead in inquiring about specific mechanisms for dealing with "Reactive Attachment Disorder," the condition he insisted was affecting Paul.⁶⁵ As the parenting-education process continued, Lance P. and his wife became more set in their own ways, less willing or able to accept guidance and instruction from the CAFAS-SB staff, rendering little benefit for Paul. (Testimony Karen C.)

65 See footnote 28.

Lance P. further protests that his family counseling with Gary F. has rendered him sufficiently rehabilitated so that he can provide effective permanent parenting for Paul. In his capacity as a licensed clinical social worker, Gary F. found that Lance P. had made progress in his ability to demonstrate positive involvement with and set appropriate limits for Colton and young Joel. However, Gary F. frankly admitted at trial that he did "not have great knowledge of Paul or Dakota with regard CT Page 8191-r to their issues" and that he had not worked on the relationship between Lance P. and Paul during their sessions. (Testimony Gary F.) The court appreciates this social worker's candor with the court. However, due to their insufficient foundation the court attributes little weight to Gary F.'s opinions concerning Lance P.'s ability to serve as a responsible parent for Paul, whose special needs are unique and distinct from those of Colton, Joel or Dakota.⁶⁶

66 Lance P. may argue that evidence related to the family counseling he has received from Gary F. outweighs the other evidence which consistently establishes his failure to achieve rehabilitation. However, in providing family counseling for Lance P., Gary F. admitted that he had not secured any reports from the respondent father's previous health care providers such as Deedee P. Gary F. has never evaluated Paul or seen him interacting with Lance P. On the other hand, Dr. Rogers's psychological opinions were soundly based upon his superior education and experience in the evaluation process, upon his professional consultation with Deedee P. and Dr. B.T., and upon the thorough and reliable data base accumulated during his serial evaluations of Paul, Lance P. and Michelle P. The psychologist alone based his opinion upon the sum of the relevant factors, and not overly limited aspects of the matter. Under the circumstances of this case, the court finds that Gary F.'s conclusions CT Page 8191-as about Lance P.'s mental health and parenting capacity with regard to Paul lack foundation. As such, his conclusions cannot prevail over the more credible, well-founded opinions of the independent court-appointed psychologist, Dr. Rogers. Keans v. Bocciarelli, supra, 35 Conn.App. 241-42.

Based on all the facts presented in this case, the court finds that Lance P.'s rehabilitation is not foreseeable within a reasonable time. In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 353. In reaching this conclusion, the court has analyzed the respondent father's relative lack of present rehabilitation as it relates to Paul's particular needs for a responsible parent who can provide him with emotional stability, security, and consistency. Even if Lance P. should now actively engage in rehabilitation properly directed at developing insight into his compulsion for control, his rigidity and overly high expectations of young children in his care, those efforts would be "too little and too late" for Paul given the lengthy period that has passed since his adjudication as an uncared for child in February 2001. In re Sheila J., 62 Conn.App. 470, 481-82, 771 A.2d 244 (2001). This child should not be further burdened by having to wait any longer for his father to attempt to achieve the level of competency necessary to parent him. In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 385.

The respondent father loves Paul, and wants to serve as his custodian and caretaker. However, the court accepts and credits Dr. Roger's opinion that after the intensive, long-term CAFAS-SB training, Gary F.'s family counseling and Dr. B.T.'s psychotherapy, although Lance P. showed a better ability to relate to his son than he had in the past, the degree of his rehabilitation was insufficient to meet Paul's needs; thus, father-son interactions still left the child with anxiety. (Exhibit 2.) See In re Latifa K., supra, 67 Conn.App. 748; In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn.App. 230. Even if Lance P. has improved his ability to manage his own affairs and achieved a level of stability within his own limitations, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that he is not yet ready to serve as a responsible parent for Paul. Where the clear and convincing evidence establishes that a respondent cannot be a competent parent to the child because he cannot provide the nurturing, safe and structured environment warranted by Paul's age and special needs, "[a] parent's love and biological connection . . . is simply not enough" to overcome clear and convincing evidence of failure to achieve rehabilitation. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 667. CT Page 8191-s

In its totality, the clear and convincing evidence compels the conclusion that despite some participation in a rehabilitation regimen, Lance P. remains without the qualities necessary to successfully parent Paul and further lacks the ability to assume a responsible position in Paul's life within a reasonably foreseeable time in the future. While understanding and appreciating "the hardship suffered by the respondent [father]," based on the clear and convincing evidence in this case, the court is constrained to find that the petitioner has proved Lance P.'s failure to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). In re Jessica S., supra, 51 Conn.App. 674.

II.C. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION — APRIL P.⁶⁷ II.C.1. ABANDONMENT — § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)

67 "Because the statutory grounds necessary to grant a petition of termination of parental rights are expressed in the disjunctive, the court need find only one ground to grant the petition." In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 473, 815 A.2d 1261 (2003), citing In re Alexander C., 67 Conn.App. 417, 427, 787 A.2d 608 (2001), aff'd, 262 Conn. 308, 813 A.2d 87 (2003). To comply with Practice Book § 6-1, the court has addressed both grounds for termination brought against April P.

The petitioner first alleges that April P. abandoned Paul within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A). Applying the requisite legal standards⁶⁸ and construing the statute in accordance with § 17a-112(p),⁶⁹ the court finds that the petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proof on this issue.⁷⁰

68 "Abandonment focuses on the parent's conduct . . . General Statutes [§ 17a-112(j)(3)(A)] defines abandonment as the fail[ure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest . . . The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes; (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care; (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn.App. 193.

69 See footnote 52.

70 "Because the statutory grounds necessary to grant a petition of termination of parental rights are expressed in the disjunctive, the court need find only one ground to grant the petition." In re Brea B., 75 Conn.App. 466, 473, 815 A.2d 1261 (2003), citing In re Alexander C., 67 Conn.App. 417, 427, 787 A.2d 608 (2001), aff'd, 262 Conn. 308, 813 A.2d 87 (2003). To comply with Practice Book § 6-1, the court has addressed both grounds for termination brought against April P.

The petitioner bases her abandonment claim upon the fact that April P. had no contact with Paul since the entry of the family court orders in April 1998; with the exception of interaction during Dr. Rogers' psychological evaluations. (Testimony of Christine R.) She asserts that this evidence proves that during the adjudicatory period and for long prior thereto, the respondent mother failed "to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child . . ." In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn.App. 193. This argument must fail for two reasons. First, prior to Dr. Rogers' evaluation of Paul in December 2000 and his evaluation of April P. in January 2001, the respondent mother remained subject to the family court's April 1998 orders which limited her to visits that had been arranged by the child's attorney, to be held only at a professionally supervised facility. (Exhibit 14.) The family court did not prohibit April P. from seeing her son; she had not committed a crime, which resulted in her incarceration and punitive sequestration from Paul. The petitioner provided insufficient evidence from which the court could reasonably ascertain whether the visitation contemplated by the family court was ever made available to April P.⁷¹ See Part I.A. Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence from which the court could reasonably find that April P. was economically able to access visits at a professionally supervised facility, but elected not to participate in such visits, thereby demonstrating her lack of interest in or attention to Paul.⁷² Under these circumstances, any failure to attend contemplated visits CT Page 8191-t cannot fairly be attributed to the respondent mother.

71 On January 12, 2000 April P. submitted a Motion for Contempt claiming that Paul's attorney had not made sufficient efforts to effectuate the professionally supervised visitation that had been ordered in April 1998. Although this motion was not acted upon by the court, by raising the issue, April P. complied with the spirit of In re Alexander C., supra, 67 Conn.App. 425.

72 On April 23, 1998, the court (Gordon, J.) found April P. to have "an earning capacity of seven dollars and fifty cents an hour on a full-time basis." (Exhibit 14.) Nonetheless, based upon her affidavits, CT Page 8191-at the court has found April P. to be indigent and thus eligible for waivers of fees and costs on other occasions. See Orders of April 4, 1998 (Handy, J.); April 8, 1998; May 13, 1998 (Handy, J.); February 26, 1999; January 12, 2000 (Corradino, J.); November 29, 2000 (Schimmelman, J.).

Second, the court records show that while April P. did not provide physical care for Paul, she made repeated attempts to secure access to her son during the years of litigation that preceded the TPR trial. Although she had asked the family court to terminate her parental rights to Paul in November of 1997, April P. thereafter demonstrated her interest in the child by filing a series of motions asking the court to increase the parameters of permissible visitation.⁷³ See In re Alexander C., supra, 67 Conn.App. 42 (court expects a parent to affirmatively attempt modification of extant visitation orders). Objectively viewed, these motions indicate April P.'s continued attention to and concern for her son, notwithstanding the failure of her efforts to enhance the visitation schedule or to secure custody through the family court. The clear and convincing evidence indicates that April P. maintained "a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child" without violating the extant court orders which significantly restricted her access to him. In re Deana E., 61 Conn.App. 193. April P.'s actions thus effectively blunt the force of any evidence which might suggest that she had ever abandoned Paul by failing to visit him. Under these circumstances, a finding that the respondent mother's failure to visit the child constituted statutory abandonment would be overly harsh, violating the spirit and intent of In re Alexander C., supra, 67 Conn.App. 425.

73 The family court file demonstrates that through the years April P. repeatedly filed motions seeking additional opportunities for contact with Paul; appropriately, she submitted no motions for visitation between September 13, 2001 when evidence in the neglect case commenced, and September 20, 2002 when the court (Driscoll, J.) entered the adjudication for Paul. April P.'s "Ex Parte Motion for Modification of Judgment," requesting the court to terminate her parental rights, was denied (Solomon, J.) on November 10, 1997. The following motions for custody or enhanced visitation were submitted to the court by April P., but were never the subject of court action: a Motion for Modification of pendente lite custody and visitation orders, dated March 29, 1998; Proposed Orders seeking joint custody of Paul and his brothers, dated April 6, 1998; a Motion to Open and Modify seeking "immediate physical contact with" and custody of Paul and his brothers, dated February 19, 1999; and a Motion to Open and Modify seeking immediate visitation with and custody of Paul and his brothers, dated January 12, 2000, along with a Motion for Contempt claiming that Lance P. had not made the children available for visits as ordered. On January 23, 2001, the court (Kenefick, J.) denied the following additional motions which had been submitted by April P.: Emergency Ex Parte Injunction for Change of Custody, dated November 29, 2000; Motion to Open and Modify Restraining Order dated November 30, 2000; and Motion for Contempt, requesting the court "to revert custody of the three minor children back to" April P., dated November 30, 2000.

Whether the adjudicatory date of May 24, 2002 or the evidence as of the time of trial is utilized, the evidence in this matter clearly and convincingly establishes that the petitioner has failed to meet her burden of proving that April P. has not met the test of parental interest and concern identified as a ground for abandonment. In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn.App. 193. Accordingly, the petitioner cannot prevail on her allegation that April P. abandoned Paul within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A).

II.C.2. FAILURE TO REHABILITATE — § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)

The petitioner next alleges that April P.'s parental rights should be terminated because she has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).⁷⁴ April P. counters that she has attended to the pivotal elements of the specific steps, and has made sufficient progress in rehabilitation to resume a responsible role in Paul's life. As Paul was found to be uncared for on February 1, 2001, the critical issue for this court is whether the respondent has achieved rehabilitation in the statutory sense. Applying the requisite legal standards⁷⁵ and construing the statute in accordance with § 17a-112(p),⁷⁶ CT Page 8191-u the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.

74 See footnote 50.

75 See footnote 51.

76 See footnote 52.

Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion that April P. has yet to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation with regard to her underlying parenting deficits and mental health issues as would encourage the belief that at some reasonable date in the future she could assume a responsible position in Paul's life. See In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 354; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448. First, the psychological evidence adduced through the court-appointed evaluator clearly and convincingly establishes that April P.'s capacity to parent Paul remains markedly adversely affected by her unremediated mental health condition.⁷⁷ In reaching its determination, the court has accepted and relied upon the testimony and written opinions emanating from Dr. Rogers, the court-appointed psychological evaluator who performed serial assessments of April P. and Paul. Dr. Rogers's thorough evaluation process, his detailed, comprehensive analysis and his credible expert testimony provided a clear and convincing explication of April P.'s psychological instability, communication difficulties, and parenting issues, consistent with the other reliable evidence produced at trial.

77 See footnotes 54 and 55. Noting that Dr. Rogers fully accounted for significant ambivalence and/or bias in April P.'s responses to his psychological test instruments, the court credits and adopts his opinions concerning the respondent mother's mental health, based on the thoroughness of his evaluations and the other applicable reasons set forth in Part II.A. (Exhibits 2, 5; Testimony of Dr. Rogers.)

In January 2001, when Dr. Rogers performed his first court-ordered evaluation of April P., he found her to carry the diagnosis of Personality Disorder; this enduring condition is manifest through April P.'s overtly maladaptive personality traits, which fundamentally impair her ability to serve as a responsible parent for Paul.⁷⁸ (Testimony of Dr. Rogers.) This condition had persisted notwithstanding the course of previous mental health care that April P. reported, including medication management for bipolar disorder, depression and anxiety; brief psychotherapy; psychiatric treatment in 1996, and a year and a half of psychiatric treatment at CMH that commenced in mid 1999, as described in Part I.A. Notwithstanding these appropriate interventions, from a psychological perspective, April P. lacked insight into her condition in January 2001." . . . [H]er view of herself [was] highly distorted," leaving her unable to accurately assess her significant need for mental health treatment. (Exhibit 5.) Dr. Rogers then credibly opined that April P.'s internal conflict, anger, aggression, highly labile emotions and conduct, and self-absorption were contraindications for her success in fulfilling a caretaking role for Paul. Noting Paul's deep disturbances, distorted perception and confusion, Dr. Rogers warned that "[April P.], in her unpredictable and self-focused style, would be poorly equipped to care for him now, or in the foreseeable future."⁷⁹ (Exhibit 5.)

78 April P.'s psychological profile revealed Passive-Aggressive, Borderline, Dependent, Self-Defeating, Histrionic and Compulsive Personality traits which manifest themselves in negativism, anger toward CT Page 8191-au her environment, aggressive behavior, chronic sadness, perfectionism and a preoccupation with detail. (Exhibit 5; Testimony of Dr. Rogers.)

79 Based on his thorough evaluation in 2001, Dr. Rogers also credibly determined it likely that April P.'s future behavior "would be quite confusing to a dependent child" and that "she is unlikely to consistently devote much energy to maintaining the welfare of others, including children." (Exhibit 5.)

The clear and convincing evidence further establishes that over the many months following Dr. Rogers' January 2001 evaluation, April P.'s CT Page 8191-v mental health issues failed to adequately respond to the additional treatment proffered to her, so that the respondent mother remained psychologically incapable of safely parenting Paul or meeting his special emotional needs. As found in I.C., April P. commenced medication management at LMH-TCC, a local hospital's out-patient facility during the fall of 2001. On October 26, 2001, LMH-TCC's treatment plan for April P. included follow-up with talk therapy sessions and regular use of medication. (Exhibit AA.) The evidence available to the court indicates that April P. commenced individual counseling at LMH-TCC in the spring of 2002. On May 7, 2002, LMH-TCC noted that April P. struggled with "overwhelming stressors" which included her continuing "loyalty to alcoholic partner" as well as DCF's intervention in her family. (Exhibit AA.) Later in May and in mid-June 2002, April P. was noted to have adequate coping skills and was able to present a "stable mood despite severe stressors related to loss of children." (Exhibit AA.) However, any improvement April P. may have made in managing her own psychological concerns was short-lived and of minor effect, at best, as evinced by the LMH-TCC staff's ominous observation regarding April P.'s clinical status recorded just two months later, on August 22, 2002: "She is not interested in changing how she deals [with] stressors — still works against herself. No capacity for insight. Unable to accept responsibility for her actions or part in relationships. Blames others. [Patient] not interested in feedback." (Exhibit 9.)

Consistent with the findings of the LMH-TCC staff, upon repeat evaluation in October 2002, Dr. Rogers found that April P. still lacked the psychological stability or insight needed to serve as a responsible parent for Paul, whose own emotional status had improved but was still fragile. Although she reported taking her medication on a regular basis, testing in 2002 showed that April P. continues to be "a moody individual with changeable feelings and behavior . . . [that is known to be] erratic and unpredictable."⁸⁰ (Exhibit 2.) She is persistently irritable, and "most certainly employs guilt to maintain allegiances." (Exhibit 2.) Dr. Rogers again noted April P.'s irritability, "poor insight and often very poor self-control" aspects still present in her psychological profile, which significantly limit her ability to parent a child with Paul's special needs. (Exhibit 2.) Dr. Rogers's assessment of April P. yielded a diagnosis that was very similar to, and not improved from, the diagnosis established after the January 2001 evaluation, such that he reported: "[a]s previously, [the respondent mother's] psychometrics and clinical observation strongly supported Borderline and Histrionic Personality Disorders with Passive-Aggressive and Self-Defeating Traits." (Exhibit 2.) Dr. Rogers explained that April P.'s long-standing, unchanged psychological condition would have a negative functional effect upon Paul if he were subject to reunification with her: "April P. is a highly CT Page 8191-w changeable and conflicted person whose life is frequently chaotic. This lack of structure, likely extending to variability in her response to and advocacy for dependent children, would be both confusing and alarming for a child in her care, and would provide substantial risk of neglect and/or abuse." (Exhibit 2.)

80 At her October 2002 evaluation session, April P. reported taking separate medications for mood stabilization, for sleep, and that she was also taking Demerol for pain. The respondent mother then informed Dr. Rogers "`that she has psychotic visions — dreams, or whatever. I have visions of strangling Lance and Michelle and watching the life slip out of them.'" (Exhibit 2.)

Thus, from a psychological perspective, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that despite treatment both prior to and following Paul's removal from Lance P.'s home, and despite the long period of time her son has spent in foster care, April P. has failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation. In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn.App. 384-85; In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn.App. 448; In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 665. Given the deep-seated nature of April P.'s mental health issues, her failure to respond to appropriate treatment over time, her lack of stable housing and poor choice of partners, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that April P. will be unable to serve as a responsible parent for Paul in the reasonably foreseeable future. (See Exhibit AA.) In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 353. Due to her erratic and changeable behavior, if April P. served as Paul's parent, she would present a significant destabilizing influence in the life of this very disturbed child, introducing stress where he needs stability, understanding, and protection from stress. (Testimony of Dr. Rogers.) Given the fragile nature of Paul's psychological status as found in Part I.B. and the length of time he has already spent in foster care, this child should not be farther burdened by having to wait any further for his mother to achieve the level of competency necessary to parent him.⁸¹ In re Amneris, supra, 66 Conn.App. 385.

81 It is April P.'s inability or unwillingness to function as a parent, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, and not her unresolved mental health status per se, that leads the court to find that the respondent mother has failed to achieve rehabilitation in the context of this case. See In re Jessica S., supra, 51 Conn.App. 673. As previously noted, "`[t]ermination has been consistently recognized as being in the best interest of the child when the parent has a mental deficiency or illness which renders [him or her] unable to provide the child with necessary care.' In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn.App., supra, 605," In re Jessica S., supra, 51 Conn.App. 667, 673-74.

Moreover, although specific steps were assigned to assist April P. in achieving rehabilitation, and although DCF admits that she complied with a number of the steps, the evidence clearly and convincingly indicates that the respondent mother failed to fulfill significant criteria.⁸² (Exhibit 10.) April P. has refused to tell DCF where she lives, and accepts the department's transportation services only by meeting the department's worker at a local gas station. (Testimony of Christine R.) As of October 2002, April P. had no stable residence of her own and was living with friends, in breach of the steps' requirement that she maintain adequate housing. Although the specific steps directed April P. to participate in parenting counseling, she has not complied with this requirement. (Exhibits 1, 2, 10.)

82 As found in Part II.B., compliance with specific steps does not by itself indicate that a parent has achieved statutory rehabilitation. In re Vincent D., supra, 65 Conn.App. 670.

In addition, April P. has not complied with the steps' requirement that she live in a lawful manner, without becoming involved with the criminal justice system. On February 26, 2001, April P. engaged in criminal CT Page 8191-x activity involving a credit card.⁸³ On November 30, 2001, she was convicted of Forgery in the third degree and Larceny in the sixth degree, and was sentenced to serve a total effective sentence of six months in jail, suspended, with eighteen months of probation. On December 1, 2001, while that probation was pending, April P. engaged in activities that led to her arrest for Breach of Peace. Two weeks later, on December 15, 2001, she engaged in criminal activities that led to her arrest for Harassment in the second degree, and exposed her to additional charges for violating her probation.⁸⁴ This pattern of conduct, continuing during the trial of the neglect petition, indicates either April P.'s willing disregard for the steps' prohibition of further involvement with the criminal justice system, or her inability to abide by so minimum a restraint on her public conduct. Either explanation mandates the conclusion that the respondent mother lacks the judgment and impulse control to appreciate the consequences of her unlawful behavior, even though such factors are critical to effectively parenting a child like Paul.

83 See footnote 13.

84 Our courts have held on several occasions that "[a revocation of probation proceeding based upon a violation of a criminal law need not be deferred until after a disposition of the charges underlying the arrest because the purpose of a probation revocation hearing is to determine whether a defendant's conduct constituted an act sufficient to support a revocation of probation . . ." State v. Breckenridge, 66 Conn.App. 490, 496, 784 A.2d 1034, cert. denied, 259 Conn. 904, 789 A.2d 991 (2001), citing Payne v. Robinson, 10 Conn.App. 395, 403, 523 A.2d 917 (1987), aff'd, 207 Conn. 565, 541 A.2d 504, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898, 109 S.Ct. 242, 102 L.Ed.2d 230 (1988).

In reaching the decision that April P. has not achieved statutory rehabilitation, the court acknowledges that she attended a substance abuse evaluation in January 2002 and was found to have no need for drug treatment. The court also acknowledges that April P. attended hospital-based individual counseling in 2002, at DCF's request. (Testimony of Christine R.) However, based on the totality of the circumstances in this case, the court finds that April P.'s rehabilitation is not foreseeable within a reasonable time, particularly in view of Paul's particular needs for a responsible parent who can provide him with emotional stability, security, and consistency. In re Daniel C., supra, 63 Conn.App. 353. Even if April P. should now actively engage in the rehabilitation process, cooperating with attendance at individual counseling and consistently pursuing her medication therapy, those efforts would be "too little and too late" for Paul given the two years that have passed since his February 2001 adjudication as an uncared for child. In re Sheila J., supra, 62 Conn.App. 481-82.

The respondent mother loves Paul, and wants to serve as his custodian and caretaker. However, where the clear and convincing evidence establishes that a respondent cannot be a competent parent to the child because she cannot provide the nurturing, safe and structured environment warranted by Paul's age and special needs, "[a] parent's love and biological connection . . . is simply not enough" to warrant continuing the legal relationship at issue. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn.App. 667.

In sum, the clear and convincing evidence compels the conclusion that CT Page 8191-y despite some participation in a rehabilitation regimen, April P. remains without the qualities necessary to successfully parent Paul, and lacks the ability to assume a responsible position in his young life within a reasonably foreseeable time in the future. While understanding and appreciating "the hardship suffered by the respondent mother," based on the clear and convincing evidence in this case, the court is constrained to find that the petitioner has proved April P.'s failure to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). In re Jessica S., supra, 51 Conn.App. 674.

III. DISPOSITION

As the court has concluded that statutory grounds for termination exist, it next "must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child." (Citation and quotation marks omitted.) In re Quanitra M., supra, 60 Conn.App. In this dispositional phase the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events through the close of evidence. Practice Book 33-5.

III.A. SEVEN STATUTORY FINDINGS

The court has made each of the seven written factual findings required by General Statutes § 17a-112(k) based upon the evidence presented at trial, and has considered the evidence relevant to each of these findings in determining whether to terminate parental rights. See In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516.

III.A.1. TIMELINESS, NATURE AND EXTENT OF SERVICES — § 17a-112(k)(1)

As found in Part II.A., the clear and convincing evidence establishes that neither Lance P. nor April P. is able or willing to benefit from reasonable reunification services. Nonetheless, DCF provided timely and appropriate services for Lance P. and April P. as set forth in Parts I. and II., and including case management, permanency planning, and administrative case reviews. Other services for Lance P. included IFP; parenting education and visitation services through CAFAS-SB; UCFS parent aide; weekly visitation with Paul; and the proffer of referral for counseling, although Lance P. elected to pursue any treatment elsewhere. Services for April P. included referral for medication management and hospital-based individual therapy at LMH-TCC, and transportation to meetings; court orders initially limited her access to Paul, and the child's best interests subsequently precluded visitation thereafter.

III.A.2. REUNIFICATION EFFORTS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL LAW — § CT Page 8191-z 17a-112(k)(2)

DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the amended federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act through the provision of such reunification services as were warranted in this case, as described in Part III.A. Herein, the court has found that both Lance P. and April P. are unable or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts. Furthermore, DCF made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate or prevent the removal of Paul from his home. (Exhibit 20.)

III.A.3. COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS — § 17a-112(k)(3)

As found in Part II.C.2., April C. failed to comply with the November 2000 specific steps by engaging in conduct that led to involvement with the criminal justice system. Lance P. has technically complied with his specific steps., as found in Part II.B.⁸⁵

85 However, see footnotes 35 and 40.

III.A.4. THE CHILD'S FEELINGS AND EMOTIONAL TIES — § 17a-112(k)(4)

Paul is comfortable in the care of his foster parents, and desires to be raised by them. Paul does not wish to live with Lance P. because he does not feel safe in that home; Paul is familiar with Lance P.'s wife Michelle P., but has no affection for her. Paul expresses love for the respondent father and sees him as a psychological parent, but the child also suffers from anxiety from the relationship and maintains a great deal of animosity about Lance P.⁸⁶ (Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4; Testimony of Dr. B.T.)

86 In his November 4, 2002 report Dr. Rogers cogently explained: "There is certainly a bond between father and son, but the boy appears quite ambivalent about his association with the man, and it generates appreciable anxiety for him." (Exhibit 2; see also Exhibit 3.)

Paul does not relate specific positive memories of April P.⁸⁷ As of October 2002, Paul had no bond with April P., although he had lived with her until he was five years old. (Exhibit 1.) While he maintains some curiosity about her, Paul is generally disinterested, and views his biological mother only "as some distant relative to whom he owed some ill-defined fealty."⁸⁸ (Exhibit 2; Testimony of Dr. Rogers, Dr. B.T.)

87 To his therapist, Paul reported negative memories about April P.'s parenting; he held the respondent mother responsible for the fact that he was required to live under harsh conditions with Lance P. and his wife. (Testimony of Dr. B.T.)

88 April P. seems to focus upon the significance of a stuffed animal she gave to Paul at some time in the past. However, the evidence is insufficient to allow the court to infer that even if the animal is still in Paul's possession, it is in any way a specific emblem of positive feelings he may have for the respondent mother.

III.A.5. AGE OF THE CHILD — § 17a-112(k)(5)

Paul was born May 29, 1992 and is now eleven years old.

III.A.6. PARENTS' EFFORTS TO ADJUST THEIR CIRCUMSTANCES — § 17a-112(k)(6)

Lance P. and April P. have made some efforts to conform their conduct CT Page 8191-aa to minimally acceptable parental standards. Lance P. did not make adequate progress in his work with CAFAS-SB despite a protracted period of hands-on parenting education in his home setting. Thus, he remains deficient in parenting skills as described in Part II.B. (Exhibit 17.) Although April P. has intermittently cooperated with medication management and although she recommenced talk-therapy in July of 2001, she has not attended to her mental health issues in a fashion which would enhance her ability to accept responsibility for her actions with regard to her relationship to this child. (Exhibit 9.) Even if additional time was provided, neither parent is able or willing to benefit from such reasonable efforts as would bring his or her performance, as a parent, within acceptable standards sufficient to make it in the best interests of the child to be reunited with either one. See Parts II.A.1. and 2., II.B. and II.C.2.

III.A.7. EXTENT TO WHICH PARENTS WERE PREVENTED FROM MAINTAINING RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE CHILD — § 17a-112(k)(7)

No unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties prevented Lance P. or April P. from maintaining a relationship with Paul, nor did the economic circumstances of the parent prevent such relationships, although the limitations and restrictions inherent in the foster care system were in effect. Lance P. protests that Paul's foster parents have unreasonably impeded the father-son relationship by prohibiting telephone contact between them. However, abundant evidence indicates that the respondent father had weekly in-person visits with Paul, although Lance P. was chronically disappointed in his son's performance at those meetings. (Exhibit 2.) As there is insufficient basis from which the court could logically infer that the addition of phone calls to a regimen of weekly visitation would have materially enhanced the father-son relationship, Lance P.'s complaint is entitled to little weight.

As described in Part I., April P. was significantly restricted from building a relationship with Paul due to orders issued by the family court in 1997 and 1998. These restrictions were continued by DCF in reasonable response to the recommendations made by the court-appointed evaluator and by Paul's therapist, after Paul was placed in foster care. Accordingly, even if April P. lacked the financial resources to implement the professionally-supervised visitation protocol imposed by the family court, and even if Paul's attorney had failed to make reasonable efforts to arrange such visitation, it was DCF's well-founded decision to continue the suspension of visitation that caused the respondent mother to remain separated from her son, not any economic circumstances or any course of action taken by Lisa M. or her family.⁸⁹ The evidence is CT Page 8191-ab insufficient to allow the court to determine whether April P.'s efforts to obtain visitation were in any way affected by actions or inactions of Dr. B.T. or the attorney for the minor child. However, given April P.'s failure to make any measurable progress in rehabilitation, as found in Part II.C.2., such visits would have been futile at best, and likely detrimental to the child in this case.

89 See footnote 71.

III.B. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD — § 17a-112(j)(2)

The court is next called upon to determine whether termination of the parental rights of Lance P. and/or April P. would serve Paul's best interests.⁹⁰ Applying the appropriate legal standards to the facts which are clearly and convincingly apparent in this case,⁹¹ the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.

90 The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, § 17a-112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, "by clear and convincing evidence . . . (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child."

91 "[T]he question . . . to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship. That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child. See Practice Book § 33-5." In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999). "In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition." (Citation omitted.) In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441 (2000).

In determining whether termination of the respondents' parental rights would serve Paul's best interests, the court has examined the multiple relevant factors, including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of his environment; his length of stay in foster care; the nature of his relationship with his foster parents and biological parents; and the degree of contact maintained with his biological parents and his stepmother.⁹² In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000). The court has also balanced Paul's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with his biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).

92 "[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider." (Citations and quotation marks omitted.) In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). See also footnote 58.

Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that it is not in Paul's best interests to continue to maintain any legal relationship with Lance P. or April P. Focusing first on Paul's special needs, it is abundantly clear that this child has experienced great difficulty forming and maintaining relationships in the past, and that he has made marked improvement after removal from the home of Lance P. and Michelle P., exposure to the structure and reasonable parenting techniques provided by his foster home, and experiencing a long course of effective psychotherapy. While Lance P. may quarrel with the specific diagnoses reached by Dr. B.T. and/or Dr. Rogers, these experienced, highly qualified psychologists have consistently identified Paul's need to inhabit an environment that promotes, rather than hinders, his ability to develop a stable sense of self without exposure to undue criticism, inadequate communication styles or harmful punishment techniques. (Testimony of Dr. Rogers, Dr. B.T.) Paul cannot thrive in a CT Page 8191-ac home characterized by parental rigidity, overly high expectations, unreasonable methods of discipline and insensitive responses to his emotional needs, as is found in Lance P.'s home. Even more than many children, Paul needs permanence and stability in his life, as he is emotionally unable to withstand hostility, rejection or inflexible strictness in his environment. As Dr. Rogers so poignantly stated, Paul needs permanency in his life so that he can "relax and get on with the job of growing up." (Testimony of Dr. Rogers.)

Fortunately, Paul's special needs appear well met in his current foster home.⁹³ The court credits and accepts Dr. B.T.'s opinion, based upon her psychological expertise and her long association with Paul, that the child has formed a secure attachment with Lisa M., whom he views as a reliable caretaking figure. In his foster home and engaged in appropriate, effective counseling, Paul is now able to put his own feelings into words and is willing to communicate them to his therapist. Recently, Paul has embarked upon the important process of forming his own identity, separate and apart from his parent-figures, critical step to becoming an emotionally secure person in his own right.⁹⁴ He has resolved some of his withdrawal behaviors, feels valuable, and accepts the fact that he is worthy of being appreciated by others.⁹⁵ Removing Paul from his stable, secure foster placement, at this stage of his emotional development, would be devastating to the child's psychological health; such action would prompt reversion to his previous negative behaviors and extinguish the attachment-forming skills he has finally acquired. (Testimony of Dr. B.T.) The court cannot condone an action which would have such a markedly injurious effect upon a child who has suffered so much instability in his young life.

93 In a termination proceeding, the Appellate Court has affirmed the relevance of the suitability of adoptive parents to the court's consideration of best interests issues. In re Vincent D., CT Page 8191-aw 65 Conn.App. 658, 666, 783 A.2d 534 (2001). However, while considering the attributes of Lisa M. and John M. in the context of determining Paul's best interests, the court has fully adhered to the axiom that "a judicial termination of parental rights may not be premised on a determination that it would be in the child's best interests to terminate the parent's rights in order to substitute another, more suitable set of adoptive parents." In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 280, 618 A.2d 1 (1992), cited in In re Denzel A., 53 Conn.App. 827, 835, 733 A.2d 298 (1999).

94 While Paul has stated that he wishes to see Lance P. four times a year, it is unreasonable to infer that he wishes to have any additional contact with his biological father. (Testimony Lisa M.) Rather, Paul's statement is consistent with a child's expression of loyal ambivalence to a birth parent with whom he has a visiting relationship, but also an indication that this pre-adolescent recognizes that his needs will only be met if he is allowed to reside in a stable, reasonably structured environment in which he is free to grow and develop, sheltered from over-exposure to Lance P.'s rigid, controlling ways. (See Testimony of Dr. B.T.)

95 Dr. B.T. emphasized the importance of Paul's perception that Lance P. felt the child was worthless and without value, regardless of the specific words or actions the respondent father may have directed to his son. (Testimony Dr. B.T.)

As to April P., this respondent's unstable personality would be a deleterious factor in any relationship she might wish to build with her son. The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that while Paul may express a desire to see April P. on a very infrequent basis in the future, he has little overt interest in the respondent mother. The risks of building a mother-son relationship far outweigh any potential benefit for Paul. In re Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 296, 314. The court credits and adopts Dr. Rogers's well-founded opinion that "[c]ontinued contact with the mother, and the expectation of reestablishing a parent/child bond, would erode the child's fragile sense of security in his present setting and further detract from his progress in making meaningful, developmentally appropriate and formative bonds with his caretakers, and others." (Exhibit 3; see also Testimony of Dr. Rogers, Dr. B.T.) Overall, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Paul's best interests cannot be served by continuing his legal bond to his biological mother. CT Page 8191-ad

As to Lance P., while it is apparent that he fervently desires to raise Paul according to his self-determined management methods, this respondent is either unable or unwilling to extend the nurturing, supportive parenting style that Paul so desperately needs and deserves to receive.⁹⁶ Based on the totality of the evidence presented in this case, the court credits and adopts the well-founded opinion tendered by the court-appointed psychological evaluator, who stated that "[Lance P.'s and Michelle P.'s] seeming need for control interacts poorly with the boy's apparently excessive fear of being punished and his often distorted perceptions of events and relationships." (Exhibit 4.) Under these circumstances, reunification of the respondent father and his son Paul would expose the child to the potential for significant emotional harm, which is inimical to the best interests contemplated by the statute at issue.

96 No complaints of significant behavioral issues have emanated from Paul's placement with Lisa M. and John M. (Testimony of Lisa M.)

Moreover, in the context of the pending TPR petitions, if Paul was ever returned to the care of Lance P., he would necessarily reside with Michelle P., Colton and young Joel. Lance P. has admitted that Colton has been diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant Disorder, and that he considers that child to show symptoms of Attachment Disorder as well. (Exhibit 2.) Accordingly, if Paul was allowed to reside in his father's home, he would be exposed to the stress and influence of his younger brother's ostensibly difficult-to-manage pattern of behavior. (See Testimony Gary F.) Under these circumstances, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Paul's best interests would not be served if he were allowed to return to the custody of the respondent father.

Furthermore, the credible results of Michelle P.'s court-ordered psychological evaluation clearly and convincingly establish that Paul's best interests would be ill-served if he was returned to his step-mother's parenting style.⁹⁷ Dr. Rogers discerned the presence of Histrionic and Compulsive Personality Traits in Michelle P., which render her likely to over-exaggerate events, and unlikely to properly respond to the needs of a child such as Paul. Due to her personality style, "[w]hether or not she demonstrates hostility, others are likely to perceive her as more aggressive than is the norm." (Exhibit 4.) While Michelle P. apparently has a sincere interest in Paul and his welfare, and while she possesses valid notions regarding many aspects of child care, she is rigid and inflexible in her view of Paul's situation. Michelle P. also has episodic outbursts of resentment and admitted difficulties in anger control which could "potentially be problematic" if Paul was added to her household.⁹⁸ (Exhibit 4.)

97 According to Paul, Michelle P. has employed a number of overly harsh methods in a misguided attempt to discipline children in her care. Paul and his brothers have been punished by standing for overly-long periods of time, food has been withheld from them, and Paul has been "paddled." (Testimony of Dr. Rogers.)

98 In reaching this determination, the court has acknowledged Dr. Rogers's observation that the "step-mother, more than the father, continues to express a loving interest in Paul and an acceptance of the child." (Exhibit 4.)

Overall, the relationships between Lance P.'s family members are so CT Page 8191-ae dysfunctional that Paul's needs could not be met in a healthy, effective manner if he was injected into the mix. (Exhibits 1, 4.) Paul enjoys visiting Lance P., and wishes to maintain a connection with him. However, even though the father-son visits may have some value, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that it is necessary to serve Paul's best interests by creating conditions that will allow him to form firm bonds with adults who will serve as his permanent parent figures, a role that Lance P. can never assume.⁹⁹

99 See footnote 94. The court accepts and credits the court-appointed psychological evaluator's opinion that at this stage in Paul's life, about to enter the stressful period of adolescence and puberty, while his relationship to Lance P. has some benefits, it is not critical to the child's health and growth. (Testimony of Dr. Rogers, Dr. B.T.)

Paul's present emotional health, while improved, is new and fragile; he will require a long period of continued appropriate support of his nascent positive self-esteem if this status is to become stable and secure. Indeed, as previously discussed, if Paul were required to return to live with Lance P. and his wife, Paul would lose all of the progress in socialization and mental health that he has made since his entry into foster care. (Testimony of Dr. B.T.) On balance, it is abundantly clear that termination of Lance P.'s parental rights and provision of a stable, secure and nurturing home for Paul far outweigh the benefits of any continued contact with the respondent father. (Testimony of Dr. B.T.) Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 313-14.

Our courts have recognized that "long-term stability is critical to a child's future health and development." In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 709. Furthermore, "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence . . ." when resolving issues related to the permanent or temporary care of neglected children. In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992); see also In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). Paul's GAL has reported that the child's best interests will be served by terminating April P.'s parental rights, as she is fundamentally unable to care for the child. The GAL has emphatically reported that Paul should not be returned to the care of either Lance P. or his stepmother Michelle P., as neither one was able to make adequate improvement in their capacity to parent child during the years he has spent in foster care, and as Lance P. demonstrated a diminished ability to care for this child during his most recent assessment by the court-appointed psychological evaluator. Ominously, the GAL cautioned that Paul cannot be emotionally or physically safe in Lance P.'s home. On the other hand, the foster home in which Paul is currently living is stable, and has provided him with the nurturance and structure the child so dearly deserves.¹⁰⁰ (Testimony of Dr. B.T.) The court is constrained to agree with Paul's attorney and his GAL, and concludes that the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that the child at issue in this case is entitled to the benefit of ending, without further delay, the long period of uncertainty as to the availability of CT Page 8191-af his biological parents as caretakers by terminating the respondents' parental rights.

100 Lance P. and/or April P. may argue that the state of Lisa M.'s physical and mental health renders her an inappropriate caregiver for Paul. However, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that both her physical and psychological conditions are now well controlled, and that she is committed to a regimen of appropriate care and medical treatment. (Testimony of Lisa M.)

Accordingly, with respect to the best interests of the child contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(2), having balanced Paul's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with Lance P. and/or April P., by clear and convincing evidence and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Lance P. and April P. is in the best interest of the child Paul P. Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 313-314.

IV. ORDER OF TERMINATION

WHEREFORE, after due consideration of the child's sense of time, his need for a secure and permanent environment, the relationship he has with his foster parents, and the totality of the circumstances; and having considered all the statutory criteria and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights; and having concluded that the termination of the parental rights at issue will be in the child's best interests, the court issues the following ORDERS:

That the parental rights of Lance P. and April P. are hereby terminated as to Paul P.

That the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for Paul P. for the purpose of securing an adoptive family or other permanent placement for him.

That a permanency plan shall be submitted within 30 days of this judgment, and that such further reports shall be timely presented to the court, as required by law. That primary consideration for adoption of this child shall be offered to his current foster parents.

BY THE COURT,

N. Rubinow, J.