Opinion
2 CA-JV 2023-0109
03-12-2024
In re Termination of Parental Rights as to A.M.,
Michael M., Tucson In Propria Persona Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General By Autumn Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. JD20200208 The Honorable Cathleen Linn, Judge Pro Tempore
Michael M., Tucson In Propria Persona
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General By Autumn Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
Presiding Judge Eppich authored the decision of the Court, in which Chief Judge Vasquez and Judge Gard concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
EPPICH, PRESIDING JUDGE:
¶1 Michael M. appeals from the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights to his son, A.M., born March 2020, based on chronic substance abuse and length of time in care. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (8)(c). We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile court's order. See Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, ¶ 12 (App. 2007). A.M. was born exposed to amphetamine and methamphetamine and removed from his parents' care in March 2020. He was found dependent as to his parents in May 2020. In June 2021, the case plan changed from reunification to severance and adoption. The next month, DCS filed a motion to terminate Michael's parental rights on time-in-care grounds. The court denied the motion in June 2022. Although the court found that A.M. had been in an out-of-home placement for more than fifteen months, that DCS had made diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services, and that Michael's compliance in services had been minimal, it found that termination of Michael's parental rights was not in A.M.'s best interests.
¶3 More than a year later, in October 2022, DCS again moved to terminate Michael's parental rights, alleging grounds of chronic substance abuse and length of time in care. After a multi-part contested hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion, finding that DCS had established both grounds for termination and proven termination was in A.M.'s best interests. This appeal followed.
The juvenile court also terminated A.M.'s mother's rights, but she is not a party to this appeal.
Discussion
¶4 To sever a parent's rights, the juvenile court must find there is clear and convincing evidence at least one of the statutory grounds for termination exists and that a preponderance of the evidence establishes severing the parent's rights is in the child's best interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, ¶¶ 32, 41 (2005). The statutory grounds include a parent's inability to discharge parental responsibilities due to a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs or controlled substances, § 8-533(B)(3), and a parent's inability to remedy the circumstances causing the child's out-of-home placement for fifteen months or longer, § 8-533(B)(8)(c). We do not reweigh the evidence on appeal; rather, we defer to the court's factual findings because, as the trier of fact, that court "is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts." Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶ 4 (App. 2004). Consequently, we will affirm the order if reasonable evidence supports the factual findings upon which it is based. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). And, as previously noted, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the court's order. See Christy C., 214 Ariz. 445, ¶ 12.
¶5 In a pro se brief filed pursuant to Rule 607(e)(1)(B), Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct., Michael asserts that the juvenile court committed several errors and asks that we reverse the termination ruling and grant a new trial. He does not challenge the court's findings of sufficient evidence to support the grounds for termination or that termination was in A.M.'s best interests. Accordingly, we deem such arguments abandoned and waived. See Crystal E. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, ¶ 5 (App. 2017).
¶6 Michael has also failed to provide citations to legal authorities or otherwise explain how the juvenile court's ruling was erroneous. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7)(A); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 607(b). We must hold pro se litigants to the same standards as attorneys, see Flynn v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, ¶ 24 (2017), and we can summarily reject an appellant's claims based on "lack of proper and meaningful argument alone," Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, ¶ 11 (App. 2013). We do so here. See Melissa W. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 238 Ariz. 115, ¶ 9 (App. 2015) (arguments waived for failing to support them "with citation to relevant authority"); Crystal E., 241 Ariz. 576, ¶ 5.
¶7 Even assuming Michael's arguments were not waived, however, we have no basis to disturb the juvenile court's ruling. Michael first argues the court failed to change the case plan to family reunification after the first severance trial. That is not supported by the record. The court ordered the case plan changed from a permanency goal of severance and adoption to family reunification after it denied DCS's first termination motion. At a September 2022 review hearing, however, A.M.'s attorney requested a change in the case plan to severance and adoption. Michael objected, and the court ordered a concurrent case plan of family reunification and severance and adoption. To the extent Michael contends DCS failed to make certain services available to effectuate family reunification, that too is unsupported by the record, which reflects that DCS provided extensive services including case management, drug testing, referrals for various types of counseling, supervised visitation, and Child and Family Team meetings.
¶8 Michael also contends the juvenile court improperly considered the DCS case manager's testimony, which he maintains was "false" and "clearly erroneous." In support of this claim Michael points to her having misidentified his recovery coach and having incorrectly stated anger management was a service in the original case plan. He also points out that the court and case manager characterized substance abuse evaluations as psychological or psychiatric evaluations. Michael had the opportunity to cross-examine the case manager on her testimony and did so. In any event, those are issues of credibility and weight, but we do not reweigh conflicting evidence or redetermine the credibility of witnesses. See Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, ¶¶ 18-19 (2018).
Disposition
¶9 We affirm the juvenile court's order terminating Michael's parental rights to A.M.