Whether a bankruptcy court properly dismissed a bankruptcy case is "a factual question to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard." Tolbert v. Fink (in re Tolbert), 255 B.R. 214, 216 (B.A.P. 9 Cir. 2000) (citing Pagnac v. Minnesota Dep't of Revenue, 228 B.R. 219, 221 (B.A.P. 8 Cir. 1998)). Section 109(g)'s central purpose is to "curb abusive repetitive filings."
"If the bankruptcy court's conclusions supporting dismissal are supported by the facts, there is no abuse of discretion." Tolbert v. Fink (In re Tolbert) , 255 B.R. 214, 216 (8th Cir. BAP 2000) ; Pagnac v. Minnesota Department of Revenue, 228 B.R. 219, 223 (8th Cir. BAP 1998). DISCUSSION
See, e.g., In re Woodall, 81 B.R. 17 (E.D. Ark. 1987); In re Pagnac, 228 B.R. 219, 222 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 1998); In re Occhipinti, 1997 WL 837627 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997); In re Bair, 240 B.R. 247 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1999). Although these cases were issued prior to Young, they stand for the general proposition that tolling applies to both pre- and postpetition taxes during the pendency of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The Brensings argue that under Young equitable tolling must be determined on a case-by-case basis and that there is no per se rule that requires such tolling.
See, e.g., In re Woodall, 81 B.R. 17 (E.D. Ark. 1987); In re Pagnac, 228 B.R. 219, 222 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 1998); In re Occhipinti, 1997 WL 837627 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997); In re Bair, 240 B.R. 247 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1999). Although these cases were issued prior to Young, they stand for the general proposition that tolling applies to both pre- and postpetition taxes during the pendency of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The Brensings argue that under Young equitable tolling must be determined on a case-by-case basis and that there is no per se rule that requires such tolling.
Section 1307(c) sets out ten examples of cause but this list is only illustrative and is not exclusive. In re Paaac, 228 B.R. 219 (D.Minn. 1998). One of the most frequent reasons to dismiss a Chapter 13 case is upon a finding of bad faith.
The issue of whether a bankruptcy court properly dismissed a bankruptcy case is a factual question to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Pagnac v. Minnesota Department of Revenue, 228 B.R. 219, 221 (8th Cir. B.A.P. 1998). If the bankruptcy court's conclusions supporting dismissal are supported by the facts, there is no abuse of discretion. Id. at 223.
ee-year priority period under section 507(a)(8)(A). See 11 U.S.C.A. § 108(c) (1988 Supp. 1998) (a creditor may commence an action against the debtor thirty days subsequent to either the end of the automatic stay or the statutory limitations period); 26 U.S.C.A. § 6503 (1982 Supp. 1998) (Section 6503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code suspends the collection of taxes for any period the taxpayer's assets "are in the control or custody of the court in any proceeding before any court of the United States . . . and for six months thereafter."); Waugh v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Waugh), 109 F.3d 489 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Taylor, 81 F.3d 20 (3rd Cir. 1996); West v. United States (In re West), 5 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Richards (In re Richards), 994 F.2d 763 (10th Cir. 1993); Montoya v. United States (In re Montoya), 965 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1992); Palmer v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Palmer), 228 B.R. 880 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999); Pagnac v. Minnesota Dep't of Revenue (In re Pagnac), 228 B.R. 219 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1998); Brickley v. United States (In re Brickley), 70 B.R. 113, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) ("it is clear that Congress, by enacting Section 108(c), intended to activate Section 6503(b) and thereby suspend the running of the statute of limitations for tax collection during a taxpayer's bankruptcy proceeding"); In re Pastula, 203 B.R. 941 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.) (holding that three-year priority period was not suspended), rev'd, 227 B.R. 794 (E.D.Mich.
The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals has not specifically decided the issue of partial dischargeability. However, in Pagnac v. Minnesota Dep't. of Revenue (In re Pagnac), 228 B.R. 219, 223 (8th Cir. BAP 1998), we found the argument that the debtor's tax obligation "be partially discharged based on some hardship theory" unavailing because courts that have permitted partial discharge of certain debts "exist only in the context of sections 523(a)(8) and 523(a)(15), governing discharge of student loans and divorce obligations, where hardship exists as a statutorily created issue[,]" whereas "[s]ection 507(a)(8), governing priority of certain taxes, has no hardship provision.
In re Taylor, 81 F.3d 20, 25 (3rd Cir. 1996); West, 5 F.3d at 426; United States v. Richards ( In re Richards), 994 F.2d 763, 765-66 (10th Cir. 1993); Montoya v. United States ( In re Montoya), 965 F.2d 554, 558 (7th Cir. 1992). See also Pagnac v. Minnesota Dept. of Revenue ( In re Pagnac), 228 B.R. 219 (8th Cir. BAP 1998). These courts toll the three-year look-back period during the pendency of any previous bankruptcy.