Another bankruptcy court judge has explained aptly that "section 1334 supports the duality of allowing a claim to be adjudicated to final judgment in state court while preserving the issues of the status and enforce ability of the claim to the bankruptcy court." Republic Reader's, 81 B.R. at 427; see also In re Comer, 723 F.2d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 1984) (distinguishing between extent of debt, for which state court decision was res judicata, and nature of debt, the crucial issue in dischargeability for which a state court decision would not be res judicata in a bankruptcy court); In re Ozai, 34 B.R. 764, 766 (Bankr.9th Cir. 1983) (existence of debt and discharge ability of debt are separate issues). The bankruptcy court cannot use the claim's impact on the value of the estate to justify reaching a different conclusion than that dictated by state law.

See In re Roberts, No. 15-22434-B-7, 2017 WL 2779625, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. June 26, 2017) ("A non-dischargeability action involves two separate and distinct causes of action: 'one is on the debt, as determined by state law, and the other is on the dischargeability of that debt, as determined by federal law.'") (quoting Roussos v. Michaelides (In re Roussos), 251 B.R. 86, 93 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2000)); see also In re Ozai, 34 B.R. 764, 766 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1983). Brown did not concern the existence of a debt, but instead "refused to allow the principle of res judicata to bar the bankruptcy court from looking beyond the state court judgment to determine whether the debt came within one of the exceptions to discharge[.]"

Where the specific question presented is whether to grant relief from stay to allow a state court action to proceed, courts consider matters such as judicial economy and the expertise of the state court, see Mac Donald v. Mac Donald (In re Mac Donald), 755 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1985), as well as prejudice to the parties and whether exclusively bankruptcy issues are involved, see Ozai v. Tabuena (In re Ozai), 34 B.R. 764, 766 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1983).

Christensen v. Tucson Estates, Inc. (In re Tucson Estates, Inc.), 912 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir.1990); see also Piombo Corp. v. Castlerock Props. (In re Castlerock Props.), 781 F.2d 159, 163 (9th Cir.1986). Among factors appropriate to consider in determining whether relief from the automatic stay should be granted to allow state court proceedings to continue are considerations of judicial economy and the expertise of the state court, see MacDonald v. MacDonald (In re MacDonald), 755 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir.1985), as well as prejudice to the parties and whether exclusively bankruptcy issues are involved, see Ozai v. Tabuena (In re Ozai), 34 B.R. 764, 766 (9th Cir.BAP1983). As advocated by Mr. Kronemyer, the bankruptcy court applied factors (the "Curtis Factors") articulated in In re Curtis, 40 B.R. 795, 799-800 (Bankr.D.Utah 1984), and adopted more recently by the bankruptcy court in Truebro, Inc. v. Plumberex Specialty Prods., Inc. (In re Plumberex Specialty Prods., Inc.), 311 B.R. 551, 559-60 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.2004).

The purpose of such a time limit is to promote a basic bankruptcy goal: the speedy resolution of the debtor's financial affairs. In re Ozai, 34 B.R. 764, 766 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1983).

Numerous courts have determined that, under appropriate circumstances, a bankruptcy court may grant relief from the stay to allow a debt to be liquidated in a pending state court proceeding, and then make a determination of dischargeability based on the state court record. Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Olmstead (In re Olmstead), 608 F.2d 1365, 1367 (10th Cir. 1979); Austin v. Wendell-West Co., 539 F.2d 71, 72 (9th Cir. 1976); Harris v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland (In re Harris), 7 B.R. 284, 286 (S.D.Fla. 1980); Robinson v. Mountjoy (In re Mountjoy), 368 F. Supp. 1087, 1096 (W.D.Mo. 1973); Ozai v. Tabuena (In re Ozai), 34 B.R. 764, 766 (9th Cir. BAP 1983); Roberts v. Spencer (In re Spencer), 168 B.R. 142, 145 (Bankr.N.D.Tex. 1994); National Credit Union Administration v. Harris (In re Harris), 135 B.R. 434, 436 (Bankr. S.D.Fla. 1992); In re Saunders, 103 B.R. 298, 299 (Bankr.N.D.Fla. 1989); Braun v. Zarling (In re Zarling), 85 B.R. 802, 804 (Bankr.E.D.Wis. 1988); Mutual Fire, Marine Inland Insurance Co. Of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania v. Frantz (In re Frantz), 82 B.R. 835, 837 (Bankr.S.D.Tex. 1988); Kowalewycz v. Sears (In re Sears), 68 B.R. 34, 36 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1986); Barrios v. Ruiloba (In re Ruiloba), 58 B.R. 700 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 1986); Sapp v. Naughton (In re Naughton), 44 B.R. 670, 673 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1984); Hoenig v. Hoffman (In re Hoffman), 33 B.R. 937, 941 (Bankr. W.D.Okla. 1983); Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc. v. Hunter (In re Hunter), 32 B.R. 140, 141 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 1983); Carter v. Larkham (In re Larkham), 31 B.R. 273, 277 (Bankr.D.Vt. 1983). In such a review, this Court must consider that if relief from the stay is grante

The same principle applies in a dischargeability proceeding when considering whether to give collateral estoppel effect to a prior state court judgment. For the Ninth Circuit's position on this issue, see Ozai v. Tabuena (In re Ozai), 34 B.R. 764, 765 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983). Such a holding would return this court to the position of a federal court interpreting state law. It would allow individual states to dictate the terms of dischargeability. If this were the case, the granting of a discharge would be far from uniform.

1981). See In re Ozai, 34 B.R. 764 (Bkrtcy.App.Pan. 9th Cir. 1983). (11) Whether the foreign proceedings have progressed to the point where the parties are prepared for trial.

Where the expertise of a state court is needed in resolving a question of state law, the bankruptcy court will likewise defer to the state forum. See, e.g., Ozai v. Tabuena (In re Ozai), 34 B.R. 764 (Bkrtcy.App. 9th Cir. 1983). See also Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 60 S.Ct. 628, 84 L.Ed. 876 (1940).