Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J07-01947
Haerle, Acting P.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner C.W. (Mother) seeks an extraordinary writ to overturn the juvenile court's decision to terminate reunification services she was offered by the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5 , and to set a permanency planning hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother argues that she was denied adequate reunification services. We disagree and deny the petition.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The child in this case, O.M., was born a month after Mother was convicted of substance abuse charges and sentenced to two years in prison and while she was incarcerated at a Family Foundations Residence. When Mother began to display paranoid and isolating behaviors, Mother was transported to the California Women’s Institute Facility in Corona, California and placed on a two-week mental health hold. She did not provide the name of a caregiver to look after O.M. The Bureau filed a petition alleging the absence of a caregiver, and mother’s incapacity and failure to protect based on Mother’s severe and chronic substance abuse history.
At a jurisdictional and dispositional hearing held on January 24, 2008, Mother submitted to the allegations of the petition and O.M. was adjudged a dependent child under sections 300, subdivision (b) and (g). At that time, a Family Reunification Plan was ordered.
Mother’s reunification plan had as its goal O.M.’s return to Mother. Among other things, Mother was required to “complete a mental health assessment arranged through Contra Costa County Mental Health or other Mental Health provider” and to “sign necessary releases of information regarding previous Mental Health treatment and follow all recommendations resulting from that assessment.” The record indicates that Mother could request this assessment while in prison or it could be deferred until her release. A memo written by Mother’s counsel explained that “as of the date of disposition, there was an agreement based on a discussion amongst counsel for mother, counsel for the child and for the Bureau, that the evaluation would be procured by mother and mother’s counsel. Specifically the on-the-record statement by mother’s counsel that if mother or mother’s counsel could not get the evaluation done, or done to the Bureau’s satisfaction, the evaluation would be deferred until mother was released from prison. Counsel met and conferred on 1/24/8 and came to this agreement so that disposition could proceed on that day. This was done at mother’s request.”
A contested six-month status review hearing was held on July 23, 2008. Mother reported having attended computer classes, and a 12-step recovery program but she had not verified her attendance, despite a request that she do so. During this same time period, Mother had twice monthly half-hour no contact visits with O.M. Mother reported that she would like contact visits and that she was prepared to enter a substance abuse residential program when she came out of detention. (Mother was scheduled for release in November 2008.) The Bureau recommended termination of family reunification services because it could not “state that [O.M.] would be safe in the care of his mother.” The Bureau recited Mother’s “significant history of substance abuse, domestic violence, mental health instability, criminal activity, and involvement with the Bureau” as well as Mother’s “demonstrated pattern of not following through with court orders or treatment.” The Bureau concluded that based on this history “it is likely that her treatment would take a significant amount of time to begin to address the issues of [O.M.’s] safety in her care. At this time, despite [Mother]’s stated participation in services available... while incarcerated she has not made an impact on the issue that need[s] to be addressed to insure that [O.M.] would be safe in her care.” The Bureau also noted that although Mother “has stated on several occasions that she had a completed Mental Health Evaluation performed while incarcerated at Chowchilla Women’s Prison,” the social worker was unable to obtain a copy of the report despite a signed release obtained from Mother. Apparently, the Chief Psychologists would not release the report to the Bureau, despite the release and the efforts of Mother’s attorney to obtain a copy of the report.
Despite this recommendation, the court found a substantial probability of return and ordered six more months of Family Reunification Services. An updated Case Plan was circulated. Mother did not appeal from this order.
The 12-month status review hearing was held on February 26, 2009, after a number of continuances. A forensic psychological examination of Mother was conducted and a report regarding this evaluation was issued on September 29, 2008. The evaluating psychologist noted that Mother “presents with many of the features of developing or prodromal paranoid schizophrenia. No matter the exact diagnosis, she is a severely disturbed woman who struggles with substance abuse, paranoid thinking, and a formal thought disorder.” The “alcohol recovery issues – issues which have not been formally and aggressively treated for any extended period of time. Her love for her son was obvious and genuine in clinical interview; her inability to meet the psychological and developmental needs of any child, at this time, is just as obvious based on test results and interview.” The psychologist recommended that Mother be placed in “a dual diagnosis program which can address both her alcohol use and mental health issues. It is imperative that this program have the sophistication to deal with more severe mental illness such as schizophrenia.” The outlook, even with such treatment was, according to the psychologist, not good: “It is possible that even with aggressive treatment and a positive response to psychotropic medication Ms. Woods will never be psychologically capable of the daily demands and stress of mothering or parenting; it shall require all her psychological resources just to manage her daily life and maintain her sobriety.” He recommended that mother be reevaluated in two years. The Bureau recommended that services be terminated and a 366.26 hearing be held.
At the contested review hearing held on February 26, 2009, the court found that reasonable services had been provided and set a section 366.26 hearing. This writ petition followed.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Adequacy of Reunification Services
Mother argues that she was denied adequate reunification services and that the court erred in finding that reasonable services had been provided at the 12-month review hearing. She argues that (1) no-contact visits with O.M. were an inadequate way for her to establish a bond with her child; (2) the Bureau did not, during the first six months of reunification make any effort to have her evaluated; (3) after Mother was evaluated, the Bureau failed to “help mother get into an appropriate program when she was released from custody.”
The Bureau correctly points out that any challenge to the reunification plan itself and the reasonableness of reunification services offered to Mother at the six-month review hearing has been waived because Mother did not challenge the adequacy of the reunification plan at the disposition hearing or the six-month review hearing. (Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 811; In re Daniel K. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 661, 667.) Her failure to do so amounts to a waiver of any challenge to the no-contact visits and the fact that the results of any psychological evaluation were not available to the Bureau during the first six months of reunification. (John F. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 400, 405.)
To the extent that Mother is contending that the trial court erred in finding that, between the six and 12-month review hearing, she had been provided with reasonable services, she has also waived this issue for failing to object on this ground at the hearing, as the Bureau points out. (In re Kevin S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 882, 885-886.) However, even if the issue was not waived for failure to object at the hearing, we conclude that there was no error.
We evaluate this argument under the following standard: “In reviewing the reasonableness of the services provided, this court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the [Agency]. We must indulge in all reasonable and legitimate inferences to uphold the judgment. [Citation.] ‘If there is any substantial evidence to support the findings of a juvenile court, [we are] without power to weigh or evaluate the findings.’ [Citation.]” (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1361-1362.)
Mother appears to argue that the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding that reasonable services were offered. The correct standard of review, however, is substantial evidence. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.)
Although Mother argues that she was not given access to a “dual diagnosis program,” there was substantial evidence that Mother was in fact enrolled, upon her release from prison, in a residential substance abuse treatment program. She was also seeing a therapist, and a psychiatrist. Nothing in the record indicates that these services were inadequate to treat Mother’s mental health issues.
It is clear that Mother worked hard to reunite with O.M. However, her failure to reunify within the statutory time period was not due to flawed services provided by the Bureau. Rather, Mother simply could not show, at the time of the hearing, that she could provide for O.M.’s needs. As the psychologist who examined Mother observed, Mother’s severe mental health issues made her unable “to meet the psychological and developmental needs of any child at this time.” We conclude that the services provided were reasonable under the circumstances.
IV. DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. The decision is final in this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b)(3).)
We concur:
Lambden, J., Richman, J.