In re of

Full title: IN RE: ADOPTION OF: L.J.C. APPEAL OF: K.G., NATURAL MOTHER

Court: SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date published: Oct 24, 2016

No. J-S65045-16 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 2016)

Opinion

J-S65045-16 No. 690 WDA 2016

10-24-2016

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: L.J.C. APPEAL OF: K.G., NATURAL MOTHER

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order Entered April 1, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County
Orphans' Court at No.: 2015-782 IVT BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.^* MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

Appellant, K.G. (Mother), appeals from the order granting the involuntary termination of her parental rights to her son, L.J.C. (Child), born in September of 2011, and changing his goal from return to parent to adoption.¹ We affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion.

1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Child's father, R.C. Father did not appeal.

On August 20, 2015, Cambria County Children and Youth Services (CYS) filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child. The trial court aptly explained the events that led CYS to file that petition in its order and opinion entered April 1, 2016. ( See Trial Court Order and Opinion, dated March 31, 2016, filed April 1, 2016.) We respectfully direct the reader to that order and opinion for a more thorough summary of the facts of this case.

For the convenience of the reader, we note briefly that CYS became involved on May 17, 2012, after receiving a report of domestic violence involving Mother and Father. Further investigation revealed other issues involving finances, poor parenting skills, and housing instability as well as drug use by both Mother and Father, who were only seventeen and eighteen, respectively, at the time. Mother was only minimally compliant with the permanency plan CYS provided to her. Mother's progress was inhibited by mental health issues and related problems. Eventually, CYS exhausted its available services.

The trial court held hearings on CYS' petition on November 23, 2015, February 22, 2016, and February 29, 2016.² The trial court entered its order terminating Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511 (a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b) on April 1, 2016. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal and statement of errors complained of on appeal on April 27, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court filed a Rule 1925 statement on May 17, 2016, referencing its order and opinion dated March 31, 2016 (filed on April 1, 2016). See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

2 Testifying at those hearings, in addition to Mother and Father, were CYS caseworker, Alex Martin; CYS casework supervisor, May Popovich; psychologist, Dennis Kashurba; Independent Family Services (IFS) home management coordinator, Kathy Scaife; IFS family resource professional, Sarah Bantly; Child's grandmother, L.K.; Mother's outpatient therapist, psychologist Erin Bougher; and court-appointed special advocate (CASA), Ellen Shayesteh, D.O.

Mother raises the following question on appeal:

1. Whether the [c]ourt either abused its discretion or commited an error of law when it granted the [p]etition for [i]nvoluntary [t]ermination of [p]arental [r]ights, thereby terminating the parental rights of [Mother] to [Child][?]

(Mother's Brief, at 2).

Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. ( See Mother's Brief, at 2). She maintains that she evidenced a purpose to get Child back, not to give up her parental claim. ( See id. at 6).

Part III of the Domestic Relations Code is known and referred to in whole as the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2101. The Adoption Act consists of five chapters and numerous respective subchapters; those provisions most relevant to this case appear in Chapter 25 (governing proceedings prior to petition to adopt including termination of parental rights); and to a lesser extent, Chapter 27 (governing the petition for adoption) and Chapter 29 (governing decrees and records). See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501-2903. Adoption in Pennsylvania is purely a statutory right. In re Adoption of R.B.F., 569 Pa. 269, 276, 803 A.2d 1195, 1199 (2002). Strict compliance with the Adoption Act is a prerequisite to the court's jurisdiction to hear a petition to terminate parental rights in connection with a proposed adoption. In re Adoption of J.F.D., 782 A.2d 564, 565 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citing In re Adoption of W.C.K., 748 A.2d 223, 226 (Pa. Super. 2000), appeal denied, 567 Pa. 745, 788 A.2d 378 (2000)).

In re E.M.I., 57 A.3d 1278, 1284-85 (Pa. Super. 2012).

Our standard of review for a challenge to the involuntary termination of parental rights is well-settled:

In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence presented as well as the trial court's factual findings and legal conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will reverse the trial court's order only if we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge's decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

Furthermore:

Where the hearing court's findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court even though the record could support an opposite result.

We are bound by the findings of the trial court which have adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not evidence capricious disregard for competent and credible evidence. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Though we are not bound by the trial court's inferences and deductions, we may reject its conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court's sustainable findings.

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

Requests to have a natural parent's parental rights terminated are governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. Here, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). ( See Order and Opinion, at 9-11). To affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree with any one subsection of Section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.3d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Section 2511(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused to perform parental duties.


* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 (a)(1), (b).

It is well settled that a party seeking termination of a parent's rights bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by "clear and convincing evidence," a standard which requires evidence that is "so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." In re T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004). Further,

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one's parental

responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her physical and emotional needs.

In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations omitted.)

To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), the person or agency seeking termination must demonstrate through clear and convincing evidence that, for a period of at least six months prior to the filing of the petition, the parent's conduct demonstrates a settled purpose to relinquish parental rights or that the parent has refused or failed to perform parental duties. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003).

With respect to a termination pursuant to subsection 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has explained:

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights [pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1)], the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent's explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).

Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M , II , 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 1998) (citation omitted). Further,

the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. The court must examine the individual circumstances of each case and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary termination.

In re N.M.B., 856 A.2d 847, 854-55 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 872 A.2d 1200 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted).

The Adoption Act provides that a trial court "shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The Act does not make specific reference to an evaluation of the bond between parent and child but our case law requires the evaluation of any such bond. See In re E.M., 533 Pa. 115, 620 A.2d 481 (1993). However, this Court has held that the trial court is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation performed by an expert. See In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008).

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court, we conclude that there is no merit to the issues Appellant has raised on appeal. The trial court opinion properly disposes of the questions presented. ( See Trial Court Order [and Opinion], 4/01/16, at 8-11) (concluding: (1) Mother's inability to resolve the various issues which caused the removal of Child still exist today, more than thirty-four months later; (2) Mother has failed to complete the necessary programs to achieve reunification; (3) the safety of Child to be free from domestic violence is still a continuing concern; (4) for a period of six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition Mother evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing her parental claim to Child or had refused or failed to perform parental duties; and (5) termination of Mother's parental rights will best meet the developmental, physical and emotional needs and the welfare of Child)).

Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's opinion.

Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 10/24/2016

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