Opinion
No. COA08-862.
Filed 18 November 2008.
Beaufort County Nos. 06 J 82-83.
Appeal by respondent-mother from an order entered 23 April 2008, nunc pro tunc 28 March 2008, by Judge Michael A. Paul in Beaufort County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 November 2008.
Alice Anne Espenshade for petitioner-appellee Beaufort County Department of Social Services. Pamela Newell Williams for appellee Guardian ad Litem. Duncan B. McCormick for respondent-appellant.
Respondent-mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to N.M.D. and L.M.D. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
On 29 June 2007, nunc pro tunc 27 April 2007, N.M.D. and L.M.D. were adjudicated dependent juveniles based on facts stipulated to by respondent-mother. In its adjudicatory order, the court found that N.M.D. and L.M.D. were the "seventh and eighth child, respectively, born alive to their twenty-seven-year-old mother," and that respondent-mother's parental rights to four of her older children had been terminated. In its disposition order, the court made findings regarding respondent-mother's "borderline" or "low average range" intelligence and a diagnosis of a personality disorder. The court also noted positive actions respondent-mother had taken to improve her life skills. Nevertheless, the court found that "in light of [respondent-mother's] psychological profile, present ability to care for herself, and history related to her older children . . . that continued efforts at reunification with [respondent-mother] would be inconsistent with the twins' health, safety and need for a safe[,] permanent home within a reasonable period of time." Accordingly, the court relieved the Buncombe County Department of Social Services ("DSS") of reunification efforts.
On 6 July 2007, DSS filed a motion to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights. DSS alleged two grounds for termination: (1) that respondent-mother was incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of the juveniles, such that the juveniles were dependent juveniles within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9), and that there was a reasonable probability that such incapability would continue for the foreseeable future, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6); and (2) that the parental rights of respondent-mother with respect to another child had been terminated involuntarily by a court of competent jurisdiction and respondent-mother lacked the ability or willingness to establish a safe home, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(9). Hearings were held on the motion to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights on 14 and 28 March 2008. The trial court concluded that respondent-mother: (1) had willfully left the juveniles in foster care for more than twelve months without showing reasonable progress under the circumstances to correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the children from her custody, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2); (2) that respondent-mother's intelligence and Axis II personality disorder rendered her incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of the juveniles, such that they were dependent, and there was a reasonable probability that such incapacity would continue for the foreseeable future, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6); and (3) that respondent-mother's parental rights to other children had been terminated involuntarily by a court of competent jurisdiction, and she lacked the ability to establish a safe home, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(9). The trial court further concluded that it was in the juveniles' best interest that respondent-mother's parental rights be terminated. Accordingly, the trial court terminated respondent-mother's parental rights. Respondent-mother appeals.
On appeal, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred by finding that grounds existed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 to terminate her parental rights. Respondent-mother additionally challenges several of the trial court's findings of fact. After careful review of the record, briefs, and contentions of the parties, we affirm. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 sets out the statutory grounds for terminating parental rights. A finding of any one of the separately enumerated grounds is sufficient to support a termination. In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990). "The standard of appellate review is whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law." In re D.J.D., D.M.D., S.J.D., J.M.D., 171 N.C. App. 230, 238, 615 S.E.2d 26, 32 (2005) ( citing In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 291, 536 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2000), disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 374, 547 S.E.2d 9, 10 (2001)).
In the instant case, respondent-mother challenges the trial court's findings of fact numbers 15, 16, 17, 18, and 23. The trial court's findings were as follows:
15. Mother suffers from a narcissistic personality disorder with histrionic and antisocial traits. This diagnosis falls on Axis II in the system employed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Axis II disorders are deeply [i]ngrained dysfunctional patterns of world view and response to stress. They are traits not easily or quickly changed through therapy, even when an individual is highly motivated to do so. Dr. Dickinson estimated that it would take five years of intensive therapy for mother to make such change.
16. Mother has great difficulty in trusting others, a fact noted by Ms. Freeman and Ms. Savage as they reported their efforts to initiate mental health services with mother. This trait would have an adverse effect on mother's ability to parent in that it may undermine the parent-child bond, and will interfere with mother seeking assistance when needed. Mother's primary coping style is to withdraw from others and close herself off emotionally in times of stress.
17. Mother has no capacity for empathy, and a hard time forging and maintaining emotional connections.
Empathy is needed in parenting? because the ability to put yourself in your child's place is required to properly moderate parental responses to child misbehavior. Empathy also assures sufficient attention to a child's emotional and physical needs. Mother's difficulty in establishing emotional connections will undermine the stability of her household to the child's detriment.
18. Mother's concrete style of thinking would inhibit her ability to anticipate problems in order to avoid them. In a test involving a series of hypothetical problems with children of varying ages, mother had great difficulty in imagining solutions to problems she had not yet encountered in real life. So far, mother has not been the primary care provider for any child over the age of eight months. Mother tends to respond immediately to any perceived crisis, rather than engaging in a logical analysis that might provide a broader range of solution options. Although mother had completed a course of parent skills instruction shortly before her evaluation with Dr. Dickinson, mother was still at high risk for poor parenting decisions, and an unduly rigid response to discipline.
. . .
23. Despite the progress that mother has made, she is not yet capable of maintaining herself without significant assistance from mental health providers, and her protective payee. There has been no substantive change in mother's intelligence or personality, and such change is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Mother's problems with abstract thought, empathy, trust, and the maintenance of relationships persist, and with them, her incapability to parent.
Respondent-mother contends that the above findings of fact are in error because although they were based on the opinion of Dr. Patricia Dickinson, the court ignored evidence that Dr. Dickinson had changed her opinion. Specifically, respondent-mother contends that after the court received evidence that she was making significant progress, Dickinson testified and recognized the positive changes she had made. Moreover, respondent-mother asserts that Dickinson declined to express her opinion on respondent-mother's present ability to parent. We are not persuaded.
The trial court received Dickinson's evaluation of respondent-mother into evidence, and Dickinson testified as to respondent-mother's personality disorder. Dickinson further testified that she believed it would require community based assistance workers providing respondent-mother with ten hours a day of services, five days a week, for five years before respondent-mother might be able to function as a parent. Although Dickinson acknowledged the positive steps respondent-mother had made, she never stated a different diagnosis, nor disavowed her original diagnosis. Dickinson declined to state an opinion as to respondent-mother's "present ability" to parent "because I don't know what the living setting is for the twins to be in that with her and a new baby." Thus, the court could properly rely on Dickinson's original diagnosis and opinions when making its findings of fact. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in making findings of fact numbers 15, 16, 17, 18, and 23.
In finding of fact number 14, the trial court found that:
Mother functions intellectually in the borderline, or "low average" range. Her thinking is concrete, with little power of abstraction. As of April, 2007, mother was reading at a fifth grade level, spelling at a sixth grade level, and performing mathematical calculations at a fourth grade level. At the time of the hearing on the motion to terminate mother's parental rights, no evidence was offered as to any education in the intervening period that would have improved the academic skills noted. Mother left school after the eleventh grade, and at the age of twenty nine still has not earned a GED.
Respondent-mother does not argue that the trial court erred in making finding of fact number 14. Therefore, the finding of fact is deemed to be supported by sufficient evidence, and is binding on appeal. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6); see also In re P.M., 169 N.C. App. 423, 424, 610 S.E.2d 403, 404-05 (2005) (concluding respondent had abandoned factual assignments of error when she "failed to specifically argue in her brief that they were unsupported by evidence"). We conclude that the trial court's finding of fact number 14, along with findings of fact numbers 15, 16, 17, 18, and 23, as expressed herein, were sufficient to support its conclusion that respondent-mother's intelligence and personality disorders rendered her incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of N.M.D. and L.M.D., and that the children were dependent children within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6). Since grounds exist pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6) to support the trial court's order, the remaining grounds found by the trial court to support termination need not be reviewed by the Court. Taylor, 97 N.C. App. at 64, 387 S.E.2d at 233-34. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Judges GEER and ARROWOOD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).