Opinion
No. COA12–1492.
2013-07-2
In the Matter of N.L.
Senior Associate Attorney Twyla Hollingsworth–Richardson for Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, Youth and Family Services petitioner-appellee. Assistant Appellate Defender J. Lee Gilliam for respondentmother appellant.
Appeal by respondent-mother from orders entered 27 July and 17 September 2012 by Judge Louis A. Trosch, Jr., in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 June 2013. Senior Associate Attorney Twyla Hollingsworth–Richardson for Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, Youth and Family Services petitioner-appellee. Assistant Appellate Defender J. Lee Gilliam for respondentmother appellant.
Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog LLP, by Sara B. Warf, for guardian ad litem.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court's orders adjudicating the juvenile N.L. dependent and placing him in the custody of the Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, Youth and Family Services (“YFS”). Respondent argues the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact in its adjudication order. We reverse the adjudication and disposition orders.
On 22 March 2012, YFS received a report that respondent had been more than one hour late picking up the five-year-old juvenile from school. According to the report, respondent also indicated that she would pick up the juvenile late the next day, and that she would like the school to allow the juvenile to walk home by himself. The report further alleged that the juvenile had failed a vision screening and been referred for Exceptional Children's Services, but that respondent had failed to take the juvenile for further testing. In May of 2012, YFS received additional reports that respondent had threatened to kill the juvenile during conversations with two relatives.
On 30 May 2012, YFS filed a petition alleging that the juvenile was neglected and dependent and the juvenile was placed in non-secure custody. On 25 June 2012, respondent entered into a “Mediated Petition Agreement” (“MPA”) with YFS. The MPA purported to contain “the parties' mutually acceptable understanding of the issues discussed” during mediation and recited the allegations made in the reports to YFS and in the juvenile petition. Respondent and YFS also entered into a “Mediated Case Plan Agreement,” which established the prerequisites for respondent to satisfy in order to achieve reunification with the juvenile.
The matter came on for adjudication and disposition on 10 July and 9 August 2012. The juvenile's father did not contest adjudication and is not a party to this appeal. The MPA was introduced into evidence at the adjudication phase of the hearing. No witnesses testified at adjudication. When the trial court reviewed the stipulations in the MPA, respondent denied that she ever threatened to kill the juvenile. Respondent also requested that the trial court dismiss the petition and that the juvenile be returned to her custody.
The trial court declined to adjudicate the juvenile neglected, but concluded that the juvenile was dependent. At the conclusion of the adjudication phase, the trial court stated:
Uhm—Based on the evidence that's been presented, I can't find neglect that's been proven by clear and convincing evidence. Based on paragraph A and B [of the MPA], I can find dependency, but I'll tell you all if you include in a mediated agreement “YFS received the report” that's not evidence. “We had allegations that—“ That's not evidence. And so, sometimes I'll just tell all the parties you gotta try a case or present evidence. In this case, solely based on the fact Ms.—because of—apparently because of work, her work schedule she was leaving a five year old alone for 30 minutes a day after school. I'm going to find that, that made him dependent, but the rest of it, I can't find that it made him neglected. And I'll tell you that's—I'm—I mean, I'll just leave it at that. Just because we have a mediated agreement doesn't mean that there's going to be an adjudication.
In the preprinted adjudication order, entered 27 July 2012, the trial court found:
The mother states under oath that she entered into a mediated agreement with the assistance of counsel and would like the court to receive it into evidence, being fully aware of the consequences. The Court find[s] these statements to be true.
The trial court also found that the petition had been offered into evidence without objection. The trial court made no additional written adjudication-phase findings of fact in the order. The trial court made disposition-phase findings of fact in the 27 July 2012 order and in a separate 17 September 2012 dispositional order. Respondent entered notice of appeal.
On appeal, respondent argues the trial court's adjudication order contains insufficient findings of fact to support a conclusion that the juvenile was dependent. We agree.
“The allegations in a petition alleging that a juvenile is abused, neglected, or dependent shall be proved by clear and convincing evidence.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–805 (2011). “If the court finds from the evidence, including stipulations by a party, that the allegations in the petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court shall so state.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–807(a) (2011). “The adjudicatory order shall be in writing and shall contain appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–807(b).
“In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury ... the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon [.]” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 52(a) (2011). Although “there is no specific statutory criteria which must be stated in the findings of fact or conclusions of law [in an adjudication order], the trial court's findings must consist of more than a recitation of the allegations.” In re O.W., 164 N.C.App. 699, 702, 596 S.E.2d 851, 853 (2004) (citing In re Anderson, 151 N.C.App. 94, 97, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002)). Thus, the trial court “must through processes of logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts find the ultimate facts essential to support the conclusions of law.” In re Harton, 156 N.C.App. 655, 660, 577 S.E.2d 334, 337 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In this case, the findings of fact in the adjudication order are entirely dependent on the MPA and the petition. As the trial court acknowledged in open court, however, the MPA phrases all of its statements as allegations rather than statements of fact, and prefaces each statement with a phrase such as “received a report,” “the report also alleged,” and “received a report alleging.” The petition, as it consists of YFS's allegations against respondent, uses similar language. Thus, even though the statements in the MPA and the petition were adopted by the trial court as findings of fact, the “mere recitation” of YFS's allegations cannot support a conclusion that the juvenile was dependent. In re O.W., 164 N.C.App. at 702, 596 S.E.2d at 853. Therefore, we hold that the trial court failed to make sufficiently specific ultimate findings of fact to allow this Court to determine whether the findings are supported by sufficient evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the adjudication and disposition orders.
Reversed. Judges ELMORE and DAVIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).