Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. J21037
Premo, J.
The juvenile court found defendant Nicholas P. to be a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 in that he committed robbery. On appeal, defendant contends that no substantial evidence supports the intent-to-steal element of the offense. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding in a juvenile court proceeding, the reviewing court is bound by the same principles as to sufficiency and the substantiality of the evidence which govern the review of criminal convictions generally. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809.) These principles include the following: “It is the prosecution’s burden in a criminal case to prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 260.) The appellate court, to determine whether the prosecution has introduced sufficient evidence to meet this burden, must determine “ ‘whether from the evidence, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the existence of each element of the offense charged.’ ” (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 139, fn. 13.) In making this determination, “[the appellate court] must examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence--evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value--such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “Although it is the duty of the [trier of fact] to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the [trier of fact], not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ‘ “If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.” ’ ” (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932-933.)
BACKGROUND
The victim and a friend were eating at a restaurant at 12:30 a.m. when the friend received a telephone call from a girl whom he knew. The two decided to ride their bikes to an elementary school to say hello to the girl. They arrived, met four or five girls, and began “just hanging out and just talking.” Thereafter, defendant and two friends arrived. One of defendant’s friends approached the victim and slapped the sunglasses off his face. The friend picked up the sunglasses, put them on his face, and announced that he had just obtained new sunglasses. He then grabbed the hat off the victim’s head and put it on. One of the girls tried to get the sunglasses and hat from the friend so as to return them to the victim, but the friend would not give the property to her. Defendant then told the victim that his friend had a pocket knife and showed the victim his own pocket knife, which persuaded the victim against trying to retrieve the property. Defendant’s friend then approached the victim, made a remark about the victim’s shirt being expensive, told the victim to take off the shirt, placed his knife on a table, and remarked that he did not need a knife. The victim took off his shirt and put it on the table. Defendant’s friend grabbed the shirt and called the victim a “bitch” for being so weak as to surrender his shirt. Defendant advised his friend against taking the shirt, and defendant threw the shirt back to the victim. While the victim waited to see whether he would regain his sunglasses and hat, defendant and his other companion discussed whether the victim was the person who “snitched” on another student in PE class. They then declared that they hated snitches and asked the victim whether he was a snitch. Defendant’s friend got close to the victim’s face and said, “I hate fucking snitches.” Defendant then took back the victim’s shirt and slapped the victim in the face with the shirt. He then told the victim, “get out of here before I steal your bike or something like that.” Defendant’s friend returned from attending to one of the girls who was intoxicated and asked why the victim was still there. The victim and his friend then got on their bikes and rode away. They called the police who responded to the elementary school where defendant’s friend was wearing the victim’s shirt, sunglasses, and hat.
According to defendant, he and his friends went to the school to help one of the girls who was drunk; he heard his friend and the victim arguing; when his friend and the victim separated, he advised the victim to stand up to the friend in order to get back his property; and after he slapped the victim with the shirt, he either threw the shirt toward his friend or left it on a table.
The juvenile court explained its robbery finding as follows: “I find [defendant] committed a [Penal Code section] 211 as to the shirt. It’s no longer a teasing when, as I believe the witnesses, you start getting in somebody’s face and calling them a snitch. Now I’m not finding that you committed these offenses while armed. . . . [¶] Nevertheless, the existence of the knives certainly contributed to the fear that [the victim] felt. . . . [¶] . . . If you take somebody’s property and you use force or fear to do it, that is a robbery. It’s not pickle in the middle, especially if you don’t even know the guy. That’s not teasing. That’s bullying. You don’t even know this kid.”
DISCUSSION
Robbery is defined as “the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” (Pen. Code, § 211.) The requisite taking must be done with intent to steal (People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 938, 948), which includes an intent to permanently deprive a person of the person’s property. (People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1058.) Robbery requires the “ ‘intent to steal . . . either before or during the commission of the act of force’ [citation], because ‘[i]f [the] intent to steal arose after the victim was assaulted, the robbery element of stealing by force or fear is absent.’ ” (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 214.) Absent that intent, taking property of another is not theft and therefore cannot be robbery. (People v. Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 947-948.)
Defendant argues that there was no evidence of his specific intent to permanently deprive the victim of his shirt. He asserts that the evidence shows no more than that the victim’s property was “more likely the props of a short-lived taunting episode than the targets of a theft.” He clarifies that his acts “were fleeting, momentary acts that were far more consistent with a taunting and possible assault episode than a robbery.” He explains away the seemingly incriminating threat that he made to the victim (“get out of here before I steal your bike”) as “vague” and unrecounted by witnesses other than the victim. But this argument implicitly concedes that defendant’s acts were consistent with a robbery and amounts to no more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which is not our function.
“ ‘[I]ntent is inherently difficult to prove by direct evidence. Therefore, the act itself, together with its surrounding circumstances must generally form the basis from which the intent of the actor may legitimately be inferred.’ ” (People v. Edwards (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1099.) In other words, an intent to deprive an owner permanently of his or her property is inferable from a taking. (People v. Tufunga, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 943.)
Here, defendant took the victim’s shirt as part of bullying behavior. He did not know the victim beforehand, yet he assaulted the victim with the shirt for the perceived act of being a snitch, and joined with his companion in chasing the victim from the schoolyard while retaining the victim’s property. During all this time and until the police arrived, nothing occurred that suggested defendant intended to return the victim’s shirt. Thus, one could rationally conclude that defendant took the victim’s shirt without intending to return it. Moreover, that defendant gave the shirt to his companion or abandoned the shirt on the schoolyard table also supports that inference. That defendant might have been sympathetic to the victim during the initial phase of the encounter does not affect these facts and inferences. In light of the taking, keeping of the shirt, defendant’s behavior, and defendant’s disposal of the property after the victim’s exit from the scene, a rational trier of fact could conclude that defendant took the victim’s shirt with an intent to permanently deprive the victim. The juvenile court was under no obligation to accept at face value defendant’s self-serving testimony, and the juvenile court’s ultimate ruling indicates it did not believe defendant.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of wardship is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Rushing, P.J., Elia, J.