"Although a bankruptcy judge may consult state law for guidance as to whether [property] is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support, that concept is necessarily one founded in, and resolved through an application of, federal bankruptcy law." In re Nero, 323 B.R. 33, 37 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2005) (citing Brody v. Brody (In re Brody), 3 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1993)). Bankruptcy courts walk a fine line, because "[a]lthough it is true that '[w]hat constitutes alimony, maintenance, or support, will be determined under the bankruptcy laws, not State law', it is also true that 'Congress could not have intended that federal courts were to formulate the bankruptcy law of alimony and support in a vacuum, precluded from all reference to the reasoning of the well-established laws of the States.'"

The burden of proof (on a preponderance of the evidence standard) with respect to Sections 523(a)(5) and 523(a)(15) is on the party asserting the exception to discharge (in this case, the Defendants). See Detels v. Nero (In re Nero), 323 B.R. 33 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2005) (Dabrowski, J.). A. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)

" "The party opposing the bankruptcy discharge of a particular debt - the Plaintiff here - bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the requirements of the relevant subsection of Section 523(a) have been met. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 112 L. Ed. 2d 755, 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991)." Detels v. Nero (In re Nero), 323 B.R. 33, 37 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2005). The Plaintiff asserts in his Rule 56(a)1 Statement that the Debtor's debts to him reflected in the Settlement are (i) in the nature of a "domestic support obligation" within the meaning of §§523(a)(5) and 101(14A) and/or (ii) are not domestic support obligations, but are debts to a former spouse, incurred by the Debtor in the course of a "divorce . . . or separation agreement, divorce decree. . . ," within the meaning of §523(a)(15), and either way, are not dischargeable. The Plaintiff cannot prevail under both subsections, however.

[C]ertain objective "factors" [are] traditionally utilized . . . in divining the actual nature of an obligation imposed in a divorce decree: e.g., (1) the label given the obligation in the decree, (2) the form and placement of the obligation in the decree, (3) whether the obligation terminates on death, remarriage, etc., (4) the economic disparity between the parties, (5) the length of the marriage, (6) the presence of minor children, (7) the age, employability, and educational level of the parties, and (8) the financial resources, actual or potential, of each spouse.Detels v. Nero (In re Nero), 323 B.R. 33, 38 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2005) (Dabrowski, J.) (Section 523(a)(5) proceeding) (footnote omitted). Certain other factors are discussed in Collier on Bankruptcy. (See 4 Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 523.

analyzed certain objective "factors" traditionally utilized . . . in divining the actual nature of an obligation imposed in a divorce decree: e.g., (1) the label given the obligation in the decree, (2) the form and placement of the obligation in the decree, (3) whether the obligation terminates on death, remarriage, etc., (4) the economic disparity between the parties, (5) the length of the marriage, (6) the presence of minor children, (7) the age, employability, and educational level of the parties, and (8) the financial resources, actual or potential, of each spouse.Detels v. Nero (In re Nero), 323 B.R. 33, 38 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2005) (Dabrowski, J.). But cf. Rogers v. Chorba (In re Rogers), No. 08-3080, 2010 WL 1571196, at *5 n. 11 (Bankr. D. Conn. Apr. 19, 2010).

If a property settlement is found to be a DSO, it is not dischargeable. Detels v. Nero (In re Nero ), 323 B.R. 33, 38 (Bankr.D.Conn. 2005; Dabrowski, J.). Guardian ad Litem fees are non-dischargeable DSO debts in Connecticut.