Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17CV-P496-TBR
01-04-2018
RAYMONE V. NEAL PLAINTIFF v. MARK BOLTON et al. DEFENDANTS
cc: Plaintiff, pro se Defendants Jefferson County Attorney
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Raymone V. Neal, a pretrial detainee at the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (LMDC), filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the Court on initial review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. For the reasons that follow, a portion of the claims will continue, and the others will be dismissed.
I.
Plaintiff brings suit against LMDC Director Mark Bolton, LMDC Sgt. Ferguson, and LMDC Corrections Officer Wright. He sues Defendants in their individual and official capacities. As his statement of his claims, Plaintiff alleges:
On January 30, 2017 between the hours of 8:25 pm - 8:35 pm I was punched in the face by officer Ferguson then tackled by officer Ferguson & officer Wright stripped of my Nike air max (black) shoes and drugged into a single cell and left with a busted mouth and nose, and swelling of my eyes. I received no medical attention. My Nike Air Max shoes were never returned.As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary and punitive damages, reimbursement for his shoes, and preservation of the video of the incident.
II.
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking relief against governmental entities, officers, and/or employees, this Court must review the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the Court must review the complaint and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See § 1915A(b)(1), (2); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The trial court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Id. at 327. In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true." Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
A. Official-capacity claims against all Defendants
"Official-capacity suits . . . 'generally represent [] another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'" Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)). Plaintiff's official-capacity claims against Defendants, therefore, are actually against the Louisville Metro Government. See Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 440 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating that civil rights suit against county clerk of courts in his official capacity was equivalent of suing clerk's employer, the county).
When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality, this Court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether Plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The Court will address the issues in reverse order.
"[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor -- or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Searcy v. City of Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). "[T]he touchstone of 'official policy' is designed 'to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.'" City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986)) (emphasis in original). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff "must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy." Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)).
None of the allegations in the complaint demonstrate that any alleged wrongdoing or injury occurred as a result of a policy or custom implemented or endorsed by the Louisville Metro Government. Accordingly, the complaint fails to establish a basis of liability against the municipality and fails to state a cognizable § 1983 claim. Therefore, the official-capacity claims against all Defendants will be dismissed.
B. Individual-capacity claims against Defendant Bolton
Plaintiff fails to allege any wrongdoing by Defendant Bolton, listing him as a Defendant only. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Bolton liable based on his supervisory position as LMDC Director, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 actions to impute liability onto supervisors. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Taylor v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 80-81 (6th Cir. 1995); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). "[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that supervisory liability "must be based on active unconstitutional behavior and cannot be based upon 'a mere failure to act'") (quoting Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998)). "[S]imple awareness of employees' misconduct does not lead to supervisor liability." Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 903 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 1996)).
Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant Bolton was actively involved in any of the alleged wrongdoing. "In order for supervisory liability to attach, a plaintiff must prove that the official 'did more than play a passive role in the alleged violation or showed mere tacit approval of the goings on.'" Loy v. Sexton, 132 F. App'x 624, 626 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999)). The Court, therefore, will dismiss the § 1983 individual-capacity claims against Defendant Bolton for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
C. Individual-capacity claims against Defendants Ferguson and Wright
Plaintiff complains of an incident occurring on January 30, 2017. As to his claim that his Nike shoes were taken by Defendants Ferguson and/or Wright, the Supreme Court has held that where adequate remedies are provided by state law, the negligent or intentional loss or destruction of personal property does not state a claim cognizable under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). In order to assert a constitutional claim for deprivation of property, a plaintiff must allege that the state post-deprivation procedures are inadequate to remedy the deprivation. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. at 543-44. The law of this Circuit is in accord. For example, in Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1983), the Sixth Circuit held that "in § 1983 damage suits claiming the deprivation of a property interest without procedural due process of law, the plaintiff must plead and prove that state remedies for redressing the wrong are inadequate." Id. at 1066. The Sixth Circuit has found that Kentucky's statutory remedy for such losses is adequate within the meaning of Parratt. See Wagner v. Higgins, 754 F.2d 186, 191-92 (6th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff does not allege any reason why a state-court action would not afford him complete relief for the deprivation of his personal property. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim for the loss of his shoes, and that claim will be dismissed.
The Court will allow Fourteenth Amendment claims of excessive force and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need to continue against Defendants Ferguson and Wright in their individual capacities.
III. ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
(1) The official-capacity claims against all Defendants, the individual-capacity claims against Defendant Bolton, and the due-process claim for the loss of Plaintiff's shoes are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
(2) Because all claims against Defendant Bolton are dismissed, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate him as a party to this action.
(3) Fourteenth Amendment claims of excessive force and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need will continue against Defendants Ferguson and Wright in their individual capacities. In allowing these claims to continue, the Court passes no judgment on the merit and ultimate outcome of these claims. The Court will enter a separate Order Directing Service and Scheduling Order to govern the development of these continuing claims. Date: January 4, 2018
/s/
Thomas B. Russell, Senior Judge
United States District Court cc: Plaintiff, pro se
Defendants
Jefferson County Attorney
4413.005