Opinion
No. 111,617.
2014-12-19
In the Interest of N.C, A Male.
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; Daniel Cahill, Judge.Patricia Aylward–Kalb, of Kansas City, for appellant natural mother.Ashley Hutton, assistant district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; Daniel Cahill, Judge.
Patricia Aylward–Kalb, of Kansas City, for appellant natural mother. Ashley Hutton, assistant district attorney, Jerome A. Gorman, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before STANDRIDGE, P.J., LEBEN and POWELL, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
LEBEN, J.
Mother, who cannot live independently, appeals the termination of her parental rights to her special-needs son, N.C. Mother argues that while she may not be fit to parent her son, terminating her rights to him is not in his best interests. But the district court is in the best position to determine whether terminating a parent's rights is in a child's best interests, and we defer to the district court's best-interest determination if it is legally and factually accurate and a reasonable person could agree with it. In re R.S., 50 Kan.App.2d ––––, Syl. ¶ 2, 336 P.3d 903, 904 (2014).
Here, a reasonable person could agree that terminating Mother's rights and allowing N.C. to be placed in a permanent home was in his best interests: Mother will never be able to care for him on her own, no placements could provide Mother and N.C. joint care, and N.C .'s disabilities require immediate and consistent care by people able to provide it. We therefore affirm the district court's decision terminating Mother's parental rights.
Factual and Procedural Background
Mother's intellectual functioning is in the extremely low range, and while one expert predicted that she could learn some new, simple tasks, her overall cognitive functioning is not expected to improve. She also suffers from a speech impediment and ADHD.
Mother lives in a Mosaic “host home,” where she receives services for her disabilities. The home can care for Mother but not for her children. Because of Mother's disabilities, it is unlikely that she will ever be able to function independently or live outside a supervised setting.
N.C, Mother's son, also has ADHD. In addition, N.C. has no fingers on his left hand and has significant developmental delays. A teacher reported to a caseworker that N.C. at age 4 functioned at the level of a 2–year–old. N.C. frequently acts aggressively by kicking and biting.
By November 2012, the Kansas Department for Children and Families had investigated N.C.'s care four times. On all four occasions, it had received reports of unexplained bruising on N.C. and had investigated concerns that Mother could not care for her son due to her own disabilities. Mother had been on a restricted-rights plan with Mosaic when most of these reports were filed, which prevented her from being left alone with N.C. Mother had agreed to the restricted-rights plan because she acknowledged that she lacked parenting skills and would become physically aggressive and stressed if left with N.C. unsupervised. Nevertheless, those close to N.C. continued to note suspicious bruises on him that Mother did not report.
In December 2012, N.C. was placed in the custody of the Kansas Department for Children and Families, and he was declared a child in need of care in June 2013. Although Mother completed almost all of the tasks designed by the State to prepare her to reassume care of N .C, the State moved to terminate her parental rights to him. Significantly, Mother remained unable to care for N.C. on her own, and a placement willing to provide care for both of them had not been found despite extensive efforts by the social-service organizations involved in the case.
In December 2013, Mother completed a parenting assessment. The evaluator expressed serious concerns about Mother's ability to parent, especially in the areas of supervision, discipline, enrichment, access to reading material, and parental literacy. The evaluator expressed doubts about Mother's ability to communicate with N.C, deal with his aggressive behaviors, and handle his school system. According to the evaluator, Mother was more bonded to N.C. than N.C. was to Mother. A caseworker agreed, stating that N.C. saw Mother more as a playmate than as an authority figure.
At the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, the State asked the court to judicially notice the psychological evaluations of Mother and Father. Mother's evaluation explained her various diagnoses—including ADHD, extremely low intellectual functioning, and poor memory—and stated it was unlikely that she would ever be able to function independently. Father's evaluation suggested that he had some ability to learn and to make changes in his life that would allow him to function independently. At the hearing, however, Father's attorney admitted that Father felt he was not prepared to assume responsibility for N.C. and did not think that his group home would be an appropriate placement for the child.
Mother testified, but her speech impediment made it difficult to transcribe her testimony. In the testimony that was recorded, Mother said she wanted to continue visitation with N.C. and that she did not want to lose track of him.
After hearing from Mother, the district court terminated both Mother's and Father's parental rights. Specifically, the court held that Mother and Father were unfit by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, or physical disability of such duration or nature as to render them unable to care for the ongoing needs of N.C. now and in the foreseeable future. It also held that social-service agencies had made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the family but had failed. Taking into consideration N.C.'s mental, physical, and emotional needs, the district court concluded that his interests would be best served by terminating Mother's and Father's rights.
Mother appealed to this court, contesting only one of the district court's findings. Mother admits that she is not fit to parent N.C. and will not be fit to parent him in the foreseeable future, but she contends that terminating her parental rights to him is not in his best interests.
The sole issue for this court on appeal is therefore whether the district court erred by concluding that it was in N.C.'s best interests to terminate Mother's parental rights.
Analysis
In order for a parent's rights to be terminated, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit and will likely remain unfit for the foreseeable future, viewed from a child's perspective. K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2269(a); In re S.D., 41 Kan.App.2d 780, Syl. ¶ 9, 790, 204 P.3d 1182 (2009). Once the court makes a finding of unfitness, it must then determine whether terminating the parent's rights is in the child's best interests. K .S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2269(g)(1); In re K.W., 45 Kan.App.2d 353, 354, 246 P.3d 1021 (2011); see In re K.M., No. 111, 109, 2014 WL 3907119, at *12 (Kan.App.2014) (unpublished opinion).
When determining whether termination is in the child's best interests, the district court must give primary consideration to the child's physical, mental, and emotional health. K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2269(g)(1). If, as here, a child is physically or emotionally disabled and has special needs, the court should take into consideration those needs and the parent's ability to meet them. In the Interest of Baby Boy Bryant, 9 Kan.App.2d 768, 774, 689 P.2d 1203 (1984).
To determine whether termination is in the child's best interests in light of the child's physical, mental, and emotional health, the court must weigh the benefits of termination, which include permanency for the child, against the consequences of termination, which may include a severing of the relationship between the parent and child. In re K.R., 43 Kan.App.2d 891, 904, 233 P.3d 746 (2010). This requires the court to consider the nature and strength of the parent-child relationship. 43 Kan.App.2d at 904.
K.S.A.2013 Supp. 38–2269(g)(l) does not require that the district court make specific findings when concluding that termination is in a child's best interests, only that it consider the statutory criteria—the child's physical, mental, and emotional health. See In re T.T., No. 106,939, 2012 WL 3822914, at *6 (Kan.App.2012) (unpublished opinion). A finding that terminating a parent's rights is in a child's best interests is a discretionary judgment call made by the district court, which hears the evidence directly. In re R.S., 50 Kan.App.2d ––––, Syl. ¶ 2, 336 P.3d at 904. On appeal, this court reviews the district court's best-interests determination for an abuse of its discretion. 50 Kan.App.2d ––––, Syl. ¶ 2, 336 P.3d at 904.
A district court abuses its discretion when no reasonable person would agree with its decision or when its decision is based on a legal or factual error. 50 Kan.App.2d ––––, Syl. ¶ 2, 336 P.3d at 904. If the district court makes factual findings that pertain solely to its best-interests determination, those findings may be based on a preponderance of the evidence and are reviewed on appeal to determine if substantial evidence supports them. 50 Kan.App.2d ––––, Syl. ¶ 2, 336 P.3d at 904.
Mother does not contest the district court's determination that she is unfit to parent N.C. and that she will remain so for the foreseeable future. She argues that even though she cannot parent N.C, terminating her rights to him is not in his best interests. She points out that she has been a constant in his life and that her rights would not have been terminated had a placement been able to care for them both. She says that a joint placement was the first choice for everyone involved in the case and contends that this shows that a continued relationship between the two of them is in N.C.'s best interests.
Mother first argues that terminating her rights means the end of her relationship with N.C. This is not necessarily true. While terminating her parental rights means the end of her right to exercise control of N.C. as his parent, it does not automatically follow that Mother and N.C. will have no relationship. The court's ruling does not prevent Mother from working with N.C.'s foster family or adoptive family to have contact or visitation with N.C; it only means that the court found that Mother should not be legally and physically responsible for him. Though the court cannot order the future foster or adoptive families to continue visitation with Mother, at the time Mother's rights were terminated, she had a relationship with one of N.C.'s former foster parents and had been informed about a change in his foster placement. When the court terminated her rights, the judge told Mother he didn't see why she could not continue to work with social services to visit her son.
Mother also argues that terminating her rights is not in N.C.'s best interests because the court and the State favored a joint placement for her and N.C. The problem with this argument is that even though the court found value in the relationship between Mother and N.C, it ultimately concluded that N.C.'s need for permanency was more important in light of his special needs. See In re K.R., 43 Kan.App.2d at 904 (explaining that court should weigh benefits of permanency against consequences of termination—which might include trauma to the parent-child relationship); Baby Boy Bryant, 9 Kan.App.2d at 774. The record supports a finding that Mother and N.C's relationship was not as crucial to him as his need for permanency. For instance, a caseworker reported that N.C. did not view Mother as a parent, but as a friend. The parenting evaluation also suggested that Mother was more bonded to N.C. than he was to her. While this does not mean that N.C. does not care for Mother, it does support a finding that other considerations may have been more important in his case.
Based on our careful review of the evidence, a reasonable person could agree with the district court's determination that terminating Mother's rights served N.C's best interests. See In re R.S., 50 Kan.App.2d ––––, Syl. ¶ 2, 336 P.3d at 904. Mother freely admits that she cannot provide N.C. the care he needs without significant support and that no one is able to support them together. Accordingly, the court was left with two choices: (1) terminating Mother's rights and allowing N.C. to be placed in a permanent home; or (2) allowing Mother's rights to remain intact, which would prevent N.C. from being adopted by a family that could provide him with permanency as well as the care he needs and deserves. In light of the fact that Mother will never be able to assume full care of N.C. and in light of N.C.'s numerous special needs, a reasonable person could agree that placing him in a permanent home as soon as possible was a better choice than keeping him in limbo to maintain a friend-like relationship with Mother.
Even so, we note that “[c]ases like this are difficult ones. A parent may be labeled ‘unfit’ under the law even though he or she loves the child and wants to do the right thing, which may be the case here.” In re A.A., 38 Kan.App.2d 1100, 1105, 176 P.3d 237 (2008). But our obligation is to provide final resolution within a reasonable amount of time viewed from N.C.'s perspective. See 38 Kan.App.2d at 1105. While maintaining some sort of visitation with Mother may benefit N.C., the district court found that the benefit he would gain from the chance at a permanent home was greater than the benefit he would gain from a continued parent-child relationship with Mother. Because a reasonable person could agree with this determination, it's entitled to our deference.
We therefore affirm the district court's decision to terminate Mother's rights.