AND NOW, this 31st day of March, 2005, it is ORDERED that the motion filed by Frederick L. Reigle, Esquire, the Standing Chapter 13 Trustee ("the Chapter 13 Trustee") requesting dismissal of this chapter 13 case with prejudice is GRANTED as the court finds that Debtor filed this bankruptcy case in bad faith. In re Lilley, 91 F.3d 491, 496 (3rd Cir. 1996); In re Narod, 138 B.R. 478, 482 (E.D. Pa. 1992); In re Dami, 172 B.R. 6, 10 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). On March 14, 2005, Debtor filed a motion to strike the Chapter 13 Trustee's brief because it was allegedly filed in violation of Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a).

As we stated in our March 31, 2005 Order, it is well established that the filing of a chapter 13 petition in bad faith constitutes grounds for dismissal under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c). In re Lilley, 91 F.3d 491, 496 (3rd Cir. 1996); Lucabaugh v. Internal Revenue Service (In re Lucabaugh), No. 01-2254, 2001 WL 997416 *3 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2001); In re Narod, 138 B.R. 478, 482 (E.D. Pa. 1992);In re Dami, 172 B.R. 610-11 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). We further explained that the existence of a bad faith is determined by reviewing the "totality of the circumstances."

Furthermore, we reject the Debtor's implicit assertion that the sixth filing eradicates any power of this court to examine her conduct in the course of the fifth filing. Were there any doubt on the latter point, In re Narod, 138 B.R. 478, 480 (E.D.Pa. 1992), appears to settle the issue. In that case, the movant sought to reopen the debtor's fifth bankruptcy case a considerable time after its dismissal, and after the intervention of a sixth bankruptcy case, to append a restriction on future filings to the dismissal order in the fifth case.

We also noted, in Oglesby II, 161 B.R. at 924, that a bankruptcy court is not powerless to address abuses effected by bankruptcy recidivists. The bankruptcy courts have many other tools at their disposal for preventing abuses of the Bankruptcy Code. See F.R.B.P. 9011; and In re Narod, 138 B.R. 478, 481-82 (E.D.Pa. 1992). We therefore shall invoke some of these tools and the request by Prudential that any future filings by the Debtor be curtailed in formulating that aspect of our Order which provides directives to the parties for the future.

The Rule further requires publication of a notice that "expressly and clearly stated the deadline for filing a claim and/or answer... and ... that a consequence of failing to file a timely claim and/or answer was default and being forever barred from filing a claim and/or answer." In re Narod, 2013 WL 3491088, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Petitioner published the Notice of Complaint for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability in Newsday once a week beginning on August 16, 2023, for the four consecutive weeks prior to the claim bar date of September 12, 2023.

The Rule further requires publication of a notice that “expressly and clearly stated the deadline for filing a claim and/or answer . . . and . . . that a consequence of failing to file a timely claim and/or answer was default and being forever barred from filing a claim and/or answer.” In re Narod, 2013 WL 3491088, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In addition, bad faith exists when a debtor lacks a sincere desire to pay back his debts. See Lucabaugh v. I.R.S., Civ. No. 01-2254, 2001 WL 997416, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2001) (citing In re Narod, 138 B.R. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1992). 7. Although the Bankruptcy Code does not contain any express limitation on refiling a bankruptcy case after another is dismissed, many courts have recognized that it is inappropriate for a debtor to file another bankruptcy reorganization case (under chapters 11, 12 or 13) after dismissal of an earlier one for non-performance, unless there has been a material change of circumstances which demonstrates that the second (or later) reorganization attempt now has a possibility of success after the first had failed.

, In re Andersson, 209 B.R. 76, 78 (6th Cir. BAP 1997); In re Dickerson, 209 B.R. 703, 707-08 (W.D.Tenn. 1997); Kuo v. Walton, 167 B.R. 677, 679 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1994); see also In re Narod, 138 B.R. 478, 483 (E.D.Pa. 1992) (application of § 109(g)(2) is "mandatory rather than discretionary"); In re Madison, 184 B.R. 686, 694 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1995) ("§ 109(g)(2) strictly prevents certain tactics on a debtor's part, irrespective of the debtor's actual `abusive' motive"); In re Walker, 171 B.R. 197, 202 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1994) ("[W]hen the facts of a case fit squarely within the parameters of § 109(g), we cannot let the equities, which may run in favor of a debtor, prevent us from applying the statute.") (citations omitted); Harry Wright, IV, "Must Courts Apply Section 109(g)(2) When Debtors Intend No Abuse in an Earlier Dismissal of Their Case?" 7 Bankr.Dev. J. 103, 119 (1990) (courts should interpret this provision as mandatory).

11 U.S.C. § 350 (b). Specifically, to prevent Debtor from abusing the Bankruptcy process by his successive filing and to allow GE to foreclose on Debtor's real property. This constitutes sufficient "cause" for reopening under section 350(b). In re Narod, 138 B.R. 478 (E.D.Pa. 1992). III. Conclusion.

The court notes, however, that "[i]f and when the bankruptcy court becomes aware of facts that suggest that a petition for relief in bankruptcy has been filed in violation of Rule 9011 . . . the court's duty . . . to investigate such facts and the appropriateness of imposing Rule 9011 sanctions may constitute `cause' within the meaning of § 350(b) for reopening a filing."In re Narod, 138 B.R. 478, 482 (E.D.Pa. 1992). Should Judge Twardowski decide to reopen the underlying case, it will be his decision whether to order Defendants to pay damages pursuant to § 303(i); this court takes no position on that issue.