Opinion
No. 35297-4-II.
January 8, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 97-3-00085-7, Kathryn J. Nelson, J., entered August 4, 2006.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by unpublished opinion per Penoyar, J., concurred in by Houghton, C.J.; Bridgewater, J., dissenting.
Marceil and Frederick Mullan divorced in 1998 after 35 years of marriage. Frederick paid Marceil maintenance monthly until May 2005, when he turned 65. He then ceased payments, according to his interpretation of the dissolution decree. Five months later, Marceil filed for a modification of the decree or, in the alternative, relief under the decree, claiming that the court did not intend for maintenance to cease. In 2006, the trial court entered a modification of the decree, which both Marceil and Frederick now appeal. The trial court correctly interpreted the decree as requiring continuous and indefinite maintenance payments, but it erred in ordering Frederick to retroactively pay a modified amount. Marceil also raises several other arguments, but none has merit. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for entry of an order in accordance with this opinion.
We use first names in this opinion to avoid confusion. We mean no disrespect.
FACTS
After nearly 35 years of marriage, Marceil and Frederick separated in 1997. Soon after, Marceil filed for dissolution, a trial was held, and the court entered a final decree of dissolution in February 1998.
In its oral ruling at the close of trial, the trial court stated that:
[Marceil] is entitled to substantial maintenance, but she isn't entitled to all the benefits that [Frederick] might gain by spending ten months a year aboard ship . . . The maintenance will be 40 percent of gross, but not less than $3,750 per month, and the $3,750 is the $90,000 divided by two and then divided by 12 months . . . At age 65 . . . the maintenance will drop to one-half of his gross social security. Both sides will be invited to move at that point for whatever modification appears to fit, and I don't know whether the modification should go up [or] down."
Report of Proceedings (RP) (Dec. 16, 1997) at 11-12. Additionally, in its written findings and conclusions, the court concluded that Frederick should pay Marceil maintenance because (1) they were married for 35 years, during which Marceil was a wife and mother; (2) Marceil was responsible for raising their children while Frederick worked as an engineer on a fishing boat; (3) Frederick was capable of earning more than $90,000 a year, while Marceil had no job skills; and (4) the parties had significant assets and were accustomed to a certain lifestyle. The court also noted that Marceil had a need for maintenance, and Frederick was able to pay it "at the rate of 40% of his gross earnings but not less [than] $3,750[.] per month." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 4. The court concluded that Frederick should make payments in that amount "until [Frederick] is age sixty-five (65) or earlier upon his retirement. At that time the court recommends maintenance drop to [o]ne-[h]alf of his gross social security offset by [o]ne-[h]alf of her social security, if any." CP at 4. The court specifically stated that "[e]ither party may request a review of [m]aintenance at that time." CP at 4.
The dissolution decree stated that "[t]he obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated: [u]pon the death of either party," and that the obligation would not automatically cease if Marceil remarried. CP at 14. It ordered Frederick to pay Marceil 40 percent of his gross earnings, but not less than $3,750 per month. The decree also declared that:
"[m]aintenance payments shall be made until [Frederick] reaches the age sixty-five (65) or earlier upon [his] retirement at which time the court recommends maintenance be set at one-half of [Frederick's] social security benefit, offset by one-half of [Marceil's] social security [b]enefit, if any."
CP at 15.
Frederick paid all spousal maintenance required under the decree until May 2005, when he turned 65. At that time, he had not retired, nor had he started collecting social security benefits. He later testified that he stopped paying because, by his understanding of the decree, spousal maintenance ceased when he turned 65 or retired, whichever came first.
In October 2005, Marceil filed a petition to modify spousal support and/or seeking clarification of and relief under the original decree. In the motion, she stated that her understanding of the decree was that she would receive 40 percent of Frederick's earnings as long as he continued to work, and when he retired, she would receive 50 percent of his social security benefits, less 50 percent of any social security benefits she would receive on her own. She then requested that the court clarify the decree or, in the alternative, modify it so that Marceil would receive what she originally believed she would.
Frederick filed a motion to dismiss, which the court denied. The court then set the matter for trial to determine the proper amount of maintenance.
The trial court found that the provision for spousal maintenance in the original decree, and Frederick's obligation to pay it, never ceased, stating: "It is clear that the trial court anticipated that maintenance would continue until modification or death with the need to adjust support with [Frederick's] retirement." CP at 213-14. The trial court also made the following findings (to which Marceil has assigned error on appeal):
1.7 [Frederick] did not retire.
1.8 [Marceil] had earnings in 2006 consisting of interest from her investments and property.
1.9 [Marceil] and [Frederick] both drew social security in 2006. One half of the difference between what [Frederick] receives and what [Marceil] receives is $377.
1.10 Both parties received assets in the property division with a value of approximately $300,000. [Frederick] has earned more than $100,000 per year in the interim with [Marceil] receiving 40% and [Frederick] receiving 60%.
1.11 [Marceil] needs an additional $1,300 per month from June 2005 for a period of 18 months until 11/01/06. Thereafter, [Marceil] shall commence receiving 50% of the difference between her Social Security and [Frederick's] Social Security or $377 based upon the figures at this time.
1.12 Both parties have resources available to them to meet the costs of litigation and attorney fees.
CP at 214. Based on these findings, the court concluded that a substantial change in circumstances existed sufficient to warrant its modification order. It ordered Frederick to pay Marceil $1,300 per month for the period between June 2005 and November 2006, at which point the maintenance payment would be reduced to $377 (half of the difference between Frederick's social security payment and Marceil's social security payment). Marceil's appeal and Frederick's cross-appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
Marceil argues that we should review the trial court's decision using an abuse of discretion standard as used in In re Marriage of Jennings, 138 Wn.2d 612, 625-26, 980 P.2d 1248 (1999). Frederick responds that the correct standard of review for interpretation of a decree is de novo. See In re Marriage of Thompson, 97 Wn. App. 873, 877, 988 P.2d 499 (1999).
Generally, Washington courts review a clarification of a dissolution decree de novo, but we review a modification of the decree for abuse of discretion. See Stokes v. Polley, 145 Wn.2d 341, 346, 37 P.3d 1211 (2001); In re Marriage of Holmes, 128 Wn. App. 727, 734-36, 117 P.3d 370 (2005); In re Marriage of Spreen, 107 Wn. App. 341, 346, 28 P.3d 769 (2001). A clarification merely defines the rights and obligations the court already gave to the parties in their dissolution decree. In re Marriage of Christel and Blanchard, 101 Wn. App. 13, 22, 1 P.3d 600 (2000). In contrast, a modification extends or reduces those rights and responsibilities. Christel, 101 Wn. App. at 22 (citing Rivard v. Rivard, 75 Wn.2d 415, 418, 451 P.2d 677 (1969)).
Here, Marceil petitioned the court for modification and clarification. As a result, the court partially clarified the original decree, which we review de novo. The court also modified the decree, ordering Frederick to pay $1,300 (an amount never specified in the original decree) for the period between June 2005 and November 2006. We review that modification for abuse of discretion. See Holmes, 128 Wn. App. at 734-36. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on untenable grounds or reasons, or is manifestly unreasonable. A court's decision is based on untenable grounds or reasons if the record does not support its factual findings, if it has used an incorrect standard, or if the facts do not satisfy the requirements of the correct standard. In re Marriage of Mansour, 126 Wn. App. 1, 8, 106 P.3d 768 (2004).
II. Clarification of the Decree
A. Continuous and Indefinite
In his cross-appeal, Frederick argues that the trial court erred by interpreting the decree to award maintenance to Marceil indefinitely, thus violating (in Frederick's estimation) the plain language of the decree. He relies on the language in the decree stating that "[m]aintenance payments shall be made until [Frederick] reaches the age sixty-five (65) or earlier upon [his] retirement at which time the court recommends maintenance be set at one-half [the difference between Frederick's and Marceil's social security benefits]." CP at 15. Specifically, Frederick claims that (1) Marceil was improperly allowed to seek modification of the award after it terminated, and (2) the court's "recommendation" for maintenance after age 65 did not extend the award.
Marceil disagrees, responding that the evidence supported Judge Nelson's finding that the intent of the original decree was for maintenance to continue indefinitely. She also argues that neither the plain language of the decree nor the trial court's oral ruling support Frederick's interpretation of the decree.
Marceil specifically claims that the finding was supported by "a clear preponderance of the evidence," but this is the incorrect standard. Appellant's Reply Br. at 6.
As stated above, we review a court's clarification of a dissolution decree de novo. See Stokes, 145 Wn.2d at 346. When the language of an order is ambiguous, we attempt to ascertain the court's intent by using general rules of construction applicable to contracts and statutes. See Thompson, 97 Wn. App. at 878. Orders should be construed as a whole, giving meaning and effect to each provision. Stokes, 145 Wn.2d at 346-47. If a decree is ambiguous, the reviewing court seeks to ascertain the intention of the court that entered it by using the general rules of construction applicable to statutes and contracts. In re Marriage of Gimlett, 95 Wn.2d 699, 704-05, 629 P.2d 450 (1981).
Here, the decree is clearly ambiguous: it expressly states that the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon the death of either party, but it then contradicts this statement by ordering Frederick to pay maintenance "until [he] reaches the age sixty-five (65) or earlier upon [his] retirement . . ." CP at 15. Thus, the decree may be interpreted as requiring Frederick to pay maintenance for the rest of his life, but it may just as reasonably be interpreted as an invitation to Frederick to cease payments when he turned 65 or retired.
We may resolve this ambiguity by examining the court's statements elsewhere in the decree, as well as in its written findings and conclusions and oral ruling, which illustrate the court's intention to continue Frederick's maintenance obligation until either he or Marceil dies. For example, the sentence quoted above is followed by the court's "recommendation" that Frederick continues to pay Marceil a portion of his social security benefit after turning 65. This recommendation is echoed in the court's written conclusions, which also noted that either party could request modification when Frederick turned 65 or retired. This recommendation hardly comports with Frederick's contention that the court intended maintenance to cease entirely when he turned 65. Additionally, in its oral ruling, the court stated that maintenance would decrease when Frederick turned 65, but it specifically did not state that maintenance would cease at that time.
While the court's "recommendations" do not carry the same strength as a court order, they are certainly indicative of the court's intentions at the time of the decree. Moreover, we are obligated to construe the decree as a whole, giving meaning to each provision, including the court's recommendations. These recommendations, coupled with the decree's express language stating that maintenance would terminate upon the death of either party, convince us that the 1998 court intended for Frederick's maintenance obligation to be both continuous and indefinite. We accordingly affirm the trial court's clarification of the decree.
B. Amount of Retroactive Payments
Frederick alternatively contends that the trial court erred by retroactively modifying his maintenance obligation and ordering him to pay Marceil $1,300 per month for the period of June 2005 (when he ceased payments) through October 2005 (when she filed the petition for modification). Relying on In re Marriage of Drlik, 121 Wn. App. 269, 279, 87 P.3d 1192 (2004), he argues that a court may not modify maintenance payments retroactively. We agree.
It is well-settled in Washington that a court may not modify maintenance and support payments retroactively. In re Marriage of Olsen, 24 Wn. App. 292, 295, 600 P.2d 690 (1979) (citing Pace v. Pace, 67 Wn.2d 640, 409 P.2d 172 (1965)). "At most the court can only modify maintenance and support provisions as of the date of the filing of the modification petition." Olsen, 24 Wn. App. at 295 (citing Bowman v. Bowman, 77 Wn.2d 174, 459 P.2d 787 (1969)).
We agree that the trial court erred in retroactively modifying Frederick's maintenance obligation to $1,300. However, because the original decree ordered continuous maintenance, Frederick's obligation to pay that maintenance continued between June and October 2005. This begs the question of the amount of maintenance the decree intended after Fredrick turned 65 or retired. Because this involves interpretation of the original decree, it is a question of law we review de novo.
As stated above, we give the original trial court's recommendations weight only insofar as they clarify the court's intent. In each of the decree, the written findings and conclusions, and the oral ruling, the 1998 court repeatedly ordered that Frederick would pay 40 percent of his income until he reached age 65 or retired. In its oral opinion the court invited the parties to seek a modification at that time. In its written findings and conclusions, as well as the decree, the court "recommended" to any future court that the modification would result in a reduction in maintenance to one-half of the difference between the parties' social security payments. While the court never specifically addressed whether payments would decrease or remain the same if Frederick continued working after age 65, its "recommendations" do not support a finding that it intended for support continue at any more than one-half of the difference in the social security payments that the parties were entitled to when Frederick turned 65. After age 65, regardless of retirement, the court apparently intended either that (1) the parties would seek to modify the decree, or (2) Frederick's maintenance would be reduced to half of the difference between his social security benefit and Marceil's.
Thus, the overwhelming weight of evidence in the record indicates that the 1998 court intended for the amount of Frederick's payments to decrease to half the social security differential when he turned 65 or retired, as long as neither party filed for a modification of the decree before that time. The evidence further indicates that the court intended that, at age 65 or retirement, Frederick's obligation would be reduced to half of the difference between his social security payment and Marceil's.
The only scintilla of evidence to the contrary is found in the 1998 court's oral ruling, where it stated (regarding possible future modification of its decree): "I don't know whether the modification should go up [or] down." RP (Dec. 16, 1997) at 11-12. This is hardly indicative that the court intended for Frederick's payment to increase; it instead illustrates the court's apparent reliance on a future court's ability to fairly modify its decree.
In sum, the 2006 court was correct that Frederick's maintenance obligation did not cease between June and October 2005; it merely erred by ordering Frederick to retroactively pay a modified maintenance amount during that time. Because the apparent intent of the original decree was that Frederick's maintenance obligation would continue after age 65, only at a vastly reduced amount (half of the difference between his social security payment and Marceil's), we reverse the trial court in part and remand for entry of an order reducing Frederick's payment obligation accordingly.
III. Modification of Maintenance
Marceil argues that the trial court abused its discretion by modifying the maintenance decree without applying the statutory factors set out in RCW 26.09.090. She specifically points out the court's failure to enter any findings regarding Marceil's earnings, and she assigns error to findings 1.7-1.12 (see above).
Marceil also mentions a "law of the case" argument in her assignments of error, but she fails to develop the issue further in the body of the brief; we therefore need not address it. See Appellant's Br. at 2-5; RAP 10.3(a).
Frederick responds that the trial court properly reduced his maintenance obligation. He points out that (1) the court is not required to make specific findings on each RCW 26.09.090 factor; (2) several of the factors did not apply here because the original trial court addressed them in 1998; and (3) the 2006 court did consider every factor at issue here.
Frederick's argument is persuasive. Division One recently noted that nothing in RCW 26.09.090 requires the trial court to make specific factual findings on each of the factors listed in RCW 26.09.090(1). Mansour, 126 Wn. App. at 16. The statute merely requires the court to consider the listed factors. Mansour, 126 Wn. App. at 16.
RCW 26.09.090 requires a court to consider the following when crafting a maintenance decree: (1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance and her ability to meet her needs independently; (2) the time necessary to train and find employment; (3) the standard of living established during the marriage; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5) the age, physical and emotional condition, and financial obligations of the spouse seeking maintenance; and (6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his and his former spouse's needs.
In this case, the first, fifth, and last are the only factors that may have changed between the original decree and the modification hearing; that the trial court considered each of these is apparent from the modified decree. The court altered the amount Frederick was paying in response to his changing ability to provide for both himself and Marceil, showing consideration of the last factor. By attempting to continue the maintenance amount at the level the court believed Marceil still needed, the court illustrated that it considered both Marceil's financial resources and abilities as well as her advancing age and condition. Marceil's argument that the court failed to consider these factors is unpersuasive.
The court correctly interpreted the original decree as imposing upon Frederick a continuous and indefinite maintenance obligation, and it evidently considered all relevant factors in modifying the decree. However, it abused its discretion in ordering Frederick to pay the modified amount retroactive to June 2005: as stated above, for the period June 2005 to October 2005, Frederick remained obligated under the original decree to pay maintenance in the amount of half of the difference between his social security payment and Marceil's. Therefore, on the maintenance issues, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for entry of an order in accordance with this opinion.
IV. Cross-Examination
Marceil also argues that the court impermissibly limited her ability to cross-examine Frederick on the subject of his future income. Frederick disagrees and responds that the court merely limited Marceil's counsel's argumentative manner of questioning, not the subject of that questioning.
At issue here is an exchange between Marceil's counsel and Frederick, when counsel was questioning Frederick about his income in the fishing industry:
[Counsel]: And you told the Court that the fishing industry was a crap shoot, and you may not make any more money or fish again?
[Frederick]: Fishing industry is a crap shoot, Mr. Caraher.
[Counsel]: But every year, you've made an increase in pay?
[Frederick]: It's going down now.
[Counsel]: When has it gone down? When has it ever gone down?
[Frederick]: It is right now.
[Counsel]: When did it go down?
[Frederick's counsel]: Object, Your Honor. He's arguing with the witness.
The Court: Sustained.
[Counsel]: Didn't go down through May, did it?
[Frederick]: Pardon?
[Counsel]: Didn't go down through May, did it?
[Frederick's counsel]: Your Honor —
The Court: Sustained. I just sustained the argumentative line of questioning. Move on.
RP (Jun. 30, 2006) at 101-02. Earlier, Marceil's counsel had asked Frederick similar questions:
[Counsel]: Have you, in the last five years, had any significant reduction in the amount of money you've earned?
[Frederick]: It's going to be, yes.
[Counsel]: Have you, in the last five years, had any significant reduction in what you've earned every year?
[Frederick]: Not significant, no.
[Counsel]: Have you had significant increases in what you've earned?
[Frederick]: Not real significant, no.
RP (Jun. 30, 2006) at 96-97.
Marceil's argument fails on two levels: first, her counsel failed to preserve any error for appeal — he did not object to the court's ruling at any time. Where an error has not been preserved for appeal, we will not examine it unless it is an error of constitutional magnitude. RAP 2.5(a)(3). Second, her counsel had already asked questions covering the same subject, and Frederick answered those questions. Determinations regarding the scope of cross-examination are within the trial court's discretion and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Dixon, 159 Wn.2d 65, 75, 147 P.3d 991 (2006). Considering that counsel asked and received answers to very similar questions, it was well within the trial court's discretion to limit his argumentative questioning the second time he raised the issue.
V. Trial Court's Denial of Attorney Fee Request
Marceil also apparently argues that the trial court erred in denying attorney fees to Marceil for responding to Frederick's alleged discovery violations, but her argument focuses only on the actual alleged discovery violation, not the failure to impose attorney fees. In response, Frederick points out that the trial court did not find that he committed any discovery violations and found only that the testimony in question was irrelevant. Therefore, he asserts that the court was not required to award attorney fees under CR 26 or 37 as it found no discovery violations.
We review a trial court's decision whether to impose discovery sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wn.2d 299, 338, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993). A court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. Fisons, 122 Wn.2d at 339. It was not manifestly unreasonable for the trial court to deny sanctions where the testimony at issue was never admitted and was deemed irrelevant.
VI. Additional Arguments Raised in Marceil's Reply Brief
In her Reply Brief, Marceil assigns additional error to the trial court's finding that she filed a "petition requesting relief under the decree or[,] in the alternative, modification of spousal maintenance." Appellant's Reply Br. at 20. She then argues that no substantial change in circumstances existed sufficient to warrant modification (apparently asserting that the original decree ordered Frederick to pay 40 percent of his gross income (and no less than $3,750 per month) as long as he continued to work.
Marceil's argument fails for several reasons. First, RAP 10.3(c) limits reply briefs to responses to issues in the brief to which the reply is directed (here, the respondent's brief). Second, Marceil did not assign error to the trial court's finding regarding her petition for modification in her initial briefing to this court. Third, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Marceil petitioned the court for modification — indeed, she filed an additional petition for modification the day before trial, asking the court to either rule that the maintenance order continued after Frederick's 65th birthday or, in the alternative, to modify the maintenance award "to conform to the change in [Frederick's] circumstances, i.e. he did not retire." CP at 165, 168.
Even if we were to consider Marceil's argument that the trial court erred in finding a change in circumstances, the claim is without merit. We review the court's determination of whether a substantial change of circumstances warrants modification solely for an abuse of discretion. Fox v. Fox, 87 Wn. App. 782, 784, 942 P.2d 1084 (1997). Here, the initial change in circumstances was that Frederick ceased paying Marceil. Additionally, the 1998 court's oral ruling and written conclusions of law specifically allowed that modification could (and likely would) occur when Frederick turned 65 or retired. It was well within the 2006 court's discretion to rule that a change in circumstances occurred sufficient to warrant modification of the decree.
VII. Attorney Fees
Finally, Marceil claims that Frederick has the ability to pay attorney fees, but she does not specifically request those fees until the close of her brief, which includes a perfunctory request that we award her attorney fees for both the alleged discovery abuses and for fees on appeal.
Marceil relies on In re Marriage of Shellenberger, 80 Wn. App. 71, 87, 906 P.2d 968 (1995), for her statement that the court considers the parties' relative need and ability to pay fees in a maintenance action. However, she offers argument only that Frederick has the ability to pay attorney fees; she does not claim that she is unable to pay such fees. She has not offered any evidence to support her request for fees, and as such we deny the request.
Frederick responds that Marceil should pay both her fees on appeal and his, as the appeal is without merit and sanctionable under RAP 18.9 and CR 11. Frederick asserts that Marceil's appeal is based on the untenable position that the original decree awarded her 40 percent of Frederick's gross income until he died, and her claims regarding limitation of cross-examination and fees are similarly without merit.
RAP 18.9 permits us to order a party who files a frivolous appeal to pay terms or damages to any other party who has been harmed or to pay sanctions to the court. An appeal is frivolous if, considering the entire record and resolving all doubts in favor of the appellant, the court is convinced that the appeal presents no debatable issues upon which reasonable minds might differ and that it is so devoid of merit that there is no possibility of reversal. Ramirez v. Dimond, 70 Wn. App. 729, 734, 855 P.2d 338 (1993). We resolve all doubts to whether an appeal is frivolous in favor of the appellant. Camer v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 52 Wn. App. 531, 540, 762 P.2d 356 (1988).
While Marceil's appeal has not been entirely successful, it was not frivolous. We deny both parties' requests for attorney fees.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for entry of an order in accordance with this opinion.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
HOUGHTON, C.J., concur:
Bridgewater, J.
I respectfully dissent. While I agree that we resolve a decree's ambiguity by examining the dissolution court's statements found elsewhere in the record, we need not do so in the present case. The dissolution decree is not ambiguous.
The majority relies on the dissolution court's recommendation with respect to what should happen when Frederick turned 65. Majority at 7. But we need go no further than the plain language of the decree itself to resolve this case. The decree plainly states that Frederick's maintenance obligation will terminate upon one of two events: (1) his turning 65, or (2) his earlier retirement. When Frederick turned 65, his obligation to continue maintenance ceased, and it was entirely proper for him to terminate payment under the plain language of the decree.
The dissolution court made its recommendation in conjunction that the statement that either party could request a "review of [m]aintenance" before Frederick turned 65. CP at 4. However, this statement only concerns the ability of a party to request a modification before Frederick's maintenance obligation terminated. Furthermore, the recommendation is mere surplussage and only indicates what the court might do if presented with a modification petition on the part of Marceil or Frederick. The recommendation adds nothing to the maintenance order, and it does not show that the dissolution court intended to create a perpetual and indefinite maintenance term.
The majority also relies on the language that maintenance will terminate upon the death of either party to support its holding that the dissolution court intended to create a permanent maintenance term. Majority at 6. But, as Marceil admitted at oral argument, this statement is only a recitation of RCW 26.09.170(2), that "[u]nless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance." In this case, the parties did not agree, nor did the decree expressly state, that future maintenance was to extend beyond death. This language does not clarify the dissolution court's intention as the majority would hold. This language is of no effect, other than to reiterate the language of the statute.
Finally, Frederick notified Marceil that he would stop paying maintenance after he turned 65. Marceil received this notice one month before payments actually ended, but she did not move to modify the decree until five months after Frederick's maintenance obligation under the decree terminated.
Because the language of the decree is clear, and the dissolution court did not intend that Frederick continue paying indefinite and perpetual maintenance, the trial court should have dismissed Marceil's untimely petition. I would reverse.