Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK67479, Jan Levine, Judge.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Senior Associate County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
M. Elizabeth Handy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellants.
Joseph D. MacKenzie, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent Rosa P.
Jennifer Mack, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent Delores R.
KRIEGLER, J.
M. and Bonnie R. (the children) and the Department of Children and Family Services appeal from the judgment and orders of May 17, 2007, declaring the children dependents of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. Appellants contend it was error to dismiss the allegations that Delores R. (father) sexually abused M. because sufficient evidence supports the allegation. As substantial evidence supports the dependency court’s dismissal of the sexual abuse allegations of the petition, we affirm the judgment and orders.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.
Father spells his name “Delores.”
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURE
M., born in September 1996, and Bonnie, born in December 2001, are half-sisters adopted by Rosa P. (“mother”) and father in 2004 following a prior dependency proceeding involving the children’s biological parents. Mother and father are Bonnie’s paternal grandparents. Nine to ten family members lived in the family’s three-bedroom home.
On March 17, 2007, mother and father brought M. to a police community relations office seeking counseling for her because she had tried to run away from home. Asked what problems she was having at home, M. initially told the police mother had become upset with her over some chores. When the police would not accept this answer and probed for more of an explanation, M. became angry and frustrated and told them father had been fondling her under her clothes on her vaginal area, buttocks, and breasts almost every night for the past three years when she was in bed. She would tell him to stop and try to push his hand away. No one witnessed him doing this to her, and she never told anyone. She stated that presently father was touching her twice a week. The children were taken into protective custody and a dependency petition was filed alleging father sexually molested M.
Father denied the allegation. He stated he sometimes would put the covers back on M. at night if it was cold and she had kicked them off, but he had never inappropriately touched her. He loved all his children equally.
No household member had ever seen father molest M., heard M. tell father to stop, or been told by M. about the abuse. Father had never touched Bonnie in a way that made Bonnie feel uncomfortable. M. slept in her adult sister I.’s bedroom at first, with I. and one of I.’s children, and then slept with Bonnie in mother’s and father’s bedroom. Family members reported that father loved M. and was not capable of molesting her. M. missed father greatly when he went to Mexico for four months in late 2006 and was happy when he returned home. Family members reported that M. acted out when she did not get her way, and M. did not want to live with the family. M. had recently learned her biological mother was out of jail and told family members she wanted to live with her biological mother. Mother had been warned by her son, Bonnie’s biological father, that M.’s biological family would try to find a way to take M. away from them and would coach M. to say that one of the family members was abusing her.
In an April 2007 forensic interview, M. stated father never touched her under her clothing. She would tell him to stop touching her. M. also revealed, for the first time, that mother physically abused the children. Mother put chili in Bonnie’s mouth, hit the children with a wooden cooking utensil resembling a spatula, kicked M., and forced M. to take cold showers. Bonnie confirmed that mother would hit M. with the wooden utensil.
At the hearing on the petition, M. testified that father had been touching her on her vaginal area, buttocks, and chest area since before she was adopted. He would try to touch her under her clothes, but she would not let him. She usually told him to stop. M. acknowledged he was a good father except for the touching, and she loved him because “I took him as a father to me because he’s been with me most of the time.” Mother and I. testified at the hearing. Father did not.
On May 17, 2007, at the conclusion of the trial, the dependency court sustained allegations that mother physically abused the children and father failed to protect. The dependency court struck the allegations that father sexually abused M. Finding the adult witnesses’ evidence contained too many inconsistencies and unbelievable statements to be reliable, the dependency court stated that the case came down to whether to believe M. or father. The dependency court could not find by a preponderance of the evidence that any sexual abuse occurred because the court did not find M.’s story credible. The children were declared dependents of the court, custody was taken from the parents, and reunification services were ordered. These timely appeals followed.
DISCUSSION
Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding the Sexual Abuse Allegation was Not Proved
Appellants contend substantial evidence does not support the dependency court’s finding there was insufficient credible evidence to support the allegations that father sexually abused M. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the dependency court’s finding.
We review the dependency court’s conclusion the evidence was insufficient to prove the sexual abuse allegation, that is, there was a failure of proof under the substantial evidence standard of review. (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 198-199 [substantial evidence supported dismissal of the petition].)
“Substantial evidence is evidence that is ‘reasonable, credible, and of solid value’; such that a reasonable trier of fact could make such findings. [Citation.] [¶] It is axiomatic that an appellate court defers to the trier of fact on such determinations, and has no power to judge the effect or value of, or to weigh the evidence; to consider the credibility of witnesses; or to resolve conflicts in, or make inferences or deductions from the evidence. We review a cold record and, unlike a trial court, have no opportunity to observe the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses. [Citation.] ‘Issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trial court.’ [Citations.] It is not an appellate court’s function, in short, to redetermine the facts. [Citation.] Absent indisputable evidence of abuse--evidence no reasonable trier of fact could have rejected--we must . . . affirm the juvenile court’s determination [that the sexual abuse allegations in the petition had not been proved]. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Our review of the record . . . does not persuade us that there was indisputable evidence of abuse. Absent such evidence, we conclude substantial evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s determination that [the child] did not come within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (c) [emotional abuse] and (d) [sexual abuse]. The juvenile court’s decision must therefore be upheld, and its order must stand.” (In re Sheila B., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 199-200.)
We have reviewed the record and do not find indisputable evidence of sexual abuse. The only evidence the molestation occurred was M.’s story. Father denied he molested her. The dependency court was entitled not to be persuaded by M.’s story and to find her allegations of sexual abuse not true. No one in this ten-person household saw any of the incidents or heard M.’s verbal rebuffs. It is difficult to reconcile the evidence that M. loved and missed father when he was away for four months, with her claim that he frequently made unwelcome sexual advances when he was home.
Appellants’ argument that substantial evidence does not support the ruling because M.’s story is substantially consistent and M. had no motive to lie is but a request that we reweigh the evidence. This we will not do. (In re Sheila B., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 199-200.)
To the extent appellants challenge the dependency court’s reasons for the ruling, the challenge is not cognizable. “[I]t is judicial action, and not judicial reasoning or argument, which is the subject of review; and, if the former be correct, we are not concerned with the faults of the latter.” (Davey v. Southern Pacific Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 325, 330; accord, People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 272.) “The deliberations of the court are conclusively merged in the judgment. The findings of fact and conclusions of law constitute the decision which is the final, deliberate expression of the court. To hold that oral or written opinions or expressions of judges of trial courts may be resorted to overturn judgments would be to open the door to mischievous and vexatious practices. Neither a juror nor a judge is permitted to impeach his verdict or judgment.” (De Cou v. Howell (1923) 190 Cal. 741, 751.) “The order is measured by its terms and not by any reasons the court may give for it. [Citations.] It is recognized that ‘the reasons given by the court for its action may be bad, and the decision, at the same time, correct for other reasons. It is the action of the court that is presumed to be correct and this presumption obtains even though the reasons given may be bad.’ [Citations.] The reasons stated may be valuable in illustrating the trial judge’s theory but they are not binding on an appellate court [citation] and they may never be used to impeach the order or judgment.” (Yarrow v. State of California (1960) 53 Cal.2d 427, 437-438.) In any event, we have considered the evidence as a whole and have no difficulty concluding the dependency court’s ruling is supported by substantial evidence and must be upheld.
The dependency court pointed to inconsistencies in M.’s statements, noted that no one heard M. tell father to stop as M. claimed, did not believe that M. could love father while sustaining long-term abuse from him, and questioned M.’s inability in her testimony to remember more than one incident in detail.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and orders are affirmed.
We concur: ARMSTRONG, Acting P. J., MOSK, J.