Opinion
No. COA14–545.
2014-11-4
In the Matter of M.M.V. and D.M.V.
Twyla Hollingsworth–Richardson for Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, Petitioner–Appellee.Administrative Office of the Courts, by Appellate Counsel Tawanda N. Foster, for Guardian ad Litem.
Appeal by Respondent from order entered 27 December 2013 by Judge Rickye McKoy–Mitchell in District Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 6 October 2014. Twyla Hollingsworth–Richardson for Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, Petitioner–Appellee. Administrative Office of the Courts, by Appellate Counsel Tawanda N. Foster, for Guardian ad Litem.
Robert W. Ewing for Respondent–Appellant Mother.
McGEE, Chief Judge.
Respondent–Appellant Mother (“Mother”) appeals from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to M.M.V. and D.M.V., her minor children (“the children”). We affirm the trial court's order.
I. Background
The Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, Youth and Family Services (“YFS”) first became involved with Mother's family in 1999 as a result of family violence issues and Mother's substance abuse. The children were removed from Mother's custody shortly thereafter. However, Mother regained custody of the children in 2007 and moved to California. YFS became involved with the family again in July 2011 after Mother relapsed and the children were sent to reside with their father in North Carolina. However, M.M.V. disclosed in December of 2011 inappropriate sexual contact by her father, and the children were placed with a paternal aunt until the aunt could no longer provide placement. YFS filed a juvenile petition on 19 January 2012, alleging that both children were neglected and dependent and that M.M.V. also was abused. On that same date, YFS obtained non-secure custody of the children.
The trial court conducted an adjudication and disposition hearing on 10 April 2012. The trial court, by order entered 1 May 2012, adjudicated M.M.V. abused, neglected, and dependent; D.M.V. was adjudicated neglected and dependent. The disposition hearing was continued until 10 May 2012 for further presentment of evidence. In its disposition order, the trial court entered findings regarding Mother's long history with YFS, including that Mother “has a history of repeated relapses,” and that “[t]his is the fourth time a petition has been filed placing the [children] and/or their siblings in custody.” The trial court ordered that legal custody of the children remain with YFS, although telephone contact between Mother and the children would continue. The plan of care at that time was reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption. The trial court also ordered Mother to submit to random drug screens and comply with her case plan, which was to be amended to address concerns presented during disposition.
YFS filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights on 18 March 2013, alleging grounds of neglect, Mother's failure to make reasonable progress while the children were in foster care, and her willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of the children's care, in violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 7B–1111(a)(1), (2), and (3) (2013). The trial court held a subsequent permanency planning hearing on 14 June 2013 and found the issues that necessitated the children's placement with YFS had not been ameliorated, and the children “could not under any circumstances be returned immediately to the mother.” The trial court further found “[i]t is not possible for the [children] to be returned to the mother in the next [six] months due to not only her substance abuse but her poor decision making and lack of supervision” of the children. The trial court then ceased reunification efforts and changed the permanent plan to adoption.
A termination hearing was held on 4 September 2013 and 7 October 2013 (“termination hearing”). In its order, the trial court made numerous findings regarding Mother's repeated relapses, her endangerment of the children, and her failure to make reasonable progress towards correcting the conditions that resulted in the termination of her custody of the children. Based on those findings, the trial court found the existence of all grounds alleged by YFS. The court also determined that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate Mother's parental rights. The trial court then entered an order terminating Mother's parental rights (“termination order”) on 27 December 2013. Mother appeals.
II. Standard of Review
“We review the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights for abuse of discretion.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C.App. 94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002). “A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its actions are ‘manifestly unsupported by reason.’ “ Davis v. Davis, 360 N.C. 518, 523, 631 S.E.2d 114, 118 (2006) (quoting Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 129, 271 S.E.2d 58, 63 (1980)). Moreover, the trial court's findings of fact are binding on appeal if they are supported by any competent evidence. In re Isenhour, 101 N.C.App. 550, 553, 400 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1991).
III. Analysis
Mother does not raise any issues related to the trial court's determination that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights. Rather, she challenges the trial court's determination that termination of her parental rights was in the children's best interests.
“After an adjudication that one or more grounds for terminating a parent's rights exist, the court shall determine whether terminating the parent's rights is in the juvenile's best interest.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1110(a)(2013).
A. Stable and Permanent Home
Mother first takes issue with finding of fact 17 in the termination order: “That the juveniles are in a stable and permanent home.” Mother contends that the trial court “abused its discretion in making this finding” because, at the time of the termination hearing, the children were actually in foster care.
As a preliminary matter, Mother confuses the standard of review that this Court applies to the trial court's findings of fact. The sufficiency of findings of fact is not reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See generally Isenhour, 101 N.C.App. at 553, 400 S.E.2d at 73. Instead, the trial court's findings of fact are reviewed on appeal to see if they are supported by any competent evidence, in which case they are binding on this Court. Id.
Nonetheless, Mother is correct that the children were not in a “permanent” home at the time the termination order was issued. Therefore, the trial court's finding of fact 17, to the extent that it suggests that the children were in a “permanent” home at the issuance of the termination order, is not supported by competent evidence.
Mother further argues that finding of fact 17 was “crucial” to the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights. Mother asserts that finding of fact 17 necessarily led the trial court to operate under an erroneous belief that the children were likely to be adopted by the children's foster parent. Given the insufficiency of finding of fact 17, Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating Mother's parental rights based on this purportedly faulty assumption. We disagree.
The trial court did not, and was not required to, consider whether the children might be adopted by their foster parent when deciding to terminate Mother's parental rights. The trial court must consider the following factors and make written findings regarding those that are relevant in determining whether terminating the parent's rights is in the children's best interests:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1110(a) (2013). However, “N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1110(a) [does not] require[ ] the trial court to make written findings with respect to all six factors; rather, as the plain language of the statute indicates, the court must enter written findings in its order concerning only those factors ‘that are relevant.’ “ In re D.H., ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 753 S.E.2d 732, 735 (2014). “A trial court may, but is not required to ” consider the availability of alternative placements during the dispositional phase of a hearing to terminate parental rights. See In re M.M., 200 N.C.App. 248, 258, 684 S.E.2d 463, 469 (2009) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In fact, “nothing within N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1110 ... requires that termination lead to adoption in order for termination to be in a child's best interests.” Id. at 258, 684 S.E.2d 463, 684 S.E.2d at 470. In other words, although the question of whether a child in a proceeding such as this is likely to be adopted can be relevant in determining whether to terminate a parent's rights, it may nonetheless be in the best interests of the child to terminate the parental relationship irrespective of the child's adoptability.
In the present case, the trial court made extensive findings that focused specifically on Mother's ongoing pattern of behavior, which provided a sufficient basis on which to terminate her parental rights. For instance, the trial court found there was “no evidence [Mother] has broken her consistent pattern of abusing substances, becoming sober, then relapsing and putting the lives of [the] children in danger[;]” and there is “no evidence that [Mother] will not continue to leave [the] children in the care of inappropriate people whether [Mother] is or is not under the influence.” Mother does not challenge the sufficiency of these, and many other, findings of the trial court. Therefore, they are binding on appeal.
Given the ample—and largely uncontested—factual record before us, there is no meaningful indication that the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights hinged on an assumption that the children were going to be adopted. Notwithstanding the deficiency of finding of fact 17, Mother's argument is without merit.
B. Therapist Recommendations
Mother also claims that the testimonies of the children's therapists clearly endorsed the children having continued contact with Mother. Mother argues that these purported testimonies were a “relevant consideration” in the case and therefore the trial court abused its discretion by not considering the testimonies when it decided to terminate Mother's parental rights. See N.C.G.S. § 7B–1110(a)(6).
This Court disagrees with Mother's blanket assertion that the therapists' testimonies clearly endorsed the children having continued contact with Mother. D.M.V.'s therapist testified that D.M.V. wanted to continue contact with Mother. But this testimony falls short of the therapist stating that D.M.V. should continue such contact. M.M.V.'s therapist did testify that she could not recommend permanently severing ties between M.M.V. and Mother, based on the therapist's sessions with M.M.V. However, M.M.V.'s therapist was primarily helping M.M.V. with issues related to the sexual abuse by M.M.V.'s father. Moreover, M.M.V.'s therapist later acknowledged that she did not have a full understanding of Mother's struggles with addiction or the extent to which Mother's behavior had adversely affected M.M.V.'s life. She also stated that M.M.V. was at a heightened risk for further victimization, particularly if her caretaker was not sober.
“[I]t is the duty of the trial judge to consider and weigh all of the competent evidence, and to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” In re Gleisner, 141 N.C.App. 475, 480, 539 S.E.2d 362, 365 (2000). Moreover, “findings of fact of the trial court which are supported by competent evidence are conclusive on appeal, even in the face of conflicting evidence.” See In re L.T.R., 181 N.C.App. 376, 388, 639 S.E.2d 122, 129 (2007).
M.M.V.'s therapist's statement that she could not recommend permanently severing ties between M.M.V. and Mother relied on an incomplete understanding of M.M.V.'s and Mother's history. To the extent that this statement may conflict with the therapist's later testimony, it is not the role of this Court to re-weigh the evidence. See id. In its termination order, the trial court did find: “[A]s therapeutically determined, [M.M.V.] needs to be with someone equipped to ‘parent’ her, and it would be easy for the minor children to regress to the inappropriate sexualized behaviors they experienced while in the care of the mother and father.” This finding is well supported by the testimony of M.M.V.'s therapist, and the trial court was not required to make any further findings. The trial court was acting within its discretion when it declined to make findings that the children's therapists endorsed continued contact with Mother.
IV. Conclusion
In spite of these challenges, Mother has not convinced this Court that the trial court abused its discretion by terminating Mother's parental rights. Indeed, Mother does not assert that there were no grounds on which the trial court could have based its termination decision.
When there are “grounds for terminating a parent's rights[,] ... the court shall [then] determine whether terminating the parent's rights is in the juvenile's best interest.” N.C.G.S. § 7B–1110(a). As already stated, this Court will only overturn this determination if it is “manifestly unsupported by reason.” See Davis, 360 N.C. at 523, 631 S.E.2d at 118. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights, and its conclusion that doing so would be in the best interests of the children, was not manifestly unsupported by reason. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and the trial court's order is affirmed.
Affirmed. Judges HUNTER and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).