Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK40943. Marilyn Mordetsky, Juvenile Court Referee.
Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for Minor.
DOI TODD, J.
Defendant and appellant J.S. (Mother) appeals from an order terminating her parental rights as to the child Misty T. She contends that the juvenile court erred in determining that the Indian Child Welfare Act, title 25 United States Code section 1901 et seq. (ICWA) did not apply. She claims that the responses of certain noticed tribes were inadequate to enable the juvenile court to make that determination, and that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) failed to provide one tribe with enough information about Misty’s relatives.
We affirm. The tribes’ responses conclusively determined that Misty was not an Indian child as defined by federal law, and the tribes properly received all known information about Misty’s Indian heritage enabling them to make that determination.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Misty and her siblings Kayla Z. and D.Z. first came to the Department’s attention in July 2001 when they were taken into protective custody after Mother was arrested and incarcerated for possessing methamphetamines. The Department filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), against Mother and alleged father P.T. (Father). The petition contained the handwritten notation “ICWA? MGGP-Cherokees.” At the hearing on the petition, the juvenile court detained the children and directed the Department to provide notice to the Cherokee tribe to determine if the case fell within the ICWA. On August 24, 2001, the Department provided ICWA notices to the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Only the child Misty is the subject of the instant appeal, and Father is not a party to this appeal.
The Department’s September 10, 2001 jurisdiction/disposition report stated that the ICWA does or may apply. At a hearing the same day, the parties indicated that they had reached an agreement through mediation, whereby Mother and Father agreed to admit certain allegations of the petition and the Department agreed to dismiss the balance of the allegations. The juvenile court adjudicated the petition in the agreed manner, sustaining allegations that the children had been exposed to violent confrontations between Mother and Father; Mother and Father had used methamphetamines; Father had been convicted for the sale of methamphetamines; and Mother had endangered the children by not using proper safety restraints while driving. With respect to disposition, the children were placed with their maternal grandparents. Mother and Father were ordered to participate in a drug rehabilitation program with random testing and to attend parenting classes and individual counseling. The juvenile court did not make any finding at the hearing as to whether the ICWA applied, and there was no indication as to whether the tribes or the BIA had responded to the ICWA notices.
In its March 11, 2002 status review report, the Department reported for the first time that the ICWA did not apply. Thereafter, subsequent review reports continued to indicate that the ICWA did not apply. At the six-month review hearing in April 2002, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s reunification services but continued services to Father. Approximately one year later, however, the juvenile court terminated Father’s reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. Although the juvenile court initially identified Misty’s permanent plan as adoption, at the November 6, 2003 permanency planning hearing it found that Misty was not adoptable and identified her permanent plan as legal guardianship. Misty’s maternal grandparents were appointed as her legal guardians.
In May 2004, the Department reported that the maternal grandparents intended to relocate to Pennsylvania with Misty and her siblings. That same month, after insuring that Kin-GAP funding was in place, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over the matter.
Almost two years later, in February 2006, the juvenile court reinstated jurisdiction at the request of the maternal grandfather. In December 2005, the juvenile court had granted a section 388 petition to reinstate jurisdiction so as to commence an accelerated Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) for one of Misty’s siblings. Misty and her other sibling inadvertently had not been included in the minute order.
Beginning in March 2006, the juvenile court conducted regular review hearings to ascertain the status of the children and the progress on the ICPC. The Department reported that the maternal grandparents had been excellent caretakers and the children, including Misty, were thriving academically and socially. As before, the Department’s reports for these hearings consistently indicated that the ICWA did not apply. Through January 2009, the Department’s recommendation for Misty’s permanent plan continued to be legal guardianship.
In its July 2009 review report, however, the Department reported that Misty had expressed a desire to be adopted by her maternal grandparents and that her grandparents shared that desire; her siblings were content with legal guardianship. Accordingly, the Department assigned an adoptions social worker to the case. Because the Department’s notices for that hearing had recommended no change in Misty’s permanent plan, the juvenile court declined to set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing and instead set the matter for a progress report on notice. In its efforts to provide notice to Mother and Father of the intended change in permanent plan, the Department obtained an address for Father but was unable to locate Mother. Finding notice proper, in August 2009 the juvenile court set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.
Thereafter, the Department’s section 366.26 report indicated that the ICWA does or may apply. In a September 15, 2009 social worker interview, Misty’s maternal grandfather advised that he had Cherokee heritage through his maternal grandmother. He further advised, however, that he was not an enrolled member of the tribe and that his children were not eligible for enrollment. In addition, Father advised the social worker that he believed he had some Native American heritage. Father contacted his paternal grandmother, who provided the names of the paternal grandfather’s parents and stated she believed they descended from the Cherokee or Chippewa tribes.
The Department included the information it received from Misty’s maternal grandfather and Father in the ICWA-030 form and, in September 2009, provided notice to 17 tribes. During the next two months, the Department received responses from the tribes. Seven tribes, comprised of the Hannahville Indian Community, Lac Courte Oreilles, Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, Boise Forte Band, Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians and Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians stated that Misty was neither an member of the tribe nor eligible for membership. The Sokaogon Chippewa Community and the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians similarly responded that Misty was not an enrolled tribal member and was not eligible for enrollment.
The Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians responded that Misty was not a member of the tribe. The White Earth Band of Chippewa and the Bay Mills Indian Community responded that Misty was not eligible for membership in the tribe. The Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewas responded that Misty was not eligible for enrollment or membership in the tribe.
The Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, Keweenaw Bay Indian Community and Grand Portage Band of Chippewas responded that Misty was not eligible for enrollment and that each tribe did not plan to participate in the proceedings. Finally, the BIA responded that no action was required on its part, as the tribal responses would dictate the ICWA determination.
The Cherokee Nation responded by requesting additional information to enable it to validate or invalidate the claim of Indian heritage. Specifically, it requested the full name and date of birth of Alice R., Misty’s paternal great-grandmother, as well as all birth dates and maiden names. When it had not received a response in 30 days, the Cherokee Nation sent a follow-up notice requesting only information pertaining to the paternal great-grandmother.
As of November 17, 2009, the Department had received responses from all 17 tribes; it characterized the responses as demonstrating that Misty was neither an enrolled member in any tribe, nor was she eligible for enrollment or membership. Accordingly, the Department recommended that the juvenile court find the ICWA did not apply. Consistent with its recommendation, subsequent reports indicated that the ICWA did not apply.
Mother appeared for a November 30, 2009 hearing and indicated that she intended to contest the recommended change in Misty’s permanent plan.
In a February 23, 2010 information for court officer, the Department provided letters from three additional tribes indicating that Misty was neither an enrolled member nor eligible for membership. A supplemental letter from the Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians clarified that Misty was neither a member of the tribe nor eligible for enrollment. Similarly, a second letter from Grand Portage Band of Chippewas added that Misty and her parents were not enrolled members of the tribe.
The information further indicated that the social worker had spoken with a Cherokee Nation representative, requesting a determination that Misty was not enrolled or eligible for membership. In response, the Cherokee Nation advised that its most recent February 2010 letter set forth its position. In that letter, the Cherokee Nation stated that Misty could not be traced through the tribal records according to the information provided about her relatives, and that therefore the Cherokee Nation was not empowered to intervene in the proceedings because Misty was not considered an “Indian child” as defined by federal law.
On the basis of the information for court officer, as well as the prior tribal responses, the juvenile court determined that there was no reason to believe that Misty fell within the ICWA and that, accordingly, the ICWA did not apply.
In March 2010, the maternal grandparents’ home study was approved by the state of Pennsylvania. At an April 20, 2010 hearing at which Mother and Father did not appear, the juvenile court found Misty to be adoptable, identified Misty’s permanent plan as adoption and terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights; the court opined that the adoption should be completed by October 2010. Mother appealed from the order terminating parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends that the order terminating her parental rights should be reversed because the juvenile court erred in determining the ICWA did not apply. She argues that six of the tribal responses were inadequate to determine whether Misty was eligible for tribal membership and that the Department’s failure to provide the information requested by the Cherokee Nation constituted insufficient notice. We disagree and find no basis to disturb the order terminating parental rights.
I. The ICWA.
Congress enacted the ICWA in 1978 “to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families....” (25 U.S.C. § 1902.) The “‘ICWA presumes it is in the best interests of the child to retain tribal ties and cultural heritage and in the interest of the tribe to preserve its future generations, a most important resource.’ [Citation.]” (In re H.B. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 115, 120.) An Indian child is defined as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either: (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); see In re A.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 832, 838.)
Under the ICWA, the tribe of an Indian child has a right to intervene in state court dependency proceedings involving the child. (25 U.S.C. § 1911(c).) Notice to the tribe enables it to exercise its right to intervene. (In re Damian C. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 192, 196.) Describing the type of notice required, the ICWA provides that “where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention.” (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) In the event the tribe is unknown, notice must be given to the BIA. (Ibid.) Neither foster care placement nor termination of parental rights may proceed until at least 10 days after the tribe, or the BIA where the tribe is unknown, receives notice. (Ibid.; In re A.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 838.)
Though the ICWA itself does not impose a duty on state courts or child protective agencies to inquire whether a child is or may be an Indian child, “long-standing federal guidelines provide ‘the state court shall make inquiries to determine if the child involved is a member of an Indian tribe or if a parent of the child is a member of an Indian tribe and the child is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.’ [Citations.]” (In re H.B., supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 121, fn. omitted.) In accordance with this directive, our Legislature has enacted statutes and adopted rules to implement the ICWA. (In re A.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 838.) Section 224.3, subdivision (a), and rule 5.481(a) of the California Rules of Court impose a continuing duty on the juvenile court and the Department to inquire whether the child “is or may be an Indian child.” In addition, rule 5.481(a) provides that the Department must ask the parents whether the child is or may be an Indian child and the parents must be ordered to complete a form notification of Indian status.
Unless otherwise indicated, all further rules citations are to the California Rules of Court.
Once the ICWA notice provisions are triggered, notice must be sent to the Indian child’s tribe and, if the tribe is unknown, to the BIA. (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) “The purpose of the ICWA notice provisions is to enable the tribe or the BIA to investigate and determine whether the child is in fact an Indian child. [Citation.] Notice given under ICWA must therefore contain enough information to permit the tribe to conduct a meaningful review of its records to determine the child’s eligibility for membership. [Citations.]” (In re Cheyanne F. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 571, 576.) As to the alleged Indian child’s biological parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents, the required notice includes “[a]ll names known... their current and former addresses, birthdates, places of birth and death, tribal enrollment numbers, and any other identifying information, if known.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a)(5)(C); see also 25 C.F.R. § 23.11(d)(3).) The BIA and the tribe have the right to determine conclusively whether a child is an Indian child. (Alicia B. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 856, 865; In re Santos Y. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1300.)
Because the principal purpose of the ICWA is to protect and preserve Indian tribes, an alleged failure of ICWA notice may be raised for the first time on appeal. (In re J.T. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 986, 991.) We review ICWA compliance under the harmless error standard. (See, e.g., In re E.W. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 396, 402–403; In re Alexis H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 11, 16; but see In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1530 [juvenile court’s findings under the ICWA reviewed for substantial evidence].) As the court observed in In re Jonathan D. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 105, 110, “appellate courts in California have recognized that technical compliance with the Act’s notice requirements may not be required where there has been substantial compliance....” Moreover, reversal and remand is not required where “the tribe has... expressly indicated no interest in the proceedings.” (In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460, 472.)
II. On the Basis of the Tribes’ Responses, the Trial Court Properly Concluded That the ICWA Did Not Apply.
California courts have adopted the federal rules as guidelines for what should be included in proper notice under the ICWA. (Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 255.) “The notice must include the name, birth date, and birthplace of the Indian child; his or her tribal affiliation; a copy of the dependency petition; the petitioner’s name; a statement of the right of the tribe to intervene in the proceeding; and information about the Indian child’s biological mother, biological father, maternal and paternal grandparents and great-grandparents or Indian custodians, including maiden, married and former names or aliases, birth dates, places of birth and death, current and former addresses, tribal enrollment numbers, and/or other identifying information.” (In re S.M. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1116; 25 C.F.R. § 23.11(a) & (d); § 224.3, subd. (a)(5).) Since January 1, 2008, notice must be provided on a form ICWA-030, titled Notice of Child Custody Proceeding for Indian Child; the form is designed to elicit the required information. (See rule 5.481(b)(1) [“If it is known or there is reason to know that an Indian child is involved in a [dependency] proceeding... the court must send Notice of Child Custody Proceeding for Indian Child (form ICWA-030) to... the Indian child’s tribe, in the manner specified in... section 224.2”].)
In accordance with these provisions, the ICWA-030 form provided to the tribes and the BIA in this case contained Misty’s name, birth date and birthplace; the names of the tribes through which Misty was a member or eligible for membership; information about Mother, including her full name, birth date and birthplace, and alleged tribal affiliation together with a statement of how that information was obtained; information about Father, including his full name, address, birth date and birthplace, and alleged tribal affiliations together with a statement of how that information was obtained; the maternal grandfather’s name, birth date, birthplace and tribal affiliation; the paternal grandmother’s name; the paternal grandfather’s name, address, birth date, birthplace and tribal affiliation; the maternal great-grandmother’s name, address, birth date, birthplace and tribal affiliation; the maternal great-grandfather’s name; another maternal great-grandmother’s name, birthplace, tribal affiliation, and date and place of death; the paternal great-grandmother’s name, birthplace and tribal affiliation; and the paternal great-grandfather’s name, birthplace and tribal affiliation. The notice also included both a copy of the relevant dependency petition and a copy of Misty’s birth certificate. (See § 224.3, subd. (a)(5).)
Mother does not contend-nor would she have any basis for contending-that the notices to the tribes and the BIA were inadequate in any respect. Rather, her argument hinges on the purported inadequacy of the responses to those notices by six tribes. She contends that while the responses indicated Misty was neither enrolled nor eligible for enrollment in the tribes, they did not rule out the possibility of her tribe membership. “Formal membership requirements differ from tribe to tribe, as does each tribe’s method of keeping track of its own membership. [Citation.]” (In re Santos Y., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1300.) Because “‘[e]ach Indian tribe has sole authority to determine its membership criteria, and to decide who meets those criteria, ’” lack of enrollment is not necessarily dispositive of tribe membership. (D.B. v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 197, 207.) “‘“Enrollment is not required... to be considered a member of a tribe; many tribes do not have written rolls. [Citations.] While enrollment can be one means of establishing membership, it is not the only means, nor is it determinative. [Citation.]”’” (Id. at pp. 207–208.) Thus, according to Mother, responses indicating merely a lack of enrollment were not dispositive of the question of Misty’s membership in the tribe.
We recognize that each Indian tribe has sole authority to determine its own membership criteria. (Dwayne P. v. Superior Court, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 254.) Our review of the challenged responses demonstrates that each of the six tribes conclusively determined that Misty was not an Indian child as defined by federal law. (See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) [defining an Indian child an unmarried minor who is either “a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe”].)
The responses by both the Bois Forte Band and the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians were comprised of checked spaces on a preprinted form. The Bois Forte Band checked the spaces indicating that Misty was not enrolled in the Bois Forte Band, she was not eligible for enrollment in the Bois Forte Band and her parents were not eligible for enrollment in the Bois Forte Band. The space indicating that the Bois Forte Band did not intend to participate in the proceedings was likewise checked. Correspondingly, the spaces that were not checked provided that the child was enrolled, the parents were enrolled, the child was eligible for enrollment and the Bois Forte Band intended to participate in the proceedings. Because lack of enrollment and eligibility for enrollment were the only criteria utilized by the Bois Forte Band to determine it would not participate in the proceedings, we logically infer that lack of enrollment is dispositive of membership for the Bois Forte Band. Similarly, the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians checked the space indicating that neither Misty nor her parents were eligible for enrollment and, on that basis, checked the additional space indicating that it did not intend to participate in the proceedings. The tribe left blank the space indicating that Misty or her parents were enrolled members of the tribe, thus confirming that Misty fell within neither definition of an Indian child under federal law.
The letter from the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians likewise confirmed that Misty was neither a member of the tribe nor eligible for membership. Though Mother focuses on the portion of the letter indicating that Misty was neither eligible nor enrolled with the tribe, the balance of the letter stated that “[o]ne of the membership requirements is that applicant [sic] must possess ¼ or more Indian blood as required by the Constitution Bylaws of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians.” The letter further stated that neither Mother nor Father were enrolled in the tribe. On those bases, the tribe concluded Misty was not eligible or enrolled with the tribe. We find neither ambiguity in the letter nor the possibility that there would be other means available to establish Misty’s membership in the tribe.
The letter from the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community was similarly unambiguous, ruling out the possibility of either Misty’s membership or eligibility for membership in the tribe. The letter provided: “[W]ith the information provided I was able to determine that neither the child, nor the parents, [J.S. and P.T.], are enrolled members of the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community. They are also not eligible for enrollment. Additional notice to the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community will not be necessary.”
The Grand Portage Band of Chippewas initially submitted a letter stating that neither Misty nor her parents were enrolled with the tribe, and that therefore the tribe would not be intervening in the matter. The tribe later supplemented the letter to add that neither Misty nor her parents were eligible for enrollment. Again, the tribe determined that Misty was not enrolled or eligible for enrollment as conclusive, and on that basis declined to intervene in the matter. Because the tribe identified enrollment or eligibility for enrollment as the only means by which it would intervene on Misty’s behalf, we construe the tribe’s letter as a conclusive determination that Misty was not an Indian child. (See § 224.3, subd. (e)(1).)
The last challenged response from the Mole Lake Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians similarly determined that Misty was not an Indian child, writing that according to the tribe’s records, “Misty... is not an enrolled tribal member of the Sokaogon Chippewa Community; and is NOT ELIGIBLE for enrollment with the Mole Lake Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians.” The determination that Misty was neither an enrolled member nor eligible for enrollment conclusively resolved her Indian status. (Compare, D.B. v. Superior Court, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 207–208 [juvenile court’s finding that the ICWA did not apply vacated where BIA responses indicated that neither father nor child were enrolled members, but did not rule out the possibility that the child was eligible for membership].)
Indeed, we find no meaningful distinction between the responses challenged by Mother and the responses that she concedes conclusively determined that Misty was not an Indian child. Indeed, some of the unchallenged responses determined that Misty was not an Indian child on the basis of her ineligibility for enrollment. For example, the Lac Courte Oreilles Tribe responded that Misty “is not a member or eligible for enrollment based on the information we have received.” Similarly, the Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians stated in its response that Mother and Father were not enrolled members of the tribe and that “[t]herefore, the child listed does not meet the requirements for membership and would be ineligible for enrollment.” Further, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians responded that Misty was not a member of the tribe and was “[i]neligible for enrollment.” All of the responses sufficiently determined that Misty was not an Indian child subject to the ICWA.
Even if the tribes’ responses had not constituted conclusive determinations, the juvenile court could have determined that the ICWA did not apply pursuant to section 224.3, subdivision (e)(3), which provides that if proper notice has been given, “and neither a tribe nor the Bureau of Indian Affairs has provided a determinative response within 60 days after receiving that notice, the court may determine that the [ICWA] does not apply to the proceedings....”
Nor are we persuaded that the juvenile court’s finding that the ICWA did not apply should be set aside because of the Department’s failure to provide additional information to the Cherokee Nation. In a letter sent in September 2009, the Cherokee Nation requested additional information about the paternal great-grandmother’s full name and date of birth, as well as the dates of birth for all individuals listed and maiden names of all females; it repeated its request for information about the paternal great-grandmother in an October 2009 letter.
In its November 2009 report, the Department outlined how it had obtained the information that was provided in the ICWA-030 form. The social worker interviewed the maternal grandfather (Misty’s legal guardian) who advised that he had Cherokee heritage through his maternal grandmother, but further advised that he knew he was not eligible for enrollment nor were his children eligible for enrollment. Nonetheless he provided what family information he could. The social worker also interviewed Father, who “stated that he believed his father had Native American heritage, but that he was not sure about any specific tribal affiliations. The father then contacted the paternal grandmother, [T.T.], who advised the names of paternal grandfather’s parents and that she believed that he descended from the Cherokee or Chippewa tribes. The family did not have any detailed information to provide but gave as much as they could about the grandfather’s family, citing that he has not been involved with the family for an extended period of time.”
The Department “must provide all known information to the tribe.” (In re Louis S. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 622, 631, italics added; see also § 224.2, subd. (a)(5)(A)-(C).) The ICWA-030 form contained all information the Department learned from the maternal grandfather, Father and Father’s relatives. There is no indication in either the record or in Mother’s briefs on appeal that the additional information requested by the Cherokee Nation was known either to Father or any relatives with whom he was in contact. On this record, the information provided in the ICWA-030 form about Misty’s parents, grandparents and great-grandparents constituted “enough information to permit the tribe to conduct a meaningful review of its records to determine the child’s eligibility for membership.” (In re Cheyanne F., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)
The circumstances here stand in sharp contrast to those where appellate courts have reversed ICWA determinations for insufficient notice. (See In re Francisco W. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 695, 700, 703–704 [Department failed to provide Indian tribe with all “available” information about the child’s ancestors, where the family history section of the ICWA-030 form was largely left blank and the social worker did not include any background information about the paternal grandmother claiming Indian heritage even though she had made herself available]; In re Louis R., supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 631 [ICWA notice that contained misspelled and incomplete names, provided information about the relative claiming Indian heritage in the wrong part of the form and failed to provide information about relatives with whom the child was living did not enable the tribe to conduct a meaningful investigation]; In re D. T. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1455 [ICWA notice inadequate where it failed to provide information already included in the social worker’s report, such as the mother’s married name, parents’ address, names of the grandparents, and claimed tribal affiliation].)
This is not a case where the Department failed to inquire into a child’s alleged Indian heritage. Rather, the Department sought and obtained information about Misty from both Mother’s and Father’s side of the family. Mother’s assertion that further efforts on the part of the Department would have yielded information about the paternal great-grandmother and other relatives is based on speculation. (In re Gerardo A. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 988, 994–995 [appellant’s argument that the Department should have inquired of additional relatives to obtain family history for ICWA purposes rejected as based on speculation].)
Moreover, even if we were to conclude that the failure to conduct additional inquiries constituted error, we would find such error harmless. (E.g., In re S.B. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1162 [ICWA errors harmless when a child would not have been found to be an Indian child regardless of the error].) The focus of the Cherokee Nation’s requests for information was to obtain the full name and birth date of the paternal great-grandmother. But Misty could not have claimed Indian heritage through Father, as the juvenile court had found him to be Misty’s alleged father. The Department’s last status report summarized that Father “is the alleged father of the child, Misty T[]. No paternity test has been conducted, and his name is not on Misty’s birth certificate.” “Until biological paternity is established, an alleged father’s claims of Indian heritage do not trigger any ICWA notice requirement because, absent a biological connection, the child cannot claim Indian heritage through the alleged father.” (In re E.G. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1533; see also In re B.R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 773, 785 [holding that either a biological or an adoptive relationship can trigger ICWA notice].) Here, because there was no determination that Father was Misty’s biological father, nor any evidence of an adoptive relationship, ICWA notice concerning Misty’s paternal relatives was not even required by virtue of Father’s relationship with Misty.
Accordingly, we find the juvenile court properly determined that the ICWA did not apply to this case, and given that the ICWA finding is Mother’s only challenge to the order terminating her parental rights, we find no basis to reverse that order.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
We concur: BOREN,, P. J., CHAVEZ, J.