Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Caryl A. Lee, Judge. Super. Ct. No. DP012408.
Diana W. Prince, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, Karen L.Christensen and Julie J. Agin, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
SILLS, P. J.
Juan T. appeals from the orders summarily denying his petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, which requested reunification services, and terminating his parental rights to his daughter, Miracle T. He contends he made a prima facie case that circumstances had changed and reunification services would be in Miracle’s best interests; accordingly, he should have received a full evidentiary hearing. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS
Miracle T. was born with a positive toxicology screen for amphetamines. Her mother admitted using methamphetamines regularly during the pregnancy; “the last four months of the pregnancy she used three to four times a week.” Miracle and her two-year-old half sister, Malila, were detained by the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) and placed with their maternal great-grandmother.
Malila has a different father and is not the subject of this appeal.
The mother identified Alfredo M. as the father of Miracle and paternity testing was ordered. However, Alfredo was incarcerated, then deported, and the testing was not completed by the time of the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, held on February 22, 2006. Miracle was declared a dependent of the juvenile court, and the mother was provided reunification services.
On March 13, 2006, the social worker received Miracle’s birth certificate, which listed Juan T. as Miracle’s father. The next day, the social worker interviewed the mother, who said that “Mr. T[.] was her boyfriend at the time of the child’s birth and thought that the child was his, and that this is why his name is on the birth certificate. The mother stated that the father of the child is Alfredo G. M[.] and that Mr. T[.] is now aware of this. The mother stated that she and Mr. T[.] no longer have a significant relationship.” The social worker filed an ex parte request with the juvenile court to have Juan T. found to be Miracle’s presumed father. The court did so on March 27, 2006.
The six-month review hearing was scheduled for June 8, 2006. SSA had been unable to locate the father; the social worker submitted a search declaration to the juvenile court. The hearing was continued to June 29, at which time the juvenile court terminated the mother’s reunification services and scheduled a permanent plan selection hearing for October 2006.
The father was apparently located in jail, because notice of the permanent plan selection hearing was personally served on him at the Theo Lacy Facility on July 18, 2006. On August 11, 2006, the juvenile court found he had received proper notice of the hearing. The father was present in custody on October 26, 2006, and the court appointed counsel to represent him. The hearing was continued several times to November 30, 2006.
The father was again present in custody on November 30; he filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 asking the court to vacate the scheduled permanent plan selection hearing and order six months of reunification services for him. His declaration in support of the petition stated he was present at the hospital when Miracle was born; he signed a declaration of paternity and his name was put on the birth certificate. He declared, “I was not allowed to participate in the meeting, two days later, to decide where the minor should be placed. The mother told me the minor would be placed with the grandmother. The mother did not tell me I was allowed to visit the minor at the grandmother’s home. [¶] I had at least ten contacts with the mother over those nine months [from October 2005 to June of 2006]. The mother never disclosed to me that the juvenile court was involved. The mother never told me there was a social worker assigned to the case. The mother never volunteered the social worker[’]s name or phone number for me [to] use to get involved in this case. During those ten contacts, the mother never told me about future court dates. . . . The mother informed me I was not allowed to visit my child.” The father stated it would be in Miracle’s best interest to give him an opportunity to reunify because “I am Miracle[’]s father and it would be in her[] best interest to have a relationship with me. I love my daughter and would provide her with love and support if afforded the opportunity.”
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The juvenile court reviewed the section 388 petition and heard argument. It found that the father had the opportunity to come forward sooner and did not do so. “[W]hat I have to look at is what efforts he made early on at the appropriate time to participate. And he clearly knew the child was born because he signed a declaration of paternity [and] was present at the birth . . . . [¶] Therefore, he had a responsibility to maintain contact and exercise his rights as a parent. And he seemed to abdicate his responsibility as a parent to family members who were apparently caring for the child safely and relieved him of the burden of paternity, although that is a 24-hour job, seven days a week. And it is, in this court’s view, a little too late.” The court found that the father had not made a prima facie case under section 388 and denied the petition.
The permanent plan selection hearing was continued to December 13. SSA submitted reports indicating that Miracle and her sister were thriving in the great-grandmother’s home. The great-grandmother and the maternal great aunt, who lived in the home, had expressed their desire to adopt the children. SSA was completing a home study. The father cross-examined the social worker, who admitted she could have submitted an ex parte request to add him to the service plan after she located him in July 2006, which would have entitled him to visitation. The father argued if he had been allowed to visit, he could have established the exception to the termination of parental rights to an adoptable child based on the child’s beneficial relationship with a parent. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).)
The court observed that “we have a period of time, perhaps four or five months, where there could have been some visitation with father at the jail . . . . [¶] And so whether or not that gives rise to the [section 366.26, subdivision] (c)(1)(A) exception is certainly what the court would need to consider. One of the things that I would consider is was there some sort of relationship that . . . would have been in danger because there was that existing bond or any type of visitation prior to father entering into the case. [¶] And certainly on his own he didn’t exercise the right to visit.” The court found Miracle to be adoptable and that none of the statutory exceptions to termination applied (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A) – (E)), and terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
“Under section 388, a parent may petition the court to change, modify, or set aside a previous court order on the grounds of changed circumstances or new evidence. (§ 388, subd. (a).) The petition must allege why the requested change is ‘in the best interest of the dependent child.’ (§ 388, subd. (b).) Section 388 goes on to state: ‘If it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change or order . . . the court shall order that a hearing be held.’ (§ 388, subd. (c).) However, the court may summarily deny the motion if the petition fails to make a prima facie showing (1) of a change of circumstances or new evidence requiring a changed order, and (2) the requested change would promote the best interests of the child. [Citation.] In determining whether the petition makes the necessary showing, the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case. [Citation.]” (In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 188-189.) We review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. (In re Daniel C. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1445.)
Here, the father failed to make any showing that delaying the permanent plan selection hearing and offering him reunification services would be in Miracle’s best interests. Miracle was just a week shy of 14 months old at the time of the hearing and had lived her entire life with the maternal great-grandmother and her half-sister. Although the father claimed he wanted to love and support her, he had done nothing to demonstrate his commitment.
The father asserts he did all he could do under the circumstances to demonstrate “a full commitment to his parental responsibilities,” thus he has a due process right to parent his child absent a showing of his unfitness. (In re Julia U. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 532, 541.) He complains he was prevented from doing more by SSA, arguing the social worker should have taken steps to obtain Miracle’s birth certificate sooner and should have arranged to provide him services while he was in jail. He also blames the mother for his inaction because she failed to tell him Miracle was a dependent of the juvenile court.
We agree with the juvenile court’s findings that the father had the opportunity to come forward but failed to do so. He knew he had a child, but was apparently content to allow the mother’s relatives to care for her. He signed a declaration of paternity, which clearly states it “will give the father parental rights such as the right to seek child custody and visitation through a court action and to be consulted about the adoption of the child.” Furthermore, when the father was served with notice of the upcoming permanent plan selection hearing, he was given notice that he had the right to appear in court and be appointed counsel. The father expressed no interest in these rights until October 26, 2006. Given this lack of involvement, it is highly unlikely the father could have established a meaningful relationship with Miracle even if SSA had provided visits during the five months he was in jail.
We grant SSA’s request for judicial notice of a blank Declaration of Paternity form. The father does not object to the request.
Blame aside, Miracle’s dependency proceeding is long past the reunification stage. She is on the verge of being adopted and finding the stability of a permanent home. After reunification services are terminated, the juvenile court’s focus shifts from the parent’s interest in reunification to the child’s need for permanence and stability. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) The father failed to make a prima facie showing that delaying the proceedings would be in Miracle’s best interests.
DISPOSITION
The orders denying a hearing on the section 388 petition and terminating parental rights are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: MOORE, J., ARONSON, J.