Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Nos. CK61349, CK61350. Marilyn K. Martinez, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Michael A. Salazar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
COOPER, P. J.
Melvin A. (father) appeals from the trial court’s dispositional order in this dependency proceeding. He argues, for the first time on appeal, that the juvenile court erred in denying him visitation and the court’s reunification plan was unreasonable. By failing to raise these issues in the juvenile court, father has forfeited them. In any event, the record supports the juvenile court’s order, which we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 30, 2006, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition, which as later sustained, alleged father physically abused his daughter D., father abused his domestic partner; and father occasionally drank alcohol to excess. D. was 14 years old at the time the petition was filed.
A second petition that named D.’s half-siblings also was filed. That petition is not a subject of the current appeal.
D. testified that when father drank, he threw a computer at her, broke a cup on her, and hit her in the back of her head. He also grabbed her hair and threw her to the floor and hit her face with a remote control. She testified that father drank and used cocaine. D. also testified that approximately every other day, father hit his girlfriend who was living with them. D. testified that father did not hit her when he was not drinking.
An emergency response worker testified that D. told her that father left cocaine in the house and D. used cocaine as a result of it being left in the house. D.’s aunt testified that she saw bruises on D.’s body. D.’s aunt believed that father used drugs because father had dilated pupils, changes in mood and character. D.’s aunt never saw father hit D. but saw bruises on D.’s body and described her home as a safe haven for D. “[D.] has r[u]n to my house many times after being abused.” She also testified that D. has a restraining order against father. An incident report from the sheriff’s department indicated that D. had redness and swelling above her right eye and an abrasion to her right eye lid.
Father testified that D. lied about the physical abuse and he never hit her. However, later he testified that he “smacked her on top of her head.” Father testified that beer was like water and he drank two to four beers every other day. He testified that in the past he had used cocaine but had not used the drug for at least a year and a half.
The court found D. to be credible. It found that father “is minimizing his problems, his alcohol abuse, his physical abuse, his anger control, his domestic violence. And if he’s not minimizing, then he’s in denial or not taking responsibility for his problems and his conduct.” The court further found: “[D.] shall not have any contact with her father, as I find by clear and convincing evidence it would [be] detrimental, and it is not in her best interest. Given the abuse that she has suffered and the disfunction within the family, perhaps after there is some progress in counseling, I will be persuaded to authorize monitored visits as a start.”
Father states that he appeals from the adjudication hearing and the disposition hearing. It is not entirely clear what father means by the “adjudication hearing.” The disposition hearing, which is the adjudication of dependency, is the first appealable order. (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 196.) Therefore, we construe this appeal as one from the dispositional hearing. That construction is consistent with the notice of appeal, which appeals from the orders dated January 16 and 19, 2007, both of which concern the dispositional hearing.
DISCUSSION
Father argues: (1) the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that visitation with D. would be detrimental to her and (2) the juvenile court failed to make a reasonable reunification plan. As we explain, father has forfeited both of these arguments by failing to object in the trial court.
As father acknowledges, “a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court. [Citation.] The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) The court asked father’s counsel if he had anything to say about visitation and he responded “no.” Father neither objected to any of the terms of the reunification plan nor proposed any additional terms.
Father argues that he refused to sign the court ordered disposition plan and therefore the “juvenile court knew that father was not in agreement with either the visitation order or the reunification plan.” Father’s lack of agreement is not equivalent to raising an objection in the trial court. Father’s refusal to acknowledge receipt of the disposition plan does not identify any error committed by the trial court in designing the reunification plan and does not raise the issues he now argues on appeal. Thus, the juvenile court had no opportunity to correct the order and father forfeited the issue even though he refused to sign the plan. “A party may not assert theories on appeal which were not raised in the trial court.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 222.) However, even if we were to consider father’s arguments on the merits, he demonstrates no error in the juvenile court order.
A. Visitation
“Visitation rights arise from the very ‘fact of parenthood’ and the constitutionally protected right ‘ “to marry, establish a home and bring up children.” ’ ” (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 49.) “Visitation between a dependent child and his or her parents is an essential component of a reunification plan, even if actual physical custody is not the outcome of the proceedings. [Citation.] Visitation ‘shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child.’ [Citation.] However, ‘[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child.’ [Citation.] It is ordinarily improper to deny visitation absent a showing of detriment.” (In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580.) We review the juvenile court’s finding for substantial evidence. (Id. at pp. 580-581.)
The juvenile court denied father visitation with D. explaining: “I find by clear and convincing evidence it would [be] detrimental, and it is not in her best interest. Given the abuse that she has suffered and the disfunction within the family, perhaps after there is some progress in counseling, I will be persuaded to authorize monitored visits as a start.”
The record contains ample evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that visitation would be detrimental to D. She testified that father physically abused her on multiple occasions. Her testimony was corroborated by her aunt, who saw bruises and testified that a restraining order was in effect, and by the social worker’s reports and the police report identifying bruises on her face. D. repeatedly left home (six times in a two year period) when she was in father’s custody because of abuse. Although father testified that D. lied, the juvenile court explicitly credited D.’s testimony and discredited father’s testimony. The juvenile court’s concern for D.’s safety was warranted based on the prior physical abuse and the order of no visitation was appropriate at the time it was made. The juvenile court expressly stated that it would reconsider this order if future conditions supported monitored visitation.
At the detention hearing the juvenile court stated that it was not delegating the decision to D. indicating: “only the court can make a decision whether or not there shall be visits,” thus rebutting father’s argument that an improper delegation occurred. (See In re Julie M. (supra) 69 Cal.App.4th at pp. 48-49 [delegating discretion to children to decide on visitation constituted improper delegation judicial power].) At the disposition hearing, the court gave reasons for its decision, evidence that it did not merely delegate the decision to D. No evidence in the record supports father’s statements that the juvenile court improperly delegated the decision to D.
B. Reunification Plan
Father also argues the reunification plan was unreasonable. According to him, the reunification plan was too general, failed to define success, and failed to consider ethnicity. The only specific suggestion father makes is that the plan should have ordered father “to attend counseling at the same facility as D. and that a family therapist be assigned to closely monitor and coordinate the child’s and father’s therapy to ensure that both father and daughter were involved in individual therapy and moving towards conjoint therapy as soon as possible to preserve whatever is left of the father-daughter relationship.”
“The reunification plan ‘ “must be appropriate for each family and be based on the unique facts relating to that family.” ’ [Citation.] Section 362, subdivision (c) states in pertinent part: ‘The program in which a parent or guardian is required to participate shall be designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court’s finding that the minor is a person described by Section 300.’ [Citation.] The department must offer services designed to remedy the problems leading to the loss of custody. [Citation.]” (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006-1007.) “The law requires a good faith effort to develop and implement a family reunification plan [citation] with services tailored to suit the needs of the parents. [Citation.] “ (In re Steve J. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 810.) The juvenile court has discretion to fashion an appropriate disposition plan. (In re Sergio C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 957, 960.)
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Father does not show that the reunification plan ordering him to attend individual counseling to address grief, physical abuse, and anger management was unreasonable. The reasons for the detention included father’s physical abuse of D., his girlfriend, and father’s excessive drinking. The reunification plan addressed each of these issues by requiring father to undergo testing, participate in individual counseling focused in part on anger management and counseling with his girlfriend. Thus, contrary to father’s argument, the reunification plan was designed to address the reasons for the detention.
Even though the court did not order father and D. to attend therapy in the same setting, father could take responsibility to ensure that he used his individual therapy to learn the skills set out by the juvenile court in order to, as he described it, “preserve whatever is left of the father-daughter relationship.” The court was concerned that father was denying or minimizing his problems, an issue that father could improve individually. Father has not shown that the reunification plan ordered was unreasonable.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s dispositional orders are affirmed.
We concur: RUBIN, J., FLIER, J.