Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. YJ31220, Wayne C. Denton, Judge.
Torres & Torres and Tonja R. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Ellen Birnbaum Kehr, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CHAVEZ, J.
Miguel L. (minor) appeals from a judgment entered after the juvenile court sustained a petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (section 602 petition). Minor contends that the judgment was not supported by substantial evidence. We find sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings, and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Minor had been adjudged a ward of the court pursuant to a section 602 petition, which was sustained April 8, 2008, after minor admitted to misdemeanor trespassing at the Mar Vista Housing Project (the Project). At that time, minor was placed with his grandparents on home probation under conditions that included staying away from the Project and other gang members.
On November 24, 2009, the People filed another 602 petition, alleging in count 1 that on November 21, 2009, minor disobeyed a court order, to wit: a gang injunction, in violation of Penal Code section 166, subdivision (a)(4). The petition alleged in count 2, that on the same date, minor resisted a peace officer in violation of Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1).
In a contested adjudication hearing held December 17, 2009, Los Angeles Police Officer Michael Switzer testified that he was assigned to the Gang Enforcement Detail in the territory of the Culver City Boys gang, which was primarily the Project and the area of Slauson Avenue adjacent to it. In the course of his duties he had come into casual contact with minor on prior occasions, and had arrested him once. Minor had admitted to Officer Switzer that he was a member of the Culver City Boys gang, and in Officer Switzer’s opinion, minor was a current member. Although minor did not live in the gang’s territory, he had been seen there wearing gang colors and letters.
Officer Switzer identified a permanent injunction issued against the Culver City Boys gang on March 27, 2001, in Los Angeles Superior Court case No. SC056980. One of Officer Switzer’s duties was to enforce the gang injunction. Officer Switzer was conducting an investigation related to the injunction on November 11, 2009, when he encountered minor on Slauson Avenue, and spoke to him.
Los Angeles Police Officer Ralph Barone identified minor in court, and testified that he recognized minor from several prior contacts in the field, including one on October 25, 2007. On that date, Officer Barone arrested minor and served him with a copy of the gang injunction after finding him in the Project after 10:00 p.m. The injunction prohibits gang members from entering the private property of others, except with the consent of the owner or person in lawful possession of the property.
Los Angeles Police Officer Johnny Carey testified that he was working in uniform on gang suppression detail during the afternoon of November 21, 2009, in the area of the Project. Officer Carey described the Project as a very large housing facility operated by the Los Angeles City Housing Authority, laid out like an enclosed school campus, with “No Trespassing” signs posted. There is a single entrance with a gate staffed by a security guard. At approximately 6:30 p.m. on that date, while driving with a partner in a marked police car inside the project, Officer Carey saw minor and another person standing on the sidewalk. Minor was wearing a red hat with a “C” on it, clothing consistent with membership in Culver City Boys gang.
When minor and his companion looked in the direction of the officers, the companion fled. When the officers approached minor on foot, minor put his hands above his head, but when Officer Carey ordered him to face away from him, minor did not move. When Officer Carey again ordered him to turn around, minor took a few steps backward, turned, and fled. As the officers gave chase, Officer Carey told him, “Stop, or I’ll initiate a taser on you.” Minor did not stop, and when the officers caught up to him after running approximately 75 to 100 yards, they used a taser on him.
Minor presented no evidence in his defense. After argument by counsel, the trial court sustained the petition, and found minor in violation of probation. The court terminated home probation, ordered minor to serve three months in camp placement, with predisposition credit of 35 days, and ordered that physical confinement not exceed one year. The court reimposed the prior terms and conditions, and ordered minor to stay away from any area covered by the gang injunction, and specifically, the Project, with or without a resident’s permission. Minor filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Minor contends that the judgment was not supported by substantial evidence. In particular, minor contends that the prosecution failed to prove that he did not have consent to be on Project property.
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a juvenile court judgment sustaining criminal allegations is reviewed under the same standard of review applicable to any criminal appeal. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) Thus, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it discloses evidence that is “reasonable, credible, and of solid value--such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578; see also Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319; In re Ryan N., supra, at p. 1372.) “The same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) We do not reweigh the evidence or resolve conflicts in the evidence. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) “Before the judgment of the trial court can be set aside for insufficiency of the evidence..., it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it. [Citation.]” (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755; In re Ryan N., at p. 1372.)
Provision D of the injunction prohibits gang members from “[b]eing present on the private property of others except with 1) the prior written consent of the owner or person in lawful possession of the property or 2) in the presence of and with the voluntary consent of the owner or person in lawful possession of the property.”
Minor points out that there was no direct evidence that he lacked permission to be inside the Project. He points out that he was in the company of another person, and argues that a reasonable inference that he had permission to be on the property may be drawn from that fact.
As respondent points out, flight implies a consciousness of guilt. (People v. Wallace (2008)44 Cal.4th 1032, 1074; see In re Anthony M. (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 491, 500-501 [unexplained flight from burglary scene implies entry with unlawful intent].) Although minor may infer permission to enter the Project grounds from the company of another person, the flight of that person upon seeing the police officers suggests that his companion had no right to give such permission, particularly in view of the injunction against the Culver City Boys in that area.
We must accept all reasonable inferences favoring the prosecution, and reject conflicting inferences drawn by minor. (In re Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1373.) A strong inference of guilt arises from minor’s continued flight under the threat of a taser strike, particularly given that he had been served with the injunction before, and his prior juvenile adjudication for trespassing at the Project. The Project was within the territory of the Culver City Boys, and minor, who did not live in the gang’s territory, was there wearing gang colors and letters.
Because the only entrance to the Project was through the gate guarded by a security guard, defendant surmises that one cannot enter the Project grounds without the security guard’s permission. Minor’s argument assumes that the gated entry made the property impenetrable by any other means, even by climbing a fence. Minor’s inference is not reasonable, as the Project is a residential facility, not a prison, which Officer Carey described as laid out like an enclosed school campus. Minor was able to gain entrance without consent before, and he was able-bodied enough to run from the officers. It is reasonable to infer that minor gained unlawful entry by the same means he had employed in the past.
In any event, minor’s argument that the security guard must have allowed him to enter is unreasonable. An inference may not be based upon “‘imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work....’ [Citation.]” (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 545.) It is very unlikely that the security guard would admit an adolescent who, like minor, did not live in the Project and was dressed in such as way as to announce his membership in the gang.
In sum, we agree with respondent that there was ample circumstantial evidence to support a finding that defendant did not have permission to be on the grounds of the Project, and thus, that his presence there was a violation of the injunction.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
We concur: BOREN, P.J., DOI TODD, J.