Opinion
A118895
7-30-2008
In re MICHAEL M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MICHAEL M., Defendant and Appellant.
Not to be Published
Appellant Michael M. appeals the determination finding true that he committed battery upon a probation officer. Appellant makes only one argument—that the finding is not supported by substantial evidence because there is no evidence of criminal intent. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On July 5, 2007 a wardship petition was filed (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) charging appellant Michael M., a previously adjudicated ward, with two additional misdemeanors: (1) battery on an officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (b)) and (2) disturbing the peace at school (Pen. Code, § 415.5). The petition also alleged that appellant violated his probation.
On July 12, appellant admitted count two of the petition, disturbing the peace on school grounds, as well as the allegation that he had failed to follow the directions of a probation officer. Appellant denied count one, battery on a probation officer.
A contested jurisdictional hearing was held on July 24, before the Honorable Robert Weir, at which the People presented one witness regarding the battery count: Del Norte County Probation Officer Bruce Swanson. Following Swansons testimony, Judge Weir sustained the allegation.
On August 16, Judge Weir ordered appellant reinstated on probation. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
THE FACTS
Swanson testified that on July 5 he was a deputy probation officer assigned to McCarthy School, where appellant was a student. Swansons office is next to a classroom, and through his window he saw appellant "yelling obscenities and pointing at somebody in the classroom." Swanson stepped outside his door, and saw appellant pointing at another student, Zachary V., yelling obscenities at Zachary, accusing him of having jumped appellants brother, and calling him a "South Sider."
Appellant was pushing aside chairs and desks in an attempt to reach Zachary. One of the teachers, Jake Williams, tried to stop appellant, who "kind of shrugged and pushed" Williams back. Meanwhile, Swanson had Zachary move to a separate area of the classroom, and then out of the room. Swanson then described what happened next: appellant came "rather fast" around a desk, and Swanson told him to stop, holding out his hands to emphasize the command. Appellant said "no," and with his right hand pushed Swanson on his left shoulder. Swanson used pepper spray on appellant, who became compliant and was thereafter handcuffed.
Brief cross-examination included the following colloquy:
"Q. Okay. And I gather, if I understand you correctly, you were trying to reach out for—for [appellant] and
"A. I just held my hands out. `Stop.
"Q. Okay, and that was when he pushed you aside or
"A. Yes. Yes.
"Q. Or did you actually touch him?
"A. We could have touched; Im not sure.
"Q. Okay.
"A. It was very fast.
"Q. Okay. And his touching of you, I gather, was not painful?
"A. No, it wasnt."
After a brief recess, appellants counsel exercised appellants right not to testify and then advised the court that appellant would submit the matter. Judge Weir found "to be true the allegation that [appellant] did use force and violence against Officer Swanson. Admittedly it was minimal, apparently just a quick shove and not painful, but youre not supposed to do that so I find that that allegation is . . . sustained."
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues that there was no substantial evidence the "touching took place with criminal intent," specifically asserting that the "burden was on the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that [appellant] intentionally touched Mr. Swanson. [And] no evidence was produced to show that the contact was deliberate."
The governing principles are well established, beginning with the principle that review of this juvenile proceeding is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809; In re Cheri T. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1404; In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088.) Thus, we "must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) "[We] consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. The test is whether substantial evidence supports the decision, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432.)
Applying those rules here leads to the conclusion that appellants claim has no merit.
"A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another." (Pen. Code, § 242.) "`[T]he least touching may constitute battery." (People v. Myers (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335, quoting People v. Rocha (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899-900, fn. 12.) "[A]ny force against the person is sufficient for a conviction." (People v. Lindsay (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 849, 855; People v. Martinez (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 886, 889.)
And as appellant acknowledges, battery is a general intent crime. (See People v. Colantuono (1994) 7 Cal.4th 206, 217.) In consequence, "[t]here need be no proof of an intent to injure, only an intent to commit the act." (People v. Lindsay, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d 849, 855.)
Recognizing these rules, appellant candidly concedes that there is "no question here" that the contact between appellants right hand and Swansons shoulder, "brief and painless as it was, sufficiently established the touching necessary for a battery." However, appellant goes on, the testimony did not "establish that the touching was deliberate or that it was initiated by Michael. Without substantial evidence that Michael had the requisite intent, the adjudication of battery cannot stand." We disagree.
To begin with, appellants argument is premised on a reading of the record that would stand the rules of appellate review on their head. For example, appellant argues that Swansons testimony "simply does not establish that the touching was deliberate, rather than an accidental contact as [appellant] furiously struggled to get to" Zachary. Appellant then asserts that "[c]ircumstantial factors may demonstrate whether contact was accidental, rather than deliberate." Maybe so, but not in light of the rule governing here: "Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the juvenile courts findings, and the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, accepting every reasonable inference that the court could have drawn from the evidence. (In re Angelina P. [(1981)] 28 Cal.3d [908,] 924; [citation].)" (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 415.) Swanson testified that appellant "tried to push me aside." This manifests intent, not accident.
Appellant asserts that Swanson "apparently moved into [appellants] path" and was "[s]tanding in [appellants] way," from which appellant contends the touching was accidental or unintentional, presumably the result of an unavoidable collision. The record references cited do not support these assertions. Nothing in those pages reflects that Swanson moved directly into appellants path such that in his movement toward Zachary he accidentally and unavoidably hit Swanson.
Appellant also points to Swansons testimony that when he held his hands out and told appellant to stop, the two "could have touched; Im not sure," and that the event happened "so fast," "very fast," in an apparent claim that this negates intent. Again, such a reading of the record is contrary to the principles of appellate review cited above. It is also of no avail: even if Swanson did touch appellant when Swanson "held my hands out"—a matter on which Swanson was not certain—and even if appellants push happened "very fast" thereafter, this does not negate the finding of a deliberate touching.
Judge Weir expressly found that appellant "use[d] force . . . against Officer Swanson." That jurisdictional finding is supported by the record. That finding is affirmed.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile courts July 24, 2007 finding regarding the battery allegation is affirmed.
We concur:
Kline, P.J.
Lambden, J. --------------- Notes: All dates are in 2007.