Opinion
C055565
6-26-2008
In re MICHAEL G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MICHAEL G., Defendant and Appellant.
Not to be Published
The minor, Michael G., appeals from certain aspects of a victim restitution order, after he admitted one count of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) pursuant to a plea agreement that dismissed the remaining counts against him for residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), unlawful taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code § 10851, subd. (a)), felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1)) and unauthorized entry of a dwelling (Pen. Code, § 602.5). We shall affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Steven Loe was checking on his son Denniss house while Dennis and his family were on vacation. He saw a male juvenile walk out of the residence. The juvenile said the homeowners son had given him and his friends permission to swim in the pool while they were gone. Steven checked with Dennis, who told him no one had been given permission to be inside the house. When Steven went back to the house, three juveniles were inside the house cleaning the counters. Steven detained the juveniles and called the police.
The juveniles told police the homeowners daughter gave them permission to swim in the pool and asked them to check on her cat inside the residence. They crawled through an open window and decided to clean the house so they would not be blamed for something they did not do.
The homeowners had not given the juveniles permission to enter their residence or use their pool. Numerous items, including money, were missing from the house, and there was damage to the house and the swimming pool.
The minor was adjudged a ward of the court, and the court ordered 71 months and 29 days as the maximum period of confinement, and placed the minor on probation. The court ordered the minor to serve a period of eight days in juvenile hall, with credit for one day served.
The court set restitution at $50,625.13, subject to a contested restitution hearing, and ordered the minor be jointly and severally liable with the two co-participants. Following the restitution hearing, the trial court awarded $73,953.56 in restitution. The minor and his parents were jointly and severally liable with another minor and his parents. The only issues on appeal involve the restitution order.
DISCUSSION
The minor argues the restitution order awarded the victim a undeserved windfall because the compensation the court awarded amounting to one day of wages ($367.56) for obtaining a restraining order was already included within the dollar amount awarded for court hearings. There is no basis for this argument.
The People requested $5,880.96 for the victims loss of work due to court appearances. This consisted of 16 days at $367.56 per day. None of these court dates appear to be for the restraining order. In a separate item, the People requested $1,837.50 for obtaining a restraining order, consisting of five days of work lost — three to obtain, complete, and file the paperwork and two for court appearances.
The victim stated that he spent five workdays obtaining the restraining order. He explained this consisted of three days to do the paperwork and two days of court appearances. He testified that the court appearance for the restraining order was not included in the separate request for court appearances.
The trial court, in its restitution order, found that the reasonable amount of time to obtain, complete, and file the paperwork for the restraining order was one day. The court found that the court appearances associated with the request for a restraining order were already included in the amount awarded for court appearances.
As the trial court made perfectly clear, the sum awarded with respect to the restraining order was for obtaining, completing, and filing the paperwork. It was not for the court appearances required to obtain the order, which the court determined had already been awarded. There was no duplicative award, therefore no undeserved windfall to the victim.
The minor also argues that the trial court should have ordered that he receive notice when the other minors make restitution payments. He makes this claim of error based upon dicta in People v. Zito (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 736, 745 (Zito). In Zito, the court concluded that joint and several restitution orders are permissible. (Id. at p. 744.) In addressing the criticism of such orders set forth in the earlier case of People v. Hernandez (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1374, the court stated, "[o]ne way to make sure the victim does not receive double compensation is to require that defendants receive notice of amounts paid by codefendants." (Zito, supra, at p. 745.) The court did not hold that such notice must be given in every joint and several restitution order, and cases are not authority for everything said in the opinion, but only for issues raised and actually decided therein. (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 620.)
Aside from the fact that there is no obvious error in the courts failure to order the minor be notified of other payments, this claim is not preserved for appeal. The waiver doctrine applies to claims involving the trial courts failure to make or articulate discretionary sentencing choices. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353.) It applies to the trial courts restitution orders. (People v. Geddes (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 448, 457.) The minor claims that by challenging the restitution itself he also challenged the notice aspects of the restitution. However, since he did not challenge the restitution on this ground, the claim is waived. (People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 755 [objection to courts sentence on only one of three grounds raised on appeal preserves appeal only on ground raised].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment (order) is affirmed.
We concur:
DAVIS, J.
BUTZ, J. --------------- Notes: The factual summary is taken from the probation officers report.