Opinion
No. 06-17-00070-CR
05-03-2017
IN RE MARTIN MENDOZA, JR.
On Appeal from the 4th District Court Rusk County, Texas
Trial Court No. Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Martin Mendoza, Jr., has filed a petition for writ of mandamus in which he asks this Court to order the Honorable J. Clay Gosset, Judge of the 4th District Court of Rusk County, to dismiss the indictment against him in trial court cause number "No.18231/CR15-085" and to "remove" a pending detainer. Because the mandamus record is insufficient to support the requested relief, we deny Mendoza's petition.
In his petition, Mendoza states that on April 18, 2015, Rusk County placed a detainer on him; however, he contends he was never presented with the indictment that served as the basis for the detainer. Further, Mendoza avers that on June 13, 2016, he filed with the trial court his first motion to dismiss the indictment, and on December 30, 2016, he filed his second motion to dismiss the indictment. Mendoza states the trial court failed to rule on either of his motions. Mendoza maintains that the pending indictment and detainer have "prejudice[d] his rehabilitation process and [his] chance for release on parole." He also contends that the trial court's failure to rule on his motions violates his federal and state rights to a speedy trial.
According to Mendoza, on July 16, 2016, and November 1, 2016, he delivered requests to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice asking the Warden to forward a "final disposition to Rusk County." Mendoza states that the Warden "refused" both of his requests. Mendoza also maintains that on November 17, 2016, he sent a letter to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice notifying the Director of the detainer, to which she never responded.
It is a relator's burden to properly request and show entitlement to mandamus relief. See Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) ("Even a pro se applicant for a writ of mandamus must show himself entitled to the extraordinary relief he seeks."). To establish a right to mandamus relief, a relator must show: (1) there is no adequate remedy at law to address the alleged harm; and (2) the act he seeks to compel is ministerial and not one involving a discretionary or judicial decision. See In re State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
A trial court is required to consider and rule on a properly filed and pending motion within a reasonable period of time. In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding). While it is within our discretion to direct the trial court to make a decision, we may not tell the court what its decision should be. Id. Any such mandamus relief, however, must be predicated on a sufficient showing that a request for a ruling has been properly and adequately presented to the trial court and that the trial court has declined to rule. Id. at 662. Mandamus relief requires the existence of a legal duty to perform a nondiscretionary act, a demand for performance of that act, and a refusal to so act. Foreman v. Jarrett, 796 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, orig. proceeding).
Mendoza asks this Court to order the trial court to grant his motions to dismiss and to "remove" a pending detainer, which he states are properly before that court. As stated above, it is not within our discretion to instruct the trial court as to how to rule on a motion pending before it. Moreover, to the extent Mendoza asks this Court to order the trial court to rule on his motions and the request for the "remov[al]" of his detainer, his requested relief must also be denied. First, there is no showing that Mendoza's motions have been brought to the attention of the trial court. The trial court is not required to consider a motion unless it is called to the court's attention. See Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 662. "Showing that a motion was filed with the court clerk does not constitute proof that the motion was brought to the trial court's attention or presented to the trial court with a request for a ruling." Id.
Further, we note that, even if Mendoza had established a proper record (1) that the motions were filed on the dates indicated, (2) that the motions were brought to the trial court's attention on a timely basis, and (3) that the trial court has known about them for some time, but has not yet held a hearing on them, we still would not reach the threshold necessary to grant the requested mandamus relief. This is so because Mendoza has not shown that a reasonable time to rule has expired.
A trial court is required to consider and rule on motions within a reasonable time. In re Burden, No. 06-08-00013-CV, 2008 WL 237657, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 30, 2008, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); Barnes, 832 S.W.2d at 426. It is well settled that determining what time period is reasonable is not subject to exact formulation. Whether the trial court has acted within a reasonable time period depends on the circumstances of each case. Barnes, 832 S.W.2d at 426. Further, no bright line separates a reasonable time period from an unreasonable one. In re Keeter, 134 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, orig. proceeding). Our sister court has held,
[A reasonable time to rule] is dependent upon a myriad of criteria, not the least of which is the trial court's actual knowledge of the motion, its overt refusal to act on same, the state of the court's docket, and the existence of other judicial and administrative matters which must be addressed first. So too must the trial court's inherent power to control its own docket be factored into the mix.In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 228-29 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding) (citations omitted). Although eighteen months is clearly too long, supporting mandamus relief, In re Ramirez, 994 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, 1998, orig. proceeding), as is thirteen months, Kissam v. Williamson, 545 S.W.2d 265, 266-67 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1976, orig. proceeding), the maximum possible delay posed here would not be clearly unreasonable.
For these reasons, we conclude that Mendoza has not shown himself entitled to the extraordinary remedy of mandamus relief. We deny his petition for a writ of mandamus.
Josh R. Morriss, III
Chief Justice Date Submitted: May 2, 2017
Date Decided: May 3, 2017 Do Not Publish