(c) Censor Committee Case No. 613 (12/29/78) โ private censure imposed by Censor Committee became public censure along with $1,000.00 fine imposed by Delaware Supreme Court on appeal in In re Mekler, Del.Supr., 406 A.2d 20 (1979) (violations of DR 7-102(a)(7), DR 7-105); (d) Censor Committee Case No. 746 (11/12/80) โ private censure;
Id. at 326.See also Matter of Swartz, 630 P.2d 1020, 1026-27 (Ariz. 1981) (where evidence did not establish that attorney violated a legal duty of disclosure because he was either incompetent, incapable or he sought to enrich himself, and disciplinary proceedings had been pending for six years, censure rather than suspension was appropriate sanction); In re Mekler, 406 A.2d 20, 25 (Del. 1979) (court considered fact that attorney sustained substantial penalty in judgment rendered against him in civil litigation arising out of same facts and course of conduct); In re Scott, 455 N.E.2d 81, 85-86 (Ill. 1983) (in light of evidence of attorney's past service as Attorney General and State Treasurer, and the high caliber of his performance as a public official, and excellent reputation for truth, veracity, and integrity both before and after his conviction, court refused to sanction attorney beyond the two year interim suspension already served); Carter v. Cianci, 482 A.2d 1201, 1203 (R.I. 1984) (severe sanction of loss of public office resulting from conviction mitigates against sanction of disbarment or suspension); In re Hansen, 584 P.2d 805, 807 (Utah 1978) (the great amount of time, effort, expense, adverse publicity and criticism, due in part to attorney's status as public official, is factor to be considered in mitigation). Similarly, in the instant case, "we believe the p
Id. at 408 n. 6. Thus, specified demands accompanied the threat in that case. See also In re Mekler, 406 A.2d 20, 22-23 (Del. 1979) (per curiam) (Court publicly censured attorney who threatened a piano company with criminal action if it did not return down payment on repossessed piano and thereafter drafted the specifications included in the criminal complaint; after the arrest, the respondent suggested the charge would be dismissed if the threatened party returned the $1,600); People ex rel. Gallagher v. Hertz, 198 Colo. 522, 608 P.2d 335 (1979) (attorney acting as receiver for partnership threatened criminal prosecution unless party repaid $4,200 attorney claimed was due to the partnership and then followed through on threat, his sole motive being promotion of his interest in the civil matter); Libarian v. State Bar, 38 Cal.2d 328, 239 P.2d 865 (1952). The direct, unequivocal "requests for action" in these cases contrast markedly with the majority's observation that it "can perceive of no purpose for the letter other than to influence the B.L.M.'s handling of a non-Native application . . . the rejection of which
al wisdom of the courts and the legal profession has been that a lawyer may not advise his client to violate a law or court order, except in the instance of a test case where there is a good faith belief that the statute or order may be invalid. See, e.g., EC 7-1; EC 7-2; EC 7-3; EC 7-5; EC 7-22; former Canon 16; former Canon 32; A.B.A. Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Defense Function ยง 3.7 (approved draft 1971); Cowen, The Lawyer's Role in Civil Disobedience, 47 N.C.L. Rev. 587, 592-93 (1969); H. Drinker, Legal Ethics, 150, 152 (1953); Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458-60, 468, 95 S.Ct. 584, 42 L.Ed.2d 574 (1975); Chapman v. Pacific Tel. Tel. Co., 613 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 601 F.2d 162, 169 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 512 (5th Cir. 1972); Odell v. Bausch Lomb Optical Co., 91 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1937); Snyder v. State Bar, 18 Cal.3d 286, 133 Cal.Rptr. 864, 555 P.2d 1104 (1976); In re Mekler, 406 A.2d 20 (Del. 1979); Committee on Professional Ethics, Etc. v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298, 307 (Iowa 1976); In re Marietta, 223 Kan. 11, 569 P.2d 921 (1977); In re Daly, 291 Minn. 488, 489, 495, 189 N.W.2d 176 (1971); In Matter of Johnson, 597 P.2d 740 (Mont. 1979); In re Cooley, 95 N.J. Eq. 485, 490, 125 A. 486 (1924), aff'd 103 N.J. Eq. 377, 143 A. 916 (1928); In re Hittson, 20 N.M. 319, 325, 326, 150 P. 733 (1915); Territory v. Clancy, 7 N.M. 580, 37 P. 1108 (1894); In re Apfel, 202 App. Div. 76, 195 N.Y.S. 325, 328 (1922); In re Clostermann, 276 Or. 261, 263, 554 P.2d 467 (1976); and Ex parte Miller, 37 Or. 304, 60 P. 999 (1900).