Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. J215252, Lawrence Kapiloff, Judge (retired judge of the San Diego Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution), and Desiree Bruce-Lyle, Judge. Affirmed.
NARES, Acting P. J.
INTRODUCTION
A judge found M.E. committed arson on school property (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (d)) and destroyed school property (playground structure) worth at least $400. (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a), (b)(1).) The court ordered a psychological evaluation of M.E. and scheduled a disposition hearing. At the disposition hearing, the court adjudged M.E. to be a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and placed him under the supervision of the probation department. The court permitted him to live with his parents under a curfew.
M.E. appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding he was the person who set the fire to and destroyed the playground structure. We affirm the judgment.
FACTS
On March 16, 2007, at about 7:30 p.m., T.M. was playing soccer at an elementary school when he saw, at a distance, M.E. ignite something in his hands and throw it into the middle of a playground structure at the school. The structure ignited and burned down.
In a photographic lineup, T.M. identified M.E. as the person who started the fire. Another witness, Eduardo F., also identified M.E. at a photographic lineup.
At trial T.M. testified that he had seen M.E. start the fire. T.M. had earlier identified M.E. by the type and color of his jacket, but at trial could no longer remember what color M.E.'s jacket was. T.M. also admitted that after the fire he was somewhat uncertain as to who started it, and only after speaking with another friend who was present at the scene did he become certain that it was M.E.
Eduardo's testimony was more equivocal. He stated both that he told police he saw M.E. start the fire and that he did not tell police he saw M.E. start the fire. Like T.M., Eduardo also admitted to discussing the event with his friends before telling the police.
M.E. presented an alibi defense and the testimony of Somajaroe Taun, an off-duty school security officer. Both of M.E.'s older brothers testified that they were at home with M.E. at the time the fire started. Taun testified that he saw the playground structure catch fire while working on his car 20 to 25 yards away from the playground. He then walked to a fence about 10 yards away from the playground and observed children running from the fire, including one boy who was running towards him about 10 yards away and "[r]ight in front of the jungle gym." He testified that this boy was Hispanic and that there were no children nearby who matched M.E.'s physical description. M.E. did not testify.
The court, in reaching its decision, stated, "So in testing veracity of the witnesses at this trial, I feel strongly that two of these young men were the most reliable in their testimony. It was─you know, they were there. One saw this young man once inside the fence and then outside the fence, which could have escaped the view of that one witness Mr. Taun. [¶] I find the allegations of the petition to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. The maximum term to be served by the minor I am not sure."
DISCUSSION
"In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, the reviewing court's role is a limited one." (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738.) We assume "the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence" in favor of the judgment. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) Under substantial evidence review, the trial court's judgment will be upheld as long as the record has substantial evidence to support the judgment. (Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429.) "Substantial" refers to the quality, not the quantity, of the evidence. (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651.) The testimony of a single witness may suffice for substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614.) But that evidence must also be " ' "reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value." ' " (DiMartino v. City of Orinda (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 329, 336.) We are not at liberty to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or resolve conflicts in the evidence, but rather must defer to the findings of the trier of fact. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.)
M.E. contends there is insufficient evidence identifying him as the person who started the playground fire. Specifically, M.E. alleges T.M.'s and Eduardo's testimony was not credible. As noted previously, both T.M. and Eduardo admitted discussing the case among their friends before telling the police that M.E. set the fire. Both T.M. and Eduardo viewed the setting of the fire at night and from a distance.
We conclude these facts do not render the evidence unreasonable and inherently incredible. Each of M.E.'s arguments poses a credibility issue for the trier of fact to determine. We may not reweigh the evidence or reexamine the credibility of the witnesses. (People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181.) The juvenile court expressly found the testimony of T.M. and Eduardo to be credible. Further, the court found Tuan, who was further away from the scene than either T.M. or Eduardo, to be less credible. Such determinations lie squarely within the province of the trial court. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we conclude substantial evidence supports a finding M.E. was the person who set fire to the playground structure.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: HALLER, J., McDONALD, J.