With the second prong, we consider whether the trial court made a reasonable decision based on the admitted evidence. See In re M.C.K., No. 14-17-00289-CV, 2018 WL 1955065, at *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 26, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
; see, e.g., In re M.C.K., No. 14-17-00289-CV, 2018 WL 1955065, at *7 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 26, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 90, 274; Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d at 73; In re M.C.K., No. 14-17-00289-CV, 2018 WL 1955065, at *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 26, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)
See, e.g., In re M.C.K., No. 14-17-00289-CV, 2018 WL 1955065, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 26, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re K.B.L., No. 07-16-00285-CV, 2017 WL 4872784, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 24, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.)
We engage in a two-pronged inquiry when deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion: first, we consider whether the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion; and second, we consider whether the trial court erred in its application of that discretion. SeeIn re M.C.K. , No. 14-17-00289-CV, 2018 WL 1955065, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 26, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). The first prong draws on our traditional standards for legal and factual sufficiency review.