Opinion
No. 5-804 / 05-1462
Filed November 9, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Mark J. Eveloff, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the district court's order terminating her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Phil R. Caniglia, Council Bluffs, for appellant-mother.
Marti Nerenstone, Council Bluffs, for appellee-father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Matthew Wilber, County Attorney, and Jon Narmi, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Kristina Kaeding, Council Bluffs, attorney for children.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., Vogel and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Rose appeals the district court's order terminating her parental rights to her three children, M.B.W., R.A.W. and P.M.W., ages two, six and seven. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
The three children in this case were adjudicated in need of assistance (CINA) in March 2004, pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(c)(2) and (g) (2003). The children were initially removed and taken into protective custody by the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) in December 2003, due to concerns over inadequate housing and the parents' failure to exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising the children. The children were first placed in the care of relatives, but then transitioned to a foster home placement in January 2004 when family members were no longer willing or able to provide care. The two older children are developmentally delayed and need specialized care. Rose was inconsistent with visitation with the children, which was supervised throughout the pendency of the case. However, after Rose separated from the children's father in August 2004, she became somewhat more compliant.
The children's father, Kevin, was also the subject of the termination order, but does not appeal the termination of his parental rights.
The State filed the petition to terminate Rose's parental rights in May 2005, pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d) (child CINA for physical or sexual abuse or neglect, circumstances continue despite receipt of services); (e) (child CINA, child removed for six months, parent has not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child); and (f) (child four or older, child CINA removed from home for twelve of last eighteen months, and child cannot be returned home) as to R.A.W. and P.M.W.; (h) (child is three or younger, child CINA, removed from home for six of last twelve months, and child cannot be returned home); and (i) (child meets definition of CINA, child was in imminent danger, services would not correct conditions) as to M.B.W. The termination hearing was held over two days in June and July 2005, with the district court entering its order in September 2005 terminating Rose's parental rights under the code sections detailed above. Rose appeals this order.
Hearing was held on June 28, and July 14. The district court left the record open to receive a home study on Rose, who was then residing with her paramour Alfred. The report was received July 28, 2005.
I. Scope of Review.
The scope of review in termination cases is de novo. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). The grounds for termination must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 661 (Iowa 2000). Our primary concern is the best interests of the child In re J.J.S., Jr., 628 N.W.2d 25, 28 (Iowa Ct.App. 2001).
II. Clear and Convincing Evidence.
Rose asserts on appeal that the State failed to present clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of her parental rights and termination was not in the children's best interests. We may affirm the terminations under only one ground as supported by clear and convincing evidence, without addressing whether proper findings were made under the other statutory provisions. See In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). Rose does not contest the fact that her children have been adjudicated CINA or that they have been removed from the home since December 2003. She does argue, however, that there was not clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be returned to her care, the last factor for termination under section 232.116(1)(f) for P.M.W. and R.A.W. and 232.116(1)(h) for M.B.W. Rose contends that she had complied with services offered and had established a home with her paramour and his parents. She was receiving Social Security benefits, which she combined with her paramour's income to meet the expenses of rent and family necessities should the children be returned to her care.
The evidence produced at the termination hearing, however, demonstrated that Rose was still unable to care for the three children on her own. A psychological evaluation of Rose submitted to the court found her full-scale IQ of 54, falling in the mild mentally deficient range. According to the evaluation, Rose has significant cognitive limitations that are manifested in poor judgment and extremely poor planning skills. The report also observed that without significant, consistent, and long-term involvement of other individuals and many social support systems, Rose could not provide adequate and consistent care for her children. Both the DHS caseworker, Connie Jones, and the children's in-home provider from Visinet of Iowa, Tad Edwards, testified that the children need specialized care and close supervision, which Rose is simply not able to provide. P.M.W. and R.A.W., the two older children, demonstrate significant developmental delays. Neither witness believed that Rose possessed the cognitive ability to parent these three children. In addition, Jones testified regarding the home study conducted in late June 2005 on Rose's current residence with her paramour and his parents. She could not approve the home for placement of the children because of the condition it was in, unsanitary for children and lacking adequate food staples for the family. Jones testified that even if the home were clean, she would still recommend termination, as she does not believe Rose is capable of parenting these children independently to ensure their safety and wellbeing. Although sanitary conditions had improved prior to a re-check of the home in July, there were still "grave concerns" as to whether Rose could care for her children.
We also note that Rose gave birth to another child in April 2005. That child was also taken into protective custody, due to concern over Rose's inability to care for the child, lack of any prenatal care, and Rose's poor cognitive behavior.
The record demonstrates that the children cannot safely be returned to Rose. Although she has cooperated with some services, service providers and DHS still harbor critical concerns over Rose's ability to care for herself, as well as her ability to care for her children. Rose has not obtained financial stability nor an independent living environment for her family. She is greatly dependent on others, both financially and for assistance in caring for the children. As we have previously noted, "[c]hildren simply cannot wait for responsible parenting." In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 781 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997) (citing In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990)). In making a permanency determination, the child's need for security, stability, and permanence in their young lives must come first. In re C.D., 509 N.W.2d 509, 513 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993). We find that clear and convincing evidence supports the finding that the children cannot be returned to Rose's care under sections 232.116(f) and (h).
Even where there is a statutory basis to terminate parental rights, the termination must still be in the best interest of the children. In re M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994). That determination considers both the children's long-range and immediate interests. In re M.N.W., 577 N.W.2d 874, 875 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). We use the parents' past performance to assess their ability to provide future care, giving substantial weight to case history records. In Interest of S.N., 500 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Iowa 1993). Although Rose loves her children and believes she can adequately parent them, the evidence was overwhelming that she could not provide for the children's most basic needs. The children's best interests are served by termination of Rose's parental rights. Therefore, we affirm the district court's order terminating her parental rights to M.B.W., R.A.W. and P.M.W.