Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK 82893, Donna Levin, Juvenile Court Referee.
Daniel G. Rooney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Frederick Klink, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FLIER, J.
Larry G. (father) appeals from a judgment of October 5, 2010, declaring Matteo G. a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (c). Father contends that substantial evidence does not support the jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (a). We conclude that father’s challenge is moot, but even if it were not, substantial evidence supports the finding. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Matteo was born to M.Y. (mother) and father in September 2005. Father and mother have been separated since November 2009. On June 22, 2010, a social worker from the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) responded to a referral alleging that mother’s niece, A.F., had physically abused Matteo. When interviewed by the social worker, A.F. denied ever hitting Matteo. Mother also denied that A.F. had hit Matteo and said that father had called in the referral because he wanted the Department to take Matteo away from mother.
The dependency court found that father is Matteo’s presumed father.
During the course of the interview, mother disclosed a long history of domestic abuse by father. One incident occurred in November 2009, while father, mother and Matteo were in the car together, and father was driving. Father became upset with mother because she had forgotten to put sunscreen on Matteo. Father stopped the car, got out, and pulled mother by her legs out of the car. Mother hit her head on the ground while being pulled from the car. Mother screamed and ran from the scene and hid in a building for four hours. She called the Los Angeles Police Department when she felt it was safe to come out from her hiding place. Father disappeared that day with Matteo, and mother did not see Matteo again until May 2010, when police found Matteo and father. Father was convicted of willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse under Penal Code section 273.5 and spent 20 days in jail as a result of the incident. In addition, in June 2010, the court issued a 10-year restraining order against father.
Mother reported another incident in which father beat her with a fireplace poker on the back of her legs and buttocks. The beating left huge welts on her legs and buttocks that began to pus, and mother could barely walk. She was required to stay in bed for a few days after the incident. Mother described other instances in which father beat her with his hands, leaving bruises on her face, and another in which father used a toothbrush to inflict contusions on her forehead. During these beatings, father would lock Matteo in the bathroom. Matteo could hear mother scream and cry. Father has not hit Matteo, but Matteo has seen his mother with “booboos” on her face, and he states that he is afraid when he hears his father hit his mother. Matteo has told mother that she should “listen to ‘Daddy’ so that he doesn’t hit her.”
The district attorney in father’s spousal abuse case believes that father is “a very, very dangerous man.” The district attorney stated that the 10-year restraining order against father was unusual because in similar cases, the restraining order is typically up to three years. Father has admitted to the domestic abuse and has been attending a domestic violence program at the Department of Veterans Affairs.
On June 23, 2010, based on the foregoing allegations of domestic abuse, the Department decided to detain Matteo from father and release him to mother. On June 30, 2010, the Department filed a petition on Matteo’s behalf pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). In preparation for the jurisdictional and disposition hearing in the case, a social worker from the Department interviewed mother again. Mother recounted some of the same incidents of abuse, though some details varied since the last interview. Regarding the incident in November 2009 when mother forgot to put sunscreen on Matteo, mother stated that father pulled her out of the car by her arms, rather than pulling her out by her legs. Mother also stated that she did not hit her head on the ground during that incident. Regarding the incident with the fire poker, mother stated that father had hit her with fireplace logs on the legs and buttocks, not a poker. She provided additional details about that incident; father’s face had turned purple or even black and he started foaming from the mouth. The next day it felt like her buttocks were stuck to the sheets, but they did not hurt because she was so numb. Father saw the bruises he had given her when she was in the shower and he began to cry, though he did not apologize and only told her what she had done “wrong” to deserve the beating.
During this second interview, mother told of many other occasions when father threatened to lock her on the balcony of hotel rooms without any clothes. Father, mother, and Matteo lived in hotels because father did not like living in a regular home. Father would often keep mother and Matteo locked in the hotel room all day. Sometimes they would have nothing to eat, but then out of nowhere, father would bring home a new car. Father exhibited other controlling behavior, like insisting that the bathroom door remain open whenever mother or Matteo were in there.
Mother has tried to report father’s abuse to the police before and has never followed through with the cases because father would threaten her. He would tell her that if she called the police, “child services would get involve[d]” and take away Matteo, or he would threaten to call immigration on mother. One such prior police report from January 2007 described an incident in which father beat mother because she refused to discipline Matteo. According to the report, father had ordered mother to hit Matteo, and when she refused, father punched mother approximately 10 times on her head and back. A police report from June 2008 described another incident in which father became angry with mother and threw some flyers at mother, stating, “Bitch if you’re not careful this could be you.” The flyers were a “missing” bulletin with photographs of mother and Matteo. Mother took this to mean father was threatening that she could one day come up missing at the hands of father.
Mother has been very worried about Matteo and how the abuse has affected him. He wakes up most mornings and tells mother, “Let’s go home. My daddy says he’s not going to kick you anymore. See I am bigger and I am going to protect you.” During the social worker’s interview of Matteo, when asked if he was afraid of father, Matteo stated, “When he beats me up and he squeezes my hand.” Matteo was unable to elaborate when asked how his father “beats him up.” When asked what happens when his father becomes mad, Matteo stated: “No because my mom didn’t put sunscreen on me. Then my pappy said, ‘Get out of the car woman.’ Then my pappy was looking for my mommy.” “[H]e pulled my mommy off the car and he said, ‘Come back here woman.’ Then pappa kept looking for mommy.”
On October 5, 2010, the dependency court held a combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing in the matter. After counsel’s argument, the court struck the section 300, subdivision (b) count against mother (substantial risk of serious physical harm due to failure to adequately supervise or protect), amended and sustained the subdivision (a) count against father (substantial risk of serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by a parent), and added a count under section 300, subdivision (c) against father (serious emotional damage, or substantial risk of serious emotional damage). The sustained section 300, subdivision (a) and (c) counts both stated: “On June 1, 2010[, ] father was convicted of PC 273.5(A), Infliction of Corporal Injury by a Spouse/Cohabitant. The injuries were inflicted by the father on the mother in the child’s presence in November 2009. [¶] Further, a Criminal Restraining Order protecting the mother from the father was ordered by the Criminal Court for a period of ten years. Such violent conduct by the father against the mother, endangers the child’s physical and emotional health, and puts the child at risk of harm and danger.” The court declared Matteo a dependent of the court and ordered that custody be removed from father and remain with mother. The court granted father monitored weekly visits of six hours with Matteo. Both parents and Matteo were ordered to counseling. The court ordered all parties back for a six-month review hearing on April 5, 2011.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the disposition of the dependency court, “we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.” (In re Matthew S. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 315, 321.) If supported by substantial evidence, we must uphold the judgment or finding, even though substantial evidence to the contrary may also exist, and the dependency court might have reached a different conclusion had it determined the facts and weighed credibility differently. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)
2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Dependency Court’s Finding Under Section 300, Subdivision (a)
Father does not challenge the court’s jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (c) that Matteo is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage. He contends only that the court’s finding under section 300, subdivision (a) is unsupported by substantial evidence.
“When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.” (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451; see also In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875 [“[A] reviewing court may affirm a juvenile court judgment if the evidence supports the decision on any one of several grounds”].) Accordingly, father’s challenge is moot; he concedes that the dependency court properly exercised jurisdiction over Matteo on at least one statutory ground.
In any event, we disagree with father’s contention. Under section 300, subdivision (a), a child comes within the jurisdiction of the dependency court if the child “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian.” A child’s exposure to domestic violence is sufficient to support jurisdiction under subdivision (a) of section 300. (In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 598-599 (Giovanni F.).) This is because the purpose of section 300 is to “provide maximum safety and protection for children who are currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.” (§ 300.2; see also Giovanni F., supra, at pp. 598-599.)
We have encountered this issue in Giovanni F., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th 594. In that case, father abused mother throughout their two-and-a-half year relationship. (Id. at p. 599.) While father had never hit Giovanni, Giovanni was present on some occasions when father’s violence against mother took place. (Ibid.) On one occasion, father beat mother while driving their car, and Giovanni was in the backseat of the car. (Ibid.) We held that father’s nonaccidental violence against mother while Giovanni was in the backseat of their moving car put Giovanni at substantial risk of serious physical harm. (Id. at p. 601.) Although this incident was sufficient in itself to support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a), there were at least two other occasions when Giovanni was placed in harm’s way because he was present during violence against mother. (Ibid.)
Here also, the dependency court’s finding that Matteo is at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm is supported by substantial evidence. Father has repeatedly used violence against mother, including the very serious instance when mother described father’s face turning purple, his foaming at the mouth, and his beating her so severely that she could not rise from her bed. Father tends to lock Matteo in the bathroom when he becomes violent with mother, but there has been at least one incident—the November 2009 incident when he pulled mother from their car—when Matteo was present during the violence. The risk to Matteo is particularly worrisome because of his statement to mother that he is “bigger” now and is “going to protect” her from father. Matteo could easily try to intervene in physical altercations between mother and father and be injured by a stray kick or punch meant for mother, or by broken glass or other objects broken during an altercation. That father is under a restraining order requiring him to stay away from mother does not benefit him. The order has been in effect for less than a year, and although father appears to have been obeying it so far, we should not ignore the conduct that necessitated the order.
We note that the father in Giovanni F. was also under a restraining order, though in that case the order was for only three years, as opposed to the 10-year order against father here. (Giovanni F., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 600, fn. 6.)
In short, father’s challenge is unavailing, both procedurally and on the merits.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BIGELOW, P. J., GRIMES, J.