Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. KD050253, H. Don Christian, Commissioner. Reversed and remanded.
Pittullo, Howington, Barker & Abernathy and P. Timothy Pittullo for Appellant.
Jeffery Street, in pro per, for Respondent.
WOODS, J.
Appellant Ramona Street appeals from the order modifying the amount of monthly spousal support and child support respondent Jeffery Street was required to pay her under the judgment on the issues of physical custody, visitation and support. Before this court, appellant asserts the lower court erred when it reduced her monthly spousal support without considering the Family Code section 4320 factors. With respect to child support, appellant complains the court’s modification of the support order did not accurately reflect respondent’s exercise of visitation with his children. Finally, both appellant and respondent raise other matters on appeal concerning tax issues, visitation and attorney’s fees. As we shall explain, we do not reach the merits of these other matters because they relate to issues that were not decided in the lower court, and were not part of the judgment on appeal. Furthermore, the tax issues and visitation matters raised by respondent have not been properly preserved for appeal. As for the child and spousal support issues subject to this appeal, as we shall explain more fully below, the evidence in the record before this court does not support the court’s order and thus the order does not reflect the proper exercise of the lower court’s discretion. Consequently we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Respondent and appellant married in 1981. During the marriage respondent held various private sector jobs in customer services, sales and retail management making between $15 an hour to $38,000 a year. During the marriage appellant was a “stay at home mom” and did not work outside the home. The marriage produced five children, three of whom were minors at the time the child support modification was sought in February 2008.
Appellant and respondent were separated in 2000. The couple was granted a divorce in 2002, with the court awarding sole legal custody of the couple’s minor children to appellant in August 2002. The court also reserved judgment on the issues of physical custody, visitation and support.
Thereafter, on June 13, 2003, the court entered a judgment on the reserved issues, awarding appellant a total of $1,149 in permanent monthly child support for the three minor children commencing on March 1, 2003. The court also awarded appellant $350 in monthly spousal support. The court also ordered a physical custody arrangement reflecting shared custody; the court provided respondent with visitation rights for periods, including “Christmas Vacation,” “Spring Vacation” and “Summer Vacation”, which amounted to approximately 82-83 days a year or an approximate 22 percent time share of custody.
In March 2004, respondent sought an order to reduce support payments. On March 23, 2004, after a contested proceeding, the court reduced the child support payments to $733 a month. According to appellant, the payment was reduced to relieve respondent from his responsibility to pay for the children’s education costs of home schooling and based on an agreement of the parties that respondent would pay for 100 percent of the costs of the children’s visitation. Spousal support was also reduced to $248 a month. The court also found respondent in arrears on child and spousal support payments in the amount of $17,532 and ordered respondent to pay $200 a month in arrearages.
On February 19, 2008, appellant filed an Order to Show Cause seeking a modification of the March 2004 child and spousal support order, and the original June 2003 visitation order.
In appellant’s declaration supporting the modification she indicated that respondent had moved to Oregon and that since April 2004 respondent had only one brief visit with the children in September 2006. She stated that respondent had not exercised his right to visitation during the prior four years and had almost no contact with his children. Consequently, appellant sought to have the visitation order modified to reflect the current visitation arrangement which “might add up to 1% time share” for respondent. She also sought a modification and an increase in the child support payment to reflect respondent’s actual 1 percent time share and she sought reimbursement of child support expenses appellant incurred because respondent had failed to exercise his full visitation rights since 2004. Appellant also requested an upward adjustment in spousal support. Appellant indicated that she was working on completing her college degree, worked part time, lived in “Section 8 housing” and received food stamps. Her expense declaration indicated that she earned approximately $250 a month with approximately $1,891 in monthly expenses, and had not filed a tax return since 2002.
In his responsive declaration to the OSC, respondent agreed that he had been unable to exercise his full visitation rights since 2004 because of financial hardship. Nonetheless, respondent stated that he wanted to resume visits and requested that the court modify the visitation order for one six-week visit during the summer each year.
He pointed out that he filed for bankruptcy in 2006, which had been granted. He also stated that he had moved to Oregon, and adopted two children during a subsequent marriage. Respondent stated that his subsequent marriage had ended in divorce in 2007 and as a result he had additional court-ordered child support obligations for his adopted children. Respondent’s expense and income declaration showed that he worked at a bank and earned approximately $4,300 a month on average. He claimed approximately $2,000 in monthly living expenses. He further claimed that he had his wages garnished in the amount of $1,243 a month which included support expenses and arrearages in this case, and an additional $300 of child support for his two adopted children from his subsequent marriage.
In her supporting declaration, appellant complained that although she had sought income documents and other financial information from respondent he had not timely provided them to her. It appears that respondent’s income and expense declaration and other financial documents were filed on March 24, 2008, the date of the OSC hearing.
Respondent also requested an order allowing him to claim the children as his dependents on his income taxes.
On April 2, 2008, the court conducted the OSC hearing. Respondent represented himself during the hearing and appeared telephonically from Oregon. Appellant was represented by counsel. During the hearing the court first discussed the proposed modifications to the visitation order. Respondent agreed that he had not consistently exercised his visitation rights, but complained of various difficulties he experienced arranging the visits with appellant and interacting with her concerning the children; he complained that the traveling from out of state proved difficult and that he otherwise could not maintain constant contact with the children long distance because of prior financial difficulties and constraints he claimed appellant had placed on his contact. Respondent indicated that he planned to resume visits and now had additional vacation time. Appellant’s counsel asserted that in 2004, respondent had received a reduction in support payments based on the assumption that he would visit and assume the child support expenses associated with such visits, but that those visits never occurred. After both sides argued the point, the court ruled that it did not find a change of circumstances to justify the change in the 2004 visitation order.
The court then turned its attention to the issues concerning support. Counsel for appellant indicated that she had provided the court with the computer printout (i.e., DissoMaster Data) showing appellant’s and respondent’s incomes and expenses. Counsel represented that the printout showed appellant earning minimum wage, which according to counsel was “more than she is making.” Counsel also pointed out that the computer printout did not reflect the costs of home schooling, to which the court responded: “That’s [the home schooling] the election of the supported party. Counsel, this is a post-judgment modification of spousal support. This is not a guideline case on spousal support.” (Emphasis added.)
After additional discussion, concerning wage garnishment, the following exchange occurred:
The Court: Sir, any order that I make is based on an assumption that you are going to exercise some custodial time with your children either by coming here and/or having the children come to you as long as you live in Oregon. That’s your choice not the courts [sic]. I don’t tell people where to live. I feel that I have all the information that I need to make an interim order at this time. That’s all I can do based on the facts.
You realize that you are under an order to pay support for two other children. Okay, sir?
Respondent: So you are going to make a judgment on visitation as well as support?
The Court: Yes, I have to.
Respondent: Okay.
The Court: I have no choice. It’s the old story, don’t shoot the messenger. If anyone is up [sic] happy with the way that process is computed, what we call guideline, talk to the Legislature and talk to your Congress, because it’s both a Federal and state guideline system that we must follow. I have no options.
Respondent: Can I make one –
The Court: On spousal, I have no options. Last comment and I want to rule….” (Italics added.)
Then the parties discussed whether respondent could claim the children as dependents on his income tax returns.
Thereafter the following discussion occurred:
The Court: Submitted?
Appellant’s Counsel: Yes, your Honor, with regards to the support issue.
The Court: What other issues?
Appellant’s Counsel: The only other issue at this time is there are – there are already in effect orders that he’s to pay for the [eye] glasses and half of the medical.
The Court: I’m not modifying any other orders. I find there was a judgment. It was Montenegro versus Diaz Judgment. It was based on custodial time and expenses. I’m not changing any of that.
Appellant’s Counsel: All right. And with regards to visitation, the court is going to order a ruling at this time as well?
The Court: I’m leaving it in effect. To me, it addresses the issues of this court. That’s not what I’m going to use for computing, though. I will use defacto as opposed to dejure. Submitted?
[¶¶] The Court: I will rule on this matter before me. The existing visitation and custody order remains in full force and effect because it is, in fact, it is your election sir, not hers and it gives you more time than you are willing to quote, unquote, settle for. I find that unacceptable. So for the benefit of your children, enforce the judgment.
Number two, in terms of support, I feel there is a need for a modification because the previous default was based on factors that didn’t mature, so I’m going to modify the custodial time. The court will order that as and for child support for the youngest child, the sum of $594 per month; the middle child, $364 and the oldest child, $235 per month, for a total of $1174.
As and for spousal support, the court is going to modify the finding that based on this income and I can’t maintain the standard of living of the parties at all at this time because of the two additional other children.
I’ve given you the three hundred dollar credit, Sir.
It’s ninety dollars, counsel.
That will be payable until death, remarriage or further order of the court. I will print this.
Respondent: What is the spousal support, Sir?
The Court: Nine zero.
Respondent: Ninety dollars.
The Court: That is not guideline. The court is making a finding based on the standard of living and the net spendable income. So, it is a tough order and it’s a tough one for me to make. As I said, I didn’t write the guideline and if anyone is unhappy with it, talk to the Legislatures [sic] and not the judges or the commissioners.” (Italics added.)
The minute order entered by the court reflected the increase in the monthly child support from $733 to $1,174 and a downward modification in monthly spousal support from $248 to $90. According to counsel, a Dissomaster Data Screen printout (the “computer printout”) was attached to the minute order. The computer printout order indicated a monthly child support figure of $1,174, a monthly spousal support figure of $90 and a yearly time share for respondent of 10 percent. The court ordered appellant’s counsel to prepare an order, which was entered by the court on April 22, 2008.
Appellant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Before this court appellant argues that the court erred when it modified the March 2004 child and spousal support order. We address the respective spousal support and child support modifications in turn.
I. Modification of Spousal Support Order
A court decides whether to order spousal support based on number of factors under Family Code section 4320, including an examination the needs of the parties, their respective abilities to meet those needs, the length of the marriage, and the age and health of the parties. (Fam. Code § 4320). In deciding whether to order support, the trial court has broad discretion. (In re Marriage of Meegan (1992) 11Cal.App.4th 156, 161.)
Family Code section 4320 provides:
Similarly, the decision on whether to modify spousal support orders also rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Ibid.) The proponent of modification has the burden of showing a material change of circumstances since the last spousal support order. (Ibid.) A modification order must be based on current facts and circumstances. (In re Marriage of Tydlaska (2003) 114Cal.App.4th 572, 575.) A “change in circumstances” means a reduction or increase in the supporting spouse’s ability to pay and/or an increase or decrease in the supported spouse’s needs; it includes all of the factors affecting the need and the ability to pay. (In re Marriage of West (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 240, 246; In re Marriage of Dietz (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 396.) To determine whether a change of circumstances has occurred, the trial court is required to reconsider the same standard and criteria set forth in Family Code section 4320. (In re Marriage of Stephenson (1995) 39Cal.App.4th 71, 77-78.) “The trial judge must both recognize and apply each applicable statutory factor in setting spousal support.” (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 304.)
“The modification of a spousal support order is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. In exercising its discretion the trial court must follow established legal principles and base its findings on substantial evidence. [Fn. omitted.] If the trial court conforms to these requirements its order will be upheld whether or not the appellate court agrees with it or would make the same order if it were a trial court.” (In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43, 47.)
Here appellant asserts the court reduced her monthly support from $248 to $90 without a showing of a change of circumstance, absent a full evidentiary hearing, and by erroneously relying on the computer printout to arrive at a support figure rather than the factors identified under Family Code section 4320.
The record before this court, and in particular the transcript from the OSC hearing on April 8, 2008, gives credence to appellant’s arguments, in particular to her claims concerning the reliance on a computer printout and apparent lack of consideration by the court of the Family Code section 4320 factors.
Preliminarily we note, however, that our consideration of this matter is hampered not only by a confusing transcript but also by the failure of the parties to request a statement of decision from the court. (Fam. Code § 4332.) While Family Code section 4320 requires the court to consider a host of factors, nothing therein requires that the court articulate its weighing process as to each individual factor on the record. Thus, because neither party requested a statement of decision, we would ordinarily presume the court followed the law by considering all of the statutory factors in the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary. (See In re Hebbering (1989)) 207 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1274.) In this case, however, in view of the record, it would not be appropriate to presume the court followed the law and considered all of the appropriate statutory factors.
During the hearing the court mentioned a number of circumstances as affecting its consideration of spousal support. Indeed, the court referenced, the “standard of living” (that could not be maintained) and the “net spendable income.” The court also mentioned and apparently considered respondent’s other support obligations to his adopted children. While these are appropriate matters for the court to consider in the exercise of its discretion, the court’s failure to make mention of other factors under Family Code section 4320—including the length of the marriage and needs of appellant, her skills and earning capacity—suggest that these matters were not considered by the lower court. Nonetheless, the court’s failure to articulate its assessment of these matters does not demonstrate, standing alone, an abuse of discretion. Rather, our conclusion that the court erred arises from the dearth of evidence indicating the court’s consideration of all Family Code section 4320 factors coupled with the court’s apparent reliance on the computer printout to calculate the monthly support award at $90.
The court made several ambiguous and seemingly inconsistent statements during the hearing—some of which suggested the court’s belief that it was appropriate to use the computer generated “guidelines” to determine support, while in other statements the court remarked that this was not a “guideline” case. Other references to “guidelines” appear to relate to other matters unrelated to support orders. However, because the court set the spousal support award at $90 a month—the figure from the computer guideline printout—and because the court attached the computer printout to the minute order, we infer the court relied on the computer printout guidelines in calculating spousal support.
Aside from the issue of whether a court can rely on a computer printout to set a permanent spousal support award, we are also concerned about the reliability of the underlying data used in the program. Here the $90 figure for spousal support is based on assumptions about the respective parties’ incomes and expenses, which do not correspond to the actual income and expense declarations or other financial documents filed with the court. Thus, even were we to conclude that the court could use computer generated information to calculate spousal support, we would question the reliability of the $90 figure in this case.
Of course, a court may use computer generated data about parties’ income and expenses to calculate support in some instances and in particular to determine temporary spousal support or child support. (See In re Marriage of Wittgrove (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1327-1328 [“guidelines” and local schedules may be used in the calculation of temporary support orders].) However, a court may not rely on a computer generated figure used as a guideline to calculate a permanent spousal support. (In re Marriage of Zywiciel (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1079; In re Marriage of Schulze, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 526-528.)
Temporary spousal support is awarded during the pendency of the dissolution proceeding. Temporary spousal support orders are intended to maintain the standard of living as much as possible pending trial and division of their assets and obligations. (In re Marriage of Burlini (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 65, 68.) The trial court has broad discretion in determining the amount of temporary spousal support subject only to the need of the receiving spouse and the paying spouse’s ability to pay. (In re Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 581, 594.) Permanent spousal support orders are authorized by Family Code section 4320. Permanent spousal support orders, authorized under Family Code section 4320 are not intended to preserve the status quo but to provide financial assistance as determined by the circumstances of the parties after the community has been divided. (In re Marriage of Schulze (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 519, 525 (Schulze).) Permanent spousal support orders are constrained by the statutory factors listed in Family Code section 4320. (Murray, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 594-595.)
Schulze is illustrative. In Schulze the trial court utilized a computer program to calculate temporary child and spousal support while the dissolution was pending. This was the purpose for which the program was developed. The trial court, however, also utilized the program when determining the permanent spousal support order. This is not an intended use of the program. The appellate court reversed the award.
The appellate court began its analysis by recognizing the different purposes of temporary and permanent spousal support. “The purpose of temporary spousal support is to maintain the status quo as much as possible pending trial. [Citations.] By contrast, permanent spousal support is supposed to reflect a complex variety of factors established by statute and legislatively committed to the trial judge’s discretion, including several factors that tend to favor reduced support, such as the ‘goal’ that the supported spouse should become self-supporting within a reasonable period of time. [Citation.]” (Schulze, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 525.) The appellate court recognized that permanent support orders are generally lower than temporary orders because of the above factors. (Id. at pp. 525-526.) The Schulze court also dismissed wife’s argument that the trial court independently determined the permanent award while only giving consideration to the computer-generated figure. “Section 4320 requires an independent evaluation of all of a variety of specifically enumerated factors. If the trial judge begins with the proposed temporary figure and then makes adjustments (or merely uses some of the section 4320 factors to justify a figure based on the temporary order), the ultimate order is not really the product of a truly independent exercise of judicial discretion.” (Schulze, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 526-527.) The court concluded “Because it is clear that, at best, the trial judge here used the [computer generated] spousal support figure as a benchmark and did not arrive at spousal support independently, the family award must be reversed to that extent and the cause remanded for the establishment of a spousal support component based, from the ground up, on the section 4320 factors.” (Id. at p. 528.)
As in Schulze, the court here appears to have relied upon the computer printout as a benchmark to calculate the spousal support and failed to consider each of the factors in Family Code section 4320 in making the permanent award.
By our conclusion we do not mean to suggest that computer programs or printouts can never be used by the court as a tool to assist in the determination of permanent spousal support awards; in some circumstances it might be a fair and cost effective method to assist in the determination of support. But what the court should not do is to use a computer program or printout as a substitute for judicial discretion or in lieu of considering all of the Family Code section 4320 factors in view of the evidence presented. Here it appears the court relied too much on the program, creating the strong impression that the computer printout was used as a substitute for a full consideration of all the required statutory factors and evidence.
In short, the record provides inadequate grounds to accord the usual deference to the court’s exercise of discretion in making the award of spousal support in this case. We will thus reverse the award of spousal support and remand to the trial court with directions to reconsider the issue, and to make the required factual findings under Family Code section 4320.
II. Modification of Child Support
On appeal, appellant also complains that the court erred in modifying the child support award in two respects. She argues the court erred in basing the support award on assumed 10 percent timeshare for respondent rather than the 1 percent timeshare he actually exercised in the past, and erred in failing to reimburse her for child support expenses she had incurred since 2004 because respondent had exercised only a 1 percent timeshare rather than the 22 percent timeshare ordered in June 2003.
This court reviews child support awards for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Wittgrove, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 1327.) This court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, but instead we determine only if any judge could reasonably have made such an order. “Our review of the factual findings is limited to a determination of whether there is any substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion.” (In re Marriage of Chandler (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 124, 128.)
We cannot say the court abused its discretion in failing to modify future child support payments to reflect a custody timeshare for respondent of only 1 percent. Although respondent acknowledged that he had not visited the children since 2006, his filings and representations to the court during the hearing reflected a desire and intention of respondent to exercise his visitation rights in the future, and the court indicated its belief that it would be in the best interest of all parties for him to do so. In fact, the court declined appellant’s request to modify the original June 2003 visitation order, reflecting a 22 percent timeshare based on respondent’s representation that he would resume visits.
Nonetheless, what is not clear to this court, however, is the evidentiary basis for the court’s decision to base the support order of $1,174 a month on a 10 percent timeshare for respondent. During the hearing, in considering the request to modify the visitation order as requested by appellant to a 1 percent time share or as requested by respondent for 6 weeks during the summer (42 days approximately 12 percent timeshare) the court indicated that it would compute the support using “defacto as opposed to dejure.” However, the support order (based on the 10 percent timeshare) neither reflects the actual timeshare of 1 percent or the prior court ordered timeshare of 22 percent. The 10 percent timeshare used to calculate the support order is included on the computer printout, but the source of that 10 percent figure is unclear; the court did not explain why it chose to use the 10 percent figure, or how it arrived at it as the proper timeshare for calculating child support. While we do not conclude that the court erred in modifying the child support order, we also cannot conclude based on the record before us that use of the 10 percent timeshare is based on sufficient evidence. Thus, we must reverse the award of child support and remand to the trial court with directions to reconsider the issue, and to make the required factual findings on the record to support the child support order.
Likewise, appellant’s request for reimbursement of child support expenses to reflect respondent’s actual prior 1 percent time share from March 23, 2004, until April 8, 2008, must also be considered on remand. Although appellant sought this reimbursement in the OSC seeking a modification of the support awards, the court failed to rule on it. In fact, the transcript from the OSC hearing does not reflect the court specifically considered the request. Consequently, on remand the lower court should consider this matter under Family Code section 3028 which governs such requests.
III. Other Issues
Both appellant and respondent also raise issues that are beyond the scope of our review on this appeal.
Appellant’s Claim for Attorney Fees.
Appellant seeks an order from this court for attorney fees on this appeal under Family Code section 2030. We decline to consider this request because it was not first raised below. “Such a request must properly be addressed to the trial court in the first instance, and we express no opinion on that subject.” (In re Marriage of Schofield (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 131, 140-141, [§ 2030]. Accord, Haywood v. Superior Court (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 949, 957, fn. 6, [§§ 271, 2030-2032, 3407]. See also, In re Marriage of Paulin (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1385, [§§ 271, 2030, 2032].)
Respondent’s Claims
Before this court respondent complains that the lower court erred in denying his request to modify the visitation order to allow him to have one six-week visit with his children each year and in failing to grant his request to declare the children as dependents on his tax returns. These claims are not cognizable in this court because respondent failed to properly appeal from the order denying those requests. After the clerk of the superior court mailed notice of appellant’s appeal, respondent had 20 days under California Rules of Court, rule 8.108(f) in which to file a cross-appeal as to any of the orders he sought to challenge in this court. The notice of appeal confers jurisdiction to the appellate court as to the matters on appeal. Failure to file a proper notice of appeal deprives the appellate court of the power to review the challenged order or judgment and requires the dismissal of the appeal. (See DeZerega v. Meggs (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 28, 43.)
Pursuant to the Rules of Court, a notice of appeal must specifically identify the order and/or judgment from which the appellant seeks appellate review. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a).) The notice of appeal is sufficient “if it identifies the particular judgment or order being appealed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2).) “‘[W]here several judgments and/or orders occurring close in time are separately appealable..., each appealable judgment and order must be expressly specified – in either a single notice of appeal or multiple notices of appeal-in order to be reviewable on appeal.’” (DeZerega v. Meggs, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 43.) Although notices of appeal are, in general, liberally construed, they will not be interpreted to include an appeal from an order that is directly and independently appealable. “If an order is appealable, an aggrieved party must file a timely notice of appeal from the order to obtain appellate review.” (Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App. 212, 239.) A notice of appeal specifying a judgment alone does not encompass other judgments or other separately appealable orders: “‘The law of this state does not allow, on an appeal from a judgment, a review of any decision or order from which an appeal might previously have been taken.’” (Ibid. quoting In re Marriage of Weiss (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 106, 119.) Respondent, however, did not file an appeal from the order denying his request to modify the visitation order, nor did he timely seek to appeal from the denial of his request to claim the children as dependents on his income taxes, thus he cannot seek appellate review of these matters in this appeal.
DISPOSITION
The portion of the April 22, 2008, order modifying the monthly spousal support and the child support awards is reversed and remanded to the trial court with directions to reconsider these issues consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. Costs on appeal are awarded to appellant.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J., JACKSON, J.
“In ordering spousal support under this part, the court shall consider all of the following circumstances:
“(a) The extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into account all of the following:
“(1) The marketable skills of the supported party; the job market for those skills; the time and expenses required for the supported party to acquire the appropriate education or training to develop those skills; and the possible need for retraining or education to acquire other, more marketable skills or employment.
“(2) The extent to which the supported party's present or future earning capacity is impaired by periods of unemployment that were incurred during the marriage to permit the supported party to devote time to domestic duties.
“(b) The extent to which the supported party contributed to the attainment of an education, training, a career position, or a license by the supporting party.
“(c) The ability of the supporting party to pay spousal support, taking into account the supporting party's earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and standard of living.
“(d) The needs of each party based on the standard of living established during the marriage.
“(e) The obligations and assets, including the separate property, of each party.
“(f) The duration of the marriage.
“(g) The ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without unduly interfering with the interests of dependent children in the custody of the party.
“(h) The age and health of the parties.
“(i) Documented evidence of any history of domestic violence, as defined in Section 6211, between the parties, including, but not limited to, consideration of emotional distress resulting from domestic violence perpetrated against the supported party by the supporting party, and consideration of any history of violence against the supporting party by the supported party.
“(j) The immediate and specific tax consequences to each party.
“(k) The balance of the hardships to each party.
“(l) The goal that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time. Except in the case of a marriage of long duration as described in Section 4336, a “reasonable period of time” for purposes of this section generally shall be one-half the length of the marriage. However, nothing in this section is intended to limit the court's discretion to order support for a greater or lesser length of time, based on any of the other factors listed in this section, Section 4336, and the circumstances of the parties.
“(m) The criminal conviction of an abusive spouse shall be considered in making a reduction or elimination of a spousal support award in accordance with Section 4325.
“(n) Any other factors the court determines are just and equitable.” (Fam. Code § 4320.)