Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tuolumne County No. FL4132. James A. Boscoe, Judge.
Richard C. Sinclair for Appellant.
Goss & Goss, Michael A. Goss and Mark A. Goss, for Respondent.
OPINION
Wiseman, J.
Despite an appearance of complexity in the briefs and the record, this case is straightforward. The divorcing spouses, Joella and Russell Sargent, agreed to a property settlement that was entered as a stipulated judgment by the superior court. The settlement required each party to take action to transfer property to the other. After Russell carried out his part of the settlement, Joella refused to take any action to carry out her part, claiming that the existence of several trusts meant she was not the owner of the property at issue. Russell filed a motion to enforce the settlement by means of the appointment of an elisor, i.e., a person authorized to execute documents on behalf of a recalcitrant party. The court granted the motion and issued three orders appointing an elisor to execute documents relevant to three items of property. The court also granted Russell’s motion for sanctions, including attorney’s fees. Joella appeals from these orders.
The alleged trusts at issue have no bearing on the orders the court issued. Joella violated the settlement agreement when she refused to execute certain documents; the court merely enforced the stipulated judgment by causing those documents to be executed. Further, Joella did not present evidence to the court sufficient to establish that the trusts she relied on owned the property at issue, or even that those trusts existed. The only question before the court in this case was whether to enforce the stipulated judgment by causing the documents to be executed. Joella has presented no reason in this appeal why the court should not have done so. She also has not shown that the court abused its discretion in finding that she willfully refused to comply with the stipulated judgment, so there is no reason to reverse the award of sanctions and attorney’s fees.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORIES
The parties were married on December 24, 1976. They separated on February 6, 2004, and Joella filed a petition for legal separation on February 27, 2004. As Joella says in her opening appellate brief, she “is a licensed Real Estate Broker who controlled and operated her separate property, Petitioner and Respondent’s Community Property as well as property of other clients.” Russell is a retired electrician. Property statements submitted by the parties showed an estate worth more than $4 million.
From 2004 to 2007, the parties filed various motions against each other and exchanged proposals for division of property. During part of this time, Joella was unrepresented by counsel and she and a person named Dennis MacPhaeddon submitted pseudo-legal documents to the court and Russell’s counsel.
For instance, on January 24, 2006, Russell’s attorney Michael Goss sent Joella a letter requesting her compliance with the court’s order granting Russell’s motion to compel her to respond to discovery requests. Joella responded on February 15, 2006, by sending Goss a document titled “Actual and Constructive Notice of Conditional Acceptance for Value Upon Proof of Claim.” In this document, Joella appeared to refer to herself as two different people, “the DEBTOR, JOELLA SARGENT, ” and “Joella Nelson, Secured Party.” The document had two different-looking signatures, one by Joella Sargent and one by Joella Nelson. The document included a list of demands apparently intended to make Goss prove he was entitled to be involved in the case. The document ordered Goss to submit to Joella an affidavit, including a “true copy of your State license giving you authority to practice law, ” and the “exact date you first involved yourself in the private business of My property.” The document also ordered Goss to produce a “dated Notarized agreement” between herself and him “which clearly demonstrates a meeting of the minds to subordinate” a certain power of attorney Russell had supposedly given her. It ordered Goss to produce a “copy of any and all paperwork” giving Goss “permission to obtain and hold said property.” Finally, the document purported to explain that Goss’s failure to satisfy Joella’s demands would constitute an agreement by Goss that he was guilty of forms of wrongdoing and would be subject to penalties:
“Further, it is stated and agreed upon that a total repudiation by MICHAEL A. GOSS of the above stated inquiry will be taken as an attempt to stultify the DEBTOR … (attorney in fact), and the Secured Party and will create a dishonor by MICHAEL A. GOSS.
“MICHAEL A. GOSS also agrees by creating a dishonor that he stands libel and so states as a point of Law that he has, by his silence, created a delictual fault and acquiesce’s to the Secured Party Remedy as found in that peculiar document FORM SA-101905 filed on 10/25/2005 with the Secretary of State #05-7046600230. Remedy is stated on Page 14 of 14 headed as PUBLIC LAWFUL NOTICE.”
On March 11, 2006, Joella sent Goss a document titled “NOTICE OF FAULT 3-DAYS to Cure.” It stated that, because Goss did not respond to her demands, he was “at FAULT” and admitted he had no license to practice law; had “attempted to stultify the DEBTOR, Secured Party, and the (attorney in fact) in order to commit an act of barratry”; had “created a delictual fault”; and had “agreed to the Secured Party remedy in the amount of, $75,000,000, ” among other things. If he did not “cure” within 72 hours, he would be giving “permission to the Secured Party, Joella Nelson, to file the NOTICE OF DEFAULT whereby All your admissions will become STARE DECISIS and RES JUDICATA.”
Joella followed this letter up with a submission to the court on March 23, 2007, which purported to remove Goss as Russell’s counsel and enter various other orders. At the top were a name and address:
“:Joella: Nelson, Sui Juris
c/o: P. O. Box 216
La Grange, [95329]
California, state
non-domestic without the US”
The caption contained this heading:
“in Admiralty
Case # FL 4132
“EXPRESS NOTICE TO THE COURT
OF DEFAULT AND DISHONOR BY
MICHAEL A. GOSS, CSB#84109
NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF COUNSEL FOR
CAUSE
“NOTICE of Order to expunge all Lis Pendens”
After stating that “Joella Nelson, Real Party in Interest under injury, third party intervenor, NOTICES THE COURT of the attached exhibits as evidence of DEFAULT AND DISHONOR by counsel for Re in the above captioned matter before this court in honor, ” Joella’s filing went on:
“Therefore it is hereby Ordered,
“1. MICHAEL A. GOSS, CSB#84109 be removed as counsel for respondent for the cause shown herein.
“2. That this case be settled and closed in a timely manner to limit further injury to the parties or to the community property as set forth in California law.
“3. The parties to this matter have stipulated in sworn depositions and agreed that all the alleged real property subject to erroneous Lis Pendens filed in this case are held in trust, and therefore must be expunged as they are not subject to jurisdiction of the court in this matter.
“4. That the Court order immediate release of escrow funds held by MICHAEL A. GOSS to the Secured Party for distribution to the proper party on it’s own order.
“It is so ordered, this 21st day of March, 2007.”
On the same day, Dennis MacPhaeddon submitted to the court a “NOTICE OF ‘Dennis MacPhaeddon Trustee’ AS AMICUS CURIAE REGARDING COMMERCIAL NOTICE OF FRAUD BY Michael A. Goss” and “Demand for immediate release of all Lis Pendens.” This document stated that MacPhaeddon was “Attorney in Fact” for “the ‘Haven Group, ’ Irrevocable Trust.” His address in Nevada City, California was, like Joella’s address, “Non Domestic—without the United States.” He stated:
“COMES NOW Dennis MacPhaeddon, Third Party Interest Intervenor, Real Party in Interest under injury, and Attorney in Fact, in the nature of amicus curiae, who is neutral in the public, making a special visitation by absolute ministerial right to the SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF TUOLUMNE by, ‘restricted appearance’ under Rule E(8), Supplemental Rules for certain Admiralty and Maritime claims, who is unschooled in law and notices the court of the enunciation of principles as stated in Haines v. Kerner [(1972)] 404 U.S. 519, wherein the court has directed that those who are unschooled in law making pleadings and/or complaints shall have the court look to the substance of the pleadings rather than in the form, and hereby makes the following pleadings/notices in the above referenced matter without waiver of any defenses.”
MacPhaeddon’s document went on to state that Goss was a “Fiduciary Debtor, ” and had breached some kind of fiduciary duty to someone. Further: “Avoidance of fiduciary duty by Fiduciary Debtor constitutes unjust enrichment, and is a dishonor of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of the UNITED STATES”; MacPhaeddon “is a U.S. vessel and falls under the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of the US”; Goss, similarly, “is a U.S. vessel and falls under the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of the U.S.”; and Goss, as “Fiduciary Debtor, ” “has become the 3rd Party Defendant in this matter for the dishonor, and the dishonor of the Fiduciary Debtor in this matter creates the funds in the involuntary bankruptcy.” Under the heading “CONCLUSION, ” MacPhaeddon’s document asserted that Goss “has assumed the liability in Civil case No.: FL 4132 for failure to settle the matter in the public in a timely manner”; that Goss “forfeits his public hazard bond” because he is “a tort feasor in dishonor”; that Goss “must show cause why he is not in contempt, and why a tort claim should not issue to purge the contempt”; and that any lis pendens that Goss filed “in an attempt to Stultify the Trusts and the Trustee’s” must be “released immediately to limit further liability to Fiduciary Debtor and to the court.”
Perhaps the strangest document was another filed by Joella, also on March 23, 2007, now calling herself “:Joella: Nelson, sui juris, agent” and “JOELLA SARGENT, ens legis nom deguerre.” This submission was headed “MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF EXPRESS NOTICE OF Joella: Nelson AS AMICUS CURIAE REGARDING COMMERCIAL NOTICE APPOINTMENT OF FIDUCIARY DEBTOR.” It contained the following averments: The “UNITED STATES is operating in a chapter 11 reorganization bankruptcy”; Joella “is a U.S. vessel operating in commerce, ” as are Russell and Goss; the “UNITED STATES is the holder of the principal obligation for all U.S. vessels”; the Tuolumne County Superior Court is “a court in Admiralty and enforces the bankruptcy of the UNITED STATES and all U.S. vessels which are in the bankruptcy within the courts jurisdiction”; “[a]ll courts of the UNITED STATES operate in fiction and with fictions and are color of law”; Goss “is hereby appointed fiduciary debtor, and is operating ultra vires in the public, ” is “misbehaving as an agent for a foreign entity acting ultra vires and causing injury in the public by filing of Lis Pendens against trust property, ” and “has created a tort with knowledge”; and in “the matter of any alleged debt owing to Respondents, Joella Nelson has already exerted a UCC remedy by ‘Acceptance, ’ but said creditor has failed to produce the product of their offer.” Finally, the document appeared to claim that the court had no power over Joella because, as an admiralty court, and for reasons having to do with the unreality of money, it had power only over fictions, and Joella was not a fiction:
“All debt issues are of necessity in the Admiralty/Maritime jurisdiction as there is no money in circulation in commerce, that is, there is no in law remedy for debt possible. Since there is no in law remedy for any court action involving debt, then Civil case No.: FL 4132 must be in Admiralty jurisdiction, and must be a colorable action dealing with legal fictions and titles. The Fiduciary Debtor in this matter appears to be making a seizure of substance, i.e., the labor/capital of JOELLA SARGENT. This court operating in Admiralty/bankruptcy cannot reach parity with Joella Nelson, a living breathing, sentient being. The attempts for seizure of substance remedy by Michael A. Goss (CSB #84109) is in the nature of involuntary servitude and peonage as against a real Woman, a non-fiction. This is known as piracy.…”
This submission was accompanied by a dozen pages of exhibits explaining other theories. Exhibit A begins with a sentence quoted from remarks made in Congress by disgraced former Representative James Traficant, asserting hyperbolically that the United States Government is “in chapter 11.” The remainder of the exhibit is three pages of discussion claiming the United States is literally bankrupt. It states that the United States Government was dissolved by legislation in 1933 and is now in a chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization and in the control of “the International Bankers, via the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, ” which have “adopted a new form of government for the United States, ” which “is known as a Democracy, being an established Socialist/Communist order under a new governor for America.” Further, United States currency is not money because it is not backed by gold or silver.
Exhibit B is a paragraph stating that “most insurance is a tontine scheme, and its therefore forbidden by law.” The Social Security Act created a “nationwide tontine scheme, ” and “the courts of the nation were thereby converted into Admiralty courts.”
Exhibit C is an invented quotation attributed to an 18th-century Supreme Court decision, Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrators (1795) 3 U.S. 54. The quotation says, “‘Inasmuch as every government is an artificial person, an abstraction, and a creature of the mind only, a government can interface only with other artificial persons.’” It goes on to state that governments, including their courts, can only be concerned with corporations, not natural persons, because governments and corporations are both imaginary; governments are “‘foreclosed from creating and attaining parity with the tangible.’” Neither the United States Supreme Court nor any other court has ever held anything of the sort and the quotation is obviously fabricated. The first known appearance in print of the word “interface” was in 1882; its first appearance as a verb—the way it is used in the fabricated quotation—was in 1967. (8 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 1101.)
Exhibit D is an essay titled “THE NATURE OF LAWYER-CRAFT IN AMERICA, ” explaining that the State Bar is “An Unconstitutional Monopoly” and “AN ILLEGAL & CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE”; that pre-trial motions and the application of precedent are unconstitutional; that a judge “tampers, fixes, and rigs the trial” by giving jury instructions and ruling on the admissibility of evidence; that “[a]s long as there are lawyers, there will never be any law, constitution or justice”; and many other things of similar character. Describing American courts, the essay says, “In these Unconstitutional courts foreign tribunals (hoodlum centers), ‘men’ in black dresses, that are Unconstitutional ROBES OF NOBILITY. (Article 1, Section 9 and 10) dispense a perverted ideology, where the people are terrorized by members of the BLACK ROBE CULT (lawyers and lawyer judges in the courtrooms).”
Exhibit E is titled “Admiralty Claim” and is a seemingly random series of purported quotations and legal citations involving the Judiciary Act of 1789, various provisions of the United States Constitution, British admiralty cases, the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, and other matters.
Exhibit F explains why “[t]he U.S. is Still a British Colony.” It also appears to argue that all governments should be rejected because God gave people the right to own land: “Don’t you think this is a good start to rid us of this Satan controlled garbage called the Pope, The King, The State, The United States, The County, The Townships, the legislators and worst of all the ‘Woe be unto you Lawyers?’ Do this and why do you need a ‘republic?’”
Exhibit G is an unattributed excerpt from a scholarly work on admiralty law.
On June 21, 2007, Joella filed in the court a document titled “JUDICIAL NOTICE NARRATIVE SUPPORTING DECLARATION OF BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN DIVORCING PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS.” This document described incidents that took place three years earlier, in March and April of 2004. Sheriff’s reports of the incidents were attached. On March 10 and 12, 2004, Joella reported to the Tuolumne County Sheriff’s Department that Russell broke into her house on Tulloch Dam Road and took files. On March 28, 2004, Joella reported to the Mariposa County Sheriff’s Department a burglary of her house on Banderilla Drive. She said someone had taken leather furniture. Witnesses had seen Russell near the house with a pickup truck the day before, but no one saw him with the missing furniture. On April 2, 2004, Joella reported vandalism at her house on Banderilla Drive. She suspected Russell, saying he had threatened to sabotage her house, which was new and still under construction. The wires to Joella’s electric meter had been cut. A propane line, which had not yet been hooked up to the propane tank, had also been cut, as had a water pipe and a telephone line. A garage window had been broken. An electric saw, which a neighbor said belonged to Russell, was found on the porch. Joella said she had been at the house all night and found the damage in the morning. Neighbors saw nothing unusual during the night.
On the same day, April 2, 2004, Russell reported to the Mariposa County Sheriff’s Department that there were trespassers at his house on Barretts Cove Drive. He said six men arrived in two pickup trucks, tore down a fence, and hitched his portable generator to one of the trucks. He told them not to take the generator and one of the men, Roy Blackwood, said, “‘I’m going to get you off of this hill.’” Blackwood said Russell’s son, Jeff, threatened Blackwood and hit Blackwood’s truck with his fist. Another of the men, David Pollard, said Joella asked him to get the generator from Russell so she could repair the damage to her house. Pollard said he opened the gate with a key, asked Russell for the generator, and towed it away when Russell said nothing. According to Pollard, the discussion was polite and no one was threatened. The generator was found in Joella’s driveway. Joella said it was hers. After dropping the generator off, Blackwood went back to Russell’s house, where he was confronted by Jeff. Blackwood said Jeff chased Blackwood’s truck with his truck, ran Blackwood off the road while yelling threats at him, and broke Blackwood’s antenna.
Also attached to Joella’s June 21, 2007, filing were a letter and an affidavit by Dennis MacPhaeddon. The letter, dated August 31, 2004, was addressed to Russell’s attorney and stated that MacPhaeddon was returning a subpoena because he had no responsive documents and was “not [the] trustee of any of the entities listed on Attachment 3.…” He thought Jeff Sargent had stolen all the documents from Joella’s house on Tulloch Dam Road. In the affidavit, dated March 13, 2004, MacPhaeddon described himself as Joella’s “friend and advisor.” He described the incident at Joella’s house on Tulloch Dam Road and claimed Russell had threatened Joella on various occasions. MacPhaeddon claimed property of his was stolen from Joella’s house.
Finally, with Joella again represented by counsel, the parties agreed to a property settlement. The settlement was entered by the court as a stipulated judgment, included in the judgment of dissolution, on February 5, 2008. The judgment described all the property it divided as community property. It awarded six parcels of real property to Joella and two to Russell. It stated that the “parties further stipulated that each party will cooperate to transfer the property from a trust or from themselves to the party it is awarded to, to effectuate this stipulation.” Russell was to receive a promissory note secured by land in Oregon and the monthly payments on the note. The judgment stated: “The monthly payments on the note are $4,766.00. Wife shall receive the monthly payment through July 2008, at which time the payments on the note shall transfer to Husband commencing August 1, 2008. Wife will cooperate in executing any and all documents to efficiently transfer the payments to Husband.” Joella was to receive a note secured by another parcel of real property. Personal property, including cars, trucks, boats, construction equipment, bank accounts, attorneys’ client trust accounts, retirement accounts, Social Security benefits, and memberships were all divided between the spouses. Each spouse also received ownership of one of the two corporations the couple had owned.
The parcels to be conveyed to Russell were the house on Barretts Cove Drive in Mariposa County, California (Barretts Cove house) and a storage facility called Prime Storage with a house on Juniper Canyon Road in Crook County, Oregon (Prime Storage facility). The note to be conveyed to Russell was secured by other land on Juniper Canyon Road, 584 acres occupied by something called Prineville Adventure Park (Prineville note).
Attached to the judgment were documents indicating that the Barretts Cove house and the Prime Storage facility were held by trusts. The Barretts Cove house was held by a trust called F-Lee Properties, of which Joella was the trustee. Russell and Joella conveyed the property to the trust via a deed dated December 4, 2003. The Prime Storage facility was held by a trust called Prime Storage, of which Lawrence James Saccatto was the trustee. Russell and Joella conveyed the property to the trust via a deed dated January 15, 2001. Nothing was attached to the judgment that showed how or through what entity the couple held their security interest in the property securing the Prineville note.
On July 31, 2008, Russell filed an ex parte application for an order to show cause why the court should not appoint an elisor to transfer the property, the note, and the payments on the note and why the court should not impose sanctions and attorney’s fees on Joella for failing to comply with the judgment. Attached was Russell’s declaration stating that a deed to transfer the Barretts Cove house from F-Lee Properties to him had been prepared and had been waiting at a title company for Joella’s signature for several weeks. Joella had been told by her attorney to sign it but she had refused. A title company was also preparing documents for Joella’s signature to transfer the Prime Storage facility, but Russell anticipated that Joella would refuse to sign them.
Russell’s declaration further stated that Russell’s counsel, Michael Goss, obtained a letter on February 5, 2008, containing Joella’s authorization to transfer the payments on the Prineville note to Russell. Goss forwarded the letter to a title company. On February 6, 2008, Goss sent a check to Joella and her counsel for $32,693.52, representing the portion of Goss’s client trust account to which Joella was entitled under the judgment. After the check was cashed, Joella contacted the title company and orally revoked her authorization for the transfer of the Prineville note payments to Russell. As of July 10, 2008, the borrower began submitting the checks to Goss’s office, but they were payable to a trust called Juniper Properties, of which Russell believed Joella was a trustee authorized to endorse checks. He did not believe Joella would do so.
Russell’s declaration also claimed Joella tried to sell the note back to the borrower at a discount for cash in order to prevent Russell from obtaining it. Goss submitted a declaration in which he stated that an attorney for the borrower had told him Joella offered to transfer clear title to the borrower if the borrower would pay off the note early. The borrower declined, knowing of the divorce proceedings and the terms of the settlement. Russell claimed Joella also tried to change the collection account for the note payments. He attached some forms Joella had filled out for this purpose and given to the borrower. Joella signed the forms as trustee of Juniper Properties. Russell’s ex parte application requested $15,000 in attorney’s fees and $25,000 in monetary sanctions.
The court issued an order to show cause on August 4, 2008. On August 25, 2008, Joella’s counsel filed a notice of his withdrawal from the representation. Joella filed a response to the order to show cause in her own person on September 4, 2008.
Joella’s response stated that she was refusing to transfer property pursuant to the settlement, which she now appeared to repudiate, because the property was held in trust for the benefit of an unnamed person and she could not transfer it without violating her “contractual obligations” to that person. She mentioned two trusts, called Juniper Properties and Haven Group. Joella claimed her signature on the letter authorizing transfer of the Prineville note payments was forged. She also continued to develop the themes that Russell and his attorney had no right to take any legal action against her and the court had no power over her.
“1. Respondent through his attorney brought this vexatious action against me in an attempt to compel me to convey property that I do not own and can not do without violating my private contractual obligations to the beneficiary. The properties in question are all owned and held in irrevocable land trusts. Both attorney’s were clearly aware of this fact, and I believe purposely withheld that evidence and other evidence from the court, and the fact that the respondent repeatedly broke into my home and stole all of my business and Trust files and turned them over to his first attorney, Mr. Gee within four months of deserting our marriage. All of the beneficial interest in Juniper properties was assigned by both parties to this divorce to the HAVEN GROUP on April 9, 2003. See ‘Exhibit 1’ attached hereto.
“2. Who is going to indemnify me and the Trust Beneficiary as a result of the intentional fraud of a vexatious litigant by this unconscionable malpractice of an officer of the court? [¶] … [¶]
“4. The real party in interest has requested to remain private and has that inherent right to do so, as the sponsor and source of credit in this matter.
“5. By what authority are you asking me or attempting to compel me to perform for you, or order me to do anything that would force me to breach the trust contracts or compel me into peonage or involuntary slavery in clear violation of your oath to the state and federal constitutions?
“6. Can respondent or his attorney prove you have any authority over me to order me to do anything that would violate the terms of a private contract or take any trust property without just compensation? See ‘Exhibit 2’ attached hereto.
“7. Can this court show me by what law or theory of law that allows the respondent by and through his attorney to file a document into the court record, listed in respondent’s ‘Exhibit A’ with a forged signature of the Petitioner, in an ultra vires attempt to defraud the court, stultify the trusts, the beneficiary and the secured party, and cause further injury to Me? See ‘Exhibit 3’ attached hereto.”
Although Joella never names the “beneficiary, ” the name of a person allegedly harmed emerges at the end of her document: Dennis MacPhaeddon.
“The attorneys [who represented the parties when the settlement was reached], each by the intervention, trespass and willful disregard of their known duty to the court have damaged Me and Dennis MacPhaeddon, Trustee of the HAVEN GROUP, have committed a tort against Juniper Properties Land Trust by slander of title on the public record in Oregon, and a tort by their scienter acts against the HAVEN GROUP in the amount of $2,000,000.”
Joella signed this filing “as Trustee of Juniper Properties.”
Purported trust documents were attached to the filing as exhibits. One document, dated September 10, 2000, is headed “DECLARATION OF TRUST” and says it is an “Irrevocable Unincorporated Organization Contract” for Juniper Properties. It states that Larry Saccatto is the trustee and that the trust property is listed on schedules A and B. No schedules A and B are attached and there is no specification anywhere of the trust property. Rights of beneficiaries are mentioned in several places, but the document does not name any beneficiaries or define any classes of beneficiaries. A section titled “LIMITATION OF DISCLOSURE OF BENEFICIARIES” forbids the trustee or any beneficiary to disclose the name of any beneficiary. The purpose of the trust is “to hold title to the trust properties and to protect and conserve them until sale or liquidation.” If the trustee becomes unwilling or unable to act, something called “Celtic Vision” becomes the successor trustee. The document never explains what Celtic Vision is, but the address given for it, 228 Commercial Street, No. 191, Nevada City, California, is the same as the address for Dennis MacPhaeddon shown in his court filing of March 23, 2007. The document is signed by Russell and Joella as grantors and by Larry Saccatto as trustee.
Another document, also dated September 10, 2000, is headed “DECLARATION of UNINCORPORATED PURE TRUST ORGANIZATION” and purports to establish something called Haven Group. It begins:
“THIS CONTRACT, CONVEYANCE and ACCEPTANCE is made and entered into, on the latest date hereafter appearing on the Acknowledgement page, BY and BETWEEN:
“THE CREATOR, Celtic Vision,
“Who, for the consideration of twenty dollars in silver, shall herein appoint a Board of Trustees who shall accept the conditions, terms and provisions of this PTO deed; and
“THE SETTLOR, Jo Ella Sargent,
“Who, by signature hereto, makes an offer to exchange all of the private properties listed on schedules ‘A’ & ‘B’, as equal consideration for all of the Certificate Units of the PTO estate, and retains the right to direct the trustee assignment of those units to other parties;
“NOW, THEREFORE, the Creator, who, by signature hereto, and without obligation to any party, implements the Board of Trustees and appoints as
“THE FIRST TRUSTEE, Dennis MacPhaeddon;
“Who, by signature hereto, accepts the appointment and agrees to the conditions, and to the terms and provisions of this PTO Deed, as the Board of Trustees, and accepts fees now negotiated, and agrees to issue all Certificate Units of the Estate to the Settlor or by the direction of the Settlor, in exchange for the private properties tendered to the Estate, thus constituting neither a gift nor a sale.”
There is, again, no explanation of what Celtic Vision might be. There also is no explanation of why a trust needs a “creator” in addition to a settlor, no schedules listing the trust property, and no signature page. No beneficiaries are named and no class of beneficiaries is defined. The document appears to be a fragment, with the initials “JS” and “DM” written at the bottom of each of the two pages, but no complete signatures.
Two identical documents dated April 9, 2003, are also attached to Joella’s response to the order to show cause. Both are titled “ASSIGNMENT OF BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN LAND TRUST” and purport to be assignments to “Haven Group Dennis MacPhaeddon Trustee” of “all of my rights, powers (including the power of direction), privileges, and beneficial interest in and under a Land Trust Agreement dated the 10th day of September A.D., 2000, and known as ‘Juniper Properties.’” One form is signed by Joella and Dennis MacPhaeddon and the other by Russell and Dennis MacPhaeddon.
A number of UCC financing statements, evidently filed with the California Secretary of State, are also attached to Joella’s response to the order to show cause. MacPhaeddon filed these forms under the name of “Haven Group” and “Dennis MacPhaeddon, Trustee.” On one form, filed on November 21, 2006, in a box labeled “This FINANCING STATEMENT covers the following collateral, ” MacPhaeddon wrote: “The beneficial interest in All the following Land Trusts as assigned by the Grantor JOELLA SARGENT.” A reference to another page followed, and on that page were listed “Grape Arbor Properties, ” “Kimball Properties Land Trust, ” and “F-Lee Properties.”
MacPhaeddon filed another form on August 28, 2008, a few days before Joella filed her response to the order to show cause. In a box labeled “COLLATERAL CHANGE, ” MacPhaeddon wrote the following:
“Acceptance of Tuolumne County Superior Court case No. FL 4132, including all associated bonds and orders, as collateral of the creditor and secured party, re-affirming all associated right(s), title and beneficial interest held by the HAVEN GROUP as beneficiary of the following Land Trusts nunc pro tunc. All past and current beneficial interest in land and real property(ies) of Kimball Properties, Grape Arbor Properties, and F-Lee Properties which covers all of the prior rights, title and beneficial interest by contract with willing consent of the parties by assignment in the aforementioned court case, and set forth the prior UCC filing, No. 06-7092998717 dated 11/21/2006. All of the rights, title and interest as beneficiary with power of direction in the land and real property owned by Juniper Properties and Prime Storage, Land Trust(s) domiciled in Crook [C]ounty, Oregon state the HAVEN GROUP as sole Beneficiary by agreement of the parties.”
The point of this, apparently, was to try to ensure that all the Sargents’ property was linked to Haven Group and MacPhaeddon. There was no explanation in Joella’s filing of how Haven Group or MacPhaeddon became a “creditor” or “secured party, ” or why the property was “collateral.”
In a space on the UCC form for “additional information, ” MacPhaeddon went on to explain that any property awarded in the Sargents’ dissolution proceedings would belong to him:
“All property, revenue, income, profits, proceeds, collateral, equity, fixtures previously granted, conveyed, accepted, acquired and/or now owned by said Trusts for the benefit of the beneficiary of record, the HAVEN GROUP are exempt from lien, levy or seizure as per long standing precedent as per contract law and as set forth in the de jure California Constitution of 1849 and constitution for the [U]nited [S]tates of America of 1787 with all rights invoked and reserved. Any and all proceeds from Case No. FL 4132 in any form, be they bonds, mutual funds, annuities, trading programs or any other form of monetization or hypothecation by the court, the officers of the court or assigns shall inure to the benefit of the secured party on behalf of the HAVEN GROUP TRUST without recourse.”
The court conducted a hearing on the order to show cause on September 4, 2008. At the hearing, the court asked Joella if she would sign the documents that had been prepared to transfer to Russell the property to which he was entitled under the settlement. Joella said she was refusing to sign them. She claimed that she had no authority to do so and that transferring the property would violate the trusts. The court granted Russell’s request and appointed the Court Executive Officer as elisor to execute the necessary documents on behalf of Joella. It set another hearing to decide Russell’s request for attorney’s fees and sanctions.
The court issued three orders appointing an elisor. The first covered the Barretts Cove house. It appointed an elisor to act on behalf of “Petitioner, Joella Sargent, as an individual and/or as Trustee of F-Lee Properties, and/or in any other capacity, to execute any and all documents necessary to effectuate the transfer of the real property.…” The second order covered the Prime Storage facility. It appointed the elisor to act on behalf of Joella “as an individual and/or as Trustee of Prime Storage, and/or in any other capacity” to execute any documents necessary. The third order covered the Prineville note and payment stream. It appointed the elisor to act on behalf of Joella “as an individual and/or as Trustee of Juniper Properties Trust, and/or in any other capacity” to execute any documents necessary to transfer the monthly payments to Russell. The elisor was also directed to endorse to Russell one check that had already been issued. The order directed the borrower to stop issuing its checks to Juniper Properties and to begin issuing them to Russell. The court ordered that, when the payments are completed, Russell may execute any documents necessary to convey clear title to the borrower; it also authorized the elisor to execute any documents that may be necessary for that purpose on behalf of Joella.
Goss filed two declarations providing further details in support of Russell’s motion for attorney’s fees and sanctions. He requested $18,961.53 in attorney’s fees and $25,000 in sanctions.
Still acting in her own person, Joella filed a response with the following caption:
“Petitioners response to DECLARATION OF MARK A. GOSS of Respondents request for an award of attorneys fees, costs and monetary sanctions against petitioner.
“Judicial Notice of attempted fraud, and conversion on the Court and Petitioner. Malfeasance of office under color of law by a Court Officer.
“Barratry, Intentional misrepresentation, Theft of Trust assets, Violation of Article I, section 10 of the Constitution for the [U]nited States of America, violation of Oath of Office.
“Counter Claim for theft and conversion of trust assets,
“WITHIN THE ADMIRALTY”
Joella repeated her claims that she was unable to transfer any property to Russell because doing so would violate the terms of trust. She asserted what she called a counter-claim in admiralty, saying “this court seems to think that my drunken, abusive, and drug addled former husband and his thieving attorneys are entitled to loot our estate of everything that I worked for and earned through a lifetime of hard work leaving me with nothing.” She stated that the attorneys, the court, and the elisor had all committed wrongful acts against her through the litigation and decision of the case. She asked the court to award her costs, fees, and damages.
The court issued a ruling on fees and sanctions on January 15, 2009. It found that Joella engaged in three intentional acts that “delayed the completion of the executory provisions of the Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage.” First, she attempted to change the collection account for the monthly payments on the Prineville note after those payments were awarded to Russell. Second, she withdrew her authorization for the transfer of the payments to Russell after she received the payment from the Goss client trust account. Third, she refused to execute the documents necessary to transfer the real property to Russell. The court found the evidence was not sufficient for an additional finding that Joella tried to sell the Prineville note. Based on its findings, the court imposed sanctions pursuant to Family Code section 271. It required Joella to pay $10,000 in monetary sanctions, of which $5,000 were temporarily stayed, and would be permanently stayed if Joella executed the necessary documents within 20 days. The court also awarded $10,000 in attorney’s fees. The court denied Joella’s request for affirmative relief.
DISCUSSION
I. Appointment of elisor
Joella argues that the court should not have appointed an elisor to execute documents because the property at issue was controlled by trusts that had not been made parties to the action. She also argues that the court should not have appointed an elisor because some of the real property was in Oregon and the court did not have in rem jurisdiction over out-of-state real property. Finally, Joella argues that the court was required to follow procedures set out in Probate Code section 17200 and failed to do so.
The superior court is authorized to enforce its judgment of dissolution and its distribution of property “by execution, the appointment of a receiver, or contempt, or by any other order as the court in its discretion determines from time to time to be necessary.” (Fam. Code, § 290.) The appointment of an elisor is one of the methods available to a court for enforcement of its judgments. (Rayan v. Dykeman (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1629, 1635.) Among other functions, an elisor can be appointed for “deed and document execution” on behalf of “recalcitrant litigants who refuse to obey orders of the court.” (Id. at p. 1635, fn. 2.) We reverse a trial court’s order enforcing its judgment only if the court has abused its discretion. (Reese v. Reese (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 181, 183; Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti (1937) 9 Cal.2d 95, 102; Hale v. Hale (1935) 6 Cal.App.2d 661, 663.) The court abuses its discretion only if its action exceeds the bounds of reason, in light of the facts and circumstances. (People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 72.)
The court did not abuse its discretion. We conclude it could reasonably find that its judgment required Joella to sign the documents and that she refused to sign them. It also could reasonably determine that appointment of an elisor was an expeditious way to enforce the judgment under these circumstances. We turn now to Joella’s arguments.
A. Claim that the property was owned by trusts
Joella’s argument that the property is owned by trusts which were not made parties to the action does not affect our conclusion. The purported trusts and their trustees and beneficiaries did not need to be parties to the action because the court directed no order against them. The elisor was appointed simply to sign, on Joella’s behalf, documents Joella refused to sign. If, because of the trusts, there really was nothing Joella could do to transfer the property, then the elisor’s signature would be ineffective; but that question was not before the trial court. In the stipulated judgment, the parties agreed that all the property to be distributed was community property of the marriage. They also agreed to take any necessary steps to transfer property to each other. No appeal from the stipulated judgment was taken. By the time the court issued the order to show cause why an elisor should not be appointed, it was no longer open to Joella to take the position that the property was not hers and this freed her from the obligation to comply with the judgment. In sum, whether the property belonged to the spouses or to some other entity was not an issue before the trial court when it decided Russell’s motion to enforce the judgment. Therefore, that issue is not properly before us now.
Even if the issue were before us, we would not reverse the judgment on that basis. The position Joella took in the trial court was that she could not transfer property to Russell because the property was owned by Juniper Properties or Haven Group. The evidence Joella presented to the trial court, however, did not even establish the existence of those purported trusts. Nothing in the purported trust documents makes it possible to determine the identity of the beneficiaries. A non charitable trust cannot exist without a beneficiary. (Prob. Code, § 15205, subd. (a).) A beneficiary exists if the trust instrument identifies a beneficiary or class of beneficiaries, or provides a definition of the beneficiaries from which it can be determined that some person is a beneficiary. (Prob. Code, § 15205, subd. (b)(1).) A trust instrument also can be sufficient if it grants the trustee or some other person a power to select a beneficiary. (Prob. Code, § 15205, subd. (b)(2).) The documents in the record for Juniper Properties and Haven Group do not satisfy these requirements.
Joella’s opening brief admits that the record fails to establish the existence of any beneficiaries, saying, “The record is silent as to who had the beneficial ownership of the Haven Group and the rules governing the Haven Group and who had beneficial ownership of the other irrevocable trusts and who were the interested parties.” Joella appears to believe it was the responsibility of the trial court to ferret these things out sua sponte and bring various unknown people into the case, but we can see no reason why it would have been. As a party refusing to comply with a judgment of the court, it was her responsibility to establish a reason why the court should not enforce it against her.
Haven Group, in particular, shows every indication of being a sham. An “unincorporated pure trust organization” is a thing unknown to California law. We know of no legal relationship involving a “creator, ” a grantor and a trustee, but no beneficiary. The record does not reveal who or what “Celtic Vision, ” the “creator, ” might be. We are aware of no law recognizing such things as “Certificate Units” of a “PTO Estate.”
A trust exists if the trust instrument conforms to the requirements of the Probate Code. Joella did not show that the document purporting to establish Haven Group did so.
Further, the evidence in the record is not sufficient to support a finding that Juniper Properties or Haven Group, if they exist, own any of the property at issue. Two documents signed by Joella and Russell purport to transfer beneficial interests in Juniper Properties to Haven Group, but there is little evidence that Juniper Properties owned the land at issue here (or anything else) in the first place. The property schedules referenced in the purported trust documents are not included in the record, and the record contains no deeds or other documents that purport to convey anything to Juniper Properties.
The court’s order appointing an elisor to transfer the Prineville note payments to Russell states that the elisor will execute documents on behalf of “Joella Sargent, as an individual and/or as Trustee of Juniper Properties Trust, ” but no deed or other document was submitted to the court showing that the Prineville note was held by any trust. Similarly, it appears that the borrower on the Prineville note made out its checks to Juniper Properties Trust when it paid its monthly payments, but nothing in the record shows that this was appropriate. A letter from an attorney for the borrower on the Prineville note states that it appears “[f]rom my examination of the documents in my possession” that the borrower bought the Prineville land from Juniper Properties, but those documents are not in the record. Even assuming the Juniper Properties trust did exist and was the holder of the Prineville note, Joella has established no reason why the court and parties could not rely on her apparent status as its trustee as a basis for her power to transfer the note to Russell. As for the Barretts Cove house and the Prime Storage facility, there is no evidence that they were ever held by Juniper Properties or Haven Group.
Russell was aware of Joella’s reliance on the purported trusts and said so in a court filing, but, contrary to Joella’s contention on appeal, his statements do not amount to an admission that the trusts are genuine, that they own the property at issue, or that they stand in the way of Joella’s transfer of the property. To the contrary, his point seems to have been that Joella was improperly using trusts to dispose of community property during the pendency of the dissolution proceedings.
The filing is a declaration Russell submitted in support of a request he made, early in the litigation, for an order preventing her from disposing of assets, among other relief. He did this, apparently, before the property securing the Prineville note was sold to the operators of Prineville Adventure Park. The declaration read:
“4. Request for Control/Accounting for ongoing profits: Petitioner and I own considerable real property, both in California and Oregon.
“a) Petitioner and I also own 584 acres of property near Prineville, Oregon. I have discovered that petitioner, as the Trustee of ‘Juniper Properties, a land trust’ may have entered into a contract with ‘Prineville Adventure Park, LLC’ in December 2003 to sell the property. A copy is attached as Exhibit A.
“‘Juniper Properties’ is one of the several trusts that petitioner has created for our properties over the years, by which she has exclusive control of the property, either personally or through her friends.”
Under any fair reading, the purpose and effect of these statements is to challenge Joella’s use of the purported trust to try to remove property from the community estate and keep the proceeds for herself, not to admit that the trust is a legitimate obstacle to the division of that estate. Elsewhere in the same declaration, Russell asserted that “‘Haven Group’ is an alter ego for petitioner.” The declaration mentioned several other trusts and claimed Joella was using them to carry out real property sales to the detriment of the community estate. In all of this, Russell consistently challenged Joella’s use of purported trusts; he did not concede the legitimacy of her tactics.
Russell’s deposition testimony that the couple’s real property is “all in trusts and stuff, I think, ” also fails to show that genuine trusts with actual title to the property prevented Joella from transferring the property to Russell. We reject Joella’s contention that “once you separate the wheat from the chaff, ” “both parties acknowledge that the properties were owned by trusts and are not community property.…”
MacPhaeddon’s UCC filings claiming ownership of all the Sargents’ property for Haven Group establish nothing. The purpose of a UCC financing statement is to give notice to the public of a security interest in personal property. It has nothing to do with ownership of real property by trusts. It is not a means of conveying real property to a trust.
In sum, Joella did not present evidence to the trial court sufficient to support her claim that she could not convey the property to Russell because Juniper Properties or Haven Group was the owner. The court did not abuse its discretion in appointing an elisor despite that claim.
Two other trusts mentioned in the record, F-Lee Properties and Prime Storage, may or may not have an impact on the elisor’s ability to execute effective documents. At the time of the stipulated judgment, the court and parties appear to have believed that F-Lee Properties was the owner of the Barretts Cove house, that Prime Storage was the owner of the Prime Storage facility, and that Joella was the trustee of both. The court and parties also appear to have believed that the trusts presented no obstacle to the division of property set forth in the stipulated judgment, presumably because they believed Joella was the trustee. Joella mentions these trusts in her appellate briefs, but she did not rely on them when opposing Russell’s motion for enforcement in the trial court. In her reply brief, Joella claims that Haven Group is the beneficiary of the F-Lee Properties trust and that she and Russell assigned their beneficial interest in the Prime Storage trust to Haven Group. These claims are not supported by any evidence in the record. In any event, the effect of these trusts was not before the trial court and is not before us now.
B. Claim that the court lacked in rem jurisdiction over out-of-state property
Joella is mistaken in her view that the court could not appoint an elisor for the purpose of executing documents on her behalf to transfer out-of-state property. Joella’s own brief supplies the authorities supporting the court’s action. Property acquired during a marriage, “wherever situated, ” is community property. (Fam. Code, § 760.) While the court lacks jurisdiction to make an order directly determining title to out-of-state real property, it can order a person over whom it has personal jurisdiction to execute a conveyance of out-of-state real property, and that conveyance will be recognized in the other state’s courts. (Rozan v. Rozan (1957) 49 Cal.2d 322, 330; Tomaier v. Tomaier (1944) 23 Cal.2d 754, 760.) That the court ordered another person to execute documents on a party’s behalf makes no difference if the court had jurisdiction over the party. (Chamberlain v. Wakefield (1949) 95 Cal.App.2d 280, 292; Phelps v. Kozakar (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1078, 1085.) Joella cites Launer v. Griffin (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 659, 667, saying it supports a contrary rule, but it does not. Instead, it is consistent with the other authorities we have just cited and supports the court’s action.
C. Claim that Probate Code section 17200 was required to be followed
Probate Code section 17200 provides that “a trustee or beneficiary of a trust may petition the court under this chapter concerning the internal affairs of the trust or to determine the existence of the trust.” A party who files a petition under this section must give notice to trustees and beneficiaries of the trust. (Prob. Code, § 17203.) Joella claims the trial court acted improperly because no notice was given to the trustees or beneficiaries of the purported trusts on which she relies.
Probate Code section 17200 has no bearing on this case. No party filed a petition pursuant to that statute. No party asked the court to take action concerning the internal affairs of a trust or to determine the existence of a trust. Joella is arguing, in effect, that the parties must conform with the notice provisions of Probate Code section 17203 in every case in which the property of alleged trusts potentially will be affected, regardless of whether any party files a petition under section 17200. Joella has cited no authority for that proposition and we know of none.
Further, as we have said, Joella did not present evidence to the trial court sufficient to show that the trusts she relied on, Juniper Properties and Haven Group, existed or owned any of the property at issue. When she agreed to the property settlement, Joella implicitly acknowledged that the property at issue was community property of the marriage and could be transferred by her. The settlement was entered as a stipulated judgment. Joella’s post judgment assertion, without proof, that trusts excused or prevented her compliance with the judgment was not an obstacle to the court’s enforcement of it.
D. Duress
In her opening brief, Joella claims she was “forced” into the property settlement “[u]nder … duress.” The alleged duress arose from the incidents described in the police reports we have mentioned. In her reply brief, Joella states that she has filed a new action in Mariposa County Superior Court collaterally attacking the stipulated judgment pursuant to Family Code sections 2120 and 2121. She says she has obtained a preliminary injunction in that case barring further enforcement of the portion of the stipulated judgment pertaining to the Prineville note and ordering Russell not to come within 300 feet of her. This new action is based on the alleged duress, among other things. These issues were not litigated before the trial court in this case. We express no opinion on them or on the merits of the new action. Contrary to Joella’s contention, the filing of the collateral attack is not a reason to reverse the judgment in the case before us.
II. Sanctions and attorney’s fees
Citing Family Code section 271, the trial court imposed attorney’s fees and additional monetary sanctions on Joella. Section 271 provides that a court in a family law proceeding may impose attorney’s fees as a sanction on a party whose conduct “frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties.…” (Fam. Code, § 271, subd. (a).) The award need not be limited to the actual cost to the opposing party resulting from the sanctioned party’s conduct and need not be correlated to specific attorney’s fees. (In re Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1226.) We review the award for abuse of discretion and will overturn it only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the award and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, no reasonable judge could have made the award. We review any factual findings on which the award rests for substantial evidence. (Id. at pp. 1225-1226.)
Applying these standards, we conclude there is no abuse of discretion. It was undisputed that Joella refused to sign documents that had been prepared to transfer the land to Russell. Russell submitted documents and declarations supporting his claim that, after Joella cashed the check for her share of the funds in Goss’s client trust account, Joella withdrew her authorization to transfer the Prineville note payments. Russell also submitted documents and declarations supporting his claim that Joella attempted to change the collection account for the Prineville note payments after they were awarded to Russell. This was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Joella’s conduct was intentional and frustrated the policy of the law to promote settlement and encourage cooperation. The total amount of the award—$20,000, or $15,000 if Joella promptly complied with the judgment—was close to the amount of the actual attorney’s fees documented in Russell’s motion and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Joella argues that the attorney’s fees and sanctions were wrongly awarded because the trusts meant she was unable to comply with the judgment and she was guilty of no more than “advising the Court that she and the Court were prohibited from doing what the Court chose to do.” As we have explained, Joella did not show that the purported trusts stood in the way of the property distribution required by the stipulated judgment. Substantial evidence supported the finding that Joella willfully refused to comply with the judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent Russell Sargent.
WE CONCUR: Ardaiz, P.J., Levy, J.