Opinion
No. 5-707 / 04-1981
Filed January 19, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. Huppert, Judge.
The petitioner appeals from the property distribution aspects of the decree dissolving his marriage with the respondent. AFFIRMED.
Katherine Spencer, Des Moines, for appellant.
John K. Vernon of Dickinson, Mackman, Tyler Hagen, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.
Jose Sanchez and Conseulo Perez were married on July 26, 1994. Two children were born during the marriage: Omar, born in 1994 and Oscar, born in 1998. Jose was born in Mexico and does not speak or read English. Consuelo speaks and reads English well and was solely in charge of the finances of the family. Jose turned over his paychecks to Consuelo who paid the family's bills and directed the financial aspects of their relationship. Prior to and during the marriage, Consuelo was quite active in purchasing and selling real estate. At the time of the marriage, Jose's sole asset was a vehicle, while Consuelo owned real estate at 2828 Raccoon Street, 2739 Scott Avenue, 1850 Easton Boulevard, and was about to sign a contract for the purchase of 1846 Easton Boulevard, all in Des Moines.
On February 4, 2004, Jose filed a petition seeking to dissolve the parties' marriage. The parties entered into a stipulation resolving their disputes except the division of the assets and debts. Following a trial of those issues, the district court entered a decree dissolving the marriage. In pertinent part, the court found that the residence located at 1846 Easton Boulevard was "conceptually" Consuelo's premarital property and it awarded Consuelo the full value of it, save for some appreciation which it awarded to Jose in recognition of Jose's labors and the length of the marriage. Further, the court ordered that the marital residence, located at S.E. 23rd Street, be sold and the proceeds split equally after Jose receives the first $500 of those proceeds due to certain "adjustments." Jose appeals, contending the court should have treated the 1846 Easton Boulevard property as property subject to division. He further maintains the property distribution ordered by the district court is inequitable because it awarded him an inadequate share of the equity in the 2739 Scott Avenue and 1846 Easton Boulevard properties.
The court aggregated Jose's share in the appreciated value of Consuelo's various properties and the benefit he received from a home equity line of credit, and then ordered certain offsets in favor of Consuelo.
Scope of Review.
We review this matter de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. We are required to examine the entire record and adjudicate anew rights on the issues properly presented. In re Marriage of Ruter, 564 N.W.2d 849, 851 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). At the same time, we recognize the value in listening to and observing the parties and witnesses. Iowa R. App. P. 614(6)( g). Consequently, we give weight to the findings of the trial court, although they are not binding. Id. Property Division Standards.
The partners to a marriage are entitled to a just and equitable share of property accumulated through their joint efforts. See In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 561 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997); see also In re Marriage of Russell, 473 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Iowa Ct.App. 1991). The Iowa courts do not require an equal division or a percentage division in determining a just and equitable share of property. Gonzalez, 561 N.W.2d at 98. Instead, each particular circumstance determines what is fair and equitable. Id. Further, the property distribution should be made pursuant to the criteria codified in Iowa Code section 598.21(1) (2003). Id.
Property which a party brings into the marriage is a factor to consider in making an equitable division. Iowa Code § 598.21(1)(b). In some instances, this factor may justify a full credit, but it is not required. In re Marriage of Miller, 552 N.W.2d 460, 465 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). A premarital asset is not otherwise set aside like gifted or inherited property. Id. Moreover, in considering accumulations to premarital assets, we do not limit our focus to the parties' direct contributions to the increase. Id. Rather, we broadly consider the contributions of each party to the overall marriage, as well as all other factors. Iowa Code § 598.21(1). Financial matters make up only a portion of a marriage, and must not be emphasized over other contributions in determining an equitable contribution. Miller, 552 N.W.2d at 465. Premarital property does not merge with and become marital property simply by virtue of the marriage. See In re Marriage of Miller, 452 N.W.2d 622, 624 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989). In making our decision, we must therefore consider property brought into the marriage as a factor in making an equitable division. See Iowa Code § 598.21(1)(b).
1846 Easton Boulevard.
This property, which is located next door to the 1850 Easton Boulevard property, was purchased by Consuelo and her brother Emeterio for $25,000 less than one week following Consuelo's marriage to Jose. Consuelo and Emeterio, each paid $2,500 toward the down payment. Consuelo's share came from premarital savings. The remaining $20,000 was financed through a real estate contract that was eventually paid off in 1995 from Emeterio's wages and rents derived from the property. Emeterio received the rents until 1998, when he quitclaimed his interest to Consuelo, although no money changed hands in this transaction. Consuelo did, however, pay Emeterio $24,000 in 2004 with funds received from a mortgage on the property.
The district court found that, even though this property was acquired by Consuelo shortly after the marriage, it should be treated the same as the other properties that were acquired by Consuelo prior to the marriage. The court apparently found it significant that Jose contributed nothing to the purchase price and that Consuelo and her brother purchased the property only one week after the marriage. The court therefore looked to Jose's contribution to this property during the marriage, which Jose argued consisted of his labors in maintaining and improving it, as well as his contributions to the family treasury through his paychecks. After analyzing these contributions, the court determined that Jose was entitled to $7,500 worth of appreciation in the 1846 Easton Boulevard property and other similarly situated properties.
On appeal, Jose maintains the court should not have treated 1846 Easton Boulevard as a premarital asset. Rather, he argues, the equity in this property should have been equally divided between the parties.
At the time of trial, the property had an appraised value of $57,000 and an encumbrance of $28,718.
Upon our de novo review, we find equitable the district court's treatment of this asset. First, as noted, the property was purchased a mere five days following the parties' marriage. The entirety of the down payment came from Consuelo's premarital savings and her brother's financial contribution. There does not appear to be any evidence that Jose played a role in or otherwise assisted in the purchase of this property. Finally, the remainder of the contract balance was paid by Consuelo's brother, Emeterio, and from rental income derived from the property. There is no evidence tending to establish that Jose's wages were used to pay off the balance of the contract. We find no inequity in the district court's disposition of this property.
General Property Distribution.
Jose maintains he should have been awarded more than $7,500 worth of the equity in the 2739 Scott Avenue and 1846 Easton Boulevard properties because he "made contributions to acquiring and maintaining those properties." The district court found "non-specific and lacking corroboration" Jose's claim that he performed substantial physical labor and made extensive repairs on these properties. Noting Jose's lack of initial investment and the properties' "self-sufficient nature in terms of generating . . . cash flow," the district court valued at $7,500 Jose's interest in the properties. We are unable on this record to conclude that the district court's resolution of this matter is inequitable. We therefore affirm the district court's decision in its entirety. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Jose.