He also received the exclusive benefit of continuing to live in the home. The following cases interpreted former Civil Code section 4800, subdivision (a), which is no different in any material respect from Family Code section 2552; In re Marriage of Priddis (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 349, 354-358 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 37]; In re Marriage of Koppelman (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 627, 631-635 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 629], disapproved on another ground in In re Marriage of Fabian (1986) 41 Cal.3d 440, 451, footnote 13 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 333, 715 P.2d 253]; In re Marriage of Bergman (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 742, 760-761 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 661].In re Marriage of Priddis, supra, 132 Cal.App.3d at page 355.

The court’s decision rests on its evaluation of the facts in the specific case before it. ( In re Marriage of Priddis (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 349, 358, fn. 2, 183 Cal.Rptr. 37 ( Priddis ) [" Hayden does not stand for the broad proposition that after every appeal a reappraisal of community property must take place"].) The Court of Appeal in Hayden held that the property could be valued at the time of remand, rather than the date of trial.

“[W]hen an asset increases in value from nonpersonal factors such as inflation or market fluctuations, generally it is fair that both parties share in that increased value.” (In re Marriage of Priddis (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 349, 355 (Priddis).) In Priddis, the court valued the community home at the time of trial. (Priddis, supra, 132 Cal.App.3d at p. 358.)

In other words, it will be upheld on appeal if substantial evidence supports it. (In re Marriage of Hewitson (1993) 142 Cal.App.3d 874, 885.) Citing In re Marriage of Priddis (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 349, Sue argues the court erroneously relied on the parties' lengthy, 14-year period of separation before trial as "the sole reason" for denying her Watts usage and additional rent reimbursement claims. This argument misconstrues the court's reasons for denying Sue's rent reimbursement claims, as explained in the court's statement of decision.

These statutes clearly authorize a trial court to use valuation date that best provides adequate compensation to the injured spouse. Alan's reliance on In re Marriage of Priddis (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 349, 183 Cal.Rptr. 37 is likewise fruitless. Alan cites Priddis for the proposition that “the mere passage of time alone between the dates of separation and trial is an insufficient basis for setting the valuation date at a time other than ‘as near as practicable to the time of trial.’ ”

These statutes clearly authorize a trial court to use a valuation date that best provides adequate compensation to the injured spouse. Alan's reliance on In re Marriage of Priddis (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 349 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 37] is likewise fruitless. Alan cites Priddis for the proposition that "the mere passage of time alone between the dates of separation and trial is an insufficient basis for setting the valuation date at a time other than `as near as practicable to the time of trial. `"( Id. at p. 358.)

An alternate valuation date is used only "for good cause shown" (§ 4800), as when the hard work and actions of one spouse alone cause the increase, not, as here, "when an asset increases in value from nonpersonal factors such as inflation. . . ." ( In re Marriage of Priddis (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 349, 355 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 37].) And the apportionment formulas of In re Marriage of Marsden, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d 426 and In re Marriage of Moore (1980) 28 Cal.3d 366 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 662, 618 P.2d 208] suggested by wife are inappropriate to the instant action.

) The trial court's decision to value the family residence as of the date of separation was reversed in In re Marriage of Priddis (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 349 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 37]. There, the wife had occupied an apartment and the husband had remained in the community home during a separation period that exceeded 11 years.

The Lucas rule has been applied to personal as well as real property. ( In re Marriage of Johnson (1982) 143 Cal.App.3d 57, 60-61 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 545]; In re Marriage of Priddis (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 349, 360 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 37].) The Lucas requirement of an agreement or understanding has been abrogated by recent legislative enactment.

In In re Marriage of Hayden (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 72, 79-80 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 183], a reassessment of the disputed property was ordered upon remand after appeal in order to prevent an inequity caused by the unfair conduct of the parties. There is no evidence in the present case which necessitates a similar result. (See In re Marriage of Priddis (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 349, 358, fn. 2 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 37].) Because we must reverse the lower court's decision on the above-stated ground, we need not address appellant's other argument that respondent breached her fiduciary duty during the loan transaction. (See 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, § 223, pp. 4212-4213.)