Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Marin County Super. Ct. No. FL020718
NEEDHAM, J.
Nancy Dow Moody (wife) appeals from a post-judgment order in a marital dissolution action denying her motion for a determination that (1) Peter Moody (husband) was the beneficial owner of certain real property, giving her a community interest in that property; and (2) husband sold his interest in another piece of real property for less than its fair market value and was required to compensate her for the difference. She also appeals the court’s award of attorney fees and costs to husband as the prevailing party on those issues. We affirm the judgment denying wife’s motion on the property ownership and valuation issues, but reverse the award of attorney fees and costs and remand the case for a new hearing. Although the court correctly determined that husband was entitled to recover attorney fees and costs under the terms of the marital settlement agreement, the record was insufficient to establish the reasonableness of the amount of fees awarded.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Husband and wife were married on September 11, 1993 and separated on November 3, 2001. During their marriage, they had one son and acquired several pieces of real property, two of which are at issue in this appeal.
I. Marital Settlement Agreement and Judgment
On June 22, 2007, the couple appeared in court and recited the terms of a settlement they had reached in their dissolution case, which they agreed would be judicially enforceable under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. After the parties proved unable to agree on the contents of a written judgment memorializing their settlement, the court granted husband’s motion for entry of judgment and prepared its own written judgment. That judgment is now final.
When it entered the judgment on husband’s motion, the court awarded husband attorney fees under Family Code sections 271 [attorney fees as sanctions] and 2030 [need-based fees]. Wife appealed the fee award and this court affirmed in an unpublished decision. (In re Marriage of Moody (Mar. 11, 2009, A121691) nonpub. opn.) Later, wife filed an appeal of a lower court order awarding husband need-based attorney fees incurred during the first appeal. We again affirmed the trial court’s order. (In re Marriage of Moody (Jun. 23, 2009, A123034) nonpub. opn.)
The settlement/judgment contemplated that further proceedings would be held to resolve issues relating to real property in Massachusetts. Paragraph 2 of the judgment provided in relevant part: “B. Leominster and Acton, Massachusetts, Properties. During the course of this litigation, Wife has claimed that the community has an interest in real property located at 160 Central Street, Leominster, Massachusetts and in properties commonly called ‘The Great Road Properties, ’ which are located at 469 Great Road, 471 Great Road, and certain property behind 469 and 471 Great Road, Acton, Massachusetts. Husband has denied Wife’s claim and alleged that he does not have any ownership in any of these properties. With respect to these properties, the parties will hire a neutral Massachusetts attorney to serve as an expert to conduct a records and title search. The expert will render an opinion as to who is the beneficial owner of these properties-that is, who would be entitled to the proceeds if the properties were sold, and as to whether either party has been the beneficial owner of any of these properties from and after November 3, 2001, the date of the parties’ separation.... If this court determines that Husband, Wife, or the community has, at any time between November 3, 2001 and the date of [the attorney]’s report, not had a beneficial ownership interest in any of those properties during that time period, then 100% of the expert’s fees will be borne 100% by Wife; if the court determines that Husband, Wife, or the community has had a beneficial interest in any of those properties, then the cost of the expert will be borne by Husband. If the court determines that Husband, Wife, and/or the community has had a beneficial [ownership] interest in the Leominster and/or the Great Road properties at any time since the parties’ separation, that interest shall be equally divided by the parties in kind.... [¶]C. Great Road Realty interest sold during marriage. Husband received $74,000 for the parties’ share of the proceeds of the sale of an interest in real estate located on Great Road, Acton, Massachusetts, during marriage, and those proceeds are disposed of in Paragraph 1(A), above [providing that husband shall keep the proceeds as part of the division of personal property]. Wife contends that husband sold his and the community’s interest in this property for less than [the] fair market value as of the date of the sale. In order to resolve this dispute, on September 25, 2007 (Order filed October 30, 2007), the court appointed Jonathan Avery as a real estate appraiser to appraise the fair market value of the parties’ interest in the Great Road property as of the date of sale. The parties initially shall equally share the cost of Mr. Avery’s appraisal fees. If the appraisal suggests that the parties’ interest in this property was transferred for an amount less than its fair market value at the time, Wife may file a motion in this case to seek whatever remedies are available to her. This agreement is without any admission on Husband’s part that the property was undervalued at the time of [the] sale. At the hearing on any such motion, Husband may offer evidence of any personal considerations which entered into the sale of that property and which may not have been considered by the appraiser. The prevailing party on such a motion will be entitled to payment of all his/her reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of suit by the other party. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subparagraph 2(C), Wife does not have the right to claim any interest in the $74,000 that husband has received in connection with the sale....”
Paragraph 15 of the judgment contained a general clause regarding attorney fees: “Each party shall pay his or her own attorneys’ fees and costs of suit through entry of judgment. However, if either party brings legal proceedings to enforce any of the terms contained in this agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of suit to be paid by the other party.”
II. Hearing on Value/ Ownership of Massachusetts Properties
Wife filed a motion for a hearing on “property valuation/ownership” under Paragraph 2 of the Settlement Agreement/Judgment. The court held a hearing to resolve the following issues: (1) whether husband had a beneficial ownership interest in the Leominster property referenced in the settlement agreement; (2) whether husband had sold his interest in the Great Road property referenced in the settlement agreement for less than the fair market value, and whether wife had any remedies available as a consequence; and (3) whether husband retained an ownership interest in the Great Road properties after November 3, 2001, the date of the couple’s separation. Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment (Goldstein v. Barak Construction (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 845, 849, fn. 1), the evidence showed the following:
On March 13, 1986, husband’s attorney put together a “1031 exchange” (see 26 U.S.C. § 1031, allowing deferment of capital gains taxes on a qualifying exchange of like kind property) so that husband could acquire an interest in the Great Road Property while his brother Jay Moody acquired the Leominster property. The Beamin Oaks Trust was created on that date to purchase and hold the Leominster property, and husband and Jay became the trustees. Husband and Jay briefly shared a 50/50 beneficial ownership interest in the Beamin Oaks Trust at its inception, but husband almost immediately transferred his 50 percent interest to Jay in exchange for a 50 percent interest in the Great Road Realty Trust, in which Jay had a 100 percent interest. After the exchange, Jay owned a 100 percent beneficial ownership interest in the Beamin Oaks Trust and husband and Jay each owned a 50 percent beneficial ownership interest in the Great Road Realty Trust; additionally, husband and Jay were trustees of both the Beamin Oaks and Great Road Realty Trusts. Husband put $92,500 into the exchange, which ultimately went to the Great Road property.
On December 15, 1999, husband entered into a written agreement to sell his 50 percent interest in the Great Road property to Marion and Gregory DeMille for $125,000, and to resign as trustee and be replaced by a nominee of the DeMilles. On June 22, 2000, husband and his brother Jay signed a trust certificate indicating that they each had a 50 percent beneficial interest in the Great Road Realty Trust. On June 23, 2000, husband resigned as trustee of the Great Road Realty Trust and was replaced by Gregory DeMille; the document appointing DeMille as trustee was signed by Jay Moody, Marion DeMille and Gregory DeMille as 100 percent beneficial owners of the trust. The Trust obtained a $130,000 loan, and escrow closed on December 28, 2001. Husband received $74,512.50 of the $130,000 and $49,675 was paid directly to a relative of wife’s who had given husband a loan. No realtor was involved and no sales commission was paid.
Larry Salem, an attorney who conducted a title search on the Leominster and Great Road properties in contemplation of the hearing on wife’s motion, concluded that husband did not have any beneficial ownership interest in the Leominster property before the Beamin Oaks Trust was created on March 13, 1986. Husband was the trustee of the Beamin Oaks Trust from March 13, 1986 until October 24, 2007, but there was no recorded evidence as to who were the beneficiaries of that trust. Husband was also a trustee of the Great Road Realty Trust from March 13, 1986 until June 23, 2000, though there was no recorded evidence that he was a beneficial owner. However, the unrecorded evidence showed that husband was the 50 percent beneficial owner of the Great Road Realty Trust on June 22, 2000, the date he signed the trust certificate in connection with the sale to the DeMilles.
Jonathan Avery, a real estate appraiser in Massachusetts, considered the fair market value of the Great Road Property as of June 1, 2001. He concluded that the property was worth $300,000 when considered with a small parcel behind the lot (in which husband did not have an ownership interest). The value of the front lot alone (in which husband did have a 50 percent interest until he sold it to the DeMilles) was $292,500. Michael Levine, another Massachusetts real estate appraiser, indicated that the fair market value of husband’s 50 percent interest in the property was worth less than half of the total value, as a partial interest is less marketable than a 100 percent fee simple ownership. Levine indicated that a 25 percent discount was an acceptable adjustment for the sale of a partial interest, meaning that in this case, the value of husband’s 50 percent interest was about $110,000 (half of the total $292,500, or $146,250, less a 25 percent discount). The lack of realtor commissions (which could be anywhere from 8 to 10 percent on commercial real estate) further increased the amount that the sale price should be discounted, because a commission would not need to be deducted from the proceeds of the sale.
Based on this evidence, the trial court concluded that wife did not carry her burden of showing that husband had any beneficial ownership interest in the Leominster property as of the date of their separation on November 3, 2001, or that he sold his interest in the Great Road property for less than fair market value. The court also ruled that husband did not have any beneficial ownership interest in the Great Road property after the date of separation.
III. Attorney Fees and Costs
On husband’s motion, the court ordered wife to pay him a total of $93,285.08 in attorney fees and costs incurred for the litigation of issues relating to the Leominster and Great Road properties. The award included $62,308.04 in legal fees to attorney Sandra Acevedo, husband’s trial counsel; $23,185.04 in legal fees to Massachusetts attorney Theresa Capobianco, who assisted Ms. Acevedo in matters relating to the Massachusetts properties and discovery conducted in Massachusetts; $3,439.50 in fees for real estate appraiser Jonathan Avery, who was appointed by the court to appraise the Great Road Properties; and $1,250 to appraiser Michael Levine, who was retained by husband to render an opinion on special considerations affecting the value of the Great Road property (sale of a partial interest, the lack of a realtor who would charge a commission, the sale of the property on an “as is” basis). The court based the award of fees and costs on Paragraph 15 of the Settlement Agreement/Judgment, which authorizes an award of fees to the prevailing party in proceedings to enforce the agreement.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Properly Framed the Issues to be Tried
Paragraph 2B of the Settlement Agreement/Judgment provides that the cost of experts retained to determine the community’s interest in the Leominster and Great Road properties would be borne by husband if it was determined that the community had a beneficial ownership interest in those properties at any time on or after the November 3, 2001 date of separation. Wife contends the trial court improperly “rewrote” this provision when it ruled that husband had no beneficial interest in the Great Road property after the sale to the DeMilles in 2000. Wife claims the evidence is undisputed that escrow on that sale did not close until December 28, 2001, almost two months after the date of separation, and that she is therefore the prevailing party under Paragraph 2B. We disagree.
The determination of the date that husband held a beneficial interest is relevant only to wife’s entitlement to fees and costs. Wife had already agreed as part of the settlement that husband would retain the $74,512.50 in proceeds from the sale to the DeMilles, and her claim concerning his failure to obtain the fair market value is not affected by whether the sale occurred before or after the date of separation.
The record contains an escrow statement showing that a $130,000 loan to the Great Road Realty Trust closed on December 28, 2001, and that funds were dispersed to husband as a result. But it appears from the report of Larry Salem, the attorney who researched the titles on the two Massachusetts properties, that the DeMilles actually became the beneficial owners of the Great Road Realty Trust in June 2000, before the close of escrow. Specifically, a trust certificate signed on June 22, 2000, approving the replacement of Gregory DeMille for husband as trustee, was signed by Jay Moody and the DeMilles as the beneficial owners of the Great Road Realty Trust. Wife has not established that the court’s factual finding on this issue was unsupported by the record or that the court abused its discretion as a matter of law. (See In re Marriage of Bower (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 893, 899.)
II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding that Husband Did Not Have a Beneficial Ownership Interest in the Leominster Property
Wife argues that a de novo review of the documents relating to the 1031 exchange that took place in 1986 shows that husband retained an ownership interest in the Beamin Oaks Trust and Leominster property. As a threshold matter, wife is incorrect that this is an issue of law to be reviewed de novo. Because the relevant documents were susceptible to more than one interpretation, the trial court properly admitted parol evidence to determine the nature of the interest transferred. (California Nat. Bank v. Woodbridge Plaza LLC (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 137, 142.) We review the court’s resolution of that issue under the substantial evidence rule. (Wolf v. Superior Court (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1351; see also Industrial Indemnity Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 999, 1002, fn. 1.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that husband did not retain any beneficial ownership interest in the Leominster property. John O’Brien, the attorney who prepared the documents for the 1031 exchange, testified in his deposition that husband took a 50 percent interest in the Beamin Oaks Trust when it was formed in 1986, which he then exchanged for 50 percent of his brother Jay’s interest in the Great Road Realty Trust, leaving Jay the 100 percent beneficial owner of the Beamin Oaks Trust. Husband testified that although he momentarily held a 50 percent interest in the Beamin Oaks trust to accomplish the exchange, he never received any rents on the property and never reported it on his income tax returns. Jay Moody testified that he himself had been the 100 percent beneficial owner of the Beamin Oaks Trust since March of 1986. After researching the title on the Leominster and Great Road properties, Larry Salem had found no recorded evidence that husband was ever the beneficial owner of the Leominster property or Beamin Oaks Trust.
Wife notes that there were three separate certificates of ownership prepared by attorney O’Brien in anticipation of the 1031 exchange that took place in 1986-one showing husband to be the 100 percent owner of the Beamin Oaks Trust, one showing his brother Jay to be the 100 percent owner, and one showing that they had a 50/50 ownership interest. Wife reasons that if husband was in fact the 100 percent owner of the Beamin Oaks Trust before the 1031 exchange, he would have retained at least a 50 percent interest after the exchange, because only 50 percent of the Beamin Oaks Trust was transferred to the Great Road Realty Trust. This ambiguity in the evidence does not require reversal. Attorney O’Brien explained in his deposition that he had prepared the three certificates before he had finally determined how to structure the exchange and that he ultimately decided to make the brothers 50/50 owners of the Beamin Oaks Trust at its inception-meaning that husband retained no interest in the property after his 50 percent interest was transferred. The trial court was entitled to credit O’Brien’s explanation and its conclusion that husband relinquished all interest in Leominster and the Beamin Oaks Trust was supported by substantial evidence.
We express no opinion as to whether this transaction met the requirements of a valid 1031 exchange for tax purposes.
III. The Evidence Supports the Court’s Rejection of Wife’s Valuation Claim
Wife argues that the evidence established that husband sold his interest in the Great Road property to the DeMilles for less than fair market value and that she is entitled to recover one-half of the difference between the sales price and the fair market value. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion to the contrary. As the court aptly explained in its statement of decision, “[T]he appraised value by Jonathan Avery is eleven (11) percent higher than the actual sale price. This is not significant in view of the facts of this case. The parties did not pay a real estate commission on the sale. According to the court’s expert, that would be five (5) to ten (10) percent for commercial properties, and according to Husband’s expert, it would be ten (10) percent. The property was also sold ‘as is.’ Husband was under financial pressure to pay off [] creditors, namely, wife’s sister and brother-in-law. In addition, the sale was for less than a fee simple interest, so that both the purchasers and husband’s brother had to be willing to continue as co-owners. Arguably, a buyer had the right, at the moment of purchase, to demand a partition action, and [] this is why minority interests are discounted, because people don’t want to buy a lawsuit.”
Nor did the trial court err when it rejected wife’s valuation claim on the alternative ground that there was no legal remedy for the wrong alleged: “Wife has made no showing, and she has made no argument that under the Family Law Act, a spouse may, with 20/20 hindsight, second guess or audit her spouse’s financial transactions during [the] marriage. There is one exception pursuant to Family Code § 2602, that relates to a deliberate misappropriation. No deliberate misappropriation has been alleged or proven in this case. There is no evidence that the sale was done to cheat Wife or the community, or that Husband received any consideration other than the sale proceeds that he was awarded in the Stipulated Judgment. If Husband did not get top dollar for the property, the law simply does not give Wife a remedy.”
Wife suggests on appeal that she does have a remedy because husband breached his fiduciary duty to inform her of the sale and to act in a fiduciary manner. (See Fam. Code, § 721, subd. (b).) In determining that the difference between the appraised value and the sales price was insignificant, the court implicitly and necessarily found there was no breach of fiduciary duty, a finding supported by substantial evidence.
IV. Attorney Fees
Wife argues that the court erred when it awarded attorney fees to husband as the prevailing party on the ownership and valuation claims. She contends that she was in fact the prevailing party as to the ownership claim and would have been the prevailing party on the valuation claim but for reversible error by the trial court. As explained in the previous portion of our discussion, wife was not a prevailing party on the ownership claim and the court did not commit reversible error in its resolution of the valuation claim.
Wife also argues that the court committed an error of law when it construed Paragraph 15 of the Settlement Agreement/Judgment to “trump” Paragraph 2B, which did not specifically provide for attorney fees relating to the Leominster ownership claims. Wife complains that the majority of the legal fees at issue were expended on this issue (as opposed to the less complicated valuation claim) and that most of the attorney fee award should be reversed. We disagree.
Paragraph 2B provides that the expert fees would be borne by wife if it were determined that husband had no beneficial ownership interest in the Great Road property after the date of separation. It made no provision for attorney fees. But Paragraph 15 provided that “if either party brings legal proceedings to enforce any of the terms contained in this agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of suit to be paid by the other party.” Moreover, Paragraph 2C provided that in a motion relating to the valuation of the Great Road properties, the other issue litigated in these proceedings, the prevailing party would be entitled to attorney fees.
The parties to a marital settlement may contractually agree to a prevailing party attorney fee clause independent of the fee provisions in the Family Code. (See In re Marriage of Sherman (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1132, 1140; Code Civ. Proc. § 1717.) When an attorney fee clause provides for an award of fees incurred for enforcing the contract, the prevailing party is entitled to fees incurred for any action “on the contract.” (Turner v. Schultz (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 974, 980.) An action is “on the contract” so long as it “involves” a contract. (Id. at pp. 979-980.) Wife’s motion for a determination of ownership and valuation was an action “on the contract” and fell within the provisions of Paragraph 15 unless that paragraph was somehow superseded by a different, more specific provision of the settlement agreement. Paragraph 2B’s mere failure to mention attorney fees cannot be reasonably construed to supersede Paragraph 15 general provision requiring the payment of attorney fees to the prevailing party. Husband was entitled to recover his reasonable attorney fees as a prevailing party.
Wife argues that even assuming husband was entitled to reasonable fees under the settlement agreement, the evidence presented by his counsel did not support the amount of fees ordered. We agree with this contention.
Attorney Acevedo requested attorney fees of $69,948.86 for services personally rendered by her between February 2008 and February 2009. Her supporting declaration included a general description of the services provided in monthly increments and the dollar amount billed for each monthly period, although it did not delineate the time spent on each task nor state her hourly rate. Attached to the declaration was a redacted billing statement generated by Ms. Acevedo’s office and addressed to husband, which showed the dollar amount of fees incurred on a daily basis, but without a corresponding description of the services rendered, the hours actually spent or a statement of the hourly rate for those services. It is impossible to determine from these documents how many hours were spent on the case by Ms. Acevedo or how much was billed per hour of time spent. On the basis of this record, the court ordered that wife pay husband $62,308.04 for Ms. Acevedo’s fees.
Ms. Acevedo also sought fees on behalf of Massachusetts attorney Theresa Capobianco for legal services rendered to husband. Although Ms. Capobianco did not submit her own declaration, Ms. Acevedo’s declaration stated, “Ms. Capobianco’s fees total a sum of $23,185, for the period of June of 2007 through the completion of trial on December 19, 2008. This sum includes reasonable costs paid to a title examiner, Mr. Colby Welch, to directly controvert [wife]’s claim that [husband] has any ‘retained’ ownership interest in any Massachusetts property(ies), in approximately the sum of $2,000. This figure also includes ongoing efforts to complete the valuation of 471 Great Road, unnecessary and ongoing negotiations with [wife’s attorney] on the valuation and title experts, as well as handling all claims related to the Great [R]oad and Leominster properties. Ms. Capobianco handled the preparation of the title and other expert records, research and other preparation of legal pleadings and correspondence since June 22, 2008 (when the Marital Judgment was entered). [Ms. Capobianco] also had to deal with [wife’s attorney]’s relentless efforts to intimidate and mislead the appraiser and insisting that property not owned by the parties be valued, causing more fees to be incurred. [Ms. Capobianco] prepared pleadings and obtained records searches and the title reports to counter the Motions set for October 28, 2008 and ultimately assisted in the preparation for trial.”
Attached to Ms. Acevedo’s declaration were three redacted billing statements from Ms. Capobianco’s office for October, November and December of 2008, each of which listed the number of hours spent working on husband’s case by date, along with the total dollar amount of the bill. The statements did not provide any description of the services rendered on those dates, nor did it show Ms. Capobianco’s hourly fee. The most recent invoice, dated January 8, 2009, showed a cumulative amount due of $15,471.04, for services rendered through December 2008. The average hourly rates for services on the three billing statements (i.e., the total dollar amount billed on each invoice divided by the total number of hours) were approximately $171, $161, and $221. Based on this information, the court ordered wife to pay $23,185.04 for fees owed by husband to Ms. Capobianco.
When reasonable attorney fees are authorized by contract or statute, the amount of those fees is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1166; Marsh v. Mountain Zephyr, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 289, 303.) There must, however, be a reasonable basis for the award. (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 142-143; Williams v. San Francisco Bd. of Permit Appeals (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 961, 965.)
An attorney need not submit contemporaneous time records in order to recover attorney fees. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) Here, however, Ms. Acevedo presented no evidence that would have permitted the court to discern her hourly rate or the time she actually spent on the case, let alone on each individual task. The trial court lacked the information it needed to exercise its sound discretion when determining the reasonableness of Ms. Acevedo’s fees. (Contrast Weber v. Langholtz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587 [affirming fee award where counsel’s declaration stated hourly rate and described tasks in detail, and it was possible to discern total amount of hours expended; court noted, however, that “a fee request ordinarily should be documented in great detail...”].)
Attorney Acevedo indicated in her declaration that the redactions had been made to protect the attorney-client privilege, and that a non-redacted version had been submitted to the trial court under seal. The trial court declined to consider the unredacted version of the billing statements in making its award.
Nor does the record support an award of $23,185.04 to attorney Capobianco. Although the declaration of Ms. Acevedo describes Ms. Capobianco’s work in very general terms (e.g., she “handled the preparation of expert records, research and other preparation of legal pleading and correspondence”), it provides a scant basis for determining the nature of the work actually performed or assessing the reasonableness of her fees. The billing statements from Ms. Capobianco’s firm showed a total number of hours billed from October to December 2008 and a balance due of only $15,417.04. There may very well be a good reason for the discrepancy between this figure and the over-$23,000 sought (e.g., amounts previously paid by husband) but the supporting declaration is silent on this point.
Wife also argues that she should not have been ordered to pay the $1,250 fee of appraiser Michael Levine, who was retained by husband to testify on various matters affecting the value of the Great Road property. Wife notes that under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (b)(1), the “[f]ees of experts not ordered by the court” will not be allowed as a cost item “except when expressly authorized by law.” (Robert L. Cloud & Assoc., Inc. v. Mikesell (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1154; Fairchild v. Park (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 919, 931.) Husband responds that the expert fees were “authorized by law” under Family Code section 2030 and/or Family Code section 271.
The court orally stated at the hearing on attorney fees and costs that it was basing its award exclusively on the prevailing party clause of the settlement agreement, and not on Family Code section 2030 or 271. Husband notes that in an attachment to the judgment, the court stated that fees and costs incurred after the entry of the stipulated settlement on June 22, 2007 were subject to Family Code sections 2030 and 271. But the court did not make any findings necessary to support an award under Family Code section 2030 or 271; the attachment merely notes that wife has been able to extensively litigate the property-related issues in this case because she has a personal relationship with her lawyer and that this enhanced her ability to pay husband’s fees and costs.
We therefore remand the case for a new hearing regarding attorney fees and costs, consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
DISPOSITION
The order denying wife’s motion on “property valuation/ownership” is affirmed. The order awarding attorney fees and costs is reversed and the case is remanded for a new hearing on the issue. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur. JONES, P. J., SIMONS, J.