Opinion
G060110
07-05-2022
In re the Marriage of MICHAEL and PATRICIA MILLS. v. PATRICIA MILLS, Appellant. MICHAEL MILLS, Respondent,
Law Office of Jeffrey A. Lewis and Jeffrey A. Lewis for Appellant. Michael Mills, in pro. per., for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 13D003103, Daphne Grace Sykes, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Jeffrey A. Lewis and Jeffrey A. Lewis for Appellant.
Michael Mills, in pro. per., for Respondent.
OPINION
SANCHEZ, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Patricia Mills appeals from a postjudgment order denying her request to modify her divorce judgment, which she asserts contains clerical errors regarding attorney and expert fees. We review the postjudgment order for abuse of discretion and conclude that even if error can be discerned, Patricia fails to show any errors are clerical in nature. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2013, respondent Michael Mills initiated the underlying divorce case.Litigation generated over half a million dollars in attorney fees as well as fees for retained experts. The accounting for some of those fees, as reflected in the judgment, are at issue in this appeal.
We refer to the parties by their first names because they share the same surname; no disrespect is intended.
In 2017, the family residence was sold and the proceeds placed in a trust account. Relevant to this appeal, an expert was paid $9,600 from the trust account. The trial court also ordered two payments of $75,000 disbursed from the escrow account of the family residence sale, to pay for Patricia and Michael's respective attorney fees (i.e., $150,000 combined). In 2018, additional attorney fees were paid with disbursements of $35,000 (for Patricia) and $25,000 (for Michael) from the trust account.
Trial proceedings concluded at a January 2019 hearing where the trial court entered a minute order incorporating a 74-page reporter's transcript of the hearing, to serve as a statement of decision. The transcript shows the court and parties discussed the payments of the expert and attorney fees relevant to this appeal. The court ruled that Patricia and Michael should generally "bear[] their own fees and costs," but on the expert fee, Patricia should be responsible for 75 percent of the fee and Michael 25 percent.
Judgment was entered six months later, in July 2019. Regarding the residence, the judgment states: "Award to [Patricia the family r]esidence . . ., including any sales proceeds from the sale of th[e] residence, is awarded to [Patricia] as her separate property. The total value is $612,000.00 and is assigned to [Patricia] per the marital balance sheet [attached to the judgment]." On the expert fee at issue on appeal, the judgment states Patricia owes Michael $2,400 (i.e., 25 percent of the total fee). On attorney fees, the judgment states Patricia was ordered to pay Michael "$10,000 to equalize the attorney's fees [Patricia] received from the trust account." The fee calculations are incorporated into the judgment's further calculation that Patricia should ultimately "receive $15,136.38 from the remaining funds in trust."
Patricia asserts the judgment contains clerical errors on the attorney and expert fees and, if corrected, should have awarded her $129,936. In the trial court, Patricia sought modification of the judgment through three requests for orders: two filed in 2019 followed by an October 2020 request.
Both parties were represented by multiple lawyers throughout the litigation of this case. We do not distinguish between them in this appeal.
After several continuances, the trial court held a January 2021 hearing on Patricia's requested relief. The court heard oral arguments and one month later issued a ruling denying relief. Patricia filed a notice of appeal in April 2021.
For reasons immaterial to this appeal, different judges conducted the 2019 hearing, signed the judgment, and conducted the 2021 hearing.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review and Applicable Principles
Patricia's appeal rests on Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) (section 473(d)), which states in relevant part that: "The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed." Outside of voidness issues not implicated in this appeal, section 473(d) authorizes trial courts to set aside judgments and orders based on clerical error, but not judicial error. (Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Corp. v. Western Pacific Roofing Corp. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 110, 117, 118 ["The purpose of postjudgment correction of clerical errors is to ensure that the court's records 'speak the truth'"]; see In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705 ["The distinction between clerical error and judicial error is 'whether the error was made in rendering the judgment, or in recording the judgment rendered.' [Citation.] Any attempt by a court, under the guise of correcting clerical error, to 'revise its deliberately exercised judicial discretion' is not permitted"].)
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
We apply the abuse of discretion standard of review to a trial court's ruling on requested section 473(d) relief for clerical error. We focus on the correctness of the ruling's result and not its reasons (see Knapp v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 932, 939 (Knapp)), and indulge "all intendments and presumptions . . . in favor of correctness" (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58 (Fladeboe)). Even where a ruling is susceptible to an interpretation showing error, we look for a miscarriage of justice to support a reversal. (In re Marriage of Dellaria & Blickman-Dellaria (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 196, 204-205 & fn. 6.)
"The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court's decision exceeded the bounds of reason. [Citation.] In applying the abuse of discretion standard, the reviewing court measures the evidence presented to the trial court against the range of options permitted by the established legal criteria. [Citation.] The scope of the trial court's discretion is limited by the governing law, and an action that '"'transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law'"' constitutes an abuse of discretion." (Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare REIT, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 789.) On our constituent review for substantial evidence on factual issues (ibid), if an "appeal turns on a failure of proof" for an issue the appellant had the trial court burden on, as Patricia did, the test is whether the evidence compels a finding in appellant's favor as a matter of law (see Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838; see Evid. Code, § 500). Accordingly, Patricia has the burden to show the record compels us to conclude the judgment contains clerical error.
II. Analysis
Patricia contends the trial court failed to "correct discrepancies between the trial court's [statement of decision] and [its later entered] judgment." All her appellate contentions rely on a premise that the initial payments of the fees at issue were made with money belonging to Patricia alone. For example, on the challenged expert fee, Patricia asserts in her briefing that "[a]ll of the funds in the trust account were allocated to [her], therefore [she] paid the $9,600.00 to [the expert] and Michael owe[s] Patricia 25 [percent] of the fee[, i.e.,] $2,400.00."
By contrast, if we view the $9,600 as initially paid by the marital estate - i.e., if the money was at that time community property - then there is no logical inconsistency between the trial court's statement of decision on the expert fee and its subsequent judgment decree on the point. This is the view supported by the record because the court explicitly stated it was treating the initial payment money as community property:
THE COURT: "One of the missed - mishaps . . . I think it's a misunderstanding - was [Patricia] thinking all that she owed [Michael] was the business [not relevant to this appeal], plus [the residence].
"When, in fact, even though it was awarded to her, it never really got effectuated. "It was - the value at time of sale got on [Michael]'s - put on her side of the balance sheet.
"So, it resulted in something that happened a little differently on the balance sheet, and she kept talking about the money in the trust account as being her money.
"[PATRICIA'S COUNSEL]: Correct.
"THE COURT: Well, it isn't.
"It's the communit[y's] money to divide."
The trial court's statement of decision's comments resolve whether the court erroneously denied Patricia relief under section 473(d) on the judgment decree for the expert fee. Based on the comments, the record does not compel a conclusion that the initial payment for the expert's fee was from Patricia's separate property, as she contends. Instead, the record supports there was no error in directing that Michael be reimbursed for 25 percent of the community property that initially paid the fee.
More fundamental to this appeal, even assuming arguendo the trial court's community property characterization of the initial payment was erroneous, the court's comments show it deliberately treated the money as community property through judicial reasoning. Even if Patricia could show the judgment decree on the expert fee was based on error, it would not be clerical and therefore would not show the abuse of discretion needed.
Similarly, Patricia's other contention, about attorney fees, is unavailing. She asserts clerical error on those fees exists in the trial court judgment because the residence was awarded to her as her separate property, its sale proceeds paid for Michael's attorney fees, and therefore the judgment erroneously failed to order Michael to reimburse Patricia for the payment.
Patricia also relatedly asserts the judgment should not have directed her to reimburse Michael $10,000 for the difference in their at issue attorney fees.
As with the expert fee issue, Patricia has not shown any purported failure to properly account for the attorney fees was clerical in nature, as opposed to based on judicial reasoning. In the hearing transcript serving as the trial court's statement of decision, the court and Patricia's counsel explicitly discussed the fees as follows:
We do not decide whether any judicial error occurred.
"[PATRICIA'S COUNSEL]: I need a clarification of what you said - so far found.
"With regards to the attorney fees, the $75,000 that was paid, $25,000 paid to [Michael's former counsel].
"You are stating that the asset after - it was turned over to [Patricia], it was still deemed community property?
"THE COURT: My feeling was that because of what happened, and how it happened, yes.
"And it got put on her side of the balance sheet, as hers.
"[PATRICIA'S COUNSEL]: Correct.
"THE COURT: It got put there, and she's still getting it as separate property.
"It's just a different format.
"[PATRICIA'S COUNSEL]: What we are saying - for clarification, we need a seven - a hundred thousand, 25 and 75, taken out for attorney fees.
"It would have been taken from what would have been hers.
"THE COURT: No.
"You can't look at it that way.
"[PATRICIA'S COUNSEL]: But it's
"THE COURT: It's charged against her share and his is charged - his share and it's
"[PATRICIA'S COUNSEL]: Still. Have a problem with it [sic].
"THE COURT: You may have.
"[PATRICIA'S COUNSEL]: Well, I know
"THE COURT: It's not my question of the source of the money.
"It's a question of who - what is charged to him, so that you can
"[PATRICIA'S COUNSEL]: I understand.
"THE COURT: That's my order.
"[PATRICIA'S COUNSEL]: I understand.
"THE COURT: The $75,000 got charged to each - in essence, each are bearing their own fees and costs.
"Except to the extent that I made other orders, that [Patricia] pay to [Michael]."
The trial court's statement of decision's comments resolve Patricia's assertion about attorney fees because they show the errors claimed, even if true, were products of judicial reasoning, not inadvertence. The record does not compel a conclusion that denying Patricia's requested section 473(d) relief was erroneous.
III. Remaining Assertions
None of Patricia's remaining assertions have merit. She relies on In re Marriage of Kaufman (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 147 (Kaufman), to argue the record here shows clerical error. In Kaufman, an appellate court affirmed a trial court's decision that errors in a judgment warranted correction under section 473. (Kaufman, at pp. 149-151.) The judgment had been entered more than two years earlier, after the parties orally stipulated in court to terms about their divorce. (Id. at p. 149.) The judgment contained modifications of some terms based on post-stipulation correspondences between the parties' counsel. (Ibid.)
The appeal in Kaufman did not involve claims of accounting error, but (1) whether spousal support should be determined by past or future income and (2) how many insurance policies the respondent was obligated to maintain for his children. (Kaufman, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at pp. 149-150.) The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling. (Id. at p. 151.)
Kaufman does not assist Patricia because that appellate review presented the opposite case posture of this appeal. The Kaufman court affirmed the trial court's decision to grant relief, holding the record there showed the "trial court acted within its discretion in modifying the judgment" and that clerical correction was not limited by time. (Kaufman, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 151.) In contrast, the trial court here denied relief. We presume the decision reached the correct result in this case and we look to Patricia to demonstrate the abuse of discretion she claims, which she has not done for the reasons discussed above. Kaufman does not show the result here was incorrect.
Patricia also asserts the trial court failed to issue a requested statement of decision and that "[t]he court abused its discretion by failing to rule on the relief requested[,] thereby denying Patricia her right to due process." As noted, by the time of the court's ruling, Patricia had filed three requests for orders seeking modification of the judgment. At the hearing that resulted in the ruling, Patricia asserted there were alterative grounds for relief available to her: section 473(d) and subdivision (b) of the same section.
Although Patricia accurately notes the court's denial ruling contains statements that could be interpreted as inconsistent with her request for section 473(d) relief-e.g., the ruling stated Patricia's "request [was] not timely, nor ha[d she] cited nor proven the statutory grounds alleged"- her assertion fails for three reasons. First, we indulge "all intendments and presumptions . . . in favor of [the ruling's] correctness" (Fladeboe, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 58) and note the ruling can be read as commenting on Patricia's other requested relief.
Second, Patricia's claim there was no statement of decision issued does not provide a ground for appellate relief because she claims the basis is section 473(d) but does not demonstrate that it entitled her to a statement of decision. (See In re Marriage of Fong (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278, 293-297 [discussing general rule that statements of decision are not required for motion rulings]; compare Fam. Code, § 2127 [entitling party requesting relief under that section's chapter to statement of decision].) In other words, she has not shown the trial court was obligated to provide a statement of decision for her requested relief based on section 473(d).
Third, as noted, we focus on the correctness of the ruling's result and not its reasons. (See Knapp, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 939.) Because the record does not support a conclusion that clerical error occurred, Patricia cannot show the prejudice that would be required to compel reversal. (F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1102.)
IV. Michael's Request for Sanctions
Finally, Michael asserts Patricia's appeal is frivolous and that she should accordingly be sanctioned. We deny the request because Michael has not filed a separate motion with a supporting declaration. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276.)
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed. Michael shall recover costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: MOORE, ACTING P. J., GOETHALS, J.