Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. PD032185. Alan H. Friedenthal, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Rojelio Lopez, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Ekerling & Doherty, Howard L. Ekerling for Respondent.
BOREN, P.J.
Petitioner Rojelio Lopez appeals the trial court’s post judgment order requiring him to pay $30,856 to respondent Diana Ornelas for retroactive child support. Lopez, representing himself on appeal, apparently contends the trial court was biased and prejudiced because it did not consider the evidence itemized in his declaration, and it did not accept his arguments on the issue of child support arrears.
However, the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in using presumptively correct tax return information and DissoMaster data calculations. Because Lopez has failed to provide a reporter’s transcript, there is no appellate record supporting a claim of bias, prejudice, or abuse of discretion. Also, Lopez’s opening brief not only lacks any discretely defined contention, but it lacks appropriate citation to the clerk’s transcript and any supporting legal authority. We thus affirm the order under review.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In March of 2003, a judgment of dissolution was entered between the parties. In April of 2005, Ornelas filed an order to show cause to modify child custody and visitation and to obtain child support and attorney fees. Several continuances ensued, and in September of 2006, the court made various findings and filed an order addressing custody, visitation and other issues, but reserved jurisdiction on some issues, including child support.
Both parties filed numerous income and expense declarations covering the period of time from the initial order to show cause until the child support order. At the hearing on August 18, 2008, the court addressed the issue of child support. Because Lopez was then in propria persona status, the court gave him additional time to submit briefs and argument to reply to Ornelas’s calculation of current child support and support arrears. Both parties filed additional briefs. On September 22, 2008, the court took the issue of child support arrears under submission, thereafter filed its ruling and entered a formal order on February 19, 2009, directing Lopez to pay Ornelas $30,856 for child support arrears.
Lopez appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its determination of retroactive child support because the determination was based upon tax returns, which are presumptively valid.
Child support orders are reviewed on appeal under the abuse of discretion standard. (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 282-283.) The court’s exercise of discretion will not be disturbed if it is within the range of the evidence presented. (In re Marriage of de Guigne (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1360.) We “confine ourselves to determining whether any judge could have reasonably made the challenged order.” (Ibid.)
The amount of child support must be computed in accordance with “the statewide uniform child support guideline.” (Fam. Code, § 4050 et seq.; In re Marriage of Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 284.) To calculate the guideline, the court must ascertain the “total net monthly disposable income of both parties.” (Fam. Code, § 4055, subd. (b)(1)(E).) The net disposable income is ascertained by deducting certain amounts from gross income (Fam. Code, §§ 4058, 4059), which is defined in terms “lifted straight from the definition of income in... the Internal Revenue Code.” (In re Marriage of Schulze (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 519, 529.)
“Hence it is not surprising that tax returns are the core component of determinations under the guideline formula.” (In re Marriage of Loh (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 325, 332.) That is because the parents’ gross incomes are stated under penalty of perjury on tax returns and should be deemed presumptively correct. (Id. at p. 333; In re Marriage of Riddle (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1080.)
In the present case, Ornelas presented the trial court with three scenarios for determining retroactive child support to be paid by Lopez. Each scenario was based on the actual physical custody orders made by the court, with the variable factor of Lopez’s income each year. The scenarios were also supported by calculation charts and DissoMaster Data Screen printouts.
The first scenario, which the trial court ultimately used, was based on the income stated in the parties’ respective income tax returns and yielded a total amount of retroactive child support of $30,856.52. The second scenario was based on Lopez’s statement of larger monthly income ($8,000 per month) as reflected in a credit application for a boat purchase, which would have resulted in retroactive child support of $45,257.97. And, the third scenario was based on Lopez’s statement of an even larger income ($9,000 per month) as reflected in a credit application for a car loan, which would have resulted in retroactive child support of $50,736.90.
The trial court’s written ruling indicates it specifically considered the three alternative approaches. The trial court selected the first scenario, the lesser of the three amounts, thus belying Lopez’s assertion that the court was biased or prejudiced against him. Moreover, just because the trial court did not accept Lopez’s assertion that Ornelas had purportedly “lied as to her financials” does not mean that the court did not consider his assertion. The trial court apparently considered but rejected the arguments Lopez asserted in his opposing declaration and opted, rather, to rely on the parties’ income as reflected in tax returns. A difference of opinion as to the credibility or value of certain evidence does not establish bias, prejudice, or an abuse of discretion.
II. Alternatively, the failure to provide a reporter’s transcript and proper appellate briefing warrants affirmance of the order.
Lopez, as the appellant, has the burden of providing an adequate record on appeal to affirmatively establish an alleged error. (See Davenport v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1695, 1700; Calhoun v. Hildebrandt (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 70, 72.) Lopez has failed to provide a reporter’s transcript of any of the proceedings. Having failed to provide a record on appeal sufficient to demonstrate any purported bias or prejudice, or any abuse of discretion as to the child support order, adequate appellate review of such issues is precluded, and the order under review must be affirmed. (See Brown v. Boren (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1320-1321; Estrada v. Ramirez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 618, 620, fn. 1; Interinsurance Exchange v. Collins (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1448.)
Also, Lopez’s opening brief contains no page references in the statement of facts and lacks any supporting case or statutory authority in the argument section. Indeed, the opening brief suffers from the lack of any discretely defined contention (see Tilbury Constructors, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 466, 482), and the argument section consists only of a somewhat cryptic single and incomplete sentence. A reviewing court is not required to make an independent search of the record to find error or grounds to support the judgment. (Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115-1116.) “When a party provides a brief ‘without argument, citation of authority or record reference establishing that the points were made below, ’ [the reviewing court] may ‘treat the points as waived, or meritless, and pass them without further consideration.’” (H.N. & Frances C. Berger Foundation v. City of Escondido (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1, 15; see also People v. Dougherty (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 278, 282.)
Finally, we acknowledge that Lopez may have had some difficulties representing himself. Nonetheless, procedural rules of law “must apply equally to parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) Parties proceeding in propria persona are “entitled to the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys.” (Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638.)
DISPOSITION
The order under review is affirmed.
We concur: DOI TODD, J. CHAVEZ, J.