Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 04FL04969
SCOTLAND, P.J.
Cornell O. Johnson appeals from a family court judgment awarding the sum of $125,821, a 1996 Ford Explorer, and $3,500 in attorney fees to Muriel Johnson pursuant to Family Code sections 271 and 2030. We shall affirm the judgment.
For simplicity and to avoid confusion, we hereafter refer to the parties by their first names.
BACKGROUND
Cornell has chosen to proceed on a clerk’s transcript. (Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 8.120, now rule 8.121.) Thus, the appellate record does not include a reporter’s transcript of the contested trial or of any other hearing. This is referred to as a “judgment roll” appeal. (Allen v. Toten (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1079, 1082-1083; Krueger v. Bank of America (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 204, 207.) The limited record that we have establishes the following:
On October 19, 2004, Cornell was ordered to pay $1,327 each month to Muriel as spousal support. On October 25, 2004, Cornell filed a motion to modify the support order. The trial court held hearings in December 2004, declined to modify the order, directed Cornell to return for another hearing on January 10, 2005, and told him that if he were not employed by then, he must “bring in 10 more job applications.”
At the January 2005 hearing, Cornell failed to present the job applications as directed. The trial court again confirmed the spousal support order of October 19, 2004.
On May 22, 2006, a judgment was entered, dissolving the parties’ marriage and reserving the court’s jurisdiction over all other issues.
In October 2006, Cornell filed another motion seeking to “terminate” the spousal support order of October 19, 2004.
A trial on all reserved issues was held on January 11, 2007. Both parties were present. Muriel, who was represented by counsel, submitted numerous exhibits as evidence, including an inter spousal transfer deed regarding real property situated in Sacramento, California, described as “Lot 425, as shown on the Map entitled, ‘Plat of Strawberry Manor Unit No.4,’ recorded in Book 61 of Maps, Page 34”; several deeds of trust related to real property situated in Sacramento, identified as 51 Cathcart Avenue, whose legal description is “Lot 425, as shown on the Map entitled, ‘Plat of Strawberry Manor Unit No.4,’ recorded in Book 61 of Maps, Page 34,” and 6 Dakota Court, whose legal description is “Lot 84, as shown on the Plat of Woodgate Unit No. 1, recorded in Book 115 of Maps, Map No. 6, records of said County”; and a “Declaration of Homestead” for real property identified as 6 Dakota Court, Sacramento, requested by Cornell.
After the trial concluded, the court entered a judgment awarding Muriel “the sum of $131,821.00 (one hundred thirty-one thousand eight hundred and twenty-one.) $6,000 subtracted leaves a balance of $125,821.00. [Muriel] is awarded the 1996 Ford Explorer valued at $6,000. Explorer to be delivered to [Muriel] within 10 days. [¶] Attorney Fees: [Cornell] is ordered to pay to [Muriel] on account of $750.00 plus $3,500.00 for [Family Code sections] 271 and 2030 fees.”
Cornell appeals from the judgment purportedly entered on January 11, 2007, the date of the trial. However, the judgment was not entered until February 8, 2007. We shall construe the appeal to be from the February 8 judgment. (See Klingele v. Engelman (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1482, 1485, fn. 3.)
DISCUSSION
On appeal, we must presume the trial court’s judgment is correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Thus, we must adopt all inferences in favor of the judgment, unless the record expressly contradicts them. (See Brewer v. Simpson (1960) 53 Cal.2d 567, 583.)
It is the burden of the party challenging a judgment to provide an adequate record to assess claims of error. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141.) An appellant must present an analysis of the facts and legal authority on each point made, and must support the analysis with appropriate citations to the material facts in the record. If an appellant fails to do so, the argument is forfeited. (County of Solano v. Vallejo Redevelopment Agency (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274; Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.)
When an appeal is “on the judgment roll” (Allen v. Toten, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1082-1083), we must conclusively presume evidence was presented that is sufficient to support the court’s findings. (Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 147, 154.) Our review is limited to determining whether any error “appears on the face of the record.” (National Secretarial Service, Inc. v. Froehlich (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 510, 521; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.163.)
These restrictive rules of appellate procedure apply to Cornell even though he is representing himself on appeal. (Leslie v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 117, 121; see also Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638-639; Wantuch v. Davis (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 786, 795.)
On the sparse record in this appeal, we find no error.
Cornell claims he “did not have adequate income to support the spousal support award” and, thus, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay $1,327 to Muriel each month as spousal support. There are two problems with this contention. First, the spousal support order of which Cornell complains was entered not in the judgment, but by the court more than two years earlier, on October 19, 2004. Consequently, the challenge to that order is untimely. (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368-370 [temporary spousal support orders are immediately appealable]; Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 564; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104 [an appeal must be filed no later than 180 days after entry of the appealable order].) Second, even if his challenge to the order were timely, it would fail because, in this judgment roll appeal, we must presume the trial court was presented with substantial evidence that Cornell had the income to support himself and pay the spousal support award. (Ehrler v. Ehrler, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at p. 154.)
Cornell also claims the trial court “[e]rred in awarding . . . Muriel $125,821.00 in [c]ommunity property equity” as well as the 1996 Ford Explorer. Again, with no reporter’s transcript of the trial, we must presume there was sufficient evidence to support these rulings. (Ehrler v. Ehrler, supra, 126 Cal.App.3d at p. 154.) On the face of this record, there is nothing to suggest otherwise. (National Secretarial Service, Inc. v. Froehlich, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 521; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.163.)
Finally, Muriel asks us to find that this appeal is frivolous (citing In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650) and thus to order Cornell to pay “additional attorneys fees for this appeal . . . .” Although Muriel cites the standard for imposing sanctions, she provides no analysis regarding why Cornell’s appeal meets that standard. Thus, we decline to consider the request. (People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 482, fn. 2 [a reviewing court need not discuss claims that are asserted perfunctorily and insufficiently developed]; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 150 [same]; People v. Galambos (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1159 [appellate contentions must be supported by analysis].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Cornell shall reimburse Muriel for her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).) Muriel’s request for sanctions for a frivolous appeal is denied.
We concur: SIMS, J. RAYE, J.