Pension benefits should be considered in framing the financial clauses of dissolution decrees. See In re Marriage of Jones, 309 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1981); Locke v. Locke, 263 N.W.2d 694, 696 (Iowa 1978); In re Marriage of Ralston, 242 N.W.2d 269, 271-72 (Iowa 1976); In re Marriage of Jensen, 396 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Iowa App. 1986); In re Marriage of Yates, 365 N.W.2d 49, 51 (Iowa App. 1985). See also Pensions or Retirement Benefits as Subject to Award or Division by Court in Settlement of Property Rights Between Spouses, 94 A.L.R.3d 176 (1979).
This is one method for equitably allocating a pension plan. See In re Marriage of Jensen, 396 N.W.2d 367, 369-70 (Iowa App. 1986). In such an award, no future litigation is necessary to secure future payments, and the financial circumstances and life expectancy of the spouse owning the award cannot depreciate its value after the dissolution.
See Shipley v. Shipley, 182 N.W.2d 125, 128 (Iowa 1970) (holding that a decree that dissolves a marriage but reserves a subsidiary issue for future determination is still a final decree for purposes of appeal); see also In re Marriage of Fenchel, 268 N.W.2d 207, 209 (Iowa 1978) (concluding the rules and statutes governing dissolutions "contemplate one final decree" terminating the marriage and stating if that decree is supplemented by a later one, "only the supplementary decree may then be appealed"); Elmquist v. Nairn, 98-1843, 2000 WL 372555, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2000) (addressing a father's appeal from the denial of his request for physical care where the court "reserved jurisdiction on the issue of visitation in order to allow the parties to reach a mutually workable schedule"); In re Marriage of Jensen, 396 N.W.2d 367, 368 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (reaching wife's challenge to a spousal support award where the court retained jurisdiction to address child support if the parties could not agree on their obligations). But see In re Marriage of Graziano, 573 N.W.2d 598, 599 (Iowa 1998) (concluding a decree entered after a dissolution trial that "addressed only the children's custody, and specified that other issues would be reserved for further order of the court" was interlocutory).
Pension benefits are a form of property. In re Marriage of Martin, 641 N.W.2d 203, 204 (Iowa Ct.App. 2001); see also In re Marriage of Wilson, 449 N.W.2d 890, 892 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989); In re Marriage of Jensen, 396 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Iowa Ct.App. 1986); In re Marriage of Byall, 353 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa Ct.App. 1984). Ordinarily, a dissolution decree settles all property rights and interests of the parties. Prochelo v. Prochelo, 346 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Iowa 1984); see also Walker v. Walker, 203 N.W.2d 320, 322 (Iowa 1972); Carr v. Carr, 185 Iowa 1205, 1211, 171 N.W. 785, 787 (1919).
Even if Michael is correct and an intraspousal gift cannot be set aside as gifted property, the key question is whether, viewing all economic aspects of the decree as an integrated whole, the overall distribution scheme is in fact equitable. See In re Marriage of Jensen, 396 N.W.2d 367, 368 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986). The district court found the overall scheme of distribution to be equitable, and we agree with that assessment.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bevers, 326 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Iowa 1982); In re Marriage of Wilson, 449 N.W.2d 890, 892 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989); In re Marriage of Jensen, 396 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Iowa Ct.App. 1986); In re Marriage of Byall, 353 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa Ct.App. 1984). Accordingly, if the district court intended to distribute a portion of Joseph's pension benefits to Samnieng via the aforementioned provision, it should not have used the term "alimony."
Iowa courts have consistently determined pensions and other retirement plans may be considered in framing the financial clauses of dissolution decrees. In re Marriage of Jensen, 396 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Iowa App. 1986). In reviewing a division of marital assets, all economic aspects of a decree must be viewed as an integrated whole.
As a general rule, the Iowa courts have considered a spouse's pension benefits as an asset to be considered in dividing marital property. See In re Marriage of Bevers, 326 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Iowa 1982), In re Marriage of Jensen, 396 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Iowa App. 1986); In re Marraige of Byall, 353 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa App. 1984). However, in Knipfer v. Knipfer, 259 Iowa 347, 144 N.W.2d 140 (1966), the Iowa Supreme Court stated that property divisions are not subject to modification proceedings ". . . in the absence of fraud, duress, coercion, mistake or other grounds as would justify the setting aside or changing a decree in any other case."
The pension in this case is going to her as a property division. See In re Marriage of Bevers, 326 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Iowa 1982); In re Marriage of Jensen, 396 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Iowa App. 1986). To adopt the trial court's decision would give Darrell almost all the property acquired during marriage should Cheryl remarry or cohabit.