Opinion
No. 6-129 / 05-0644
Filed March 29, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Marsha M. Beckelman, Judge.
Respondent appeals from the dismissal of his application to hold petitioner in contempt for alleged violations of the visitation provisions of the decree dissolving the parties' marriage. AFFIRMED.
Bryan Iehl, Waterloo, pro se.
Benjamin Blackstock of Blackstock Law Offices, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
In 2001 the marriage of Maria and Bryan Iehl was dissolved pursuant to a stipulation between the parties. The dissolution decree placed physical care of the parties' child Alexandra with Maria, and granted Bryan visitation. Relevant to this appeal are the visitation and "extended family" provisions of the decree:
5. CUSTODY, PRIMARY CARE AND VISITATION. . . .
a. Bryan shall have Alexandra every other weekend. . . .
b. Bryan shall have four weeks of visitation during the period commonly designated as school summer visitation. . . . Bryan shall take his weeks in no more than two week increments. . . .
. . . .
17. EXTENDED FAMILY. . . . The parties agree to modify their schedules to accommodate Alexandra having time with members of the extended families who are visiting from out of town or who have significant events occur, such as weddings, anniversary parties, funerals and graduations.
On June 25, 2004, Bryan filed an application for rule to show cause, alleging Maria had denied him regularly scheduled visitation the weekend of June 24, 2004, and intended to deny him summer visitation. An order to show cause was issued and the contempt application came on for hearing in September 2004.
Hearing on Bryan's contempt application was initially scheduled for July 22, 2004, the same day set for trial of a modification petition filed by Maria in June 2003. The modification petition proceeded to trial, and was dismissed. Hearing on the contempt application was reset for September 8, to allow Maria's attorney an opportunity to review several hours of tape recordings Bryan had made of certain conversations between the parties and wished to introduce into evidence.
Maria admitted that she had denied Bryan visitation the weekend of June 24, but stated she had done so to allow Alexandra to spend time with her uncle, a member of the military who had been stationed in Belgium and was briefly visiting Iowa before deployment to Iraq. Maria contended her decision to deny Bryan visitation that weekend was fully supported by the extended family provision of the dissolution decree. Bryan did not dispute that Maria had denied visitation in reliance on the extended family provision, but contended the provision did not allow Maria to unilaterally modify the visitation schedule.
Maria denied she had deprived Bryan of summer visitation. She pointed out Bryan had received a total of twenty-eight days of visitation between June 13 and August 10, 2004, and asserted this satisfied the four-week provision in the dissolution decree. Bryan contended he had in fact received only twenty days of summer visitation, because eight of the twenty-eight days were regularly scheduled visitation. Maria asserted that under the decree summer visitation superseded regular visitation, and Bryan was attempting to manipulate the visitation schedule to garner more than the four weeks of summer visitation allotted in the decree. She pointed out that, under Bryan's interpretation of the decree, he would be allowed to schedule summer visitation in small increments before and after regularly scheduled visitation and thereby assume Alexandra's care for all but three or four days in a thirty day period.
In an April 2005 ruling the district court concluded Bryan had failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Maria had willfully disobeyed a court order. Accordingly, the court dismissed the contempt application. Bryan appeals, asserting (1) "substantial evidence exists . . . to overturn" the court's ruling, (2) the ruling "made an unauthorized modification to the summer visitation schedule . . . [and] allows[s] for `de facto discrimination,'" (3) the extensive delay between submission and ruling violated his rights to due process and constitutes an ethical violation by the district court, and (4) the court "ignored evidence that was . . . critical in rebutting some testimony of Maria."
Our review is limited to correcting errors at law. In re Marriage of Ruden, 509 N.W.2d 494, 496 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993). We affirm the district court if substantial evidence supports its finding that Maria was not guilty of contempt. In re Marriage of Wegner, 461 N.W.2d 351, 354 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990).
Bryan was required to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Maria willfully violated the dissolution decree. See Iowa Code § 598.23 (2003); Ruden, 509 N.W.2d at 496. Willful disobedience is
conduct that is intentional and deliberate with a bad or evil purpose, or wanton and in disregard of the rights of others, or contrary to a known duty, or unauthorized, coupled with an unconcern whether the contemner had the right or not.
In re Marriage of Jacobo, 526 N.W.2d 859, 866 (Iowa 1995) (citation omitted). The only defense available to a Maria, "other than absence of willfulness in disobeying the order, is indefiniteness or uncertainty of the order at issue." Id.
At the heart of Bryan's arguments is his contention that Maria and the district court erroneously interpreted the visitation and extended family provisions of the dissolution decree, and that under his interpretation Maria willfully violated the decree. We need not decide whether either Bryan's or Maria's interpretation is correct. The provisions at issue are somewhat ambiguous, and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Bryan has not shown that Maria's interpretation was so wholly unreasonable or unfounded that it required a finding of contempt. Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's dismissal of Bryan's contempt application. As the remainder of Bryan's claims are without merit, or not within the purview of this court, the district court's ruling is affirmed.
Maria seeks an award of appellate attorney fees. In support of her request she asserts that "[n]o valid grounds existed for Bryan to file this appeal" and that the appeal "was filed in bad faith or for an improper purpose, including to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation, in violation of Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.413." Bryan resists on various grounds. Maria's application was ordered submitted with Bryan's appeal.
As we have earlier noted in this opinion, the provisions of the decree that were at issue in the contempt proceeding are somewhat ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. Just as Maria's interpretation was not wholly unreasonable or unfounded, neither was Bryan's interpretation wholly unreasonable or unfounded. We conclude the record does not demonstrate that Bryan's appeal was filed for an improper purpose, and decline to award appellate attorney fees.