Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. FL023983
Bamattre-Manoukian, ACTING P.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this marital dissolution action, we understand the self-represented appellant, Hugh James Howard (Hugh), to challenge several rulings by the trial court that are set forth in the judgment of dissolution entered on June 11, 2008. For the reasons discussed below, we agree with respondent Cheryl Lynn Howard (Cheryl) that Hugh failed to meet his burden as an appellant to provide an adequate record for meaningful appellate review. Therefore, we will affirm the judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
Our summary of the factual and procedural background of this case is drawn from the minimal record on appeal. Hugh and Cheryl were married on February 14, 1992, and separated on August 8, 2006. Of their three daughters, Kira, Sarah, and Jennifer, only Jennifer, born in 1992, is a minor. Cheryl filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on September 19, 2006.
The marital dissolution litigation proceeded to a trial that began on February 13, 2008, and concluded on February 14, 2008. On February 13, 2008, the parties and their experts testified. No record of the proceedings of February 13, 2008, was included in the record on appeal. The only reporter’s transcript included in the record is a partial transcript of the proceedings of February 14, 2008, in which the parties entered into a stipulation that reflected their agreement on several issues. The February 14, 2008 reporter’s transcript does not include any proceedings that took place on February 14, 2008, after the stipulation was placed on the record in open court.
This court’s order of March 5, 2008, granted Cheryl’s motion to augment the record with the reporter’s transcript of the stipulation of the parties entered on February 14, 2008.
The stipulation of February 14, 2008, included a division of personal property according to a two-page list, with Hugh to pay Cheryl an equalizing payment of $6,747; an agreement that Hugh would remove his personal property from the Boulder Creek residence; a mutual spousal support waiver; an agreement that Hugh would pay nonguideline child support of $1,000 per month by electronic transfer until Jennifer reached the age of 18; and an agreement that Hugh may visit the children “at Mother’s option upon 48 hours advance notice.”
After the stipulation was read into the record, the trial court inquired as to any remaining issues. Hugh agreed that the only remaining issue was the characterization of the parties’ real property in Willits, California, which he contended was trust property not subject to division under the Family Code.
Thereafter, the trial court issued a statement of decision after trial on March 18, 2008. As a preliminary matter, the court noted that it had received testimony from the parties and experts, received numerous exhibits in evidence, and heard argument. The court also noted the parties’ stipulation to their agreements on several financial and personal property issues, as described in open court “before the February 14, 2008 session began.”
Further, the trial court stated that it had “extended multiple opportunities to both parties to provide the court with additional evidence at the beginning of the second day of trial. Neither side had further new evidence. Mr. Howard began to present arguments supporting his position regarding characterization of separate and community assets (again asserting that this court has no jurisdiction over the parties’ revocable trust), an issue earlier decided by motion and brought up repeatedly during the trial by Mr. Howard. The court did not intend to hear this matter anew.” Finally, the court stated that it had reviewed all of the documents submitted, including the income and expense declarations, transcript excerpts, checking account statements, and copies of checks, invoices and receipts that Hugh had submitted posttrial.
The March 18, 2008 statement of decision included the following findings by the trial court, in addition to the dates of marriage and separation: (1) Hugh had a continuing obligation to comply with the automatic temporary restraining orders (ATROs); (2) the court rejected Hugh’s contention that he did not have to comply with the ATROs because he had filed probate litigation regarding the parties’ revocable trust in Mendocino County and Michigan; (3) the Willits real property was acquired during the marriage on June 11, 1999, and the parties took title as trustees of a revocable trust; (4) the Willits property is subject to the Family Code and the jurisdiction of the Santa Cruz County Superior Court; (5) the down payment on the Willits property was funded by separate property of $35,629 and community property of $59,809; (6) the value of the Willits property as of August 1, 2007, was $450,000, based on expert testimony; (7) Hugh was awarded $9,990 to reimburse him for his separate property contribution to the down payment for the Willits property; (8) Hugh “was unable to trace the ongoing payment history or finances of the Willits property to justify further characterization as separate property;” (9) Hugh purchased the Boulder Creek residence in 1987 for $106,050 and in 1990 the property was encumbered with an equity line of $25,000; (10) after the Boulder Creek residence was refinanced for the second time in 2004, Hugh received and spent the net proceeds from escrow of $31,547, although Cheryl was entitled to one-half of the proceeds; (11) at the time of trial, the value of the Boulder Creek residence was $459,000; (12) the Boulder Creek residence was awarded to Cheryl, subject to monetary adjustment; (13) Hugh’s separate property interest in the Boulder Creek residence is $22,585; (14) at the date of separation, Hugh had a retirement account with a balance of $21,000, but the court had received no other facts regarding that account; (15) Hugh’s monthly income available for support was $3,939; (16) child support arrears through February 13, 2008, totaled $13,174; (17) spousal support arrears through February 13, 2008, totaled $1,005; (18) attorney fees of $15,000 were awarded to Cheryl; and (19) Hugh was obligated to pay one-half of his children’s uncovered medical expenses.
A findings and order after hearing was entered on April 4, 2008, regarding child support. Hugh was ordered to pay monthly child support for Jennifer of $1,000 and all support owing from February 13, 2008.
Judgment of dissolution was entered on June 11, 2008. The March 18, 2008 statement of decision after trial and the April 4, 2008 findings and order after hearing were incorporated in the judgment of dissolution. The judgment also included the following orders: (1) the Willits property is community property; (2) the Boulder Creek residence was awarded to Cheryl; (3) Hugh has a separate property interest in the Willits property in the amount of $9,990 and in the Boulder Creek property in the amount of $22,585; (4) Cheryl was owed reimbursement for one-half of the $24,000 debt paid on Hugh’s premarital home equity line of credit secured on the Boulder Creek property; (5) Cheryl was owed reimbursement of one-half of the loan proceeds of $31,547 from the 2004 refinance of the Boulder Creek property; (6) child support arrearages through February 13, 2008, totaled $13,174; (7) spousal support arrearages through February 13, 2008, totaled $1,005; (8) attorney fees of $15,000 were awarded to Cheryl, payable in a lump sum from any escrow related to the liquidation of any real property described in the statement of decision; (9) Hugh was to pay Cheryl $566.50 for one-half of the children’s uncovered medical expenses; and (10) the parties’ personal property was confirmed to them pursuant to stipulation, as set forth in a document titled “Personal Property proposed Division Using Revised Figures from 2/13/08.”
Hugh filed a notice of appeal on August 7, 2008, that states, “I will be appealing some perhaps all elements of the above case.” However, the civil case information statement that Hugh filed in this court on August 26, 2008, indicates that he is appealing from the judgment of dissolution entered on June 11, 2008, and from an order denying a motion for “mistrial; recusal” on April 17, 2008. No such motion was included in the record on appeal. We therefore determine that Hugh seeks to raise issues on appeal that arise from the June 11, 2008 judgment of dissolution, as discussed below.
III. DISCUSSION
In his opening brief, Hugh, a self-represented litigant on appeal and in the proceedings below, identifies the following issues on appeal: (1) “Whether the [trial] court was within its legal power to deny [Hugh] all of his community property;” (2) “Whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction or interfered with proper and prior actions;” (3) “Whether the trial court Commissioner failed to conduct a proper proceeding by vacating the courtroom before the close of evidence;” (4) “Whether the trial court denied [Hugh] legal rights, and protections of Supreme Court jurisprudence, federal, state, as well as local affirmative statutes;” (5) “Whether the trial court erred by awarding excessive attorney fees, for defending federal questions, and state statutes.”
Before addressing each issue, we will provide an overview of the general rules that govern our appellate review and also place certain burdens on Hugh as the appellant.
A. Basic Rules of Appellate Review and Appellate Practice
In conducting our appellate review, we presume that a judgment or order of a lower court is correct. “All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support [the judgment] on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) Therefore, a party challenging a judgment or an appealable order “has the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record.” (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574.) “ ‘A necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed. [Citations.]’ ” (Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.) Thus, where the appellant fails to provide an adequate record as to any issue the appellant has raised on appeal, the issue must be resolved against appellant. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295.)
Additionally, when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellant is required to provide a summary of all of the evidence, not merely his or her own evidence, with citations to the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) The appellant must also present argument supported by relevant legal authority as to each issue raised on appeal. “ ‘[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] This principle is especially true when an appellant makes a general assertion, unsupported by specific argument, regarding insufficiency of evidence. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, “the reviewing court must start with the presumption that the record contains evidence sufficient to support the judgment; it is appellant’s burden to demonstrate otherwise.” (Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Denton (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 333, 368.)
Hugh is not exempt from compliance with these basic rules of appellate practice because he is representing himself on appeal. “Under the law, a party may choose to act as his or her own attorney. [Citations.] ‘[S]uch a party is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]’ [Citations].” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247.) Thus, a self-represented litigant is not entitled to lenient treatment. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.)
Having reviewed the basic rules of appellate review and appellate practice, we turn to the issues that Hugh seeks to raise on appeal.
B. Community Property
In the June 11, 2008 judgment of dissolution, the trial court made several rulings regarding the separate property and community property interests in the parties’ real property, debts, and loan proceeds. We understand Hugh to challenge these rulings within the scope of the issue he identified as “[w]hether the [trial] court was within its legal power to deny [Hugh] all of his community property.”
The standard of review for the trial court’s order finding that certain property is separate or community property is whether the finding is supported by substantial evidence. (Bono v. Clark (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1421.) “ ‘The finding of a trial court that property is either separate or community in character is binding and conclusive on the appellate court if it is supported by sufficient evidence, or if it is based on conflicting evidence or upon evidence that is subject to different inferences;...’ [Citations.]” (Beam v. Bank of America (1971) 6 Cal.3d 12, 25.) We presume that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding, unless the appellant demonstrates that the evidence is insufficient. (Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Denton, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 368.)
Additionally, “the court has broad discretion to determine the manner in which community property is divided and the responsibility to fix the value of assets and liabilities in order to accomplish an equal division. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Duncan (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 617, 631-632.) The burden is on the appellant to establish a “clear case of abuse” resulting in a miscarriage of justice. (Denham v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 566.)
In the present case, Hugh failed to meet his burden to show that the trial court’s characterization of property as either community or separate was not supported by sufficient evidence. He did not provide a summary of all of the relevant evidence or a record that is adequate for appellate review, since the record on appeal lacks a reporter’s transcript of the trial proceedings of February 13 and 14, 2008. We must therefore presume that evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s characterization of the property at issue as either separate or community. (Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Denton, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 368.) For the same reason, we determine that Hugh failed to meet his burden to show that the trial court’s valuation and division of community property constituted an abuse of discretion.
C. Jurisdiction
Hugh raises the issue of “[w]hether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction or interfered with proper and prior actions.” We understand Hugh to contend that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine the community and separate property interests in the Willits property because that property is held in a revocable trust and is therefore properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court.
The question of whether the trial court lacks fundamental jurisdiction to hear and determine a case is a pure question of law subject to our independent review. (Thompson Pacific Construction, Inc. v. City of Sunnyvale (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 525, 537.) We agree with the trial court that the court had jurisdiction in this marital dissolution action to determine the community and separate property interests in the Willits property, because the management and control of community property held in a revocable trust is subject to Family Code section 761. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lund (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 40, 51-52.)
Family Code section 761 provides, “(a) Unless the trust instrument or the instrument of transfer expressly provides otherwise, community property that is transferred in trust remains community property during the marriage, regardless of the identity of the trustee, if the trust, originally or as amended before or after the transfer, provides that the trust is revocable as to that property during the marriage and the power, if any, to modify the trust as to the rights and interests in that property during the marriage may be exercised only with the joinder or consent of both spouses. [¶] (b) Unless the trust instrument expressly provides otherwise, a power to revoke as to community property may be exercised by either spouse acting alone. Community property, including any income or appreciation, that is distributed or withdrawn from a trust by revocation, power of withdrawal, or otherwise, remains community property unless there is a valid transmutation of the property at the time of distribution or withdrawal. [¶] (c) The trustee may convey and otherwise manage and control the trust property in accordance with the provisions of the trust without the joinder or consent of the husband or wife unless the trust expressly requires the joinder or consent of one or both spouses.”
D. Evidence
Hugh also asserts that an issue on appeal is “[w]hether the trial court Commissioner failed to conduct a proper proceeding by vacating the courtroom before the close of evidence.” We understand Hugh to argue that the trial court improperly ended the trial of February 13 and 14, 2008, before the close of evidence, which prevented him from attempting to “lay a foundation of a constitutional defense.”
We are not convinced by Hugh’s argument. It is well established that “ ‘a trial court has inherent power, independent of statute, to exercise its discretion and control over all proceedings relating to the litigation before it [citation].’ ” (Weiss v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1094, 1098-1099.) Here, the record available on appeal directly contradicts Hugh’s assertion that the trial court ended the trial before the close of evidence. The statement of decision indicates during the proceedings of February 14, 2008, the trial court gave the parties “multiple opportunities” to provide the court with additional evidence, but neither party provided any “further new evidence.” We therefore determine that Hugh failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in the court’s conduct of the trial proceedings of February 13 and 14, 2008.
E. Denial of Rights
Hugh also argues on appeal that the “trial court denied [Hugh] legal rights, and protections of Supreme Court jurisprudence, federal, state, as well as local affirmative statutes.” We understand Hugh to challenge a number of the trial court’s factual findings in this case. However, as we have discussed, we must presume that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings, due to Hugh’s failure to provide a summary of all the evidence and an adequate record on appeal. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881;Ballardv. Uribe, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 574.)
We also determine that Hugh failed to meet his duty as an appellant “to articulate and support his own arguments on appeal in a manner that will make them susceptible of rational evaluation by this court. [Citations.]” (Dahms v. Downtown Pomona Property& Business Improvement Dist. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 708, 719.) Accordingly, we find no merit in any of Hugh’s claims of trial court error with respect to the denial of rights or any errors in the trial court’s factual findings.
F. Attorney Fees
Finally, Hugh contends that the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Cheryl was excessive. The trial court awarded $15,000 under Family Code sections 2030, 721 and 1100.
We review the trial court’s award of attorney fees under the abuse of discretion standard. An order awarding attorney fees “ ‘ “will be overturned only if, considering all the evidence viewed most favorably in support of its order, no judge could reasonably make the order made. [Citations.]” ’ [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Huntington (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1523.)
Again, we must presume that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s award of attorney fees in the amount of $15,000 to Cheryl. The record on appeal is inadequate for review of the attorney fees award because it lacks any of the evidence that was before the trial court when the court determined that Cheryl was entitled to attorney fees and calculated the amount of the award. We therefore reject Hugh’s claim that the trial court’s award of attorney fees of $15,000 is excessive.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent.
WE CONCUR: MIHARA, J., MCADAMS, J.