Opinion
E076835
02-10-2023
In re the Marriage of CHRISTY AND GERBEN HETTINGA. v. GERBEN HETTINGA, Respondent; CHRISTY HETTINGA, Appellant, GH DAIRY et al., Movants and Respondents.
John L. Dodd &Associates, and John L. Dodd; Brown &Chabonneau, Gregory G. Brown and Mark Higuchi for Appellant. Anderson LeBlanc and Jeff W. LeBlanc for Movants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County No. FAMRS1400253. Cheryl C. Kersey, Judge.
John L. Dodd &Associates, and John L. Dodd; Brown &Chabonneau, Gregory G. Brown and Mark Higuchi for Appellant.
Anderson LeBlanc and Jeff W. LeBlanc for Movants and Respondents.
OPINION
MENETREZ J.
Christy and Gerben Hettinga separated after 18 years of marriage. They settled their marital dissolution action, and the trial court entered judgment pursuant to the settlement agreement. Christy later moved to set aside the judgment on the basis of Gerben's allegedly incomplete disclosure of his income and his ownership interests in various businesses. Christy sought discovery from various third parties including Hein and Ellen Hettinga and GH Dairy (collectively, nonparties). Gerben co-owned GH Dairy with Hein and Ellen. After a trial on Christy's motion, the trial court declined to set aside the judgment. Nonparties moved for sanctions on the basis of the court's pretrial rulings on numerous discovery motions. The court awarded nonparties $41,092.90 in sanctions. Christy appeals from that award. We affirm the award of sanctions but reduce the amount by $192.75.
We refer to the parties and some other witnesses by their first names because they all have the same last name. No disrespect is intended.
BACKGROUND
A. The Dissolution and Postjudgment Proceedings
In 2015, Christy moved to set aside the judgment of dissolution on the ground that Gerben had not accurately and fully disclosed his assets and income. She claimed that Gerben and his father, Hein, lied to her about GH Dairy's value, Gerben lied in his disclosures about his income, Gerben falsely claimed to own only 25 percent of American Beef Packers, Inc. (American Beef Packers) when he actually owned 50 percent of the company, and Gerben failed to disclose his ownership interest in other businesses.
After an 11-day bench trial in 2020, the trial court denied the motion. We affirm the denial in a separate nonpublished opinion.
B. Nonparties' Posttrial Motion for Sanctions
After the court denied Christy's motion to set aside the judgment, nonparties filed a consolidated motion under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1987.2 and 2025.410 (undesignated statutory references are to this code) for sanctions against Christy in the amount of attorney fees they incurred as a result of their participation in the discovery process. In particular, nonparties argued that sanctions were warranted because of the favorable results they had obtained on six pretrial discovery motions: (1) a June 14, 2017, motion to quash, (2) a September 7, 2017, motion for clarification, (3) a September 19, 2018, motion to quash, (4) a January 23, 2019, motion to quash, (5) a March 27, 2019, motion to compel by Christy, and (6) a May 2, 2019, motion to quash. (Nonparties identify the motions by hearing date rather than filing date, so we do the same.) Nonparties attached minute orders of the trial court's rulings on the motions and billing records from their attorney and a paralegal. The motion was based on the notice of motion, the motion, a memorandum of points and authorities, "the Court's instructions," a declaration from nonparties' attorney, and "all pleadings, records, and transcripts on file or that have been prepared in this matter."
Nonparties argued that Christy "received clear and concise guidance on discoverable materials on June 14, 2017, and nevertheless persisted in bombarding the [nonparties], their affiliates, and their business partners with almost fifty subpoenas. Further, at no time did [Christy] simply subpoena the information requested in the June 14, 2017, Order." (Boldface omitted.) In addition, they argued that Christy also had violated the June 14, 2017, order by failing to meet and confer concerning any of the over 50 subpoenas she served, even though the court ordered her counsel to do so. Nonparties claimed that Christy's allegedly abusive discovery practices cost them $48,936.90 in attorney fees and costs. Their attorney attested that he had analyzed 700 attorney billing entries involving GH Dairy from January 2017 through October 2020, and he "separated out each entry related to the various subpoena motions and activities identified in the Motion."
Christy opposed the motion. She argued that it was untimely, sought fees that were previously awarded or denied or had never been requested before, and failed to specify which fees were associated with each motion.
C. Relevant Discovery Proceedings
Nonparties' posttrial sanctions motion was based on six pretrial discovery motions. The record on appeal contains only one of those discovery motions (and none of its attachments) and does not contain any of the discovery requests on which those motions were based. We recount the relevant proceedings as best we can in light of the limited record on appeal.
In July 2016, Judge Michael Knish presided over a hearing on various matters in the dissolution proceeding, including Gerben's motion to dismiss Christy's motion to set aside the judgment and numerous discovery-related motions. None of the motions is included in the record on appeal. Judge Knish denied Gerben's motion to dismiss and concluded that discovery was necessary to determine the validity of Christy's arguments.
In April 2017, nonparties, American Beef Packers, and another entity moved to quash deposition subpoenas issued by Christy. That is the first discovery motion on which nonparties' posttrial sanctions motion is based. The moving parties requested attorney fees under section 1987.1. The notice of motion is included in the record on appeal, but the motion, the subpoenas at issue, and any opposition are not.
On June 14, 2017, the court held a hearing on the motion. Nonparties argued that the subpoenas were facially overbroad. At the hearing, Judge Cheryl Kersey stated that according to a previous ruling made by Judge Knish, Christy had "a right to explore the value of" American Beef Packers, what American Beef Packers paid Gerben, and Gerben's ownership interest in American Beef Packers when Gerben and Christy stipulated to the judgment. Judge Kersey did not specify which of Judge Knish's rulings she was referencing.
The trial court granted nonparties' motion to quash. It ordered Christy's counsel to redraft narrowly tailored subpoenas to GH Dairy, American Beef Packers, and any other business that Christy believed Gerben had failed to disclose. The court indicated that the subpoenas needed "to be specific as to the ownership interest of [Gerben], any money by way of salary or stock or any typ[e] of benefit that he may have received prior to the date of separation." (Capitalization omitted.) The court further ordered the parties' counsel to meet and confer about any future objections concerning requested documents and to bring objections to the court's attention only if counsel could not reach an agreement. The minute order does not include any ruling on the moving parties' request for attorney fees, and the trial court did not orally rule on the request at the hearing. In December 2017, Gerben's counsel filed findings and orders from the hearing, a portion of which are included in the record on appeal.
On July 14, 2017, Christy filed an ex parte motion asking the court to clarify its order, and nonparties opposed. That is the second discovery motion on which nonparties' posttrial sanctions motion is based. The July 14, 2017, motion is not included in the record on appeal, but nonparties' opposition is. Nonparties' counsel attested that as of August 2, 2017, Christy had not served nonparties with revised subpoena requests, as ordered by the court. Nonparties asked the court to impose sanctions against Christy.
On August 15, 2017, the court appointed a discovery referee, over the objection of Gerben's counsel. None of the circumstances concerning the appointment is apparent from the record on appeal. The request for appointment, any corresponding motions or oppositions, and the hearing transcript are not included in the record on appeal.
On September 7, 2017, the court held a hearing on Christy's July 14, 2017, motion for clarification, and the court denied the motion. Despite the denial, the court nevertheless clarified at the hearing that the relevant timeframe as to which Christy could seek information concerning valuation and ownership was through the date of judgment, not the date of separation. In denying the motion, the court explained that its prior order allowed Christy "to look into the issue of American Beef [Packers] and the percentage owned and the change of percentage owned by [Gerben] and anything that has to relate with that change of ownership. [¶] . . . And if that ends up being that [Gerben] also owns part of another company once you look into the ownership of American Beef [Packers], that then will lead you there." The court did not rule on nonparties' request for sanctions.
In the statement of facts in her opening brief, Christy claims that in December 2017, the court issued findings and orders concerning the July 2017 motion. The order she cites, however, is from the hearing conducted on June 14, 2017. She also incorrectly cites an order from a July 15, 2016, hearing to support her assertion that the court indicated that attorney fees were not applicable to the July 2017 motion.
Nearly one year later, nonparties filed an ex parte motion to quash. On September 19, 2018, the court held a hearing on the motion. That is the third discovery motion on which nonparties' posttrial sanctions motion is based. The motion and the hearing transcript are not included in the record on appeal. The court ordered numerous subpoenas quashed as they had previously been withdrawn by Christy, and the court stayed the production date on other subpoenas and set a future hearing date to address nonparties' objections to them. The court also stated that it would entertain any requests for attorney fees or costs at the future hearing.
The following month, nonparties filed a motion for attorney fees based on the ex parte motion to quash. Nonparties requested $3,985 in attorney fees under section 1987.2. The motion is included in the record on appeal but none of the supporting documentation is. On April 9, 2019, the court ruled on the motion and on a motion for attorney fees filed by American Beef Packers. The court found Christy "at fault for causing overbroad and unnecessary subpoenas to be served and then later withdrawn for unknown reasons." (Capitalization omitted.) The court ordered "the costs of the ex parte motion, attorneys fees and objections against [Christy] in the amount of $3985.00 payable to GH Dairy." (Capitalization omitted.)
On December 19, 2018, nonparties filed another motion to quash seven subpoenas. On January 23, 2019, the court held a hearing on the motion. That is the fourth discovery motion on which nonparties' posttrial sanctions motion is based. The request for order and notice of motion are included in the record on appeal, but the motion and the subpoenas are not.
At the hearing, the court referred the motion to a discovery referee for recommendations. The court ordered: "All subpoenas seeking third party discovery are referred to referee for any objections. The referee . . . will make recommendations to the court regarding any discovery disputes." (Capitalization omitted.) According to the minute order, the court ordered Christy to prepare findings and an order after the hearing. No such order appears in the record on appeal.
The discovery referee issued a 32-page recommendation concerning nonparties' December 18, 2018, motion to quash seven subpoenas. None of the underlying discovery requests appears in the record on appeal.
In February 2019, Christy moved to clarify the scope of discovery. On March 27, 2019, the court held a hearing on the motion. That is the fifth motion on which nonparties' posttrial sanctions motion is based. The request for order is included in the record on appeal, but the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities, the supporting declaration, and the transcript of the hearing on the motion are not. The order on the motion provides: "Request for order held. Issues submitted to the discovery referee." (Capitalization omitted.)
In February 2019, Christy moved to compel compliance with certain subpoenas. On May 2, 2019, the court held a hearing on the motion. That is the sixth discovery motion on which nonparties' posttrial sanctions motion is based. The request for an order and the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities are included in the record on appeal, but a supporting declaration and its attachments are not. The court denied the motion and reserved jurisdiction on nonparties' request for sanctions. At the hearing, the court explained that the requests went "beyond the scope of the discovery that's previously ordered in this case."
D. The Sanctions Ruling
The court granted the posttrial motion for sanctions. It ordered Christy to pay $41,092.90 to nonparties as a sanction. The amount reflected what nonparties "requested less fees incurred prior to the July 2017 Motion to Quash and admonishment." The court explained that it was exercising its authority to award sanctions to a nonparty under section 1987.2 and section 2025.410, subdivision (d).
The court found that Christy "willfully disobeyed the court[']s order to restrict post judgment discovery to income or assets held by [Gerben] and the failure to meet and confer regarding requests with GH Dairy." The court explained: The first set of "subpoenas issued in July of 2017 were ruled overbroad by the court and quashed as they did not restrict themselves to information sought to the parameters of the ruling from Judge Knish. The second set of subpoenas restated the first group even after a hearing for clarification of the Court's ruling. The Court restricted discovery to [Gerben's] sources of income. [Christy] ignored the ruling and sent similar and duplicate subpoenas to GH Dairy. The Court was forced to appoint a discovery referee to handle the volume of discovery requests to review and to advise the court of compliance issues. In spite of the court order, [Christy's] counsel did not meet and confer with attorneys from GH Dairy to obtain the limited discovery permitted in spite of [the] court order."
DISCUSSION
Christy argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions. In the alternative, she argues that the award should be reduced because certain portions are not supported by substantial evidence. We agree about $192.75 of the award but reject Christy's challenge to the imposition of sanctions.
Christy argues that because we should reverse the trial court's order denying her motion to set aside the judgment, we should reverse the sanctions award as well. The argument fails because by separate opinion we affirm the order denying her motion to set aside the judgment.
Section 1987.2 provides that except as otherwise specified in the statute, when a court rules on a motion to quash a subpoena under section 1987.1 "the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive." (§ 1987.2, subd. (a).)
Under section 2025.410, the trial court is required to impose monetary sanctions as specified in chapter 7 of the code "against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to quash a deposition notice, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust." (§ 2025.410, subd. (d).) Section 2023.030 of chapter 7 further describes a trial court's authority to issue monetary sanctions. The statute provides: "The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. The court may also impose this sanction on one unsuccessfully asserting that another has engaged in the misuse of the discovery process, or on any attorney who advised that assertion, or on both. If a monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this title, the court shall impose that sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust." (§ 2023.030, subd. (a).)
"We review the trial court's sanctions order for abuse of discretion. As the trial court has broad discretion in selecting sanctions, 'we will reverse the trial court only if it was arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical in the exercise of that discretion.'" (Kwan Software Engineering, Inc. v. Hennings (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 57, 73.) We review any express or implied factual determinations for substantial evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the court's order. (Ibid.; West Coast Development v. Reed (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 693, 697-698.)
Christy argues that the trial court erred by awarding sanctions based in part on its erroneous "belief the requested discovery was outside 'the parameters of the ruling of Judge Knish' and not relevant to Gerben's income." She similarly contends that the court erred by restricting discovery to issues concerning American Beef Packers and did not allow discovery of Gerben's income from GH Dairy. The arguments lack merit. The court recognized in its sanctions ruling that Christy had been permitted to seek discovery from GH Dairy concerning Gerben's "sources of income." The court imposed sanctions because Christy did not so limit her discovery requests and instead repeatedly sought discovery from GH Dairy beyond the limited scope of permissible discovery.
Christy's challenge to the imposition of sanctions otherwise fails because the record on appeal is not adequate for us to review the court's factual determinations concerning the parties' conduct. We presume that a trial court's order is "correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment." (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 (Jameson); Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) "'This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.'" (Jameson, supra, at p. 609; see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) "'In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court's action will be made by the appellate court.'" (Jameson, at p. 609.)
Here, nonparties sought an award of sanctions based on six pretrial discovery motions. Nonparties' motion was based on attached minute orders containing the rulings on those motions, attached billing records from their attorney and a paralegal, "and on all pleadings, records, and transcripts on file or that have been prepared in this matter." The trial court had access to the entire record. But only one of the six motions is included in the record on appeal, and none of the underlying discovery requests at issue in those motions is included. For two of the motions, transcripts of the hearings are not included in the record. We cannot review the merits of the court's order awarding sanctions based on its assessment of the discovery requests in light of the record provided. For example, in the order awarding nonparties sanctions, the court reasoned that "[t]he second set of subpoenas restated the first group even after a hearing for clarification of the Court's ruling." We cannot evaluate the court's reasoning because the record does not include any of the subpoenas it was comparing. Likewise, we cannot evaluate Christy's challenge to the court's partial reliance on the appointment of the discovery referee as a basis for imposing sanctions or her claim (which she did not make in the trial court) that sanctions were not warranted because she did not act in bad faith or without substantial justification. It is not possible to analyze the parties' conduct from the sparse and inadequate record on appeal.
It is the appellant's burden to provide an adequate record on appeal. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.) We must resolve an issue against the appellant when they fail to provide an adequate record on that issue. (Ibid.) Because Christy has failed to provide an adequate record for us to review the merits of the court's reasoning, we must affirm the court's decision to award sanctions to nonparties.
Christy "disputes the central claim [GH Dairy] is a 'nonparty' for purposes of these sanctions motions." The argument is forfeited because Christy did not make the argument in the trial court. (Richey v. AutoNation, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 909, 920, fn. 3 (Richey).) On the contrary, Christy referred to all moving parties, including GH Dairy, as "the 'Non-Parties'" in her opposition. In any event, Christy was married to Gerben, not to GH Dairy. Regardless of the nature of Gerben's ownership interest in GH Dairy, GH Dairy was not a party to the divorce proceeding.
Christy also argues that nonparties did not carry their burden of proof in the trial court because they supported their motion only with minute orders and attorney billing records. Christy did not make that argument in the trial court, so we do not consider it. (Richey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 920, fn. 3.) Moreover, in addition to the attached exhibits, nonparties' sanctions motion was based "on all pleadings, records, and transcripts on file or that have been prepared in th[e] matter." Christy did not argue in the trial court (and does not argue here) that the court could not consider the entire case file as nonparties requested. We accordingly do not consider the propriety of nonparties' request to have the trial court consider all of the records in the case.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we reject Christy's arguments challenging the imposition of sanctions.
We next analyze Christy's arguments concerning the amount of sanctions awarded. She contends that the award is not supported by substantial evidence because approximately $28,000 was not related to discovery disputes. She also separately challenges the amounts awarded as to each of the six pretrial discovery motions. We agree with Christy that the award must be reduced by $192.75.
As to the amount of sanctions, Christy first argues that because nonparties did not itemize the fees and costs incurred in relation to each discovery motion, the award of sanctions was based on mere speculation and not fees attributable to the underlying motions. She contends that the award must be reversed with directions to allow nonparties to file a revised motion. We disagree. Neither of the cases Christy cites stands for the proposition that a sanctions motion seeking attorney fees based on numerous underlying motions must separately itemize the amount of fees sought for each of the motions. (Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271; Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare REIT, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 790.) Mountjoy does not involve attorney fees as a sanction and is thus inapposite. In any event, Christy cites it for the unremarkable proposition that a fee award must be based on the actual time spent. (Mountjoy, supra, at p. 271.) Christy cites Cornerstone for the similarly unremarkable principle that under the plain language of section 2023.030 when attorney fees are awarded as a monetary sanction for abuse of the discovery process, the fees must have been incurred "'as a result of that conduct.'" (Cornerstone, supra, at p. 790, quoting § 2023.030, subd. (a).) Neither of those principles supports Christy's contention that the failure to itemize the fees incurred for each of the discovery motions here means that the court's award was based on speculation.
On the contrary, nonparties' counsel attached detailed billing records from its attorney and a paralegal. Many of the entries were blacked out. Counsel attested that he reviewed 700 billing entries and "separated out each entry related to the various subpoena motions and activities identified in the Motion." That constitutes substantial evidence supporting the court's award of sanctions based on attorney fees expended for work related to the conduct at issue in the motion. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by awarding nonparties sanctions based on the evidence before it. (See Conservatorship of Becerra (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1482 [sanctions award not supported by substantial evidence "represents a prejudicial abuse of discretion"].)
As to the amount of sanctions awarded, Christy next argues that the trial court miscalculated the amount it intended to deduct for "fees incurred prior to the July 2017 Motion to Quash and admonishment," thereby erroneously inflating the sanctions award by $308.75. We agree about the miscalculation but not the amount. Nonparties requested $48,936.90 in sanctions. The court awarded nonparties $41,092.90. The court stated that it was awarding nonparties the amount they requested with the exception of fees incurred before the July 2017 motion. The court therefore deducted $7,844 for fees incurred before that motion. Between April 3, 2017, and June 27, 2017, nonparties' attorney billed 20.03 hours at $400 per hour and charged an additional $24.75 for mileage during that period, for a total of $8,036.75. In light of the court's decision not to award any sanctions for fees incurred before July 2017, the requested award of $48,936.90 should have been reduced by $8,036.75, not by $7,844. The sanctions award therefore must be reduced by $192.75.
It is not clear from the record which motion the court meant to identify. The only motion from July 2017 on which the sanctions motion is based is Christy's motion for clarification filed on July 14, 2017. We assume the court was referring to that motion. In any event, the only billing entry in July 2017 is for time billed on July 31, 2017, which could not have occurred before the filing of any July 2017 motion because no motion was filed that day.
Nonparties do not respond to the argument concerning the amount of the deduction. Instead, they appear to contend that the court properly imposed sanctions on the basis of the June 2017 proceedings. The argument is not supported by the record. The court expressly excluded any fees incurred before July 2017.
Christy also argues separately that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding sanctions on the basis of each of the six underlying motions. Most of the arguments were not made in the trial court, so we do not consider them. (Richey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 920, fn. 3.) We likewise do not consider Christy's challenge to sanctions awarded for fees incurred after the May 2, 2019, hearing (the hearing on the last motion), because it too was not made in the trial court. (Ibid.) Below we address only those remaining arguments that were made in the trial court.
Christy argues that the court abused its discretion by awarding sanctions on the basis of her motion for clarification heard on September 7, 2017, because the court did not impose sanctions when it ruled on the motion and also did not reserve jurisdiction over the issue. It is true that the court did not mention attorney fees or sanctions at the hearing or in its order. Christy does not develop the argument or provide any legal analysis or authority to support the contention that the court had to reserve jurisdiction over the issue to award attorney fees later. We therefore consider the argument forfeited. (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146.)
Christy argues that nonparties were already awarded sanctions for her ex parte motion to quash heard on September 19, 2018, so the trial court abused its discretion by awarding duplicative sanctions. The argument fails because the appellate record's inadequacy makes it impossible for us to determine whether the award was duplicative.
Neither the motion heard on September 19, 2018, nor the hearing transcript is included in the record on appeal. The court's order of September 19, 2018, set a future hearing date to entertain any requests for attorney fees or sanctions. On October 11, 2018, nonparties filed a motion for attorney fees based on the motion to quash heard on September 19, 2018. Nonparties requested $3,985 in attorney fees and costs. The amount was based on $2,345 that nonparties allegedly requested in the motion to quash and additional fees as set forth in the attached declaration of nonparties' attorney. That declaration is not included in the record on appeal. The court granted nonparties' motion for attorney fees and awarded them the $3,985 requested.
Christy argues that the trial court abused its discretion by including fees from the September 19, 2018, motion in the posttrial sanctions award, because those fees had already been awarded. While it appears that the trial court did award nonparties $3,985 in attorney fees for the September 19, 2018, motion, the record is not adequate for us to determine whether the posttrial sanctions included a duplicative award. The record on appeal does not contain the September 19, 2018, motion or any attachments, a transcript of the hearing on that motion, or nonparties' attorney's declaration attached to the related fee motion filed in October 2018. Thus, it is not possible for us to determine whether any of the posttrial award consisted of fees already awarded. Moreover, from the court's order on the motion to quash, it appears that the motion involved numerous discovery requests made to numerous third parties. Because of the record's inadequacy, we cannot determine what nonparties requested in the original motion to evaluate whether nonparties' initial and later fee awards were based on distinct work and issues or were instead duplicative. We therefore reject Christy's challenge to the award of sanctions for the September 19, 2018, motion.
Christy argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding sanctions for work related to the motion to quash heard on January 23, 2019, on the ground that it was referred to a discovery referee. She claims that she was "largely successful" in the referee's recommendation on the motion. We reject the argument for two reasons. First, in support of her claim of success, Christy cites the entire 32-page recommendation. She does not identify with any precision the particular ways in which she was successful. "It is not the function of this court to comb the record looking for the evidence or absence of evidence to support [the appellant's] argument" (People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 866, 879), and we will not develop a party's argument for them (Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 684). We treat arguments that are not developed or supported by adequate citations to the record as forfeited. (Ibid.) Second and more fundamentally, Christy does not provide any information about whether the referee's recommendations were final or approved by the court, so even assuming that Christy was "largely successful" in the referee's recommendation, it does not follow that she achieved the same result with the court. We therefore reject Christy's challenge to the award of sanctions for the January 23, 2019, motion.
Christy argues that there was no adjudication of her motion to compel heard on March 27, 2019, because it was referred to the discovery referee. She claims that the referee did not make any recommendation on the motion. To support her contention that the referee never made any recommendation, she cites an unsupported factual assertion she made in her opposition in the trial court. The factual assertions Christy made in her briefing in the trial court are not adequate to establish the existence of a fact. Again, we must reject Christy's argument because it is not adequately supported by citation to the record. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 276-277; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).)
For Christy's motion to compel heard on May 2, 2019, Christy argues that because the sanctions award does not refer to her motion to compel heard on May 2, 2019, "there is no indication the court intended to impose sanctions for it." The argument lacks merit. In granting nonparties' posttiral sanctions motion, the court excluded only those fees incurred before July 2017. The trial court therefore implicitly granted sanctions based on all of the other motions identified in the sanctions request. Christy does not cite any legal authority or provide any legal analysis showing that the trial court was required to separately identify each of the motions as to which it awarded sanctions. (Cf. California Common Cause v. Duffy (1987) 200 Cal.App.3d 730, 754 [for an attorney fee award under § 1021.5 "the trial court has no sua sponte duty to make specific factual findings explaining its calculation of the fee award and the appellate courts will infer all findings exist to support the trial court's determination"].)
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions but that the award must be reduced by $192.75.
DISPOSITION
The January 22, 2021, award of sanctions to nonparties is reduced to $40,900.15. As modified, the award is affirmed. Nonparties shall recover their costs of appeal.
We concur: MILLER Acting P. J. CODRINGTON J.