Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 04FL08280
NICHOLSON, Acting P. J.
Jeffrey Frankel appeals from a marriage dissolution judgment that resolved contested issues between him and his former wife, Brenden Frankel. Jeffrey claims the trial court erred by: (1) barring from evidence for any purpose testimony Brenden gave in a criminal case against him; (2) not dividing community stock options equally; and (3) ordering him, but not Brenden, to pay sanctions.
We affirm the judgment with the exception of the award of sanctions against Jeffrey, and on that point we reverse.
FACTS
We explain in detail the parties’ proceedings in the trial court, primarily to be able to review the trial court’s award of sanctions against Jeffrey.
A. The incident and Jeffrey’s criminal prosecution
Jeffrey and Brenden married in 2002. Their daughter, Samantha, was born in 2004.
On November 28, 2004, an argument between Jeffrey and Brenden escalated. Jeffery was working on a laptop computer while holding a cup of coffee. Brenden, who was holding Samantha, claimed Jeffrey was ignoring her while she talked to him. Brenden used her foot in an attempt to close the laptop’s screen. Jeffrey became upset and threw his coffee on her and Samantha.
According to Jeffrey, Brenden kicked the laptop computer he was using. Startled, he jumped out of his chair, causing the coffee cup he was holding to splatter its hot contents all over the room, including on Brenden and Samantha.
After the incident, Brenden fled from the house with Samantha. Police arrested Jeffery for spousal abuse and child endangerment.
In a separate criminal proceeding, Jeffrey was tried for domestic violence and child endangerment. A jury convicted him of endangerment but acquitted him of domestic violence. The trial court later vacated the verdict on the basis of jury misconduct. On October 17, 2005, the court ruled Jeffrey was factually innocent pursuant to Penal Code section 851.8, and it granted Jeffrey’s petition to dismiss the case, seal his records, and destroy his arrest records.
B. Civil filings and first motions
Meanwhile, Brenden initiated matters in civil court the day after the laptop incident. On November 29, 2004, she filed a domestic violence action (Sac. Super. Ct. No. 04DV03806), and obtained a temporary restraining order against Jeffrey that included stay-away and move-out orders. Then, on December 20, 2004, she filed this dissolution action.
At the same time, Brenden filed an order to show cause for sole physical and legal custody of Samantha, with no visitation rights for Jeffrey, and for permission to move with the child to the Bay Area. On March 8, 2005, the trial court (Hon. Peter J. McBrien) granted Brenden’s motion in full. It also granted temporary spousal and child support payable to Brenden retroactively to the date she filed the dissolution action and it calculated the arrearages. It ordered Jeffrey to pay Brenden’s attorney fees. It also consolidated the domestic violence case brought by Brenden with this dissolution case. It referred the issues of custody and support to trial.
Jeffrey filed a motion to reconsider and modify the March 8 support order. Brenden requested additional attorney fees and costs to oppose Jeffrey’s motion. The court denied reconsideration, and it deferred Brenden’s request for attorney fees.
C. Jeffrey’s motion to modify the March 8 order
Brenden obtained employment in the Bay Area in April 2005. At about that time, she apparently offered to agree to supervised visitation. The parties’ attorneys attempted to negotiate a stipulation. However, the parties could not agree on terms, and the negotiations ended acrimoniously.
Thereafter, Jeffrey sought a modification to the March 8 order regarding support and visitation based on Brenden’s new status and on the fact his criminal case had ended. He also requested an order to sell the family residence that had sat empty, a child custody evaluation, and that the domestic violence action be tried at the same time as the custody matter.
Brenden opposed the motion in part. She had agreed to supervised visitation but claimed the terms insisted by Jeffrey were unreasonable. She had also agreed to sell the house. She opposed modifying the support order as Jeffrey had not paid any support. She sought her attorney fees on the motion, stating Jeffrey had not paid the prior order of fees, and this motion was not necessary.
The trial court on May 24, 2005, granted Jeffrey’s motion in part. It reduced the amount of child and spousal support, and it granted supervised visitation through a Sacramento family services agency with Jeffrey to pay all of the supervision costs. The court appointed Cynthia Neuman, Ph.D., to conduct a child custody evaluation at Jeffrey’s expense, without prejudice to his claim for reimbursement for that expense from Brenden. The court also vacated the domestic violence trial date on agreement of the parties.
Regarding attorney fees, the court confirmed its prior order, and it ordered Jeffrey to pay Brenden an additional $2,000 in attorney fees and costs. The court reserved jurisdiction over the characterization of the attorney fee orders, which were without prejudice.
D. New motions against each other
Within two months of the court’s May 24 hearing, each party had filed new orders to show cause. Brenden applied to set further arrears, claiming Jeffrey had not paid all of the arrearages set in the March 8 and May 24 orders, and for support owed for Samantha’s uninsured medical costs. Brenden also requested the proceeds from the sale of the family residence, $92,167.62, be deposited in an interest bearing account with no withdrawals permitted absent written agreement or further court order. Lastly, because Jeffrey had unilaterally cancelled Brenden’s automobile insurance, Brenden requested that the insurance be reinstated immediately on an ex parte basis.
Jeffrey filed a motion seeking, among other things, a credit to offset the arrearages due to Brenden’s having exclusive use of the family residence since the court issued the temporary restraining order. He requested sanctions and attorney fees, claiming the ex parte hearing was unnecessary. He had already reinstated the insurance and had informed Brenden of that fact. He did not oppose the request to open a joint account for the house sale proceeds. The parties just needed to agree on a bank.
Jeffrey also sought a $25,000 advance from the house proceeds to pay attorney fees he believed he would incur opposing the domestic violence action and seeking custody. He intended to prove at trial that Brenden had fabricated the domestic violence issue in order to deprive him of any custody and visitation rights, and that in fact it was Brenden who endangered their child.
Jeffrey also asked for a trial date on the domestic violence action. He wanted to exonerate himself on that issue quickly while Dr. Neuman was developing her custody recommendations.
Ruling on the motions, the trial court ordered, pursuant to the parties’ stipulations, the insurance to be reinstated and the house proceeds to be deposited in a joint account at Bank of the West. It ordered Brenden to receive the amount owed her in attorney fees and costs from Jeffrey’s share of the house proceeds. It continued the matter on all of the other issues raised by the parties.
E. Jeffrey’s motion to vacate the restraining order
By August 2005, Jeffrey had learned the district attorney would not retry him in his criminal matter and the case would be dismissed. He filed a motion to vacate the restraining order and to set the domestic violence action for trial. He claimed Brenden was the guilty party. He noted the criminal trial court, in granting his motion for a new trial, stated that in its view Brenden caused the danger to the child by kicking Jeffrey’s laptop. That court could not understand why the criminal action was even brought.
Jeffrey also sought unsupervised visitation and joint legal custody. He claimed Brenden had interfered with the scheduled supervised visits, resulting in most of them not happening. Believing Brenden would oppose the motion, Jeffrey also asked the court to reserve jurisdiction over the issue of attorney fees and costs for bringing the motion.
In September, the trial court (Judge Michael Ullman sitting in for Judge McBrien) granted Jeffrey’s request to set the domestic violence action for trial. It also authorized Jeffrey to take $15,000 from the house proceeds to pay his attorney fees.
Following that hearing, Brenden filed a response to Jeffrey’s August motion. She opposed modifying the visitation and custody orders until after Dr. Neuman issued her report. She denied Jeffrey’s allegations of interference with visitation as “nothing short of vicious allegations.” Despite the new trial date on the domestic violence action, she was not dropping her request for a three-year restraining order, and asked that the temporary restraining order remain in place until trial. She also sought $15,000 from the house proceeds to pay her attorney fees.
In October, the trial court (Judge McBrien) addressed some of the parties’ unresolved issues from their earlier motions. It ordered the issue of arrearages to be heard at the domestic violence trial. It directed the parties to consider a location in Contra Costa County for supervised visits, midway between the parties’ residences. The court then deferred the other pending issues to case management, thereby preventing the filing of any further motions.
F. Case management and records subpoenas
In November 2005, counsel for Jeffrey served a deposition subpoena for the production of records on Nina Grueneberger, L.C.S.W., a therapist who had counseled with both parties. Counsel asked for all records related to services Ms. Grueneberger provided to the parties, including records of any statements made by the parties. Counsel gave notice of the request to Brenden.
At a case management conference held November 29, 2005, the parties reached various stipulations. They agreed that further visitation would be unsupervised. They agreed that Brenden could receive $15,000 from the house proceeds to pay her attorney fees. The parties also agreed that Jeffrey could take $9,000 from the house proceeds as reimbursement for his payments for Dr. Neuman’s services. Another $4,000 was taken from the house proceeds to pay Dr. Neuman’s bill.
The trial court vacated the temporary restraining order, and in its place issued a family law mutual restraining order preventing the parties from contacting each other except for child visitation. The court also deferred trial in the domestic violence and dissolution cases. All other unresolved matters were continued, and the case remained in case management.
In December 2005, Dr. Neuman released her custody evaluation. A copy of her report is not included in the record. However, in response to the report, Jeffrey’s attorney subpoenaed Brenden’s mental health records from Brenden’s therapist. Jeffrey claimed these records, along with those held by the couple’s therapist, Ms. Grueneberger, were discoverable in as much as Dr. Neuman had used information from these mental health professionals to form her custody recommendations.
Brenden refused to consent to the release of the mental health records. She claimed the records were not discoverable. Her attorney expressed “surprise” that Jeffrey was pursuing litigation instead of working to reach an agreement on custody and visitation now that Dr. Neuman’s report had been completed.
An additional case management conference in March 2006 resolved nothing. In April, both parties requested the court remove the case from case management and set the matter for trial. The trial court denied the requests. Another management conference in May produced no substantive agreements.
In June 2006, the parties agreed to the appointment of a special master, Dr. Mary Ann Frank, to resolve the issues of custody and visitation. But the case remained in case management.
In July 2006, Jeffrey requested the court remove the case from case management. He claimed custody and support were not being resolved. Visitation disputes continued. Brenden allegedly was refusing to adopt Dr. Neuman’s recommendation of substantial visitation time for Jeffrey. Even the terms of Dr. Frank’s authority as special master had not been agreed upon. Most of the financial issues had yet to be addressed. The trial court vacated the case management order on August 11, 2006.
G. Jeffrey’s motion to compel discovery, set trial, and award sanctions
In September 2006, Jeffrey moved to set the issues of child custody and visitation for trial. He also sought for the court to compel discovery of Brenden’s mental health records under the earlier issued subpoenas. He asserted Brenden had waived any privilege in the records. He argued the records would show that Brenden was an aggressor and she physically abused him during the marriage. He claimed Dr. Neuman’s custody report stated the domestic violence in the home was “reciprocal.” He sought the records to understand Dr. Neuman’s opinion as well as to show the court it would be detrimental to award custody to Brenden. Brenden allegedly had yet to sign the agreement authorizing the special master.
Jeffery also sought trial on receiving attorney fees and costs under Family Code section 3027.1 based on Brenden falsely accusing him of child abuse. He sought recovery of supervised visitation fees, and his attorney fees in this action and his criminal action. He argued the criminal trial had proven Brenden’s accusations of child abuse were false. Because she was the actual perpetrator, he asserted, she should be required to pay for all of the costs and fees he incurred due to her allegation.
Family Code section 3027.1 authorizes a court to award sanctions against a person who during a child custody proceeding falsely accuses a party of child abuse or neglect while knowing the accusation was false at the time it was made.
Jeffery also asked the court to include at trial a new request by him for a restraining order against Brenden.
On October 3, 2006, while Jeffrey’s latest motion was pending, the parties reached agreement on the terms of appointing Dr. Frank as a special master on the issues of custody and support.
A week later, Brenden opposed Jeffrey’s motion in all respects. She objected to the subpoenas, claiming her mental health records were privileged. She also asserted the information in the records was now irrelevant, as the parties had resolved the custody and visitation issues by agreeing to the special master.
She denied Jeffrey’s claims that she committed domestic violence against him or falsely accused him of child abuse and endangerment. She argued her mental health records could not prove any of these claims or that Jeffrey was entitled to receive his attorney fees in the criminal action from her.
Brenden also objected to Jeffrey’s request for a restraining order against her. He had never filed an application for such an order attesting to any facts that would support it. The request was not placed at issue for trial in the court’s trial setting order.
On October 24, 2006, the trial court ruled on Jeffrey’s motion. It denied Jeffrey’s motion for the mental health records. It did this because it claimed there were no longer any custody issues before the court. It deferred Jeffrey’s request for attorney fees. It set for trial the issues of property, support, status, attorney fees and sanctions, and all other open issues.
H. Pretrial and trial
Thereafter, the parties agreed to retain an accounting firm to provide an accounting of the community’s interest in stock options owned by Jeffrey that were acquired before and during the marriage, some of which he had already sold.
The special master issued her determinations on custody and visitation in January 2007. In general, Jeffrey was awarded unsupervised visitation every other weekend and one additional day a week.
The parties reached a partial settlement on property division, and the remaining issues proceeded to trial. By the time of trial, Jeffrey’s request for sanctions under Family Code sections 3027.1 and 271 sought reimbursement of supervised visit fees, the expense of the custody evaluation, and attorney fees and bail costs in the criminal case and this case of $120,000. He claimed he was entitled to those monies because Brenden’s false accusation of him committing child abuse caused him to incur these expenses. He attempted to prove at trial that Brenden’s accusation had been false. He also accused Brenden of filing unnecessary motions, violating custody and visitation orders, and making false allegations.
As discussed below, Family Code section 271 in general authorizes an award of attorney fees as a sanction against a party in a family law matter whose conduct frustrates settlement or prolongs the litigation.
Brenden also requested sanctions pursuant to Family Code section 271 in the amount of $25,000 in attorney fees. She accused Jeffrey of obstructing settlement throughout the case management process, refusing to agree on anything, and pursuing litigation by seeking discovery of the therapist’s records, all because Jeffrey would not give up his claim that she falsely accused him of domestic violence.
Brenden did, however, at this point drop her claims for a domestic violence restraining order. She claimed she did this because of the physical distance between the parties’ homes and the court’s earlier placement of the mutual family law restraining order limiting their contact to civil discussions regarding their child.
Trial occurred on April 5 and 6, 2007, before the Honorable Robert C. Hight. During trial, the court allowed Jeffrey to introduce evidence that Brenden was the aggressor in the laptop incident and had falsely accused him of child abuse. This was admitted for purposes of Jeffrey’s claims for attorney fees under Family Code sections 3027.1 and 271. However, the court refused to allow Jeffrey to introduce some of Brenden’s testimony at his criminal trial to impeach her testimony here, as the criminal trial records had been sealed.
Following trial, the court ruled, among other matters, that Brenden would recover her full community share of stock options Jeffery had owned and partially sold. The court denied Jeffrey’s requests for attorney fees and sanctions under Family Code sections 3027.1 and 271, but it granted Brenden’s request for sanctions under Family Code section 271 in the amount of $15,000.
Jeffery challenges each of these trial rulings in this appeal. We provide additional background information as needed.
DISCUSSION
I
Exclusion of Trial Testimony
The trial court refused to allow Jeffrey to introduce portions of Brenden’s testimony from Jeffrey’s criminal trial for purposes of impeaching her testimony at this trial and establishing that her conduct frustrated settlement. The court ruled it could not do so because all of the records from Jeffrey’s criminal case had been sealed and his arrest records destroyed pursuant to Jeffrey’s request under Penal Code sections 851.8 and 851.85.
Jeffrey claims the court’s reliance on Penal Code section 851.85 in this instance turns the intent of that statute on its head. He argues the sealing of his records was to protect him, not Brenden, and it should not prevent him from accessing those records to impeach Brenden in this matter.
The court did not err.
Penal Code section 851.85 authorizes a trial court judge to seal the records of a case where a person is acquitted of a charge and the judge determines the person was factually innocent. When a court makes this order, it informs the defendant he may “thereafter state that he was not arrested for such charge and that he was found innocent of such charge by the court.” (Pen. Code, § 851.85.)
Similarly, where a defendant has been acquitted and the court determines he was factually innocent, Penal Code section 851.8 authorizes the court to order the arresting law enforcement agency and the Department of Justice to seal their records of defendant’s arrest for three years and thereafter to destroy their records. (Pen. Code, § 851.8, subds. (b), (e).) Once the defendant has been determined to have been factually innocent, “the arrest shall be deemed not to have occurred and the person may answer accordingly any question relating to its occurrence.” (Pen. Code, § 851.8, subd. (f).) Indeed, even the finding that an arrestee is factually innocent “shall not be admissible as evidence in any action.” (Pen. Code, § 851.8, subd. (i).)
The operation of Penal Code sections 851.8 and 851.85 are to make it appear as if the defendant was never arrested and tried for an offense. They “deem” defendant not to have ever been arrested. “[A]ll cases construing the term ‘deemed’ have held without exception that the meaning of ‘deemed’ is that the deemed state of affairs is conclusively presumed to exist.” (Parmett v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1261, 1266.) In other words, there was no trial from which Jeffrey could extract a transcript of testimony, let alone introduce evidence of his own innocence from that trial.
The Legislature provided no exception by which the trial court could unseal the records and presume a state of affairs contrary to the earlier finding except where the defendant files a civil action against the arresting agency, an event that did not occur here. (Pen. Code, § 851.8, subd. (k).) By stating this limited exception, the Legislature has foreclosed us from implying the existence of other exceptions, such as the one Jeffrey seeks here. (Parmett v. Superior Court, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 1266.)
Unsealing the record for any purpose would negate the effect of the sealing, resulting in the public record demonstrating that Jeffrey was in fact arrested, tried and acquitted -- a different finding from being factually innocent or never having been arrested or tried. One could argue, as Jeffrey does, that the sealing only benefits him, and if he wants to forgo the benefits of the sealing, he should be allowed to do so. However, the Legislature did not authorize defendants or courts to remove a sealing for purposes of using the testimony from the sealed proceeding to impeach a witness in another proceeding. If there is to be such an exception, it must come from the Legislature. The trial court did not err in refusing to admit Brenden’s sealed testimony.
II
Treatment of Stock Options
Jeffrey claims the trial court failed to divide certain stock options equally due to its treating the proceeds from his sale of some of those options belonging to the community as income to him for purposes of calculating child support but not treating the eventual sale of the community portion of stock options belonging to Brenden as income to her. Jeffrey misunderstands the action taken by the trial court.
A. Additional background information
Jeffrey owned employment related stock options, some of which had a community interest. The trial court found that after Jeffrey and Brenden had separated, Jeffrey exercised and disposed of some of the stock options, including some that were community property. He did not distribute any of the proceeds from the sale of the community property stock options to Brenden. However, the remaining stock options he had not sold were sufficient to compensate Brenden for her interest in all of the options that were community property.
At trial, the parties stipulated that all of the stock options exercised by Jeffrey would be treated as his separate property. The parties also agreed that Brenden’s community interest could be fully divided from the remaining stock options.
The trial court adopted these stipulations as part of its order. It stated: “Because Husband exercised and disposed of some of the stock options after the parties separated, including the community portion of those stock option grants and Wife’s share, the parties agreed that once the entire community interest in the sold and unsold options is determined, Wife shall receive her 50% share of community options or the equivalent from the unsold stock options remaining.”
The trial court also ruled the proceeds from Jeffrey’s sale of stock options, including those that were community property, would be included as part of Jeffrey’s gross income for purposes of determining child support. However, the court ruled that neither Jeffrey’s nor Brenden’s community interest in the remaining stock options would be considered as part of either party’s gross income.
Jeffrey claims the trial court abused its discretion with these rulings, resulting in an unequal distribution of community property. He asserts this occurred because the court treated the proceeds from his sale of stock options that were originally community property as income to him, but it did not treat as income to Brenden the proceeds she would eventually obtain from selling any of her community portion of the stock options.
B. Analysis
Family Code section 2550 requires a court to divide the community estate of the parties equally “[e]xcept on written agreement of the parties, or on oral stipulation of the parties in open court[.]” Here, the trial court divided the property according to the parties’ stipulations.
The parties stipulated in open court that the proceeds from Jeffrey’s sale of stock options, including those that were part of the community estate, would all be treated as his separate property. They also stipulated that Brenden would receive her complete community interest in the stock options from the options that had yet to be sold. Thus, the trial court divided the property in compliance with the parties’ stipulations as required by Family Code section 2550.
Moreover, when Jeffrey sold what pursuant to the stipulation became his separate property, he realized income that was available for purposes of calculating child support. Any proceeds from the sale of stock options granted as part of a parent’s compensation are income available for support. (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 286, 288; cf. In re Marriage of Walker (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 644, 651.) To the extent this created an unequal treatment of community property, it did so pursuant to the parties’ stipulations. The trial court correctly applied the proceeds from Jeffrey’s sale as income.
III
Sanctions
The trial court imposed attorney fee sanctions in the amount of $15,000 against Jeffrey under Family Code section 271, but it did not impose sanctions against Brenden under that same statute or any other statute or theory. The court found that Jeffrey’s conduct, “which included the filing of too many motions throughout these proceedings, was uncooperative and frustrated settlement within the meaning of Family Code Section 271.”
The court denied sanctions against Brenden because her conduct, in light of Jeffrey’s more egregious conduct, did not justify an award of sanctions. It also found that no legal theory supported Jeffrey’s various reimbursement requests and damage claims.
Jeffrey claims the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions against him under Family Code section 271 but not against Brenden. He asserts there was insufficient evidence of obstreperous conduct by him to justify sanctions. He disputes that he filed “too many” motions. He claims it was Brenden’s actions that frustrated settlement of this matter by maintaining a temporary restraining order against him, refusing to allow visitation, and demanding supervised visitation, all based on an unproven claim of domestic violence.
Family Code section 271 authorizes a court to impose attorney fees and costs as a sanction “on the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.” (Fam. Code, § 271, subd. (a).)
“An award of fees under [Family Code] section 271 is authorized where an opposing party’s conduct frustrates the policy of the law in favor of settlement, and increases the cost of litigation.” (In re Marriage of Abrams (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 979, 990-991, disapproved on another ground in In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072, 1097.) The statute “allows the court to impose an order to pay attorney’s fees as a sanction on a party who engages in conduct to prolong litigation.” (Banning v. Newdow (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 438, 450.)
We review the trial court’s order under Family Code section 271 under the abuse of discretion standard. (In re Marriage of Burgard (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 74, 82.) We will overturn the order only if, considering all the evidence viewed most favorably in support of the order, no judge could have reasonably made the order. (Ibid.)
Upon reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions against Jeffrey. There was evidence that each party at one point or another frustrated settlement of various issues. There was insufficient evidence, however, that Jeffrey’s conduct was so much more egregious as to justify sanctions.
The court’s claim that Jeffrey filed too many motions is not supported by the record. Both parties brought numerous motions. Except for his first motion to reconsider the March 8, 2005, order, Jeffrey obtained some form of affirmative relief in each of the motions he filed.
Jeffrey’s pursuit of the subpoenas and proving Brenden falsely accused him of child abuse “was not so devoid of merit that no reasonable person would have pursued it.” (In re Marriage of Abrams, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 991.) Although he may not have recovered his attorney fees from the criminal action, his serving the subpoenas and seeking to prove Brenden was guilty of abuse went directly to his ability to defend against her long-standing domestic violence action and her claims for custody. Brenden did not drop her domestic violence action until the eve of trial, making the subpoenas relevant up to that time.
His actions at trial attempting to prove Brenden falsely claimed he was guilty of child abuse went directly to his claim for sanctions. Jeffrey was attempting to show that Brenden’s allegedly false accusation arose out of a child custody proceeding, thus potentially triggering sanctions under Family Code section 3027.1, or that the accusation itself was obstreperous and prolonged litigation, potentially triggering sanctions under Family Code section 271. While ultimately the trial court concluded there was not sufficient evidence to prove each of those claims, there was sufficient merit to them such that a reasonable person would have pursued them.
Jeffrey did not engage in this conduct solely to prolong the litigation. He was pursuing claims brought in good faith to their ultimate conclusion. Under these circumstances, it is apparent the award of sanctions under Family Code section 271 against Jeffrey was not reasonably made and thus constituted an abuse of discretion. Jeffrey’s conduct did not amount to the type of obstreperous conduct that justifies an award of sanctions under section 271.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed as to the award of sanctions against Jeffrey under Family Code section 271. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)
We concur: ROBIE, J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.