Our review of the record convinces us that the district court was correct in concluding Lewis had received actual notice of the bankruptcy court's restraining order and, as indicated, that instead of disregarding that order, Lewis was obligated to contact the bankruptcy court to ascertain whether the order had in fact been entered and to obey it. See In re MacDonald, 6 B.R. 23 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 1980) (having been informed by debtor's counsel that filing of bankruptcy was imminent, creditor should have contracted bankruptcy court immediately before repossession of automobile to determine whether bankruptcy petition had indeed been filed). In these circumstances, we decline to disturb the district court's conclusion on this issue.
If appellant had any doubts regarding the representations of plaintiff's counsel, it was incumbent upon appellant to contact the bankruptcy court, rather than to do nothing, knowing that his client was about to evict plaintiff. See Inre MacDonald, 6 B.R. 23 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 1980). For the reasons stated above, it is hereby
The Court declines to follow cases that may be interpreted as suggesting that in all instances pre-filing contact is sufficient to establish a willful stay violation. In re Brooks, 12 B.R. 283 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1981); In re MacDonald, 6 B.R. 23 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1980). The Court notes that these decisions were rendered prior to the 1984 enactment of section 362(h).
Although Flanders Hill was not listed as a creditor by the Constantinos, Flanders Hill can be charged with notice if they were in possession of sufficient facts such as would cause a reasonably prudent person to make further inquiry. In re Taco Ed's, Inc., 63 B.R. 913, 931 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1986); In re Bragg, 56 B.R. 46, 49 (Bankr.M.D.Ala. 1985); Matter of DePoy, 29 B.R. 471, 476 (Bankr.N.D.Ind. 1983); Matter of Thacker, 24 B.R. 835, 838 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1982); In re Brooks, 12 B.R. 283, 284 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1981); In re Asters, 11 B.R. 483, 484 (Bankr.D.R.I. 1981); In re MacDonald, 6 B.R. 23 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1980); In re Edwards, 5 B.R. 663, 665 (Bankr.M.D.Ala. 1980). In other words, it is the opinion of this Court that "willful blindness" is the equivalent of notice.
He also was put on notice and had a duty to inquire further regarding the scope of the stay. In re Reed, supra at 275; In re Edwards, 5 B.R. 663, 665 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Ala. 1980); In re MacDonald, 6 B.R. 23 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 1980); The Babee-Tenda Corp. v. Scharco Manufacturing Co., 156 F. Supp. 582, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); In re Asters, 11 B.R. 483, 484 (Bkrtcy.D.R.I. 1981); In re Brooks, 12 B.R. 283, 284 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1981). The record shows that Mr. Kipp frequently practiced bankruptcy law under the former Bankruptcy Act. Thus there is no doubt he would have been aware of the nature of the automatic stay. He clearly would have sufficient knowledge and training that he should inquire further and read the law before taking any further acts against the debtors, property of the estate, or property held by the estate.
In re Reed, 11 B.R. 258 (Bkrtcy.D. Utah 1981). A reasonably prudent man would have at least inquired with the bankruptcy court before repossessing the debtors' vehicles. See In re MacDonald, 6 B.R. 23 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 1980). We find that Stiely was in contempt of the automatic stay because he acted after being informed of the bankruptcy proceeding and its legal effect.
The Court finds that defendant had sufficient knowledge that a bankruptcy was imminent to put it on notice with a duty to inquire. See Matter of MacDonald, 6 B.R. 23 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio, W.D. 1980). The repossession was a violation of the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. ยง 362.
In short, where there are special facts such as these, showing not only a knowledge of the bankruptcy but also its implications in terms of protection for the debtor, a creditor will be in contempt of the stay if he abridges the protection to which he reasonably should know the debtor is entitled, even if he has no positive knowledge of the stay.See In re Edwards, 5 B.R. 663, 665 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Ala. 1980) ("It is not necessary that a creditor have formal notice of the commencement or the pendency of a bankruptcy proceeding where it has sufficient facts which would cause a reasonably prudent person to make further inquiry"); In re MacDonald, 6 B.R. 23 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio 1980) (accord). The Court is not required to decide whether a violation of the stay in connection with knowledge of the bankruptcy alone may constitute contempt.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Plaintiff relies primarily on the decision In re Abt, 1 C.B.C.2d 374, 2 B.R. 323, 5 B.C.D. 1237 (Bkrtcy., E.D.Pa. 1980); and the Defendant relies primarily on In re MacDonald, 2 C.B.C.2d 511, 6 B.R. 23 (Bkrtcy., N.D.Ohio 1980) and In re Womack, 2 C.B.C.2d 575, 4 B.R. 632, 6 B.C.D. 543 (Bkrtcy., E.D.Tennessee, 1980). In analyzing these and similar cases on the subject of contempt of court, it is the opinion of this court that the initial conclusion must be to draw a distinction between illegal actions or conduct between litigants and such conduct which constitutes contempt of court.