As part of his contention that the juvenile court abused its discretion, Appellant may challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court's implied findings of fact. In the Matter of M.A.C., 999 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, no pet.). In our review, we engage in a two-pronged inquiry: (1) Did the trial court have sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion, and (2) did the trial court err in its application of discretion?

We do not disturb the juvenile court's disposition order in the absence of abuse of discretion. In re M.A.C., 999 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, no pet.). Juvenile courts are vested with broad discretion in determination of suitable disposition of children involved in delinquent conduct.

In conducting this review, we engage in a two-pronged analysis: (1) Did the trial court have sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion; and (2) Did the trial court err in its application of discretion? In the Matter ofM.A.C., 999 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, no pet.); see also Leibman v. Grand, 981 S.W.2d 426, 429 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d 589, 591 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.). The traditional sufficiency of the evidence review, articulated below, comes into play when considering the first question.

In conducting this review, we engage in a two-pronged analysis: (1) Did the court have sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion, and (2) Did the court err in its application of discretion? See In re M.A.C., 999 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, no pet.). We apply the criminal standard of review to a claim that the evidence was factually insufficient to support an adjudication of delinquency, because in a juvenile adjudication proceeding, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile engaged in delinquent conduct, the same burden as in a criminal case at guilt-innocence.

In conducting the review, we engage in a two-pronged analysis, (1) did the trial court have sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion, and (2) did the trial court err in its application of discretion? See In re A.D., 287 S.W.3d 356, 366 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2009, pet. filed.); In re M.A.C., 999 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1999, no pet.). B. Applicable Law

In re J.R.C.S., 393 S.W.3d 903, 914 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2012, no writ). See also In re M.A.C., 999 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1999, no writ). Similarly, we hold that, in evaluating a juvenile court's decision to waive its jurisdiction, an appellate court should first review the juvenile court's specific findings of fact regarding the Section 54.02(f) factors under “traditional sufficiency of the evidence review.”

[12] The juvenile court’s best interest finding is supported by the evidence of J.H.’s repeated violent conduct, drug use, prior gang associations, and his history of problems in school and getting into fights. See In re No. 01-19-00988-CV, 2021 WL 2931437, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 13, 2021, no pet.) (best interest finding support by evidence of the child’s escalating violent conduct, criminal conduct, problems at school, drug use, and history of disobeying and assaulting mother); In re M.A.F., No. 14-03-00698-CV, 2004 WL 1661009, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 27, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (best interest finding supported by evidence of delinquent conduct offenses, theft, curfew violations, probation violations, criminal trespass, history of aggressive behavior, suspected drug use, prior affiliation with a gang, and history of behavior problems); In re M.A.C., 999 S.W.2d 442, 444, 447–48 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.) (best interest finding supported by evidence that the child agreed to transport nearly 100 pounds of marijuana across the border and there was conflicting evidence about the level of control the parents could exert over the child). Appellant points to no evidence that his diabetes condition would be better managed at home than in the TJJD.

(finding no abuse of discretion in TJJD commitment order where record showed need for juvenile's rehabilitation and need to protect the community based, in part, on probation officer's testimony that there was no less-restrictive alternative to TJJD that could address juvenile's needs); In re M.M. , No. 09-98-234CV, 1999 WL 111279, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont, Mar. 4, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (evidence supporting best-interest finding was legally and factually sufficient where state therapist testified in court she did not believe any long-term residential facility existed that could address juvenile's need for structured environment and medical treatment other than TYC [TJJD's predecessor] and where juvenile had become involved in drugs and gangs under mother's care); cf.In re M.A.C. , 999 S.W.2d 442, 448 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.) (finding evidence supporting TYC commitment order factually sufficient where probation officer asserted in court he spoke with alternative placement's director but determined juvenile was not a candidate for said program).

supported juvenile court's disposition order placing child outside parent's home when child's counselor testified that if placed with parent child might harm herself or her parent and might run away; child and parent resisted participation in court-ordered counseling; and child testified that parent lacked interest in her schoolwork and was inattentive to her medical needs and that she would run away if required to continuing living with him); In re J.K.N., 115 S.W.3d 166, 171-73 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding sufficient evidence supported juvenile court's disposition order committing child to TYC when social history report showed child had committed numerous previous offenses and been offered varied forms of treatment and probation and probation officer testified that TYC offered structured environment conducive to rehabilitation and treatment for child's psychiatric needs); In re M.A.C., 999 S.W.2d 442, 447-48 (Tex. App.- El Paso 1999, no pet.) (holding sufficient evidence supported juvenile court's disposition order committing child to TYC when, inter alia, child refused to attend school, did not obey curfew set by mother, and failed to complete community service ordered for prior offense). In raising his sufficiency challenge, J.P. emphasizes that the probation officer and psychologist presented favorable testimony regarding an alternative placement option for J.P., the ISC. Still, the probation officer testified, and the probation report emphasized, that commitment to TJJD was "strongly recommended" over placement in ISC.

In our review of whether the trial court abused its discretion, we must first determine whether the trial court had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion and, if so, whether the court made a reasonable decision or an arbitrary decision. In re L.L., Jr., 408 S.W.3d 383, 385 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) (citing In re M.A.C., 999 S.W.2d 442, 446 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.)). Appellant contends that there was no evidence that public protection would be increased by registration because the evidence showed that Appellant was at only a moderate risk to sexually reoffend and that he expressed remorse and empathy for his past conduct.