The change must be "unanticipated" to permit support modification. Patterson and Patterson , 293 Or. App. 8, 12, 427 P.3d 228 (2018) (requiring "a substantial, unanticipated change in economic circumstances"); Luty and Luty , 245 Or. App. 393, 399-400, 263 P.3d 1067 (2011) (similar); Nieth and Nieth , 199 Or. App. 330, 334, 111 P.3d 746, adh'd to as clarified on recons. , 200 Or. App. 582, 116 P.3d 234 (2005) (similar).

To the contrary, ORS 107.104(4) provides that nothing in subsections (2) or (3) of that statute (regarding procedures for enforcement of stipulated judgments and other settlements) “limits a party's ability, in a separate proceeding, to file a motion to set aside, alter or modify a judgment under ORS 107.135 * * *.” See Beebe and Beebe, 244 Or.App. 44, 48, 260 P.3d 601 (2011) (“[E]ven where parties have stipulated to an initial spousal support award, nothing limits their ability to file a motion to modify the award under ORS 107.135.”). Moreover, we repeatedly have held that modification of support provisions in stipulated judgments is appropriate if the ORS 107.135 requirements are satisfied. See, e.g., Luty and Luty, 245 Or.App. 393, 400–01, 263 P.3d 1067 (2011) ( “termination of husband's spousal support obligation,” which was included in a stipulated dissolution judgment, was “just and equitable under the totality of the circumstances”). We find no authority supporting wife's argument that the trial court could not modify the spousal support provisions of the stipulated dissolution judgment unless those provisions violated the law or clearly contravened public policy.

Under ORS 107.135(3)(a), a court "may set aside or modify a spousal support award if there has been a substantial change in economic circumstances sufficient to justify the court's reconsideration of the award." Luty and Luty , 245 Or. App. 393, 399, 263 P.3d 1067 (2011). The "substantial change in economic circumstances," however, "must have been unanticipated when the court entered the last relevant judgment in the dissolution proceeding."

Under ORS 107.135(3)(a), a court "may set aside or modify a spousal support award if there has been a substantial change in economic circumstances sufficient to justify the court’s reconsideration of the award." Luty and Luty , 245 Or. App. 393, 399, 263 P.3d 1067 (2011). The "substantial change in economic circumstances," however, "must have been unanticipated when the court entered the last relevant judgment in the dissolution proceeding."

Further, we review for abuse of discretion the trial court's ultimate conclusion as to whether, and to what extent, modification of an existing award is "just and equitable under the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 432 (citing Luty and Luty, 245 Or App 393, 401, 263 P3d 1067 (2011)). The trial court's finding that the parties' respective retirements constituted a "substantial change" in economic circumstances is not contested on appeal and is supported by our case law.

That standard of review follows from the fact that the trial court's task upon reconsideration of spousal support is to determine what level of spousal support, if any, is “just and equitable under the totality of the circumstances.” Luty and Luty, 245 Or.App. 393, 401, 263 P.3d 1067 (2011) (footnote omitted). And we review “the trial court's ultimate determination about a ‘just and equitable’ amount of support for abuse of discretion.”

200 Or.App. at 585, 116 P.3d 234. No such unexpected events occurred here, and we cannot yet tell whether the increase in father's income will continue over a significant period of time, as occurred in Nieth. See also Luty and Luty, 245 Or.App. 393, 400, 263 P.3d 1067 (2011) (unanticipated decrease of over 90 percent in the father's income, which resulted from his cocaine addiction, justified a modification of his child-support obligation); Pierce, 206 Or.App. at 707, 138 P.3d 889 (characterizing as “slight” an increase from $23,103 to $26,230 in actual annual income and holding, by comparison, that a “more than 70 percent” difference between anticipated income and actual income did establish a substantial change in circumstances). In short, the four-percent increase in father's income is neither substantial nor unexpected, given the specific circumstances involved in this case.

No such unexpected events occurred here, and we cannot yet tell whether the increase in father's income will continue over a significant period of time, as occurred in Nieth. See alsoLuty and Luty,245 Or App 393, 400, 263 P3d 1067 (2011) (unanticipated decrease of over 90 percent in the father's income, which resulted from his cocaine addiction, justified a modification of his child-support obligation); Pierce, 206 Or App at 707 (characterizing as "slight" an increase from $23,103 to $26,230 in actual annual income and holding, by comparison, that a "more than 70 percent" difference between anticipated income and actual income did establish a substantial change in circumstances). In short, the four-percent increase in father's income is neither substantial nor unexpected, given the specific circumstances involved in this case.